Henri J. Barkey is Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
What role are outside powers playing in Syria’s new rebel offensive?
Turkey is the most important outside power supporting the rebel side. It geographically adjoins Syrian rebel territory in the northwest, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government supported the 2011 Arab Spring uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. At times, he also backed a variety of Islamist groups during the Syrian civil war. The leading and most substantial rebel group, Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is the former Al-Nusra Front, a jihadist organization that fought the self-declared Islamic State (ISIS). It renamed itself and claimed that it renounced some of its more extreme positions, has become more respectful of minorities, and has taken on some institutional responsibilities in the form of local government. While there are indications that HTS acquired Turkish help in the form of arms, primarily drones, prior to this offensive, HTS is not Ankara’s primary client. It’s also worth noting that HTS has reportedly been manufacturing its own arms in recent years.
More on:
Turkey’s ally among the rebels is the Syrian National Army (SNA), which, despite its name, is a wholly Turkish-owned entity. Since the defeat of ISIS, the Turks have been more concerned with the emergence of a Syrian-Kurdish entity in northern Syria led by the Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF. The SDF, though a Syrian organization, has its roots in the Turkish-Kurdish insurgency. The United States decided to partner with the SDF when the Iraqi, Syrian, and Iraqi-Kurdish forces melted away at the height of the ISIS onslaught in 2014. This partnership was successful, and to this day, the United States maintains a force of roughly nine hundred soldiers in northern Syria in collaboration with the SDF to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.
The Russians and the Iranians, together with their Lebanese client Hezbollah, have been Syria’s biggest military supporters. They were instrumental in helping the regime survive the civil war and maintain the status quo. The Russians have used their air force to bomb rebel positions in Syria’s Idlib province. During the current offensive, Russian jets have attempted to slow down the rebels’ advance by bombing the newly conquered territories. The Iranian regime has been Assad’s foremost ally. It has provided Assad with military advice and arms as well as directed Hezbollah to deploy experienced and battle-tested fighters against the insurgents. Other Iranian proxies, such as Iraqi Shi’a militias, have also been mobilized to help Damascus.
At this stage, it is unclear how much actual physical support Assad’s allies can offer. Russia is consumed by the war in Ukraine and, in the cases of Iran and Hezbollah, they are significantly weakened following recent confrontations with Israel. The Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi Shi’a militia have reportedly sent combatants to the Iraq-Syria border while other Shi’a forces entered Syria to help regime forces.
How does Turkey view the seizure of Aleppo and Hama?
The Turks were probably aware of HTS’s preparations but were unlikely to have been part of the operation’s planning or timing. As with many observers, they, too, must have been surprised by the speed with which the opposition overpowered the Syrian defenses, first in Aleppo and then in Hama.
Aleppo’s fall was a welcome development for Ankara. After years of scolding Assad and his regime, Erdoğan concluded that it was time to reverse policy and reengage with Damascus. An emboldened Assad chose to ignore Erdoğan. This current reversal of fortunes will certainly increase Turkey’s influence in Syria.
More on:
Aleppo’s relatively easy fall is a sign of the Syrian regime’s weakness and could also be a harbinger of its coming demise. Whereas this would have been welcomed with great exultation in Ankara half a decade ago, HTS’s jihadist disposition and independence should worry Turkey. This is especially true following the rebels’ capture of Hama. Hama is strategically critical: it sits at the intersection of many other cities, including Homs, the rebels’ next objective. At the time of publishing, the city of Homs is now about to fall, and the Syrian Army is deploying all its assets for the defense of Damascus. Erdoğan came out today, saying that he hopes the insurgents go all the way to Damascus.
Not only can Ankara not control the rebels, but the prospect of new refugee flows being triggered by HTS behavior, and the ensuing chaos caused by the regime’s collapse, is a serious possibility. Erdoğan’s government is currently facing a political backlash at home from the earlier refugee waves, which saw up to 3.5 million cross the border, and the prospect of new flows would be especially worrisome.
