Contents:
- Syria reignites, shaking Assad’s hold across the country
- The cease-fire is a start, but only a strong, sovereign Lebanese state can ensure lasting security
- The Lebanon cease-fire — a means to Netanyahu’s end
- Populist opposition party leader Imran Khan played his best card against the Pakistani government but came up short
Syria reignites, shaking Assad’s hold across the country
Charles Lister
Senior Fellow, Director of Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism programs
In only six days, a broad coalition of advancing opposition forces coordinated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has captured all of Idlib province, almost all of Aleppo province, and a sizeable stretch of northern Hama — a humiliating defeat for Bashar al-Assad and illustrative of the fragility of regime rule in Syria.
The sudden opposition surge and resulting regime collapse in northern Syria has inspired opposition-leaning actors elsewhere across the country to rise up, underlining the extent to which Syria’s crisis was never over or truly frozen, as some have claimed.
Syria’s crisis dramatically escalated last week, as a broad armed opposition coalition advanced rapidly, capturing all of Idlib province, almost all of Aleppo province, and a sizeable stretch of northern Hama — all in the span of five days. Most consequentially, the opposition is now in control of Aleppo city, along with its international airport and three airbases in its southern countryside. Bashar al-Assad’s regime fought ferociously from 2012 to 2016 to recapture half the city, so losing it so quickly represents a humiliating defeat and illustrates the fragility of regime rule in Syria. All in all, Syria’s opposition has now more than doubled the territory under their control.
The offensive is being coordinated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) but includes the entire breadth of Syria’s armed opposition. Their campaign, codenamed Operation Deter Aggression, was initially intended to seize control of Aleppo’s western countryside, from where regime forces had been indiscriminately shelling civilian communities since 2020, when a Turkish-Russian cease-fire was agreed. The speed with which that objective was achieved, all on Day 1, led to a rapid expansion of the opposition’s goals, while regime front lines simply collapsed, one after the other.
Six days later, regime forces appear to be attempting to hold the line just north of Hama city, where opposition fighters are currently 15 km from the provincial capital. That region has long been a bastion of regime military strength, but a persistent 24-hour attack by HTS and other factions has secured control of the key regime defensive line towns of Qalaat al-Mudiq, Taybet al-Imam, Halfaya, and Maardes. The fighting there has reportedly been intense, with heavy casualties.
Meanwhile, the HTS-led coalition has been advancing throughout Aleppo’s strategically vital southern countryside. In doing so, the opposition has taken control of at least five military bases, seizing dozens of tanks, armored personnel carriers, air-defense systems, several Syrian Air Force jets, at least one helicopter, as well as huge quantities of artillery rockets, anti-tank missiles, and other ammunition. Such seizures will prove enormously significant in building a meaningful defense to whatever pro-regime counter-offensive will develop in the coming weeks and months.
While this dramatic campaign has expanded, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has joined the fray, launching a concerted offensive against the town of Tel Rifat and its surrounding rural region located north of Aleppo. For several years, the town has been controlled jointly by the regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), but regime forces abandoned their positions over the weekend, leaving the SDF as its sole defender. The SNA has since taken the town.
Meanwhile, the sudden opposition surge and resulting regime collapse in northern Syria has inspired opposition-leaning actors elsewhere to rise up, challenging regime authority. In parts of Homs in the center of the country, regime forces were ambushed by former opposition fighters several times over the weekend, while in the southern province of Daraa, armed gunmen have taken over regime police stations, intelligence headquarters, and checkpoints, while beginning small-scale insurgent attacks.
All these recent developments serve to underline the extent to which Syria’s crisis was never over, as some have claimed — and neither was it truly frozen either. For years, the United States and much of the international community have disengaged from the Syria file; but as has so often been the case with unresolved crises, they tend to precipitously explode eventually and draw the world back in.
Follow: @Charles_Lister
The cease-fire is a start, but only a strong, sovereign Lebanese state can ensure lasting security
Fadi Nicholas Nassar
US-Lebanon Fellow
The fragile Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire is merely the beginning and building on it requires a broader, bolder strategy that addresses the root causes that have transformed Lebanon into a regional battleground in the first place.
Only the Lebanese can reclaim their future, but the current leadership in Beirut has neither the legitimacy nor the credibility to lead the nation out of war; a strong, sovereign Lebanese state, free from the shadow of Hezbollah’s weapons, is needed to ensure lasting security.
