The Middle East teeters on the precipice of a substantial escalation of the conflict that has gripped the region since last October, threatening to more fully draw in Lebanon, Iran, and perhaps other countries. What happens in the coming days, along with the decisions made by adversaries and allies alike, will determine if that happens.
A significant expansion of the current regional conflict would be devastating to Israel, Iran, and their neighbors. At the same time, it would complicate or outright derail the United States’ stated strategic priorities, articulated in each of the last several US National Security Strategies, to focus on competition with China and Russia — both significant pacing challenges even without the US being involved in another war in the Middle East.
To calm the situation, the US clearly would like to see a cease-fire reached in Gaza, as evidenced by the level of effort committed to achieving an agreement between Israel and Hamas. This aligns with both the Biden administration’s wider regional policy and the politics of a presidential election season. It is also clear, however, that US influence over Israel’s decision-making has reduced substantially in recent years and especially visibly over the past 10 months.
The United States’ loss of leverage partially stems from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political and legal predicaments, which fuel his obstinate reluctance to end the war; but the other side of the coin is the US’s unwillingness to threaten Israel with any significant consequences for failing to agree to a cease-fire. Any hesitation by a US administration — this or any other, from either party — to keep providing full support to the Israelis would immediately be used politically against it.
That said, the US needs to recognize that it is not simply a mediator in the Gaza conflict. Thirty-two Americans were killed during Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attack in Israel, and eight Americans are still held hostage in the Gaza Strip. The US government has an obligation to do everything in its power to rescue and recover American citizens held by a terrorist organization anywhere in the world.
Negotiated concessions will be needed to make this work. There will be no absolute victory over Hamas — as Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari rightfully pointed out last June, the group is also an “idea” that is “rooted in the hearts of the people” and thus impossible to eliminate militarily. But additionally, there is no way Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ chief official in Gaza and new political leader, will be allowed to live, let alone retain any kind of leadership role in a future Gaza — nor will Israel likely agree to such a role for Hamas.
Both warring sides must, therefore, find the elements that they can accept, stop the fighting, get the hostages released, and then build from there. The US — namely, the White House in consultations with Congress — needs to determine what leverage it has to push toward this outcome and use it.
US security assistance to Israel is substantial, and it should be. The US and Israel are and will remain key long-term strategic partners no matter who is president or prime minister. Investing in long-term military cooperation is a substantial part of this relationship.
The effort put into this and the logic of earlier having shifted Israel to US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area of responsibility seemingly paid off on April 13, when CENTCOM assets were employed to help thwart mass missile and drone attacks launched from Iran. These policies may be tested again if Iran and its proxies attack Israel with an even larger number of salvos, as they promised after the assassination of Hamas’ then political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, on July 31.
Over the past several weeks, as diplomats have raced to try to clinch a cease-fire and hostage release deal before Iran follows through on its threat to retaliate against Israel, the United States’ military has deployed a substantial amount of assets to the region, perhaps more than at any time in the last nine months. The dual goal of this buildup is to deter a broader confrontation from happening as well as to be able to defend Israel from a major strike by Iran and its multiple proxies. But a robust US military posture in a time of crisis is not enough.
The United States needs more consistency in its foreign policy between administrations, even if of another party, and irrespective of election cycles. Of course, this is easier said than done and will require much greater cooperation between the White House and the respective foreign relations committees in the House and Senate. If not, the US will never have a coherent, consistent strategy that anyone in the Middle East, or any other region, can rely on.
If successfully crafted, however, this unified US policy would then need to be implemented by the respective agencies, led, of course, by the Department of State. In the context of the current crisis, the policy would include planning for the day after the cessation of hostilities, how to build on the Abraham Accords, and how to achieve a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal in parallel with a closer alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
This will all be necessary to avoid the continuous cycle of conflict we have seen in the Middle East, a region that could soon also witness a nuclear arms race if Iran is allowed to cross the nuclear threshold.
Mick Mulroy is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, a retired CIA officer and US Marine, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.
Photo by Christoph Reichwein/picture alliance via Getty Images
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.
