While many older South Koreans support nuclear armament, younger generations, the ones who will actually live with the consequences, do not share that view. Older South Koreans, shaped by memories of the Korean War and national vulnerability in the decades that followed, view nuclear weapons as essential and defensive. Young generations, raised in a globally integrated Korea with clear superiority over the North, see them as optional and potentially counterproductive.
South Korea’s nuclear debate is becoming more heated than ever, but too often, the attention is narrowed to polling averages, as if support for nuclear weapons is uniformly distributed across society. It is not. There is a growing generational divide in how South Koreans think about nuclear weapons and, more broadly, how they understand threats, safety, and the country’s identity in the world. Older generations see the world through a lens shaped by past violence, believing another conflict on the Peninsula is likely and that national survival must come first. Younger generations believe the risk of conflict is minimal and place greater value on global standards and South Korea’s international reputation. Today’s nuclear ambitions are primarily driven by the fears and traumas of the old, not the perspectives of the young. As generational turnover accelerates, this divide will become more evident and may ultimately push South Korea’s nuclear desire to subside in the long run.
Memories of National Vulnerability and the Bomb
My research shows that South Korea’s generational gap on nuclear weapons is rooted in starkly different lived experiences. Older generations, particularly those born between the 1940s and 1960s, lived through the devastation of the Korean War and spent decades fearing another invasion at the height of Cold War rivalry. They remember a time when South Korea was poor and vulnerable, when cities were destroyed, and national survival was in question. Even today, they overestimate the possibility of another attack from the North. For them, North Korean threats are not abstract; rather, they are living memories.
My analysis identifies two distinct foreign policy attitudes of this generation, which help explain their stronger support for nuclear weapons. First, they perceive North Korea’s nuclear threats as more imminent and serious than younger generations do. Second, they are less willing to rely on the United States, or any other country, for protection. Instead, they strongly favor self-reliance. Their past exposure to violence fosters worst-case thinking: conflict can erupt at any time, and South Korea should be prepared. They recognize that external security guarantees can fail when they are needed the most. An independent arsenal, in contrast, offers certainty and control.
This preference for armament should not be mistaken for anti-American sentiment or distrust in the alliance. My data show that many in this generation are deeply pro-American and consistently rank the United States as their closest ally. They also feel that the United States will still support South Korea if another crisis breaks out. Yet it is these same individuals who most strongly advocate for an independent nuclear deterrent. Why? This is where their worst-case logic kicks in. They worry, what if U.S. protection is not enough to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons? What if U.S. support is too slow to stop a missile that could reach Seoul in minutes? Their past experiences make them hyper-focused on such scenarios, leading them to place greater value on the certainty of an independent deterrent. In their view, nuclear weapons are not a substitute for the alliance; they are an additional, more reliable layer of protection. The more security guarantees, the better. They also believe that nuclear armament is a way to enhance South Korea’s role as a more capable and committed partner to the United States. This is why the most vocal supporters of the bomb in South Korea are not anti-American isolationists but staunch pro-American conservatives, many of whom can be seen waving American flags at rallies.
Too Global To Go Nuclear
Younger generations, specifically those born between 1985 and 2005, often referred to as the “MZ Generation,” have grown up in a very different Korea: prosperous, democratic, globally integrated, and culturally influential. They have only ever known a world in which South Korea is dominant in nearly every dimension compared to the North. To them, North Korea is more of a persistent nuisance than an existential threat. While they still view the North negatively, as unreliable, undemocratic, and antagonistic, its threat feels distant and abstract. Having witnessed a relatively stable peninsula despite periodic provocations, they are increasingly questioning whether nuclear weapons are truly necessary. Instead, the security threats that feel most immediate and tangible to them are social and economic challenges, such as gender inequality, social security, demographic decline, climate change, and the impact of emerging technologies.
This generation also places greater value on global standards and cosmopolitanism. Their worldview is shaped not by memories of national struggle, but by pride in South Korea’s rapid rise as a contributor to international development and peacekeeping. They also take great pride in the country’s growing soft power. This generation is used to seeing their country as a modern, respected global cultural leader, home to Oscar winners, K-pop superstars, Olympic champions, and Nobel laureates. Their identity is not defined by a narrow peninsula rivalry but by a broader sense of global citizenship. Their aspirations are internationalists: to engage with the world, compete on the global stage, earn respect abroad, and act as a responsible player within the liberal international order.
As a result, many young South Koreans associate nuclear armament not with strength, but with regression, something that could quickly destroy all the success and reputation South Korea has worked so hard to build. Going nuclear, in their eyes, would mean following Pyongyang’s failed path: withdrawing from the international community and joining the undesired club of isolated, sanctioned states that violate global standards. The very idea of pursuing nuclear weapons feels not only unnecessary but also deeply out of step with the values and aspirations of a generation that identifies itself as proudly global.
