Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
What does Assad’s fall mean to Iran and its projection of strength and influence in the region?
This is one of the most consequential setbacks for the Islamic Republic since the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Syria offered Iran a pathway for influencing the Levant. It was its most reliable point of connection to Lebanon and its prized proxy, Hezbollah. Syria was one of the few Arab states to have cordial relations with Iran since its 1979 revolution. The Assads, both Hafez al-Assad, who ruled for nearly 30 years, and his son, Bashar, ruler since 2000, put much emphasis on ties to Shia-led Iran despite complaints from the other mostly Sunni-led Arab states.
How does it affect Iran’s axis of resistance?
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The axis of resistance is in tatters but has not been destroyed entirely. Hamas can no longer reconstitute itself as a militia threatening Israel from Gaza. Lebanon-based Hezbollah’s leadership has been decapitated and its operational capability sharply reduced. The Iraqi Shia militias are still active and deeply embedded in Iraq’s political and security institutions. Houthi militants in Yemen are also active but under increasing targeting from U.S.-led forces. Thus, Iran’s influence is for now circumscribed to the Gulf region.
How much did the Israel-Hezbollah war weaken Iran’s forces in Syria?
Iran had already withdrawn much of its forces from Syria as it assumed that the situation was manageable. Since the U.S. targeted killing of General Qassim Soleimani in January 2020, a top commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, it fell to various Hezbollah commanders to act as Iran’s surrogates in Syria. The Israeli assaults on Hezbollah this fall and the killing of many of its commanders deprived Iran of a cadre that could steady the situation in Syria at a time when it rapidly unraveled.
Does the fall of Syria’s government make Iran more dangerous or open to diplomacy?
Both. The value of nuclear deterrent has gone up in Iran. The country does not possess nuclear weapons, according to the most recent analyst reports, but it has improved its ability to enrich uranium to levels that can be weaponized in short order. As other pillars of deterrence have collapsed, the ultimate weapon is growing in importance. But the region is too dangerous and too unstable for provocative action.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tends to be cautious in times of crises. He usually awaits for the storm to pass before moving ahead. It is likely that Iran will take up American and European offers of diplomacy, possibly even from the incoming Trump administration. But that may be just a cover for protecting its expanding nuclear infrastructure from attack as opposed to seeking an agreement.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
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Will Iran Become More Dangerous After Assad’s Ouster in Syria?
The Bashar al-Assad regime’s rapid collapse deals a heavy blow to Iran’s “axis of resistance” and its ability to project power in the region, and it raises fears Iran will focus more on developing its nuclear program.
December 8, 2024 2:11 pm (EST)
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Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
What does Assad’s fall mean to Iran and its projection of strength and influence in the region?
This is one of the most consequential setbacks for the Islamic Republic since the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Syria offered Iran a pathway for influencing the Levant. It was its most reliable point of connection to Lebanon and its prized proxy, Hezbollah. Syria was one of the few Arab states to have cordial relations with Iran since its 1979 revolution. The Assads, both Hafez al-Assad, who ruled for nearly 30 years, and his son, Bashar, ruler since 2000, put much emphasis on ties to Shia-led Iran despite complaints from the other mostly Sunni-led Arab states.
How does it affect Iran’s axis of resistance?
More on:
The axis of resistance is in tatters but has not been destroyed entirely. Hamas can no longer reconstitute itself as a militia threatening Israel from Gaza. Lebanon-based Hezbollah’s leadership has been decapitated and its operational capability sharply reduced. The Iraqi Shia militias are still active and deeply embedded in Iraq’s political and security institutions. Houthi militants in Yemen are also active but under increasing targeting from U.S.-led forces. Thus, Iran’s influence is for now circumscribed to the Gulf region.
How much did the Israel-Hezbollah war weaken Iran’s forces in Syria?
Iran had already withdrawn much of its forces from Syria as it assumed that the situation was manageable. Since the U.S. targeted killing of General Qassim Soleimani in January 2020, a top commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, it fell to various Hezbollah commanders to act as Iran’s surrogates in Syria. The Israeli assaults on Hezbollah this fall and the killing of many of its commanders deprived Iran of a cadre that could steady the situation in Syria at a time when it rapidly unraveled.
Does the fall of Syria’s government make Iran more dangerous or open to diplomacy?
Both. The value of nuclear deterrent has gone up in Iran. The country does not possess nuclear weapons, according to the most recent analyst reports, but it has improved its ability to enrich uranium to levels that can be weaponized in short order. As other pillars of deterrence have collapsed, the ultimate weapon is growing in importance. But the region is too dangerous and too unstable for provocative action.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tends to be cautious in times of crises. He usually awaits for the storm to pass before moving ahead. It is likely that Iran will take up American and European offers of diplomacy, possibly even from the incoming Trump administration. But that may be just a cover for protecting its expanding nuclear infrastructure from attack as opposed to seeking an agreement.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
More on:
