TRANSCRIPT – Afghanistan’s Evolving Terrorism Landscape under the Taliban

Elizabeth Threkeld: Hi, everyone. Welcome. Good morning, good evening, depending on where you’re joining us from. My name is Elizabeth Threlkeld and I am the Director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center in Washington D.C. We are fortunate to be joined today for a discussion on Afghanistan’s evolving terrorism landscape under the Taliban by three experts on that issue. We are going to be doing double duty this morning. We find ourselves three years out from the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, and we are also going to be celebrating the launch of a recent book by Stimson Center’s Non-Resident Fellow Amira Jadoon, and Andrew Mines. It is called The Islamic State in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strategic Alliances and Rivalries.

As you all know, three years ago this week, we saw the fall of the Ghani government in Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban to power and the hasty withdrawal and evacuation of remaining U.S. forces and affiliated Afghan civilians. In the three years since, the Taliban have consolidated control over the country and managed to achieve a level of stability, albeit stability by force, that has surprised many analysts. They have failed to live up to early promises of a less draconian approach to human rights. They have denied women and girls professional educational opportunities, and they have limited opportunities to minorities.

Under their watch, international terrorism has also emerged as a significant concern. Through large-scale attacks in both Iran and Russia earlier this year, the Islamic State Khorasan Province demonstrated both its intent and its capacity to strike externally. Just last week, the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Counterterrorism described the group as Europe’s “greatest external terrorist threat.” We’ve also seen the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistani Taliban, surge in its own attacks following the Taliban takeover with attacks more than doubling from 2022 to 2023 in a trend that has continued this year.

Pakistan’s security forces have borne the brunt of these attacks with the TTP allegedly receiving safe haven and support from various actions of the Afghan Taliban. We will focus our attention this morning on those issues, on Afghanistan’s evolving terrorism landscape, reflecting on the developments that we’ve seen over the past three years of Taliban rule with an eye towards where the situation is headed and also what it means for US. and regional interests. We could not have a better panel to take us through this complex set of issues. I am really pleased that you all were able to join us today.

To start with, I’ll introduce Dr. Amira Jadoon, who is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Clemson University. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow of our program here at Stimson. Prior to joining Clemson, Amira worked at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, jointly appointed in the Department of Social Sciences and the Combating Terrorism Center. She holds an external appointment at the International Center for Counter-Terrorism and specializes in international security, political violence, and CT strategies. She is fluent in Urdu, Hindko, and Punjabi and holds a PhD in Political Science and an M.S.C. in Economic Development.

Next up, we have Dr. Arian Sharifi, who’s a lecturer and chair of the Master in Public Policy Program at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. He came to Princeton with a decade and a half of high-level practical experience in Afghanistan and internationally, having served in multiple positions in the former Afghan government, notably as Director General of the National Threat Assessment in the Office of the National Security Council, as well as Senior Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kabul. He’s fluent in Dari, Pashto, and English and understands Urdu.

Last but not least, we have Iftikhar Firdous who is a journalist and writes on conflict and the gaps in governance that it causes. He is the founding editor of The Khorasan Diary, a nonpartisan platform that provides real time information and analysis based on facts and keeping in view ground realities. It is a joint collaboration of credible journalists, researchers, and academics from across the world and one of its kind. It is a fabulous resource if you have not checked it out yet.

Just as a reminder to our audience, I know there are already questions that are rolling in which is great, please do use the Q&A function that you’ll find at the bottom of your screen. Add those questions as they come up and we’ll get to as many as possible in the hour and 15 minutes we have today. For now, I will turn things over to Amira to take us through the highlights of her book on ISKP. I should say for our audience as well, you can use the promo code FALL24, all one word for a 40% discount on her book and also be on the lookout for a new version that is coming out, not the hardcover but the soft copy later this fall, in October. Congrats again on that Amira and over to you for a summary of your book.

Amira Jadoon: Thank you, Elizabeth. Thank you everyone for being here, for joining us online. I agree with Elizabeth. We could not have a better panel here with Arian and Iftikhar, so I am really happy to be a part of this. I am really pleased to have this opportunity to discuss my book on ISK, which was released around March last year, which I co-wrote with Andrew Mines. We released our book last year and it really is a combination of a lot of work that we have been doing on ISK since its emergence in 2014 or 2015, depending on when you start the clock on it. But given that ISK is pretty much in its 10^th year of existence, a lot of our findings from the book are unfortunately still really relevant.

I will start off with discussing the motivation for writing this book, provide an overview of the methodology we used, the sources that we used, and the overarching question and our argument. I will try to integrate some of the recent developments we have been observing regarding ISK’s behavior, particularly its pivot to an international agenda. The change in its tempo, its targeting priorities, and talk about how our argument still applies to what we are observing today, as well as gain some insights into how ISK tends to adapt to its changing environment within Afghanistan, within South and Central Asia in general.

As you know, ISK first emerged late 2014, early 2015. Essentially, it extended Islamic State’s goal of creating a caliphate into South and Central Asia. While ISK is closely aligned with its parent organization and it subscribes to its ideology and its goals, its operational focus historically has been on modern day South and Central Asia. At the outset when ISK first emerged, it was not seen as a potential threat which may grow into not what we are seeing today. This was kind of fair because there were a lot of challenges that it faced at the outset. As we all know, anyone who observes South and Central Asia, the area is crowded with a host of militant groups of different types, sectarian, anti-state, ethno-nationalists, and also those which maintain links with states.

Additionally, there was already Al-Qaeda present there in the region, although subdued, but still it was Islamic State’s rival, and at the time of ISK’s emergence, the US was still present in Afghanistan and across the border. The Pakistani Army had gained significant experience engaging in counterterrorism as a partner in the war on terror. In 2024, as I mentioned ISK’s 10^th year of existence, I think one thing that we can all agree upon is that ISK has repeatedly demonstrated that it has a really tenacious grip in the region and it may fluctuate in its operational tempo, but its ability to adapt to its environment and continue to exploit security gaps even when they change, is something which needs to be explored.

Despite all these challenges that ISK faced at the outset, and we saw subsequently that it lost all the territorial control it had in Afghanistan and it experienced extreme human capital losses in terms of its top leaders, but also its rank-and-file militants. The group always retained its ability to inflict violence and really conduct all these spectacular, devastating attacks, fluctuating depending on whether it was targeting state actors more or civilian actors. And at least twice before, once in 2018 and then again in 2022, the group has been named as one of the deadliest organizations in the world after being declared defeated several times. Today, ISK finds itself in this new environment, which has allowed it to implement its plans to become a more regional organization which has global influence. Of course, we can talk about how directly or indirectly ISK has been linked to some of these external attacks that we have seen in Iran and Moscow, and also the series of plots that we have been seeing in Western Europe.

It is at this point where it’s not just a threat to its immediate region but also is threatening the stability of international security through these indirect or direct linkages. ISK’s slow revival after 2018, ’19 really started in mid-2020, I would say and we have seen it continue to endure. The questions that we really address in the book are what explains ISK’s resilience, its rise, its decline, and then subsequent resurgence. What exactly has enabled the ISK to compete with militant groups such as the Taliban, survive CT operations. Some of the sub themes that we explore in the book: we look at the evolution of ISK’s operational capacity in the face of intense counter-terrorism operations as well as clashes with the Taliban. We leveraged some of the data that we collected on counterterrorism outcomes, leadership decapitation efforts against the group to gain insights about its leadership structure, and how diverse its militant base has always been, which is connected to its transnational attacks today.

We dive deeper into the specific ways that ISK has maintained and nurtured not just as alliances but also its rivalries, most notably with the Taliban, to endure in the region and for its general survival. We adopted a multi-source approach, which incorporated original data sets on attacks, targeting priorities, and primary materials. We were also fortunate enough to gain access to some of the internal documents from ISK. Finally, we used a variety of secondary resources. The main argument in the book that we make is that ISK essentially adopted a two-pronged approach where it simultaneously relied on building a network of alliances while provoking dominant groups in the region. This continues to be a part of its strategy today. Its linkages allowed it to localize its jihad, but also build this sustainable militant base, which is very diverse, and its rivalries allow it to present itself as an alternative jihadist platform for other militant factions, which were previously connected to the Taliban insurgency for aggrieved populations and various other militants as a partner, but also as an umbrella organization.

One of the reasons for this appeal, or ISK’s appeal to a diverse body of militant factions, is that its agenda is very broad. It targets and it vilifies various governments in the region, and it is essentially fused its global narratives with very sophisticated localized narratives, which allows it to appeal to a wide variety of militants regardless of whatever their top priorities may be.

We can see that ISK’s rivalries, especially with the Taliban, have continued to yield important dividends, which have come in the form of being able to expand its recruitment even more so than before. What I would like to say in my concluding remarks before I hand it over to the next panelist is that the environment that ISK found itself in after the US withdrawal and the Taliban’s takeover, I would argue is the most permissive environment for it because it allows it to capture the militant market as an umbrella organization and serve as a resistance platform for a wide variety of aggrieved populations. This is some of what we are seeing now that ISK, after the US withdrawal and the Taliban takeover, saw itself in a position where it could start implementing its regional strategy and also influencing individuals across the world, but specifically in Western Europe.

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Threkeld: Thanks so much, Amira. I think that is actually a really good segue to Arian, particularly highlighting the role of the Taliban. This massive change in environment that we saw with the fall of Kabul in August of 2021 and what we’ve seen in the subsequent three years. Arian, I would be particularly grateful for your thoughts on how the Taliban have come to approach their counterterrorism efforts. As Amira just pointed out, ISKP is essentially the opposition group at this point competing with the Taliban in the space. How have they approached it? How successful have they been and how do CT efforts fit into the broader international community’s tacit engagement efforts with the Taliban?

Arian Sharifi: Thank you, Elizabeth. Hello to everyone who has joined us today in this webinar. I actually had a recent trip to Afghanistan after about three years, in which I had meetings and extensive discussions with the top Taliban leadership and the security sector on these very matters. There is quite a lot to talk about, but in this given brief period of time, I will try to give you some highlights on their commitments to counter-terrorism, the Doha accords, and also where they are and how they are doing.

Now, if you look at the Doha Agreement, the agreement had five major points which the Taliban committed to. Number one was allowing the safe passage of American personnel and equipment. Number two was the provision of close air support by American military while they are, during the time that they are exiting in extreme cases to Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. The third commitment the Taliban made in the Doha Agreement was to deny space for all terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Fourth, was to engage in peace negotiations with the former Afghan government that would result in a power-sharing agreement and hopefully, at a time, an inclusive government. Number five was the continuation of what the US called Over-the-Horizon counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future by the United States military forces. These were the five main commitments that Taliban made in that agreement with the United States.

As we know, most of these commitments actually did not take place and specifically on counterterrorism, the picture seems to be very complex. There are some 24 to 26 foreign terrorist groups currently operating in Afghanistan. There are a number of Pakistani groups including the TTP, and the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, etc. There are at least three regionally oriented terrorist groups. We have the ETIM or TIP, the Chinese oil wars. We have the IMU, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. And we have Jamaat Ansarullah of Tajikistan, so these three are regionally-oriented terrorist groups. Then, we have globally oriented terrorist groups. We have Al-Qaeda and then we have ISKP.

What the Taliban are claiming is that out of these 24 plus/minus groups, that 23 are absolutely under control. Their leadership are under control. Their movements in Afghanistan are under control. They are not posing any threat to the region or beyond. When it comes to ISKP, the Taliban claims that over the past three years, they have been conducting severe counterterrorism operations against that. What they claim to have done, number one is that they have denied territory to ISKP and that is verifiable. It is pretty obvious.

Before the Taliban take over and a number of places within Afghanistan, especially in Eastern Afghanistan, the province of Kunar and Nooristan, ISKP did hold territory. But now, there is really no evidence to suggest that ISKP does hold territory inside Afghanistan. Denial of the territory is one achievement that the Taliban are claiming to have made against ISKP.

Then, they claim that they have arrested over 2,000 members of ISKP and they have them in their prisons right now. In fact, they are saying that anybody who wants to verify, “They are more than welcome to come and we will show these people,” these 2000 plus ISKP members to them. Third, they claim that over the past three years, They have actually killed over 500 of ISKP members. They gave me an extensive list. Let me name a few.

They claim to have killed Qari Fateh who was the deputy ISKP. They claim to have killed Engineer Omar Haidar, who was in charge of the Central Zone of Khorasan Province. They claim to have killed Mawlawi Ziauddin, who was the head of ISKP judiciary. The claim to have killed Abu Omar Afridi, and a number of others. I have an extensive list and I would be happy to share that. They are saying that the other 23 that I mentioned are under control and that they have made no movement in terms of threat against the region or beyond. When it comes to ISKP, ISKP’s operational capability is much lower now than it used to be three years ago. They are also claiming that the top leadership of ISKP no longer lives in Afghanistan, but they are in Balochistan, area of Pakistan.

To put all this together, how I assess that is that I do feel that the Taliban have the will to fight against ISKP. They are really committed to do that, but they are lacking in operational capability to conduct really effective counter-terrorism against the ISKP. We all know any effective counter-terrorism strategy would have to include what we call really anti-terrorism measures, which is really defensive measures. It has to have operational counter-terrorism measures, which is really the kinetic military intelligence aspect of CT. And then, more importantly, it will have to have strategic counter-terrorism, so basically measures that would reduce the space to the birth, growth, and expansion of terrorism.

The Taliban have conducted operational counterterrorism against the ISKP, but they are lacking on defensive measures, and they are also really unaware. They do not really understand the strategic aspect of counterterrorism specifically when it comes to ISKP. Number two is on the other terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda and the TTP, and the other groups that I mentioned. The Taliban are claiming that all of these groups are under control, that no threat is posed by them to the region and beyond.

The problem is verification. How do we verify that what they say is true? There are reports that a number of Al-Qaeda figures have moved into Afghanistan. Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, for instance, was in charge of intelligence of Al-Qaeda is said to be living in Afghanistan. Abdul Rahman al-Ghamdi  is believed to be moving between Iran and Afghanistan, and a number of other Al-Qaeda operatives. Some reports suggest that they are there. With regard to the TTP, there are a lot of claims, especially by the Pakistani government that the TTP is under the wing of the Afghan Taliban. It is very difficult really to verify whether the Pakistani government is telling the truth or the Taliban are telling the truth. Verification of effective counterterrorism with regard to these other groups is really a big challenge. When there’s no verification, it is very difficult to hold the Taliban accountable with regard to any of the commitments.

To put it all together and conclude on the way forward: some of the stuff that I write or some of the talks that I have either with US government, or with other European governments, or the United Nations, or anybody relevant to this matter, I try to give some advice on what would be the way forward. Honestly, what I see the way forward, the only solution to this whole problem, which is unfortunately expanding, and extending, and intensifying is to help build an accountable government in Afghanistan. This one way Taliban government cannot really and should not continue into the future. The only way to hold the Taliban, hold Afghanistan really accountable to this whole threat scenario, is to have an accountable government in there, a power sharing government, a government in which the Taliban would be a part, but also others would be a part, a government that would be based on law and not based on decrees from Kandahar.

That is really the only way. Then the question of leverage comes in. I believe the international community, particularly the United States, does have a lot of leverage. This is something I see when I am talking to the Taliban leadership. I feel that the United States, the international community in general do have a pretty good leverage. It is just about the question of how committed the international community is to bringing some change and positive change in Afghanistan, not only for the Afghan people but also for these threats to be in a way, reduced and to be managed. If there would be any specific questions with regard to what the Taliban are really doing, I would be happy to get more into detail. Thank you.

Threkeld: Thank you so much, Arian. I think that brings us nicely to Iftikhar, who obviously has followed this very closely from across the border in Pakistan, which itself finds some challenges, particularly from the Afghan Taliban but also from ISKP, and the spillover effects that we are seeing from these groups, and as well some bilateral challenges between Afghanistan and Pakistan that continue to play out. Iftikhar, I am curious from your perspective how these groups, both ISK, TTP and others impact the broader regional city landscape including in Pakistan, and how the Taliban has responded to some of those challenges and how this is playing out bilaterally as well.

Iftikhar Firduous: Thank you, Elizabeth. And thank you for the rest of the panelists to open up the discussion in this way. They have really set the tone for this discussion. As last to answer questions, you have that certain space where you have less to say but more to explain on what others have actually said. I will take my liberties with the discussion as well.

The broader CT landscape in Pakistan, if you look at it in the current circumstances, if I can explain it even today, today’s the 14th of August which is Pakistan’s Independence Day, and you have at least 17 attacks taking place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, which is bordering Afghanistan. Then, you have at least about eight attacks taking place in Baluchistan today, just statistically speaking.

If you look at the range of attacks, as Elizabeth has mentioned, there is about double the increase since 2023. When you look at the spectrum of index in terms of attacks within Pakistan, 2009 was one of the years where Pakistan suffered the brunt of attacks, which is the largest. 2023, well surpassed that at over 100 attacks. In terms of impact, as Amira has put it, the Pakistan military as well as its auxiliaries somehow in the last 20-odd years have been CT trained in such an extent that the impact of these attacks has not been as massive as it was in 2009. So you do not actually feel it that way, but the largest CT spectrum is obviously disorienting the government in different ways. Number one is economically and secondly, is politically. You see the aftereffects of what happened in Afghanistan 2021 really spilling over into Pakistan. From the Pakistani perspective and what the government is trying to say, I think they are blatantly criticizing the Afghan Taliban.