Last week’s cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah offers a fragile respite for those who have borne the heaviest toll. But this tenuous deal, which ends more than 13 months of conflict, is not the final destination; rather, it is a first step and its future is far from certain. While public assurances from Washington maintain that the cease-fire is holding, it stands on shaky ground. Already, the cease-fire is being tested. Israeli strikes have hit Lebanon, Hezbollah rockets have struck the Shebaa Farms, and the language of war grows louder.
At its core, the cease-fire builds on the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, but with some important changes focused on how to actually implement a resolution that in practice never really came into force. In a 60-day period, Israel is to gradually withdraw its troops from Lebanon as Hezbollah removes its weaponry from the key buffer zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River. Unlike in 2006 though, a US-led monitoring committee will oversee violations — and Israel has vowed to intervene military if they occur. But for all the intentions about addressing the challenges of actually implementing the deal, it still appears largely reliant on the voluntary compliance of the belligerents. In other words, a breach, especially if the latest conflagration leads to a major military escalation, could unravel everything.
And that is a price Lebanon simply cannot afford. More than 1.3 million people have been displaced during the conflict, while the World Bank has estimated total economic damages and losses caused by the war have reached $8.5 billion, including the destruction of around 100,000 homes. Compounding this humanitarian crisis is Lebanon’s ongoing economic collapse, which began in 2019 and has thrust the majority of its population into poverty.
The US and its partners must recognize that this cease-fire is merely the beginning and necessitates a broader, bolder strategy. The focus must decisively move from the cessation of violence to the dismantling of the root causes that have transformed Lebanon into a regional battleground: its governance vacuum, its economic collapse, and the systemic hijacking of its sovereignty.
Only the Lebanese can authentically represent their nation’s interests and reclaim their future. But the current leadership in Beirut, which has abdicated Lebanon’s sovereignty throughout this conflict, has neither the legitimacy nor the credibility to lead the nation out of war, implement any deal, or rebuild the country. Their failure is total and irreversible.
There is one key determinant to lasting security and it is that a strong, sovereign Lebanese state emerges out of this war, free from the shadow of Hezbollah’s weapons. As the US and its partners must remember, soon after its last war with Israel in 2006, Hezbollah turned its weapons on the Lebanese themselves. Only when Lebanon is free from the threat of political violence can a credible state emerge as a reliable partner — one capable of implementing a lasting deal, driving the reforms needed to unlock international aid and investment, and rebuilding a battered country.
Follow: @dr_nickfn
The Lebanon cease-fire — a means to Netanyahu’s end
Eran Etzion
Non-Resident Scholar
Given his legal troubles and growing pressure at home and internationally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s main motivation to agree to what he deliberately calls “a pause” in fighting in Lebanon was the need to buy 60 days of US inaction until incoming President Donald Trump takes office.
Netanyahu continues to play for time and tightens his grip on power to escape criminal consequences of his actions, unleashing a barrage of anti-democratic pieces of legislation, nominations, and regulations.
The “understandings” between Israel and Lebanon (i.e. Hezbollah), reached thanks in large part to the diplomatic efforts of the United States and France, do not constitute the most thorough or ironclad cease-fire agreement imaginable. In fact, one could argue this arrangement is weaker than its “parent” — United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 — in terms of the depth of international consensus. But from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s perspective, as a newly minted fugitive wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and as an age-old anti-multinationalist politician, constructing a make-shift “monitoring mechanism” led by the US was preferable to a new UN resolution or an upgrading of the mandate given to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Arguably, this is probably also yet another reflection of the UN system’s overall degradation and ineffectiveness.
Hezbollah was forced into a humiliating delinking of Lebanon from Gaza, thus putting into question its entire rationale for entangling Lebanon in the war to begin with. The Iran-backed militant group also suffered significant battlefield losses and will need a long time to recuperate.
However, it succeeded in setting impressive precedents in a war against Israel that will echo for decades: shutting down the northern part of the country, from Haifa to the border, for many months, forcing the evacuation of some 60,000 Israelis for more than a year, and inflicting considerable damage to Israeli infrastructure and private residences.
In Israel, the conventional wisdom has become “we won, and we won’t allow Oct. 6 to return.” In other words, any attempted buildup of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, certainly on the border or south of the so-called Litani+ line, as delineated in an annex to the agreement, will be met with immediate military counteraction.