From Turkey’s perspective, the prospects are not appealing. This situation will either result in the regime in Damascus collapsing or in an unstable stalemate characterized by the regime forces, helped by pro-Iranian militias from Iraq and Hezbollah, halting rebel advances but unable to reclaim Aleppo or Hama back. Chaos will likely follow the first scenario or a state of constant combat as Damascus attempts to recover the two cities.
How does Turkey’s campaign against Syrian Kurds figure into developments?
For the Turks, the single most crucial aim remains the eradication of the Syrian Kurdish SDF, the U.S. ally. Erdoğan has raised the saliency of the Syrian Kurds in domestic politics, not just to put his Kurdish citizens on the defensive but also as a means to distract the populace. However, the real rationale, though not publicly articulated, is the fear that Syrian Kurds would cut a deal with any central government in Damascus to achieve an autonomous status just like Iraqi Kurds did following the Iraq war. Turks vividly remember that the United States was the primary agent in helping Iraqi Kurds create the Kurdistan Regional Government. Today, the United States is once again in an alliance with another Kurdish entity, deepening fears in Ankara that history will repeat itself. As a result, the American alignment has become the primary source of contention between Ankara and Washington.
The current Syrian rebellion initially gave Turkey the cover it needed to push the SNA onto Kurdish positions, with the immediate goal of pushing the SDF east of the Euphrates River. Early indications suggest that the SNA has scored some successes, but not without drawing ire from their HTS ally, which criticized them for forsaking the offensive’s principal objective.
The fate of the Syrian Kurdish enclave rests with Washington. Ankara could be hoping that the incoming Donald Trump administration will decide to withdraw its nine hundred soldiers from Syria and end its support for the SDF. After all, Trump attempted to do it twice during his first term, only to be persuaded not to by his advisors. The consequences of an American withdrawal would be far more daunting today; there are some 40,000-plus ISIS and pro-ISIS detainees in SDF-managed prisons, such as al-Hol. If released, it is quite likely that some or many of these prisoners would either join HTS, thus strengthening it or causing mayhem in northern Iraq or beyond. It would probably not be advisable to withdraw the troops even if the current rebellion had not occurred, as it would have been perceived as a victory for Iran and its allies. Iran, after all, has been exhorting Iraq to reduce the American military presence. In addition to helping prevent a resurgence of ISIS, American forces in Syria keep an eye on Iranian conveyance of goods and support to its allies such as Hezbollah.
Is there a realistic prospect for a revived peace process in Syria due to the shifting power on the ground?
Given the fast pace of developments, it is difficult to visualize prospects for a revived peace process in Syria today. It is a zero-sum conflict. HTS cannot live with Assad and vice versa.
Assad has few friends in the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Arab states have come around to politically backing him but lack the wherewithal to support him with significant military aid. The United States and Israel are sitting on the sidelines, facing some hard choices. On one hand, Assad’s demise would represent a decisive blow against Iran and its allies. Tehran would be cut off from Lebanon and Hezbollah, and pressure in Iraq to distance itself from the Iranians is also likely to increase. On the other hand, the emergence of a jihadist state in Syria would create unprecedented uncertainty and engender new cycles of violence that involve outside actors such as the United States, Israel, and Iraq. What worries everyone about the regime’s collapse is that its chemical weapons arsenal could then fall into the hands of HTS or other jihadis.
If the regime collapses and Assad flees, it is not clear who will replace him. The military is in disarray, and there is no clear successor who could take over from Assad. If he survived and recaptured some or all of the territory, would he be interested in participating in a peace process? That depends on Russia and Iran. These two countries constantly calculate their wins and losses in the current polarized global atmosphere. What would be their incentives to see a compromise in Syria emerge? Syria could just be another chip in a larger reckoning.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
What Role Is Turkey Playing in Syria’s Civil War?
Turkey opposes the Assad regime, but the fall of the government could disrupt Ankara’s aims to reverse refugee flows and defeat Kurdish forces in Syria’s north.
