Once a year, the two intelligence committees in Congress host the heads of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a “worldwide threats” hearing. The testimony is based on the Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which takes months to compile. This year, three of the five witnesses are new political appointees. CIA Director Ratcliffe knows the hot seat well from his time as director of national intelligence during the first Trump administration. However, for FBI Director Kash Patel and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, this was their first worldwide threat testimony.
Year to year, the themes in the report and the testimony largely stay the same, and that was true this year as well. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, drugs, and transnational crime all featured. There was limited discussion in the hearings about terrorism; more detail is included in the ATA’s text, in particular about the threat from ISIS.
This year, top billing went to transnational crime, illegal border crossings, and drug trafficking. China, and particularly tech competition with China, featured prominently. Witnesses specifically mentioned advances in AI, quantum, and biotech as areas where the United States should be looking to understand and match China’s progress.
But there were two notable deviations in this year’s testimony: First, senators and congressmen spent a considerable amount of time discussing recent revelations that national security cabinet officials had discussed military strikes on a Signal group chat. These discussions, which centered on hitting Houthi positions in Yemen, accidentally included a reporter. Second, climate change fell out of the ATA as a top national security concern.
As is traditional, several members took the opportunity of a rare public hearing to thank the men and women of the intelligence community for their hard work and sacrifice behind the scenes. Spies don’t wear uniforms, they don’t get special discounts, they don’t get to board planes first, and rarely does anyone know about their all-nighters at work and intense tours away from families. Committee Vice Chair Mark Warner (D-VA) went on to criticize the administration for firing some intelligence officers, pointing out both the loss and the expense. Getting someone a security clearance costs tens of thousands of dollars; training them to be a competent intelligence officer easily reaches six figures, more for specialized tactical training. In the House hearing, witnesses said that the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) specifically had played no part in their personnel decisions. Patel, Ratcliffe, and Gabbard said DOGE had not been to their offices and had seen no harm to national security because of DOGE’s efficiency measures. However, Gabbard said that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is “going through our own internal assessments to ensure we are achieving the effects in an efficient way that is responsible to the American taxpayer,” strongly suggesting that ODNI is likely to see some staffing cuts in the near future.
What Was the Top Threat?
For the first time, witnesses named foreign illicit drug actors such as cartels as the number one threat to the United States. Intelligence chiefs pointed in particular to Mexico-based cartels that are smuggling fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into the United States. They cited the high death toll from drug overdoses: 52,000 Americans died last year, more than the number killed in attacks by foreign terrorists or foreign nations. Parents, friends, and families of those affected by drugs and drug violence will surely be encouraged to hear that the might of the intelligence community will be turned toward collecting actionable intelligence against these cartels and their suppliers, but this shift could be fraught with legal questions. This issue crosses the foreign-domestic divide—a tricky zone for intelligence agencies that are explicitly forbidden from operating inside U.S. borders. In the House hearing, Gabbard mentioned these challenges and assured members that ODNI is working toward seamless information sharing.
In the Senate hearing, Chairman Tom Cotton (R-AR) asked a pointed question: is there any reason to believe that China can’t effectively monitor and crack down on the flow of fentanyl and chemical precursors to the United States, given that Beijing is a “police state” that closely monitors citizen activity? CIA Director Ratcliffe responded, “There’s nothing to prevent China, the People’s Republic of China [PRC], from cracking down on fentanyl precursors.” He added that there are “more than 600 PRC-related companies that produce those precursor chemicals in an industry that generates $1.5 trillion.”
So That Signal Chat—What Happened?
This topic largely overshadowed the hearings. The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg revealed the day before the Senate hearing that Cabinet-level officials used an encrypted messaging app to discuss strikes against the Houthis. Somehow, Goldberg was included in the chat and was thus a spectator to a conversation between top administration officials about the timing and wisdom of conducting the strikes, then details about the strike package and an initial assessment of the effects of the strikes. The officials included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, Deputy Chief of Staff Scott Miller, Gabbard, and Ratcliffe, among others.
During the hearings, Gabbard and Ratcliffe took the opportunity to assert two important points: (1) No classified information, and certainly no “intelligence equities,” were discussed in the chat. (Goldberg implied in his article that including the name of a current CIA officer might have broken classification rules, but Ratcliffe said the officer is not under cover.) (2) Signal is an approved chat app for unclassified coordination conversations. Ratcliffe asserted several times that “It is permissible to use [Signal] to communicate and coordinate for work purposes, provided . . . that any decisions that are made are also recorded through formal channels.”
While some senators and congressmen were aghast at the assertion that prestrike operational details could be unclassified, that may well be true. As Ratcliffe pointed out, the secretary of defense is an original classification authority for defense information. There are some important technical points, like whether the information was classified when Hegseth got it, thus requiring him to formally declassify it before passing it along in open channels. But, broadly, if Hegseth, as secretary of defense, decided the information was unclassified, it was. This incident is a good reminder of why a secretary of defense must have excellent judgment—he holds the power to uncover the nation’s sensitive military activities at will.