Of course, this arrangement will be very hard to enforce, which will lead to regular clashes. As a case in point, on Monday, France announced that within the first few days of implementation Israel had already violated the agreement on 52 separate occasions.
Netanyahu’s main motivation to agree to what he deliberately calls “a pause” in fighting was the need to buy 60 days of US inaction until incoming President Donald Trump takes office. There was also a credible report by journalist Barak Ravid that Trump wants both the Lebanon and Gaza fronts to be calmed down before his inauguration, on Jan. 20.
Meanwhile, public pressure on Netanyahu is mounting on multiple fronts — the demand that his government secure the release of the remaining hostages held in Gaza before most or all of them perish; the need to give Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reservists a much-needed rest and to replenish the military’s arms and munitions; the legal proceedings against the prime minister and some of his advisors; and the growing public insistence on the establishment of a national investigative committee that would look into the events of Oct. 7 and the ensuing war.
Netanyahu continues to play for time and tighten his grip on power to escape criminal consequences of his actions, unleashing a barrage of anti-democratic pieces of legislation, nominations, and regulations. He sees a kindred spirit in Trump. The war in Gaza, the fragile agreement with Lebanon, and the renewed alarmism over Iran and its nuclear threat are all a means to an end — holding on to power, as absolutely as possible.
Follow: @eranetzion
Populist opposition party leader Imran Khan played his best card against the Pakistani government but came up short
Marvin G. Weinbaum
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies
Protests organized in Islamabad by incarcerated Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party resulted in several deaths and hundreds of arrests.
PTI leadership is in disarray and pointing fingers, as Khan remains in jail; and the ruling coalition government appears unmoved by expressions of international support for Khan’s cause.
Opposition party leader Imran Khan’s not-so-secret weapon in his efforts to gain release from prison and reclaim national political power has been his enormous popularity among a majority of Pakistanis. But repeatedly, Khan has failed in attempts to instrumentalize this seeming political advantage. Last week saw the latest and perhaps most consequential push to mobilize his supporters to bring down the ruling coalition government. Yet by week’s end, Khan played his best card and came up well short. The government’s law enforcement forces in Islamabad held firm, forcibly dispersing the tens of thousands of demonstrators, most from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and led by Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi, along with Khan’s major ally from the province, Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur.
As the protests threatened to develop into a bloody confrontation, Khan is said to have advised his wife to shift his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party’s demonstrations to the outskirts of Islamabad. An intransigent Bibi reportedly ignored his instructions, however, and insisted that the demonstrators should follow the original plan and occupy the area directly facing the most prominent government buildings in the capital’s so-called Red Zone for a prolonged sit-in. In the ensuing violence, as in the preceding clashes, hundreds were arrested and several protesters as well as police and paramilitary forces were killed. Though Bibi had promised “to protest until her last breath,” she and Gandapur chose to flee the scene.
In retrospect, for all their eagerness for a fight, the protest campaign’s architects neglected to lay the groundwork required for a successful operation. They lacked the institutional backing, party alliances, and logistical measures needed to carry out their plans. Also noticeably absent were the thousands of expected protesters from the all-important Punjab. With Pakistan’s largest province under the control of Chief Minister Mariam Sharif, daughter of Prime Minster Shehbaz Sharif, roads were blocked and the internet shut down to stop organized demonstrators from reaching the federal capital. If the PTI leaders had anticipated that the economic fallout resulting from blocked supply lines and shuttered city markets during the leadup to the Islamabad showdown would induce the government to make concessions, they ended up disappointed. Many of Khan’s loyalists had also hoped that the broad expression of international support for Khan’s cause as ostensibly an embodiment of democracy would sway the government and military; but these too have had no apparent impact.
A possible outcome from the PTI’s disastrous attempt to force political change may well be a renewed effort in the parliament to ban the party and a further resolve by the establishment to keep Khan locked up for the foreseeable future. But if the intent of the government and the military is only to degrade the PTI, its job has been made easier by the opposition party’s growing disarray. From all indications, its command structure has collapsed, with several leaders resigning and a blame game in progress. To stay relevant as a parliamentary actor and retain its political aspirations, the PTI must find a way to reach an accommodation with the military; after all, the party’s falling out with the generals has been the underlying cause of its setbacks in recent years.
Research assistant Naade Ali contributed to this piece.
Follow: @mgweinbaum
Photo by AAREF WATAD/AFP via Getty Image
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.
