Looking at the strategic chessboard, it’s clear why the president seized this moment to strike at Iran’s nuclear program. There may never have been a better time. Iran was closer than ever before to having the ability to manufacture an atomic bomb. In the run-up to Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran walked away from the negotiating table, signaling it was not interested in diplomacy. And, finally, Iran was suddenly weak, its air defenses in shambles. It is too early to know the long-term ramifications of the U.S. decision to join Israel’s attack on Iran, but the short-term impacts are clear. Iran’s nuclear program has been set back, and the prestige and influence of the axis of resistance have ebbed. Operation Midnight Hammer is also a reminder of U.S. resolve and military power—and the consequences for those who underestimate either.
For years, Tehran has been constructing clandestine nuclear facilities in deeper, more expansive underground tunnel complexes. In May 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium had increased by 50 percent since its last report three months prior, citing the rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium of “serious concern,” and placing Iran within short reach of a breakout capability. In testimony this month before Congress, the commander of the U.S. Central Command wrote that Iran possessed enough enriched uranium—well past the enrichment level required for peaceful, civilian purposes—for 10 nuclear weapons and could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb within a week. Although Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei probably had not decided to build a nuclear weapon, pressure was likely increasing on him to do so, particularly after the start of Israeli strikes on June 12.
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts to convince Iran to abandon work on enriching uranium past levels needed for civilian uses had stalled for over a year. Iran’s dismissal of a U.S. proposal this spring created a diplomatic stalemate that probably reinforced concerns within the U.S. government that time was working in Iran’s favor—and that the window of opportunity to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb was quickly closing. In March 2025, it was reported that President Trump issued a 60-day ultimatum for Iran to return to negotiations; however, the deadline passed with no substantive response from Tehran. Reaffirming its lack of interest in negotiations on its nuclear program, Iran once again rejected talks as Israel launched its air campaign on June 12. With Iran potentially positioned for a sprint across the finish line to develop a bomb, doors that could lead to a diplomatic solution were closing.
A military option to disrupt Iran’s ability to develop the bomb, however, was suddenly more promising. Months of Israeli airstrikes had severely degraded Iran’s air defenses, creating a rare window for Operation Midnight Hammer, a complex, high-risk undertaking that required precision munitions, complex battle management, and overwhelming air superiority. While Israel’s contributions were vital, the United States is the only country that has weapons capable of destroying Iran’s most fortified nuclear sites, which are buried deep underground and protected by advanced air defenses. With an operational window that may be fleeting—as Tehran would almost certainly rebuild its air defenses—striking now afforded the best chance of success.
Targeting the enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz and the soon-to-open enrichment facility at Isfahan suggests the objective was to degrade Iran’s ability to rapidly enrich uranium to the quality needed to build a nuclear weapon. Though the world awaits more information about the precise damage to these three sites, Iran’s enrichment programs have likely been extremely disrupted. Even if Iran was able to relocate quantities of uranium before the bombings, it will take time for Iran to rebuild and reconstitute the capability to continue enrichment. With few signs prior to June 21 that Iran was open to renew negotiations about its nuclear program, diplomatic efforts were unlikely, in the short term, to achieve a comparable level of disruption to Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon.
There is also little sign that Iran will be able to rely on its axis of resistance partners, China and Russia, to help it rebuild its military defenses and capabilities, and probably less reason to think they will help Iran rebuild its uranium enrichment capabilities. Since Israel’s strikes started on June 12, despite significant ties to Iran, neither China nor Russia has offered more than public statements of support to the regime. Russia has only recently signed a 20-year partnership agreement with Iran and has obtained one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine. Iran is an important trading partner for China, which imports a significant amount of Iranian oil. That both China and Russia have offered limited support to Iran should be the canary in the coal mine to other nations who look to China and Russia as potential partners, and signal they are not reliable.
On the other hand, the United States sent a strong message to those who would question its resolve to defend its interests—in this case, pushing back Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon—and demonstrated its military strength. The strike also reinforced the United States’ commitment to Israel at a time when Israel finds itself under significant threat. For Israel, Iran has long been viewed as an existential threat, particularly in light of Tehran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other regional proxies. The strikes are not just about nuclear deterrence but are part of a broader campaign responding to the October 7 attacks. Though perpetrated by Hamas, Israel came to conclude that the three actors—Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran—believed they could launch a crippling, multifront assault on it, with Tehran playing a central role.
Many of the broader and long-term implications of Operation Midnight Hammer remain uncertain, including the degree to which the strikes set back or destroyed Iran’s nuclear program. But in the short term, the strikes bought the world more time—time to find a negotiated solution that will convince Iran to give up its ambitions to develop a nuclear weapon. Without the strikes, would Iranian scientists be racing today in Fordow’s underground tunnels to produce the 90 percent enriched uranium for an atomic bomb that Iran may have threatened to use—or even used—to halt Israel’s attacks? Who knows. But today, after the strikes, all signs suggest Iran wants to de-escalate the situation. After firing a brief salvo of missiles at the U.S. air base in Qatar—allegedly warning the United States before it did so—Iran has taken up the United States on its offer to broker a ceasefire with Israel. Negotiations—from a position of strength backed by the ability to strike again—have more of a chance now than they did last week.
Kari A. Bingen is the director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.
