Editor’s Note: Based in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and is a frequent contributor to Stimson’s Middle East Perspectives project on these topics. The author of “China, Russia and New Eurasian Order,” he is a recognized expert on regional ties with Russia and China and has also written for the Carnegie Endowment and Trends Research and Advisory.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives project
As U.S.-Iran talks progress toward a potential agreement limiting Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, the progress of Iran’s civil nuclear program may also be at stake.
In January, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that included a reference to increasing civilian nuclear cooperation. Russia-Iranian work in this sector began in 1992 and has slowly expanded. Russia has no serious competitors, while Iran so far has no other viable option.
The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the first in the Middle East, has been a symbol of Russia’s nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic. Russia completed the plant’s first site in 2011, building on a German project that began in the 1970s but was abandoned after the 1979 Iranian revolution. Russia and Iran have discussed building a second facility, Bushehr 2, but progress has been slowed by sanctions and other geopolitical issues.
The Bushehr project helped stabilize the Russian nuclear industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Chernobyl disaster. About 300 Russian companies and research institutes, including Atomenergoproekt and the Russian Scientific Center Kurchatov Institute, were involved in the construction of Bushehr 1. Employing Russian scientists at the site brought down the unemployment rate and increased federal revenues through tax deductions and social payments.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has deepened cooperation in this sector. Russia’s isolation from the European Union and the United States has pushed it to reorient its commercial and military cooperation toward Asia and the Middle East. Iran has been central in this pivot and this shift has benefited the Islamic Republic’s civilian nuclear ambitions.
Yet work on new reactors at Bushehr 2 has been slow. By early 2025 only 17 percent of the project was completed. A new deal with the U.S. that relieves sanctions is likely necessary for the installation to be finished in a timely manner.
Western sanctions on Iran and Russia have complicated Russian efforts to receive payment from Iran for work on the Bushehr plant. Iran’s half billion dollars in debt to Russia was reduced in 2023, which allowed planning to proceed.
Negotiations are also underway to construct the Sirik Nuclear Power Plant in the southern coastal province of Hormozgan and another nuclear facility at Karun. In April, Iran’s ambassador to Russia, Kazem Jalali, met with the Deputy Director for International Relations of the Rosatom State Corporation, Nikolay Spassky, to discuss these projects. Likewise in April, Iran’s Minister of Petroleum Mohsen Paknejad visited Moscow for the 18th meeting of the Russian-Iranian commission on trade and economic cooperation. There the minister announced that the Islamic Republic would build a new nuclear power plantwith Russia’s help although he did not specify whether it was Sirik or Karun.
Isolated from the West and facing China’s investment hesitance, Tehran has little option but to rely on Russian technology. This close relationship strengthens Russia’s grip globally over civilian nuclear energy – a potent geopolitical tool since the Soviet era. Rosatom, a state-owned entity, has so far not been targeted by Western sanctions (though the company’s officials have been) because of the importance of Rosatom’s nuclear fuel sales. The company controls up to 38 percent of uranium conversion worldwide and 46 percent of uranium enrichment. Russia provides the nuclear fuel for Bushehr, undercutting Iran’s insistence on maintaining its own enrichment capacity.
It remains unclear what impact ongoing U.S.-Iran nuclear talks will have on Russia-Iran cooperation. Russia was an enthusiastic participant in the talks that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action but appeared less supportive of efforts to revive the deal – which the first Trump administration quit in 2018 – after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, after a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 4, President Trump said Putin had expressed an interest in participating in the talks with Iran and facilitating an agreement.
Tehran, which has provided drones and other arms to Russia, has sought to leverage its position to garner Russian support for its nuclear program. Some Western outlets have alleged that Moscow provided Iran with expertise on nuclear fuel fabrication and that Russia might even assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons.