Contents:
- Syria reignites, shaking Assad’s hold across the country
- The cease-fire is a start, but only a strong, sovereign Lebanese state can ensure lasting security
- The Lebanon cease-fire — a means to Netanyahu’s end
- Populist opposition party leader Imran Khan played his best card against the Pakistani government but came up short
Syria reignites, shaking Assad’s hold across the country
Charles Lister
Senior Fellow, Director of Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism programs
In only six days, a broad coalition of advancing opposition forces coordinated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has captured all of Idlib province, almost all of Aleppo province, and a sizeable stretch of northern Hama — a humiliating defeat for Bashar al-Assad and illustrative of the fragility of regime rule in Syria.
The sudden opposition surge and resulting regime collapse in northern Syria has inspired opposition-leaning actors elsewhere across the country to rise up, underlining the extent to which Syria’s crisis was never over or truly frozen, as some have claimed.
Syria’s crisis dramatically escalated last week, as a broad armed opposition coalition advanced rapidly, capturing all of Idlib province, almost all of Aleppo province, and a sizeable stretch of northern Hama — all in the span of five days. Most consequentially, the opposition is now in control of Aleppo city, along with its international airport and three airbases in its southern countryside. Bashar al-Assad’s regime fought ferociously from 2012 to 2016 to recapture half the city, so losing it so quickly represents a humiliating defeat and illustrates the fragility of regime rule in Syria. All in all, Syria’s opposition has now more than doubled the territory under their control.
The offensive is being coordinated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) but includes the entire breadth of Syria’s armed opposition. Their campaign, codenamed Operation Deter Aggression, was initially intended to seize control of Aleppo’s western countryside, from where regime forces had been indiscriminately shelling civilian communities since 2020, when a Turkish-Russian cease-fire was agreed. The speed with which that objective was achieved, all on Day 1, led to a rapid expansion of the opposition’s goals, while regime front lines simply collapsed, one after the other.
Six days later, regime forces appear to be attempting to hold the line just north of Hama city, where opposition fighters are currently 15 km from the provincial capital. That region has long been a bastion of regime military strength, but a persistent 24-hour attack by HTS and other factions has secured control of the key regime defensive line towns of Qalaat al-Mudiq, Taybet al-Imam, Halfaya, and Maardes. The fighting there has reportedly been intense, with heavy casualties.
Meanwhile, the HTS-led coalition has been advancing throughout Aleppo’s strategically vital southern countryside. In doing so, the opposition has taken control of at least five military bases, seizing dozens of tanks, armored personnel carriers, air-defense systems, several Syrian Air Force jets, at least one helicopter, as well as huge quantities of artillery rockets, anti-tank missiles, and other ammunition. Such seizures will prove enormously significant in building a meaningful defense to whatever pro-regime counter-offensive will develop in the coming weeks and months.
While this dramatic campaign has expanded, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has joined the fray, launching a concerted offensive against the town of Tel Rifat and its surrounding rural region located north of Aleppo. For several years, the town has been controlled jointly by the regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), but regime forces abandoned their positions over the weekend, leaving the SDF as its sole defender. The SNA has since taken the town.
Meanwhile, the sudden opposition surge and resulting regime collapse in northern Syria has inspired opposition-leaning actors elsewhere to rise up, challenging regime authority. In parts of Homs in the center of the country, regime forces were ambushed by former opposition fighters several times over the weekend, while in the southern province of Daraa, armed gunmen have taken over regime police stations, intelligence headquarters, and checkpoints, while beginning small-scale insurgent attacks.
All these recent developments serve to underline the extent to which Syria’s crisis was never over, as some have claimed — and neither was it truly frozen either. For years, the United States and much of the international community have disengaged from the Syria file; but as has so often been the case with unresolved crises, they tend to precipitously explode eventually and draw the world back in.
Follow: @Charles_Lister
The cease-fire is a start, but only a strong, sovereign Lebanese state can ensure lasting security
Fadi Nicholas Nassar
US-Lebanon Fellow
The fragile Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire is merely the beginning and building on it requires a broader, bolder strategy that addresses the root causes that have transformed Lebanon into a regional battleground in the first place.
Only the Lebanese can reclaim their future, but the current leadership in Beirut has neither the legitimacy nor the credibility to lead the nation out of war; a strong, sovereign Lebanese state, free from the shadow of Hezbollah’s weapons, is needed to ensure lasting security.