December 6, 2024 1:45 pm (EST)
- Expert Brief
- CFR scholars provide expert analysis and commentary on international issues.
Henri J. Barkey is Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
What role are outside powers playing in Syria’s new rebel offensive?
Turkey is the most important outside power supporting the rebel side. It geographically adjoins Syrian rebel territory in the northwest, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government supported the 2011 Arab Spring uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. At times, he also backed a variety of Islamist groups during the Syrian civil war. The leading and most substantial rebel group, Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is the former Al-Nusra Front, a jihadist organization that fought the self-declared Islamic State (ISIS). It renamed itself and claimed that it renounced some of its more extreme positions, has become more respectful of minorities, and has taken on some institutional responsibilities in the form of local government. While there are indications that HTS acquired Turkish help in the form of arms, primarily drones, prior to this offensive, HTS is not Ankara’s primary client. It’s also worth noting that HTS has reportedly been manufacturing its own arms in recent years.
More on:
Turkey’s ally among the rebels is the Syrian National Army (SNA), which, despite its name, is a wholly Turkish-owned entity. Since the defeat of ISIS, the Turks have been more concerned with the emergence of a Syrian-Kurdish entity in northern Syria led by the Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF. The SDF, though a Syrian organization, has its roots in the Turkish-Kurdish insurgency. The United States decided to partner with the SDF when the Iraqi, Syrian, and Iraqi-Kurdish forces melted away at the height of the ISIS onslaught in 2014. This partnership was successful, and to this day, the United States maintains a force of roughly nine hundred soldiers in northern Syria in collaboration with the SDF to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.
The Russians and the Iranians, together with their Lebanese client Hezbollah, have been Syria’s biggest military supporters. They were instrumental in helping the regime survive the civil war and maintain the status quo. The Russians have used their air force to bomb rebel positions in Syria’s Idlib province. During the current offensive, Russian jets have attempted to slow down the rebels’ advance by bombing the newly conquered territories. The Iranian regime has been Assad’s foremost ally. It has provided Assad with military advice and arms as well as directed Hezbollah to deploy experienced and battle-tested fighters against the insurgents. Other Iranian proxies, such as Iraqi Shi’a militias, have also been mobilized to help Damascus.
At this stage, it is unclear how much actual physical support Assad’s allies can offer. Russia is consumed by the war in Ukraine and, in the cases of Iran and Hezbollah, they are significantly weakened following recent confrontations with Israel. The Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi Shi’a militia have reportedly sent combatants to the Iraq-Syria border while other Shi’a forces entered Syria to help regime forces.
How does Turkey view the seizure of Aleppo and Hama?
The Turks were probably aware of HTS’s preparations but were unlikely to have been part of the operation’s planning or timing. As with many observers, they, too, must have been surprised by the speed with which the opposition overpowered the Syrian defenses, first in Aleppo and then in Hama.
Aleppo’s fall was a welcome development for Ankara. After years of scolding Assad and his regime, Erdoğan concluded that it was time to reverse policy and reengage with Damascus. An emboldened Assad chose to ignore Erdoğan. This current reversal of fortunes will certainly increase Turkey’s influence in Syria.
More on:
Aleppo’s relatively easy fall is a sign of the Syrian regime’s weakness and could also be a harbinger of its coming demise. Whereas this would have been welcomed with great exultation in Ankara half a decade ago, HTS’s jihadist disposition and independence should worry Turkey. This is especially true following the rebels’ capture of Hama. Hama is strategically critical: it sits at the intersection of many other cities, including Homs, the rebels’ next objective. At the time of publishing, the city of Homs is now about to fall, and the Syrian Army is deploying all its assets for the defense of Damascus. Erdoğan came out today, saying that he hopes the insurgents go all the way to Damascus.