In response to U.S. statements about dismantling Iran’s enrichment facilities, the Russian foreign ministry has stated that it is impossible to exclude any country from the nuclear energy sphere. The ministry’s spokesperson also pledged that Russia-Iran peaceful nuclear cooperation will continue to expand.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
Editor’s Note: Based in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and is a frequent contributor to Stimson’s Middle East Perspectives project on these topics. The author of “China, Russia and New Eurasian Order,” he is a recognized expert on regional ties with Russia and China and has also written for the Carnegie Endowment and Trends Research and Advisory.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives project
As U.S.-Iran talks progress toward a potential agreement limiting Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, the progress of Iran’s civil nuclear program may also be at stake.
In January, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that included a reference to increasing civilian nuclear cooperation. Russia-Iranian work in this sector began in 1992 and has slowly expanded. Russia has no serious competitors, while Iran so far has no other viable option.
The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the first in the Middle East, has been a symbol of Russia’s nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic. Russia completed the plant’s first site in 2011, building on a German project that began in the 1970s but was abandoned after the 1979 Iranian revolution. Russia and Iran have discussed building a second facility, Bushehr 2, but progress has been slowed by sanctions and other geopolitical issues.
The Bushehr project helped stabilize the Russian nuclear industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Chernobyl disaster. About 300 Russian companies and research institutes, including Atomenergoproekt and the Russian Scientific Center Kurchatov Institute, were involved in the construction of Bushehr 1. Employing Russian scientists at the site brought down the unemployment rate and increased federal revenues through tax deductions and social payments.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has deepened cooperation in this sector. Russia’s isolation from the European Union and the United States has pushed it to reorient its commercial and military cooperation toward Asia and the Middle East. Iran has been central in this pivot and this shift has benefited the Islamic Republic’s civilian nuclear ambitions.
Yet work on new reactors at Bushehr 2 has been slow. By early 2025 only 17 percent of the project was completed. A new deal with the U.S. that relieves sanctions is likely necessary for the installation to be finished in a timely manner.
Western sanctions on Iran and Russia have complicated Russian efforts to receive payment from Iran for work on the Bushehr plant. Iran’s half billion dollars in debt to Russia was reduced in 2023, which allowed planning to proceed.
Negotiations are also underway to construct the Sirik Nuclear Power Plant in the southern coastal province of Hormozgan and another nuclear facility at Karun. In April, Iran’s ambassador to Russia, Kazem Jalali, met with the Deputy Director for International Relations of the Rosatom State Corporation, Nikolay Spassky, to discuss these projects. Likewise in April, Iran’s Minister of Petroleum Mohsen Paknejad visited Moscow for the 18th meeting of the Russian-Iranian commission on trade and economic cooperation. There the minister announced that the Islamic Republic would build a new nuclear power plantwith Russia’s help although he did not specify whether it was Sirik or Karun.
Isolated from the West and facing China’s investment hesitance, Tehran has little option but to rely on Russian technology. This close relationship strengthens Russia’s grip globally over civilian nuclear energy – a potent geopolitical tool since the Soviet era. Rosatom, a state-owned entity, has so far not been targeted by Western sanctions (though the company’s officials have been) because of the importance of Rosatom’s nuclear fuel sales. The company controls up to 38 percent of uranium conversion worldwide and 46 percent of uranium enrichment. Russia provides the nuclear fuel for Bushehr, undercutting Iran’s insistence on maintaining its own enrichment capacity.
It remains unclear what impact ongoing U.S.-Iran nuclear talks will have on Russia-Iran cooperation. Russia was an enthusiastic participant in the talks that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action but appeared less supportive of efforts to revive the deal – which the first Trump administration quit in 2018 – after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, after a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 4, President Trump said Putin had expressed an interest in participating in the talks with Iran and facilitating an agreement.
Tehran, which has provided drones and other arms to Russia, has sought to leverage its position to garner Russian support for its nuclear program. Some Western outlets have alleged that Moscow provided Iran with expertise on nuclear fuel fabrication and that Russia might even assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons.
In response to U.S. statements about dismantling Iran’s enrichment facilities, the Russian foreign ministry has stated that it is impossible to exclude any country from the nuclear energy sphere. The ministry’s spokesperson also pledged that Russia-Iran peaceful nuclear cooperation will continue to expand.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
