Editor’s Note: Fuad Shahbazov is an Azerbaijan-based policy analyst who has written frequently for Stimson about regional security issues in the South Caucasus. He is also an expert on Turkey and the resurgence of ISIS.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Over the past several days, the main Syrian opposition force, Hayat Tahrir-al Sham (HTS), has carried out a lightning-fast offensive, pushing Syrian government troops out of the country’s second-largest city, Aleppo, and moving on to Hama.
The surprise attack exposed the weakness of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which had survived a 2011-2016 civil war with the help of Iran and Russia. With little to no resistance from the government forces, HTS – an offshoot of al-Qaeda – and affiliated groups were able to seize control over Aleppo within a day and Hama shortly afterwards.
Assad turned to Russia amid the HTS assault, but Moscow – unlike in 2014-2016 – is bogged down in Ukraine and unable to provide substantial military support for Syria apart from a few air strikes. Of greater concern to Damascus, its other staunch ally, Iran, alongside Iran’s Lebanese partner, Hezbollah, have been greatly weakened since a regional war was touched off by Hamas’s attack on Israel more than a year ago. Israel’s response has included a new invasion of Lebanon and missile and drone strikes that decapitated Hezbollah and destroyed nearly all of its military infrastructure.
Although Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi rushed to Damascus and met with Assad on Dec. 1 and went to Ankara the next day to meet his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, the trips were a poor attempt through diplomatic channels to counteract HTS’s capture of Aleppo and further advancement toward Hama and Homs.
If Iran and Russia were caught on the back foot, the same cannot be said of Turkey. Footage from opposition-controlled Alepposhowed some rebel fighters draping themselves with the Turkish flag, putting a renewed spotlight on Turkey’s role and influence over Syria’s main opposition forces. Although Turkish authorities demonstrated restraint and denied any involvement in the new rebel offensive, Turkey’s leverage over these anti-Assad and anti-Kurdish Sunni Muslim militant groups is well known.
Footage of HTS fighters demonstrating professional skills in drone warfare and other enhanced military capabilities able to adapt and innovate in response to Russian and Syrian bombardment suggests that the fighters have received significant help from Turkey. Even if the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not openly support HTS, its recent successes would have been unthinkable without Turkey’s military and logistical backing, and provision of advanced weaponry.
Turkey’s goal in supporting the Syrian opposition is not just to weaken Assad but to target the Kurdish military stationed in an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Syria across the Turkish border. Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) regard the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party of Syria (PYD) as offshoots of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) “and destructive tools against Turkey in this region.” However the YPG and affiliated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have enjoyed the staunch support of the West because they have battled remnants of the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist group in the northern provinces of Syria.
Turkey, which fears the desire of its own large Kurdish minority for greater independence, has maintained a certain footprint in this area for years, with frequent military operations against the Kurdish militia. Interestingly, in 2023, President Erdogan signaled readiness for rapprochement with the Assad government in return for potential joint action against the YPG. Now, however, with Assad on the ropes and Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia weakened and distracted by other conflicts, Turkey appears to have given up on diplomatic normalization with Damascus and likely greenlighted the HTS offensive.
Turkey hopes to marginalize Kurdish groups in Syria such as the PYD/YPG, pushing them away from border areas. Secondly, Turkey may have seen an opportunity to reduce the Iranian and Hezbollah presence in Syria and to demonstrate to the incoming Trump administration Turkey’s ability to counteract Iranian influence in the Middle East.
Turkey has also adroitly played its cards with Russia since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Although Russia condemned the HTS offensive, its response was limited to a few air raids against the rebels that have not prevented them from moving into the strategic vital province of Hama.
Ironically, even though Turkey has been a vocal critic of Israel’s war on Gaza, the HTS offensive is seen as serving Israeli as well as Turkish interests. Israeli media reported that the Israeli Air Force intercepted a suspected Iranian airplane from ferrying arms to Hezbollah through Syrian airspace on December 1, ordering the plane to turn around because of the fierce clashes between HTS and Assad forces. Such events suggest that Ankara and Tel Aviv may have coordinated their efforts against Assad and Iran-backed militants. This is not surprising in light of the news that on November 19, Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet, had a secret meeting with Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın in Ankara regarding Israeli hostages, Hamas, and other Iranian-backed militants.
It is likely that Turkey expects that the incoming President Trump will pick up where he left off on Middle East policy by withdrawing the 900 or so remaining U.S. troops in Syria and possibly the 2,500 in Iraq, leaving behind a deep power and security vacuum. This would solidify Turkey and Israel as key regional players with the strong military capability to tackle their assorted opponents, including Iran-backed groups. Turkey, in particular, would have more space for military and diplomatic maneuvering against the Kurds, ironically long close to Israel, significantly increasing Ankara’s leverage in light of a weakened Iran.
Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the South Caucasus and a former research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies and senior analyst at the Center for Strategic Communications in Azerbaijan. He was also a visiting scholar at the Daniel Morgan School of National Security in Washington, DC. He tweets at @fuadshahbazov.