Last week’s cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah offers a fragile respite for those who have borne the heaviest toll. But this tenuous deal, which ends more than 13 months of conflict, is not the final destination; rather, it is a first step and its future is far from certain. While public assurances from Washington maintain that the cease-fire is holding, it stands on shaky ground. Already, the cease-fire is being tested. Israeli strikes have hit Lebanon, Hezbollah rockets have struck the Shebaa Farms, and the language of war grows louder.
At its core, the cease-fire builds on the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, but with some important changes focused on how to actually implement a resolution that in practice never really came into force. In a 60-day period, Israel is to gradually withdraw its troops from Lebanon as Hezbollah removes its weaponry from the key buffer zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River. Unlike in 2006 though, a US-led monitoring committee will oversee violations — and Israel has vowed to intervene military if they occur. But for all the intentions about addressing the challenges of actually implementing the deal, it still appears largely reliant on the voluntary compliance of the belligerents. In other words, a breach, especially if the latest conflagration leads to a major military escalation, could unravel everything.
And that is a price Lebanon simply cannot afford. More than 1.3 million people have been displaced during the conflict, while the World Bank has estimated total economic damages and losses caused by the war have reached $8.5 billion, including the destruction of around 100,000 homes. Compounding this humanitarian crisis is Lebanon’s ongoing economic collapse, which began in 2019 and has thrust the majority of its population into poverty.
The US and its partners must recognize that this cease-fire is merely the beginning and necessitates a broader, bolder strategy. The focus must decisively move from the cessation of violence to the dismantling of the root causes that have transformed Lebanon into a regional battleground: its governance vacuum, its economic collapse, and the systemic hijacking of its sovereignty.
Only the Lebanese can authentically represent their nation’s interests and reclaim their future. But the current leadership in Beirut, which has abdicated Lebanon’s sovereignty throughout this conflict, has neither the legitimacy nor the credibility to lead the nation out of war, implement any deal, or rebuild the country. Their failure is total and irreversible.
There is one key determinant to lasting security and it is that a strong, sovereign Lebanese state emerges out of this war, free from the shadow of Hezbollah’s weapons. As the US and its partners must remember, soon after its last war with Israel in 2006, Hezbollah turned its weapons on the Lebanese themselves. Only when Lebanon is free from the threat of political violence can a credible state emerge as a reliable partner — one capable of implementing a lasting deal, driving the reforms needed to unlock international aid and investment, and rebuilding a battered country.
Follow: @dr_nickfn
The Lebanon cease-fire — a means to Netanyahu’s end
Eran Etzion
Non-Resident Scholar
Given his legal troubles and growing pressure at home and internationally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s main motivation to agree to what he deliberately calls “a pause” in fighting in Lebanon was the need to buy 60 days of US inaction until incoming President Donald Trump takes office.
Netanyahu continues to play for time and tightens his grip on power to escape criminal consequences of his actions, unleashing a barrage of anti-democratic pieces of legislation, nominations, and regulations.
The “understandings” between Israel and Lebanon (i.e. Hezbollah), reached thanks in large part to the diplomatic efforts of the United States and France, do not constitute the most thorough or ironclad cease-fire agreement imaginable. In fact, one could argue this arrangement is weaker than its “parent” — United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 — in terms of the depth of international consensus. But from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s perspective, as a newly minted fugitive wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and as an age-old anti-multinationalist politician, constructing a make-shift “monitoring mechanism” led by the US was preferable to a new UN resolution or an upgrading of the mandate given to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Arguably, this is probably also yet another reflection of the UN system’s overall degradation and ineffectiveness.
Hezbollah was forced into a humiliating delinking of Lebanon from Gaza, thus putting into question its entire rationale for entangling Lebanon in the war to begin with. The Iran-backed militant group also suffered significant battlefield losses and will need a long time to recuperate.
However, it succeeded in setting impressive precedents in a war against Israel that will echo for decades: shutting down the northern part of the country, from Haifa to the border, for many months, forcing the evacuation of some 60,000 Israelis for more than a year, and inflicting considerable damage to Israeli infrastructure and private residences.
In Israel, the conventional wisdom has become “we won, and we won’t allow Oct. 6 to return.” In other words, any attempted buildup of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, certainly on the border or south of the so-called Litani+ line, as delineated in an annex to the agreement, will be met with immediate military counteraction.