The second question is about official records. For good practical and historical reasons, official government communications and decisions must be recorded. Aside from historians being sticklers about getting things right, the government needs to be able to refer to the official record to determine exactly what the president or principals decided to do. Changes in policy should be intentional, not a case of misremembering a meeting. Ratcliffe answered this point as well, contending that principals are allowed to have work conversations in Signal, as long as the results are recorded elsewhere. Indeed, the published contents of the Signal chat include Waltz referring to a “statement of conclusions,” which is the document that comes out of a Principals Committee meeting as an official record of the decisions the principals made. These were sent over a classified system, or the “high side.”
The validity of all these points will be tested in the coming weeks. Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has already promised a thorough review of the incident.
While Director of National Intelligence Gabbard largely ducked questions about the content of the chat and the wisdom of conducting business this way, Ratcliffe engaged more fully, acknowledging his role and insisting that he had passed along no classified information. That resulted in senators repeating his words back to him—sometimes inaccurately—leading to a debate about what he had and had not said. Any Hill staffer knows that this is a painful and unproductive way to fight through a hearing. The House hearing was much the same substantively but with more specific questions. By the morning of the House hearing, The Atlantic published nearly the full content of the chat, so members pushed Gabbard on whether specific information about the weapons systems and tick-tock of the flights would count as classified. She deferred to the secretary of defense.
The Senate hearing closed with a stark exchange. Senator Jon Ossoff (D-GA) asked Ratcliffe, “This was a huge mistake, correct?” Ratcliffe responded with one word: “No.”
What Did the Witnesses Say About Russia and the War in Ukraine?
Intelligence chiefs discussed the ongoing war in Europe, but they focused far more on other issues. For example, of the 15 senators, only two (both Republicans) asked questions about Ukraine, whereas every Democrat spent almost the entirety of their allotted time asking about the Signal chat. The director of DIA, Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kruse, said that Russia can sustain the fight longer than Ukraine due to its more robust domestic industrial base and relatively large population size, but that both countries will have a hard time sustaining beyond this year. Ratcliffe said that Russia has the battlefield advantage, but that the Ukrainians have been constantly underestimated in this fight, and that “they will fight with their bare hands if they need to.” That is a critically important point for an intelligence chief to make to policymakers who have decided the best way to force Ukraine to the negotiating table is to threaten to cut off military assistance. That lever may backfire.
Ratcliffe noted that “Trump has communicated that he is aware of the dangers of Russia getting everything it wants” in a peace deal with Ukraine, and that neither Russia nor Ukraine is likely to achieve the maximum version of their end goal. These are reassuring comments, given the administration’s very public pressure on Ukraine and seeming extended hand to Russia.
In the written Threat Assessment, the focus of the analytical line did seem to shift somewhat from last year. The opening line of the 2024 ATA’s Russia section states:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has resulted in enormous damage at home and abroad, but Russia remains a resilient and capable adversary across a wide range of domains and seeks to project and defend its interests globally and to undermine the United States and the West.
Then later it says:
Russia’s so-called special military operation against Ukraine has incurred major, lasting costs for Russia, failed to attain the complete subjugation of Ukraine that Putin initially sought, and rallied the West to defend against Russian aggression.
In 2025, the ATA leads with a view of the war from the Russian perspective:
Russia views its ongoing war in Ukraine as a proxy conflict with the West, and its objective to restore Russian strength and security in its near abroad against perceived U.S. and Western encroachment has increased the risks of unintended escalation between Russia and NATO.
And later:
Continuing the Russia-Ukraine war perpetuates strategic risks to the United States of unintended escalation to large-scale war, the potential use of nuclear weapons, heightened insecurity among NATO Allies, particularly in Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe, and a more emboldened China and North Korea.
Acknowledging the Russian view of the war is an important intelligence perspective. One needs to understand the enemy’s perspective to win, for sure. That said, the tone change from 2024 to 2025 is notable. All the points made in those four lines are true now and were true last year, but the choice of what to include in each assessment of the conflict is more divergent than one might anticipate. Side by side, it reads like two colleagues debating the pros and cons of a particular approach. (Much of the rest of the Russian section is substantially similar year to year, covering cyber operations, military capabilities, economic trends, and information operations.)
The intelligence chiefs also talked about the deeply concerning collaboration between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which has shown up in tangible ways on the battlefield in Ukraine. Gabbard said the four have “grown closer,” citing military aid from North Korea, military and financial backing from China, and drones from Iran. In exchange, Russia has provided advanced cyber capabilities and intelligence support to Iran. That depth of collaboration could allow Iran to level up its already aggressive cyber capabilities.
Gabbard said one more thing that should give all of Washington pause: Removing the “irritant” of war in Ukraine is unlikely to revert the relationship among these partners to its pre-2022 status. In other words, at a time when the United States is actively alienating allies, China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea are gathering strength.
What Did Witnesses Say About Support or Lack of Support for 702 Collection Authorities?
In the nomination hearings for Gabbard and Patel earlier this year, members of Congress asked tough questions about whether the nominees would support 702 authorities, given that both had opposed the program in the past. This intelligence program is responsible for many terrorist plots disrupted and counterintelligence threats ended, and an estimated 60 percent of the articles in the President’s daily intelligence brief contain some data collected under 702. However, this highly regulated, intensively overseen program has been controversial, with members of Congress seeking reassurances that the NSA and FBI are not abusing 702 to collect on Americans. (They’re not.)