Not only can Ankara not control the rebels, but the prospect of new refugee flows being triggered by HTS behavior, and the ensuing chaos caused by the regime’s collapse, is a serious possibility. Erdoğan’s government is currently facing a political backlash at home from the earlier refugee waves, which saw up to 3.5 million cross the border, and the prospect of new flows would be especially worrisome.
From Turkey’s perspective, the prospects are not appealing. This situation will either result in the regime in Damascus collapsing or in an unstable stalemate characterized by the regime forces, helped by pro-Iranian militias from Iraq and Hezbollah, halting rebel advances but unable to reclaim Aleppo or Hama back. Chaos will likely follow the first scenario or a state of constant combat as Damascus attempts to recover the two cities.
How does Turkey’s campaign against Syrian Kurds figure into developments?
For the Turks, the single most crucial aim remains the eradication of the Syrian Kurdish SDF, the U.S. ally. Erdoğan has raised the saliency of the Syrian Kurds in domestic politics, not just to put his Kurdish citizens on the defensive but also as a means to distract the populace. However, the real rationale, though not publicly articulated, is the fear that Syrian Kurds would cut a deal with any central government in Damascus to achieve an autonomous status just like Iraqi Kurds did following the Iraq war. Turks vividly remember that the United States was the primary agent in helping Iraqi Kurds create the Kurdistan Regional Government. Today, the United States is once again in an alliance with another Kurdish entity, deepening fears in Ankara that history will repeat itself. As a result, the American alignment has become the primary source of contention between Ankara and Washington.
The current Syrian rebellion initially gave Turkey the cover it needed to push the SNA onto Kurdish positions, with the immediate goal of pushing the SDF east of the Euphrates River. Early indications suggest that the SNA has scored some successes, but not without drawing ire from their HTS ally, which criticized them for forsaking the offensive’s principal objective.
The fate of the Syrian Kurdish enclave rests with Washington. Ankara could be hoping that the incoming Donald Trump administration will decide to withdraw its nine hundred soldiers from Syria and end its support for the SDF. After all, Trump attempted to do it twice during his first term, only to be persuaded not to by his advisors. The consequences of an American withdrawal would be far more daunting today; there are some 40,000-plus ISIS and pro-ISIS detainees in SDF-managed prisons, such as al-Hol. If released, it is quite likely that some or many of these prisoners would either join HTS, thus strengthening it or causing mayhem in northern Iraq or beyond. It would probably not be advisable to withdraw the troops even if the current rebellion had not occurred, as it would have been perceived as a victory for Iran and its allies. Iran, after all, has been exhorting Iraq to reduce the American military presence. In addition to helping prevent a resurgence of ISIS, American forces in Syria keep an eye on Iranian conveyance of goods and support to its allies such as Hezbollah.
Is there a realistic prospect for a revived peace process in Syria due to the shifting power on the ground?
Given the fast pace of developments, it is difficult to visualize prospects for a revived peace process in Syria today. It is a zero-sum conflict. HTS cannot live with Assad and vice versa.
Assad has few friends in the region. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Arab states have come around to politically backing him but lack the wherewithal to support him with significant military aid. The United States and Israel are sitting on the sidelines, facing some hard choices. On one hand, Assad’s demise would represent a decisive blow against Iran and its allies. Tehran would be cut off from Lebanon and Hezbollah, and pressure in Iraq to distance itself from the Iranians is also likely to increase. On the other hand, the emergence of a jihadist state in Syria would create unprecedented uncertainty and engender new cycles of violence that involve outside actors such as the United States, Israel, and Iraq. What worries everyone about the regime’s collapse is that its chemical weapons arsenal could then fall into the hands of HTS or other jihadis.
If the regime collapses and Assad flees, it is not clear who will replace him. The military is in disarray, and there is no clear successor who could take over from Assad. If he survived and recaptured some or all of the territory, would he be interested in participating in a peace process? That depends on Russia and Iran. These two countries constantly calculate their wins and losses in the current polarized global atmosphere. What would be their incentives to see a compromise in Syria emerge? Syria could just be another chip in a larger reckoning.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