Why Today’s Debate Misrepresents Public Opinion
What does this all mean for understanding South Korea’s nuclear debate? First, we must be cautious about overstating how widespread or deep current pronuclear sentiment really is among the general public. South Korea’s strategic elite is disproportionately composed of older men—those who lived through the country’s most insecure periods. Their distinct experiences of national vulnerability, combined with their dominance in politics, policymaking, and media, have allowed them to selectively amplify the importance of the nuclear issue within elite discourse. Within the conservative camp, which has long been home to pronuclear voices, those who have led the nuclear debate are senior figures such as potential presidential contender Hong Joon-pyo and long-time Chosun Ilbo columnist Kim Dae-jung. This elite emphasis has elevated the visibility of nuclear options in the public sphere, which in turn reinforced the debate again at the elite level. Their outsized influence in shaping public opinion risks inflating the appearance of a national consensus on nuclear armament beyond the actual level of public interest.
Second, we should look beyond the overall average when interpreting polling data that reports around 60 percent public support for nuclear weapons. A closer examination reveals a clear and consistent generational divide: Older South Koreans are the strongest supporters of nuclear armament, while younger generations are far more hesitant. This pattern has persisted over time. In a 2017 survey, opposition to nuclear armament was most prevalent among respondents in their 20s, with 57 percent opposed, 19 percentage points higher than those in support. In a 2022 survey, support peaked at 80.3 percent among those over 60, while those in their 20s showed the lowest support at just 53.1 percent.
More importantly, the structure of most surveys obscures even deeper generational differences. Many rely on a single, underspecified question: whether respondents support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons. A more realistic and policy-relevant question would ask whether they would support nuclearization even if it means international isolation and sanctions, as seen in the cases of North Korea and Iran. When framed this way, research shows that generational divides emerge more prominently. Older generations do not change their initial pronuclear stance and are more willing to accept those costs. Younger South Koreans, by contrast, are more likely to reconsider or withdraw their support when faced with real-world tradeoffs.
Letting the Future Speak
And this is the core of the issue: the nuclear decisions South Korea makes today will be borne most directly by its younger generations, but their voices remain underrepresented in the current debate. If the future of the country is to be shaped democratically, those who will live with the consequences must be at the center of the conversation.
In the short term, however, dramatic change is unlikely. South Korea’s political and media establishments will remain skewed toward older voices, and there are still few young politicians and opinion leaders with the institutional power to represent their generation’s different perspectives on national security. One stark indicator: Among the eleven presidential contenders from the two major parties, none are in their 40s, and only one is under 55.
But this imbalance will not last forever. As the MZ Generation gains political and media influence, their preferences will begin to reshape the debate. We will certainly see more opposing and divergent views toward nuclear armament, reflecting their internationalist worldview. While the shift is modest for now, meaningful signs are already emerging. Younger conservative leaders like Han Dong-hoon and Lee Jun-seok, both former leaders of the People Power Party (South Korea’s major conservative party), have expressed skepticism about nuclear armament. Han supports pursuing nuclear latency but opposes developing an independent arsenal, citing legal and reputational risks. Lee’s position has also been consistently negative, although nuclear policy is not central to his political agenda. His focus on gender and social issues reflects a broader generational disinterest in nuclear weapons and a greater concern for domestic priorities.
South Korea’s nuclear options are likely to remain one of the most contentious issues for the next administration. As the debate continues, it will be important to observe how generational divides, not just partisan, shape views on nuclear weapons and national security, both among the public and within the elite. But regardless of who leads the next government, the long-term trajectory of the nuclear debate will depend on how much space younger voices are given in shaping the country’s future.
That said, generational preferences are not set in stone. Young South Koreans are not inherently anti-proliferation. Their current disinterest stems from the belief that the global system still works, that the costs of proliferation remain prohibitively high, and that diplomacy and alliances provide a viable path to security. But if the international nonproliferation regime weakens, or if liberal democracies like Japan or Germany move toward nuclearization, their calculus could shift. Some advocates of the bomb in South Korea are already hoping that a second Trump administration might take a more permissive stance, tacitly endorsing ally-driven proliferation as part of a burden-sharing strategy. If that becomes reality, younger South Koreans may come to see nuclear weapons not as reckless, but as a legitimate, perhaps even prestigious, marker of great-power status. Whether that future arrives will depend on the direction of global politics, but just as importantly, on which voices South Korea chooses to amplify now.
Dr. James D. Kim is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington and a 2024–2025 CSIS-USC U.S.-Korea NextGen Scholar.
