Editor’s Note: From his base in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and contributes frequently to Stimson on these topics. He is particularly expert on the issue of regional ties with Russia and China as countries hedge against changes in U.S. foreign policy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Once focused on fighting for control over Yemen, the Ansar Allah or Houthi movement has become among the most active members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” Since the Hamas attack on Israel last Oct. 7, the Houthis are increasingly working in concert with other militant groups.
In June, Ansar Allah’s leader announced that the Houthis would cooperate with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) – a group of several Shi’ite Muslim militant factions – to initiate attacks on Israel. Both the IRI and the Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack in June on the Israeli port of Haifa and also took credit for an attack on Ashdod. In early July, the Houthis opened a new office in Baghdad. (So did Hamas.)
The growing military cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi factions followed a May statement by the Houthis’ Iraqi branch and Kata’ib Hezbollah, a major Iraqi militia. The statement argued for greater cooperation within the Axis of Resistance, a sprawling network of Iran-backed militias spread across the Middle East.
Before the war in Gaza, the Houthis, though technically part of the Axis, maintained significant autonomy. The rebel group had been receiving arms from Iran, but the alliance seemed more one of convenience than conviction as Iran leveraged the Houthis to exert pressure on its main Arab rival, Saudi Arabia.
The level of cooperation between the Houthis and other members of the Axis was likewise of relatively limited scope. The geographic distance between Yemen and the core of the Middle East where most Axis members are situated played a major constraining role. Indeed, the Axis has had more of an east-west trajectory stretching from Iran toward Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.
The level of influence Iran could exert on the Houthis had always seemed limited. In one notable example, China reportedly asked Iran to pressure the Yemeni group to limit attacks on commercial ships but Sana’a did not comply.
Since the Hamas attack on Israel last Oct. 7 and the Israeli response in waging war on Gaza, the Houthis appear to want to be more of a team player. Increasingly, they strive to portray themselves as a key member of the Axis and are pushing for ever closer ties with the other members.
The Houthis and Iraqi armed groups have links of relatively long-standing, dating at least back to 2015 when the Yemeni group reportedly sent a representative to expand bilateral political and security ties with Iraqi factions. But the nature of the relationship has deepened. Recently, the Houthis sent a new representative to Baghdad, Abu Idris al-Sharafi. One of his key tasks is soliciting financial support for the Houthis’ cause from Iraqi Shi’ite tribes and factions. Iraq is also convenient as a venue for the Houthi leadership to have access to Iranian military advisors as well as to enable the Houthis to recruit non-Yemeni fighters to join their cause.
The Yemeni group worked with Iraqi factions in 2019 when Saudi Arabia’s Aramco operations were targeted. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the drone attack but it most likely originated from southern Iraq or Iran.
Cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi factions will likely only intensify because of the ongoing war in Gaza, recent Houthi attacks on Israel and Israeli retaliation against Yemen’s Hodeidah port.
Iran, too, seems more supportive of an aggressive Houthi stance since the Israeli assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and the continued failure of efforts to negotiate a Gaza ceasefire. Tehran is banking on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, greater tensions on the Lebanese border between Hezbollah and Israel, as well as militia attacks, though limited in scope, on U.S. military bases in Iraq to keep the pressure on Israel and possibly retaliate for the Haniyeh killing. Growing cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi groups is likely to be spearheaded by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which liaises with both.
By tying the Houthis increasingly to Iraqi factions, Iran seeks greater flexibility for the Axis as well as a bigger role for the Yemeni group within the resistance network. The group is seen as playing a critical role in Iran’s ability to regain momentum and re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. Despite the 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Tehran also needs the Houthis as a check against a possible formal Saudi-U.S. defense alliance. For the Houthis, meanwhile, a bigger profile within the Axis provides leverage against Riyadh following the suspension of peace talks with the Saudis by the Yemeni government. Preventing Saudi-Israeli normalization is also a key Houthi and Iranian goal.
For the Houthis, an expanded partnership with Iraqi factions is seen as boosting their image domestically. The group lately has been facing popular discontent due to economic failures such as salaries not being paid, mounting inflation, and the transfer of the Yemeni central bank from Sana’a to Aden, still controlled by a rival Yemeni government. By forging closer ties with Iraqi factions, the Houthis may hope to influence the Saudis and central Yemeni government to change policies. Closer engagement with Iraq also completes growing Houthi influence in Oman and Lebanon and surrounds Saudi Arabia, the Houthis’ chief enemy, with potential flashpoints. Recently, Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah accused Riyadh of perpetuating the war in Gaza and warned that it would pay a price for this. The prospects of potential encirclement by the Axis are dawning on Saudi Arabia just as they have already become apparent to Israel.