So what are Gabbard and Patel’s opinions on 702 now that they are in the job? At the ATA hearings this week, both expressed support for the program, with particular verve in the House iteration of the hearing. Senator Ted Budd (R-NC) asked how effective the recent reforms have been in terms of protecting the civil liberties of Americans. Gabbard replied that 702 is “one of our most effective collection tools to ensure our national security.” She said that the reforms passed last year strengthen the protection of Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights and that she is visiting the NSA next week to do a “ride-along” to see how those reforms are being implemented. This is exactly the right answer, and her ride-along is a great idea—generally speaking when 702 skeptics meet the people doing the collection and see the intensive review process for the collection program, they understand that the program is very safe and exceedingly valuable. In the House hearing, Patel was vocal in his support for the program and also for the recent reforms. He said he had not yet seen a workable way to implement a warrant requirement without severely damaging the effectiveness of the program. Ratcliffe in the House hearing showed his support by revealing some striking statistics: He said 702 collection is responsible for 70 percent of the CIA’s work on advanced weapons counterproliferation and 90 percent of the CIA’s successful interdictions of synthetic drugs like fentanyl. He said 702 is “critical” and the loss of it would be “catastrophic” to the CIA.
What Did the Hearing Reveal About the Trump Administration’s Cybersecurity Priorities?
Cybersecurity—or lack thereof—was a topic of intense discussion at both hearings. Members highlighted that China has attacked the United States with both Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon in recent years, exposing weaknesses in the telecom sector and critical infrastructure, respectively; yet the Trump administration appears to be trimming talent at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Senator Angus King (I-ME) questioned why the Trump administration is shrinking CISA, despite recognizing the rising cyber threat. Gabbard said she is not informed on these staffing decisions, but that more people don’t always mean better effects.
Senator Mike Rounds (R-SD) asked the head of NSA and United States Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), Gen. Timothy Haugh, about “CYBERCOM 2.0.” Haugh said he is proceeding with planning on how to best manage, develop, and equip the cyber force, including providing them with the best compute power and AI tools. When asked about Volt Typhoon, Gen. Haugh responded that “99 percent of the critical infrastructure is controlled by private companies. That really drives us to talk about, ‘how do we partner with industries,’ in this case, the power sector. Volt Typhoon began when industry came to the intelligence community, said they were seeing anomalous activity. ‘Can you help us?’ . . . Since that time, we’ve continued to work very closely with industry. . . . It is a collaboration between government and industry to be able to eradicate these threats.” This collaboration is essential—the U.S. Intelligence Community is not allowed to monitor domestic networks due to civil liberties concerns, and CISA can be of limited help. Thus the only dependable way to spot a problem is if industry reports it.
Is China Still Considered a Top Threat?
China was another point of continuity between last year’s report and this year’s. Gabbard called China the United States’ most capable strategic competitor. For example, in the Senate hearing, she said, “Beijing is advancing its cyber capabilities for sophisticated operations aimed at stealing sensitive U.S. government and private sector information and prepositioning additional asymmetric attack options that may be deployed in a conflict.” In the House hearing, Patel emphasized the danger of Chinese-affiliated entities purchasing land near U.S. military bases and said the FBI would be happy to enforce a law against such purchases if such a law were to exist.
Much of the China discussion featured the tech competition, or the race to create technologies that might give China or the United States a strategic edge in a conflict but also in economic competition. Ratcliffe highlighted that the next real point of contention between the United States and the PRC will be in quantum, promising a larger discussion in the closed hearing. Gabbard noted Beijing’s development of generative AI.
What Was Missing from the Report and Testimony?
Because of all the questions about the Signal chat during Senate testimony, members did not get to talk much about the need to maintain strong intelligence relationships with global partners. The House version of the hearing discussed it more, in particular, the value of the Five Eyes alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the power of intelligence sharing to demonstrate to targets of China and Russia the perils of succumbing to their influence. Indeed, intelligence is a team sport—allies and partners can collect in places where the United States cannot. Intelligence sharing saves money, in particular on expensive systems like satellites and in hiring quite specific skill sets. Intelligence relationships have proven resilient through past political crises, and any intelligence professional will hope that remains true despite friction with long-standing friends.
Also missing was climate change. Senator King, who has served on the Senate Intelligence Committee for 11 years, hit this point directly: “Every single one of these reports that we have has mentioned global climate change as a significant national security threat, except this one. Has something happened? Has climate change been solved? Why is that not in this report, and who made the decision that it should not be included, given that it has been in every one of the eleven prior reports?” Gabbard responded, “I can’t speak to the decisions made previously, but this annual threat assessment has focused very directly on the threats that we deem most critical to the United States and our national security. Obviously, we are aware of occurrences within the environment and how they might impact operations, but we’re focused on direct threats to American safety.”
Emily Harding is the director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C. Julia Dickson is a research associate for the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at CSIS.