Of course, this arrangement will be very hard to enforce, which will lead to regular clashes. As a case in point, on Monday, France announced that within the first few days of implementation Israel had already violated the agreement on 52 separate occasions.
Netanyahu’s main motivation to agree to what he deliberately calls “a pause” in fighting was the need to buy 60 days of US inaction until incoming President Donald Trump takes office. There was also a credible report by journalist Barak Ravid that Trump wants both the Lebanon and Gaza fronts to be calmed down before his inauguration, on Jan. 20.
Meanwhile, public pressure on Netanyahu is mounting on multiple fronts — the demand that his government secure the release of the remaining hostages held in Gaza before most or all of them perish; the need to give Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reservists a much-needed rest and to replenish the military’s arms and munitions; the legal proceedings against the prime minister and some of his advisors; and the growing public insistence on the establishment of a national investigative committee that would look into the events of Oct. 7 and the ensuing war.
Netanyahu continues to play for time and tighten his grip on power to escape criminal consequences of his actions, unleashing a barrage of anti-democratic pieces of legislation, nominations, and regulations. He sees a kindred spirit in Trump. The war in Gaza, the fragile agreement with Lebanon, and the renewed alarmism over Iran and its nuclear threat are all a means to an end — holding on to power, as absolutely as possible.
Follow: @eranetzion
Populist opposition party leader Imran Khan played his best card against the Pakistani government but came up short
Marvin G. Weinbaum
Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies
Protests organized in Islamabad by incarcerated Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party resulted in several deaths and hundreds of arrests.
PTI leadership is in disarray and pointing fingers, as Khan remains in jail; and the ruling coalition government appears unmoved by expressions of international support for Khan’s cause.
Opposition party leader Imran Khan’s not-so-secret weapon in his efforts to gain release from prison and reclaim national political power has been his enormous popularity among a majority of Pakistanis. But repeatedly, Khan has failed in attempts to instrumentalize this seeming political advantage. Last week saw the latest and perhaps most consequential push to mobilize his supporters to bring down the ruling coalition government. Yet by week’s end, Khan played his best card and came up well short. The government’s law enforcement forces in Islamabad held firm, forcibly dispersing the tens of thousands of demonstrators, most from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and led by Khan’s wife, Bushra Bibi, along with Khan’s major ally from the province, Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur.
As the protests threatened to develop into a bloody confrontation, Khan is said to have advised his wife to shift his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party’s demonstrations to the outskirts of Islamabad. An intransigent Bibi reportedly ignored his instructions, however, and insisted that the demonstrators should follow the original plan and occupy the area directly facing the most prominent government buildings in the capital’s so-called Red Zone for a prolonged sit-in. In the ensuing violence, as in the preceding clashes, hundreds were arrested and several protesters as well as police and paramilitary forces were killed. Though Bibi had promised “to protest until her last breath,” she and Gandapur chose to flee the scene.
In retrospect, for all their eagerness for a fight, the protest campaign’s architects neglected to lay the groundwork required for a successful operation. They lacked the institutional backing, party alliances, and logistical measures needed to carry out their plans. Also noticeably absent were the thousands of expected protesters from the all-important Punjab. With Pakistan’s largest province under the control of Chief Minister Mariam Sharif, daughter of Prime Minster Shehbaz Sharif, roads were blocked and the internet shut down to stop organized demonstrators from reaching the federal capital. If the PTI leaders had anticipated that the economic fallout resulting from blocked supply lines and shuttered city markets during the leadup to the Islamabad showdown would induce the government to make concessions, they ended up disappointed. Many of Khan’s loyalists had also hoped that the broad expression of international support for Khan’s cause as ostensibly an embodiment of democracy would sway the government and military; but these too have had no apparent impact.
A possible outcome from the PTI’s disastrous attempt to force political change may well be a renewed effort in the parliament to ban the party and a further resolve by the establishment to keep Khan locked up for the foreseeable future. But if the intent of the government and the military is only to degrade the PTI, its job has been made easier by the opposition party’s growing disarray. From all indications, its command structure has collapsed, with several leaders resigning and a blame game in progress. To stay relevant as a parliamentary actor and retain its political aspirations, the PTI must find a way to reach an accommodation with the military; after all, the party’s falling out with the generals has been the underlying cause of its setbacks in recent years.
Research assistant Naade Ali contributed to this piece.
Follow: @mgweinbaum
Photo by AAREF WATAD/AFP via Getty Image
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.