A more intense north-south Yemeni-Iraqi momentum poses a new security challenge to the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia. It also elevates the Houthis’ position and places them roughly on the same level with other Axis members. That could limit Iran’s ability to influence the Houthis toward regional de-escalation.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
Editor’s Note: From his base in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and contributes frequently to Stimson on these topics. He is particularly expert on the issue of regional ties with Russia and China as countries hedge against changes in U.S. foreign policy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Once focused on fighting for control over Yemen, the Ansar Allah or Houthi movement has become among the most active members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” Since the Hamas attack on Israel last Oct. 7, the Houthis are increasingly working in concert with other militant groups.
In June, Ansar Allah’s leader announced that the Houthis would cooperate with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) – a group of several Shi’ite Muslim militant factions – to initiate attacks on Israel. Both the IRI and the Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack in June on the Israeli port of Haifa and also took credit for an attack on Ashdod. In early July, the Houthis opened a new office in Baghdad. (So did Hamas.)
The growing military cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi factions followed a May statement by the Houthis’ Iraqi branch and Kata’ib Hezbollah, a major Iraqi militia. The statement argued for greater cooperation within the Axis of Resistance, a sprawling network of Iran-backed militias spread across the Middle East.
Before the war in Gaza, the Houthis, though technically part of the Axis, maintained significant autonomy. The rebel group had been receiving arms from Iran, but the alliance seemed more one of convenience than conviction as Iran leveraged the Houthis to exert pressure on its main Arab rival, Saudi Arabia.
The level of cooperation between the Houthis and other members of the Axis was likewise of relatively limited scope. The geographic distance between Yemen and the core of the Middle East where most Axis members are situated played a major constraining role. Indeed, the Axis has had more of an east-west trajectory stretching from Iran toward Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.
The level of influence Iran could exert on the Houthis had always seemed limited. In one notable example, China reportedly asked Iran to pressure the Yemeni group to limit attacks on commercial ships but Sana’a did not comply.
Since the Hamas attack on Israel last Oct. 7 and the Israeli response in waging war on Gaza, the Houthis appear to want to be more of a team player. Increasingly, they strive to portray themselves as a key member of the Axis and are pushing for ever closer ties with the other members.
The Houthis and Iraqi armed groups have links of relatively long-standing, dating at least back to 2015 when the Yemeni group reportedly sent a representative to expand bilateral political and security ties with Iraqi factions. But the nature of the relationship has deepened. Recently, the Houthis sent a new representative to Baghdad, Abu Idris al-Sharafi. One of his key tasks is soliciting financial support for the Houthis’ cause from Iraqi Shi’ite tribes and factions. Iraq is also convenient as a venue for the Houthi leadership to have access to Iranian military advisors as well as to enable the Houthis to recruit non-Yemeni fighters to join their cause.
The Yemeni group worked with Iraqi factions in 2019 when Saudi Arabia’s Aramco operations were targeted. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the drone attack but it most likely originated from southern Iraq or Iran.
Cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi factions will likely only intensify because of the ongoing war in Gaza, recent Houthi attacks on Israel and Israeli retaliation against Yemen’s Hodeidah port.
Iran, too, seems more supportive of an aggressive Houthi stance since the Israeli assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and the continued failure of efforts to negotiate a Gaza ceasefire. Tehran is banking on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, greater tensions on the Lebanese border between Hezbollah and Israel, as well as militia attacks, though limited in scope, on U.S. military bases in Iraq to keep the pressure on Israel and possibly retaliate for the Haniyeh killing. Growing cooperation between the Houthis and Iraqi groups is likely to be spearheaded by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which liaises with both.
By tying the Houthis increasingly to Iraqi factions, Iran seeks greater flexibility for the Axis as well as a bigger role for the Yemeni group within the resistance network. The group is seen as playing a critical role in Iran’s ability to regain momentum and re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. Despite the 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Tehran also needs the Houthis as a check against a possible formal Saudi-U.S. defense alliance. For the Houthis, meanwhile, a bigger profile within the Axis provides leverage against Riyadh following the suspension of peace talks with the Saudis by the Yemeni government. Preventing Saudi-Israeli normalization is also a key Houthi and Iranian goal.
For the Houthis, an expanded partnership with Iraqi factions is seen as boosting their image domestically. The group lately has been facing popular discontent due to economic failures such as salaries not being paid, mounting inflation, and the transfer of the Yemeni central bank from Sana’a to Aden, still controlled by a rival Yemeni government. By forging closer ties with Iraqi factions, the Houthis may hope to influence the Saudis and central Yemeni government to change policies. Closer engagement with Iraq also completes growing Houthi influence in Oman and Lebanon and surrounds Saudi Arabia, the Houthis’ chief enemy, with potential flashpoints. Recently, Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah accused Riyadh of perpetuating the war in Gaza and warned that it would pay a price for this. The prospects of potential encirclement by the Axis are dawning on Saudi Arabia just as they have already become apparent to Israel.
A more intense north-south Yemeni-Iraqi momentum poses a new security challenge to the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia. It also elevates the Houthis’ position and places them roughly on the same level with other Axis members. That could limit Iran’s ability to influence the Houthis toward regional de-escalation.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
