Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Operation Midnight Hammer—the Pentagon’s name for the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities—was a high-tech advertisement for the precision and reach of American airpower. Time will tell whether it proves decisive, but early indications leave room for doubt.
More on:
As described at a Pentagon press conference by Air Force General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seven B-2 Stealth bombers took off from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri shortly after midnight on June 21. The pilots flew a roundtrip mission of more than 14,000 miles to deliver fourteen “bunker buster” bombs, each weighing 30,000 pounds, on two of Iran’s nuclear sites—Fordow and Natanz. Shortly after these Massive Ordinance Penetrators impacted their carefully chosen “aim points,” fourteen Tomahawk cruise missiles fired by a U.S. submarine in the region hit the Isfahan nuclear facility.
More than 125 aircraft took part in the operation, ranging from fighter aircraft that escorted the giant bombers to fleets of aerial tankers that refueled them on this globe-spanning mission that lasted nearly 20 hours. Other B-2 bombers acted as decoys and flew at the same time toward the Pacific—a deployment that was widely reported by the media and on the Internet.
The entire operation was precisely planned and brilliantly executed, even if it remains unclear whether the Iranian nuclear infrastructure was eradicated or just damaged. Although we have come to take such strikes for granted, there is no other country in the world that has these assets and capabilities and in such considerable numbers. Israel has a formidable air force of its own—with highly trained pilots flying U.S.-made aircraft—but it does not have the Massive Ordnance Penetrators or the heavy bombers needed to carry them. Those “bunker busters” were the only ones that stood any chance of penetrating Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facility at Fordow, which is why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was so anxious for U.S. involvement.
But if the United States has such cutting-edge, best-in-class military equipment, why has it struggled to win wars in recent decades? Why are so many of these conflicts—most notably Iraq, Afghanistan, or even the recent U.S. campaign against the Houthis—a study in frustration and failure? The answer is that airpower has limits, which President Donald Trump may soon discover.
Why Decisive Wins Have Been Out of Reach
Army and Marine officers love to cite a quote from historian T.R. Fehrenbach’s classic history of the Korean War: “Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.”
More on:
Air Power and Military Aircraft
Despite the impressive advances in airpower since the 1950s—and the advent of the kind of precision-guided munitions employed in Saturday’s strike—Fehrenbach’s words are as relevant as ever and explains why it is difficult to win a war decisively. In most cases, military victories require occupying enemy territory and some form of state building. This process automatically exposes ground troops to risk far beyond any encountered by advanced aircraft operating over countries that either lack advanced air defenses or have had their air advances neutralized in advance (as the Israelis did in Iran).
In Iraq and Afghanistan, which involved extensive air strikes and an eventual ground force occupation, U.S. troops found themselves in a grinding guerrilla war against brutal but low-tech foes. And now Israel, despite its ability to mount impressive strikes against a country located a thousand miles away, is still struggling to pacify the Gaza Strip next door 20 months after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack that sparked the current regional conflict. Although the Israeli Defense Forces have inflicted substantial damage on Hamas—in the process killing large numbers of Palestinian civilians and razing their homes—they have not been able to end the war, because they are afraid that as soon as Israeli troops leave, the terrorist group will spring back up out of the rubble.
Iran’s Waiting Game
What will happen now in Iran is anyone’s guess, but there is little likelihood of Iran signing an “unconditional surrender”—as demanded last week by Trump—and bringing this conflict to a swift conclusion. More likely, Iran will try to wait out Israel and the United States, while striking back in some manner to save face after this humiliating setback.
If Iran does retaliate, the United States may launch more air strikes and possibly escalate the conflict further. But there is little chance of either Israel or the United States sending ground troops to invade Iran because of the risk of another quagmire in a nation that has twice the population of Iraq, or more than 90 million people.
Many in Israel and the United States hope that the air strikes will prompt Iran’s people to rise up against their government, but this is unlikely. The history of air strikes, going back to the days of the London Blitz in 1940, is that civilians under assault from the skies rally around their leaders rather than rebel against them. Governments usually get overthrown—think of Argentina after the 1982 Falkland Islands War or Serbia after the 1999 Kosovo War—only after losing wars that involved both air and ground operations.
The Nuclear Deterrence Challenge
The best-case scenario for the air strikes is that they will set back the Iranian nuclear program for several years, but even this is uncertain. While Trump has insisted that the nuclear facilities targeted by the United States have been “completely obliterated,” Israeli officials told the New York Times that the underground complex in Fordow had been damaged but not destroyed and that the Iranians had moved nuclear material out of the site before the U.S. attack. Moreover, CNN reported that the tunnels beneath the Isfahan complex, where some of Iran’s highly enriched uranium was stored, were not touched by the air strikes. Administration officials have also admitted they are not sure what happened to the 900 pounds of near weapons-grade uranium that Iran had built up before Israel’s campaign.
Whatever the damage to Iran’s existing nuclear program, Iran retains the knowledge necessary to restart operations and may now be tempted to push toward a bomb to deter further attacks. Unless Iran reaches an international agreement to stop all nuclear activities—which seems unlikely at this juncture—Israel and the United States may wind up deciding to strike again at some point in the future.
This shows the limits of airpower, even when it is being employed by the United States, with its vaunted capabilities, precision, and reach. While U.S. airstrikes can cause tremendous damage, they cannot overthrow a government or bend it to America’s will. In other words, airpower cannot end a threat—it can only degrade or contain it.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
Trump’s Iran Attack Was Impressive, but Airpower Has Its Limits
Despite the impressive advances in airpower since the 1950s—like the precision-guided munitions employed in Saturday’s attack—there is only so much airstrikes can accomplish.