The Middle East teeters on the precipice of a substantial escalation of the conflict that has gripped the region since last October, threatening to more fully draw in Lebanon, Iran, and perhaps other countries. What happens in the coming days, along with the decisions made by adversaries and allies alike, will determine if that happens.
A significant expansion of the current regional conflict would be devastating to Israel, Iran, and their neighbors. At the same time, it would complicate or outright derail the United States’ stated strategic priorities, articulated in each of the last several US National Security Strategies, to focus on competition with China and Russia — both significant pacing challenges even without the US being involved in another war in the Middle East.
To calm the situation, the US clearly would like to see a cease-fire reached in Gaza, as evidenced by the level of effort committed to achieving an agreement between Israel and Hamas. This aligns with both the Biden administration’s wider regional policy and the politics of a presidential election season. It is also clear, however, that US influence over Israel’s decision-making has reduced substantially in recent years and especially visibly over the past 10 months.
The United States’ loss of leverage partially stems from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political and legal predicaments, which fuel his obstinate reluctance to end the war; but the other side of the coin is the US’s unwillingness to threaten Israel with any significant consequences for failing to agree to a cease-fire. Any hesitation by a US administration — this or any other, from either party — to keep providing full support to the Israelis would immediately be used politically against it.
That said, the US needs to recognize that it is not simply a mediator in the Gaza conflict. Thirty-two Americans were killed during Hamas’ Oct. 7 terrorist attack in Israel, and eight Americans are still held hostage in the Gaza Strip. The US government has an obligation to do everything in its power to rescue and recover American citizens held by a terrorist organization anywhere in the world.
Negotiated concessions will be needed to make this work. There will be no absolute victory over Hamas — as Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari rightfully pointed out last June, the group is also an “idea” that is “rooted in the hearts of the people” and thus impossible to eliminate militarily. But additionally, there is no way Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ chief official in Gaza and new political leader, will be allowed to live, let alone retain any kind of leadership role in a future Gaza — nor will Israel likely agree to such a role for Hamas.
Both warring sides must, therefore, find the elements that they can accept, stop the fighting, get the hostages released, and then build from there. The US — namely, the White House in consultations with Congress — needs to determine what leverage it has to push toward this outcome and use it.
US security assistance to Israel is substantial, and it should be. The US and Israel are and will remain key long-term strategic partners no matter who is president or prime minister. Investing in long-term military cooperation is a substantial part of this relationship.
The effort put into this and the logic of earlier having shifted Israel to US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area of responsibility seemingly paid off on April 13, when CENTCOM assets were employed to help thwart mass missile and drone attacks launched from Iran. These policies may be tested again if Iran and its proxies attack Israel with an even larger number of salvos, as they promised after the assassination of Hamas’ then political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, on July 31.
Over the past several weeks, as diplomats have raced to try to clinch a cease-fire and hostage release deal before Iran follows through on its threat to retaliate against Israel, the United States’ military has deployed a substantial amount of assets to the region, perhaps more than at any time in the last nine months. The dual goal of this buildup is to deter a broader confrontation from happening as well as to be able to defend Israel from a major strike by Iran and its multiple proxies. But a robust US military posture in a time of crisis is not enough.
The United States needs more consistency in its foreign policy between administrations, even if of another party, and irrespective of election cycles. Of course, this is easier said than done and will require much greater cooperation between the White House and the respective foreign relations committees in the House and Senate. If not, the US will never have a coherent, consistent strategy that anyone in the Middle East, or any other region, can rely on.
If successfully crafted, however, this unified US policy would then need to be implemented by the respective agencies, led, of course, by the Department of State. In the context of the current crisis, the policy would include planning for the day after the cessation of hostilities, how to build on the Abraham Accords, and how to achieve a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal in parallel with a closer alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
This will all be necessary to avoid the continuous cycle of conflict we have seen in the Middle East, a region that could soon also witness a nuclear arms race if Iran is allowed to cross the nuclear threshold.
Mick Mulroy is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, a retired CIA officer and US Marine, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.
Photo by Christoph Reichwein/picture alliance via Getty Images
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.