Editor’s Note: Fuad Shahbazov is an Azerbaijan-based policy analyst who has written frequently for Stimson about regional security issues in the South Caucasus. He is also an expert on Turkey and the resurgence of ISIS.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Over the past several days, the main Syrian opposition force, Hayat Tahrir-al Sham (HTS), has carried out a lightning-fast offensive, pushing Syrian government troops out of the country’s second-largest city, Aleppo, and moving on to Hama.
The surprise attack exposed the weakness of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which had survived a 2011-2016 civil war with the help of Iran and Russia. With little to no resistance from the government forces, HTS – an offshoot of al-Qaeda – and affiliated groups were able to seize control over Aleppo within a day and Hama shortly afterwards.
Assad turned to Russia amid the HTS assault, but Moscow – unlike in 2014-2016 – is bogged down in Ukraine and unable to provide substantial military support for Syria apart from a few air strikes. Of greater concern to Damascus, its other staunch ally, Iran, alongside Iran’s Lebanese partner, Hezbollah, have been greatly weakened since a regional war was touched off by Hamas’s attack on Israel more than a year ago. Israel’s response has included a new invasion of Lebanon and missile and drone strikes that decapitated Hezbollah and destroyed nearly all of its military infrastructure.
Although Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi rushed to Damascus and met with Assad on Dec. 1 and went to Ankara the next day to meet his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, the trips were a poor attempt through diplomatic channels to counteract HTS’s capture of Aleppo and further advancement toward Hama and Homs.
If Iran and Russia were caught on the back foot, the same cannot be said of Turkey. Footage from opposition-controlled Alepposhowed some rebel fighters draping themselves with the Turkish flag, putting a renewed spotlight on Turkey’s role and influence over Syria’s main opposition forces. Although Turkish authorities demonstrated restraint and denied any involvement in the new rebel offensive, Turkey’s leverage over these anti-Assad and anti-Kurdish Sunni Muslim militant groups is well known.
Footage of HTS fighters demonstrating professional skills in drone warfare and other enhanced military capabilities able to adapt and innovate in response to Russian and Syrian bombardment suggests that the fighters have received significant help from Turkey. Even if the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not openly support HTS, its recent successes would have been unthinkable without Turkey’s military and logistical backing, and provision of advanced weaponry.
Turkey’s goal in supporting the Syrian opposition is not just to weaken Assad but to target the Kurdish military stationed in an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Syria across the Turkish border. Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) regard the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Democratic Union Party of Syria (PYD) as offshoots of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) “and destructive tools against Turkey in this region.” However the YPG and affiliated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have enjoyed the staunch support of the West because they have battled remnants of the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist group in the northern provinces of Syria.
Turkey, which fears the desire of its own large Kurdish minority for greater independence, has maintained a certain footprint in this area for years, with frequent military operations against the Kurdish militia. Interestingly, in 2023, President Erdogan signaled readiness for rapprochement with the Assad government in return for potential joint action against the YPG. Now, however, with Assad on the ropes and Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia weakened and distracted by other conflicts, Turkey appears to have given up on diplomatic normalization with Damascus and likely greenlighted the HTS offensive.
Turkey hopes to marginalize Kurdish groups in Syria such as the PYD/YPG, pushing them away from border areas. Secondly, Turkey may have seen an opportunity to reduce the Iranian and Hezbollah presence in Syria and to demonstrate to the incoming Trump administration Turkey’s ability to counteract Iranian influence in the Middle East.
Turkey has also adroitly played its cards with Russia since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Although Russia condemned the HTS offensive, its response was limited to a few air raids against the rebels that have not prevented them from moving into the strategic vital province of Hama.
Ironically, even though Turkey has been a vocal critic of Israel’s war on Gaza, the HTS offensive is seen as serving Israeli as well as Turkish interests. Israeli media reported that the Israeli Air Force intercepted a suspected Iranian airplane from ferrying arms to Hezbollah through Syrian airspace on December 1, ordering the plane to turn around because of the fierce clashes between HTS and Assad forces. Such events suggest that Ankara and Tel Aviv may have coordinated their efforts against Assad and Iran-backed militants. This is not surprising in light of the news that on November 19, Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet, had a secret meeting with Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın in Ankara regarding Israeli hostages, Hamas, and other Iranian-backed militants.
It is likely that Turkey expects that the incoming President Trump will pick up where he left off on Middle East policy by withdrawing the 900 or so remaining U.S. troops in Syria and possibly the 2,500 in Iraq, leaving behind a deep power and security vacuum. This would solidify Turkey and Israel as key regional players with the strong military capability to tackle their assorted opponents, including Iran-backed groups. Turkey, in particular, would have more space for military and diplomatic maneuvering against the Kurds, ironically long close to Israel, significantly increasing Ankara’s leverage in light of a weakened Iran.
Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the South Caucasus and a former research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies and senior analyst at the Center for Strategic Communications in Azerbaijan. He was also a visiting scholar at the Daniel Morgan School of National Security in Washington, DC. He tweets at @fuadshahbazov.