June 22, 2025 8:53 pm (EST)
- Expert Brief
- CFR scholars provide expert analysis and commentary on international issues.
Max Boot is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Operation Midnight Hammer—the Pentagon’s name for the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities—was a high-tech advertisement for the precision and reach of American airpower. Time will tell whether it proves decisive, but early indications leave room for doubt.
More on:
As described at a Pentagon press conference by Air Force General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seven B-2 Stealth bombers took off from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri shortly after midnight on June 21. The pilots flew a roundtrip mission of more than 14,000 miles to deliver fourteen “bunker buster” bombs, each weighing 30,000 pounds, on two of Iran’s nuclear sites—Fordow and Natanz. Shortly after these Massive Ordinance Penetrators impacted their carefully chosen “aim points,” fourteen Tomahawk cruise missiles fired by a U.S. submarine in the region hit the Isfahan nuclear facility.
More than 125 aircraft took part in the operation, ranging from fighter aircraft that escorted the giant bombers to fleets of aerial tankers that refueled them on this globe-spanning mission that lasted nearly 20 hours. Other B-2 bombers acted as decoys and flew at the same time toward the Pacific—a deployment that was widely reported by the media and on the Internet.
The entire operation was precisely planned and brilliantly executed, even if it remains unclear whether the Iranian nuclear infrastructure was eradicated or just damaged. Although we have come to take such strikes for granted, there is no other country in the world that has these assets and capabilities and in such considerable numbers. Israel has a formidable air force of its own—with highly trained pilots flying U.S.-made aircraft—but it does not have the Massive Ordnance Penetrators or the heavy bombers needed to carry them. Those “bunker busters” were the only ones that stood any chance of penetrating Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facility at Fordow, which is why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was so anxious for U.S. involvement.
But if the United States has such cutting-edge, best-in-class military equipment, why has it struggled to win wars in recent decades? Why are so many of these conflicts—most notably Iraq, Afghanistan, or even the recent U.S. campaign against the Houthis—a study in frustration and failure? The answer is that airpower has limits, which President Donald Trump may soon discover.
Why Decisive Wins Have Been Out of Reach
Army and Marine officers love to cite a quote from historian T.R. Fehrenbach’s classic history of the Korean War: “Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.”
More on:
Despite the impressive advances in airpower since the 1950s—and the advent of the kind of precision-guided munitions employed in Saturday’s strike—Fehrenbach’s words are as relevant as ever and explains why it is difficult to win a war decisively. In most cases, military victories require occupying enemy territory and some form of state building. This process automatically exposes ground troops to risk far beyond any encountered by advanced aircraft operating over countries that either lack advanced air defenses or have had their air advances neutralized in advance (as the Israelis did in Iran).
In Iraq and Afghanistan, which involved extensive air strikes and an eventual ground force occupation, U.S. troops found themselves in a grinding guerrilla war against brutal but low-tech foes. And now Israel, despite its ability to mount impressive strikes against a country located a thousand miles away, is still struggling to pacify the Gaza Strip next door 20 months after the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack that sparked the current regional conflict. Although the Israeli Defense Forces have inflicted substantial damage on Hamas—in the process killing large numbers of Palestinian civilians and razing their homes—they have not been able to end the war, because they are afraid that as soon as Israeli troops leave, the terrorist group will spring back up out of the rubble.
Iran’s Waiting Game
What will happen now in Iran is anyone’s guess, but there is little likelihood of Iran signing an “unconditional surrender”—as demanded last week by Trump—and bringing this conflict to a swift conclusion. More likely, Iran will try to wait out Israel and the United States, while striking back in some manner to save face after this humiliating setback.
If Iran does retaliate, the United States may launch more air strikes and possibly escalate the conflict further. But there is little chance of either Israel or the United States sending ground troops to invade Iran because of the risk of another quagmire in a nation that has twice the population of Iraq, or more than 90 million people.
Many in Israel and the United States hope that the air strikes will prompt Iran’s people to rise up against their government, but this is unlikely. The history of air strikes, going back to the days of the London Blitz in 1940, is that civilians under assault from the skies rally around their leaders rather than rebel against them. Governments usually get overthrown—think of Argentina after the 1982 Falkland Islands War or Serbia after the 1999 Kosovo War—only after losing wars that involved both air and ground operations.
The Nuclear Deterrence Challenge
The best-case scenario for the air strikes is that they will set back the Iranian nuclear program for several years, but even this is uncertain. While Trump has insisted that the nuclear facilities targeted by the United States have been “completely obliterated,” Israeli officials told the New York Times that the underground complex in Fordow had been damaged but not destroyed and that the Iranians had moved nuclear material out of the site before the U.S. attack. Moreover, CNN reported that the tunnels beneath the Isfahan complex, where some of Iran’s highly enriched uranium was stored, were not touched by the air strikes. Administration officials have also admitted they are not sure what happened to the 900 pounds of near weapons-grade uranium that Iran had built up before Israel’s campaign.
Whatever the damage to Iran’s existing nuclear program, Iran retains the knowledge necessary to restart operations and may now be tempted to push toward a bomb to deter further attacks. Unless Iran reaches an international agreement to stop all nuclear activities—which seems unlikely at this juncture—Israel and the United States may wind up deciding to strike again at some point in the future.
This shows the limits of airpower, even when it is being employed by the United States, with its vaunted capabilities, precision, and reach. While U.S. airstrikes can cause tremendous damage, they cannot overthrow a government or bend it to America’s will. In other words, airpower cannot end a threat—it can only degrade or contain it.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