There have been statements, which were initially post-2021 that were a little tepid, but then we have seen Pakistan never go into Afghan soil. We have seen a jet bombardment three times in Afghan territory by Pakistanis after that. I think it is overwhelming and surprising for the Pakistanis, who put so much faith behind the governance system of the Taliban, which has turned around the table 180 degrees, for them to realize that this is not something that they expected to happen. While ISKP remains a global concern and for our own interest as researchers, as journalists, we see ISKP growing from this local affiliate of the Islamic State into now having global tentacles and not die out, but also expand. On Pakistan’s perspective, whenever the international community puts in the question for ISKP as Arian has put it the blame game from Pakistan and Afghanistan, what we see is a reversal of roles actually.

Previously, it was the Afghan Taliban that was the Quetta Shura based out of Balochistan and now, the Afghan Taliban are blaming the Pakistanis for having ISKP in Balochistan. It is a reversal of roles. What we see after 2001 is almost in similar style, insurgent groups forming together. What it actually means for a global audience and what it actually means for the region is that if this buildup that is taking place in Afghanistan of these multiple groups, and one of the reasons for that, I agree with Arian, is that to identify them for the Taliban as well as for the global community on who is involved in what, what we see post 2021 is a level of fluid identities between militant and terrorist organizations. A person could be associated with Al-Qaeda. He could be part of the Afghan Taliban. He could be part of the TTP simultaneously. This is not just verbatim per se but even propaganda that has been disseminated by these groups, including some of those publications which disappeared after 2001 when American forces and allied forces entered into Afghanistan, they have begun republishing this propaganda.

It is very evident from the level of propaganda that is being produced of the collaborations that are taking place between Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, as well as how jointly they are operating. Pakistan might be suffering the brunt of it because it has a history. It also has a tacit support from a limited number of areas in terms of population for welcoming some of these groups. Although on a state level, it is not usually accepted, but for an insurgency to survive in a certain locality, there has to be some level of local support in that population for it to actually thrive on. In terms of the larger CT landscape that would have detrimental effects for the region, Kerman and Russia and Moscow, which have taught us all, are just symptoms of a larger problem that will increase.

The TTP remains a problem for Pakistan. That is very clear statistically as well. There have been claims from the Pakistani side that the Afghan soil is involved. The top of the TTP in terms of its leadership and presence is very openly within Afghanistan. There is nothing to deny about that. It is something that they have actually spoken about very openly. But as far as ISKP is concerned, I think one of the larger problems, Amira is explained quite a bit so I will not repeat a lot of it, but in terms of reaction, when 9/11 took place, there was an area, a specific group where a counter reaction was expected, that “this is Afghanistan and the world has to go after the specific group.”

In terms of ISKP and how its grown, with respect to some of the investigative files that we have witnessed on how these operations are planned, multiple countries are involved simultaneously, not just for logistical support but as well as the financial support. Afghanistan might be just one bit of it. Post-2020, we saw ISKP and the digital caliphate coming into play. When you ask investigators within the CT domain to actually explain how these certain attacks have taken place, nothing more remains than just except telegram IDs or digital footprints apart from that.

If tomorrow an attack takes place in the West, what would be the reaction in terms of vis-a-vis ISKP? Because their operations are so scattered, I think Afghanistan alone will not be the only country that would be blamed because the spectrum of ISKP’s operational capability has now increased far beyond Afghanistan, and that requires more research. It also requires more resources for states and I think one country’s CT effort will not be enough to stop ISKP’s operation. I think it has to be a large conglomerated effort. Thank you very much.

Threkeld: Thanks so much, Iftikhar. That is a great segue back to a question that I want to pose to Amira, but welcome thoughts as well from Arian and Iftikhar. One of the transitions that you very usefully highlighted in your book, Amira, is how we have seen the evolution of ISK from an entity that has a real territorial base primarily in Nangarhar but not exclusively, to an entity that is more based in urban areas, more of a sleeper cell model, or the digital caliphate as Iftikhar just called it.

I wonder if you could shed some light on how ISK has navigated that transition, if that really captures where the group is now and how that aligns with the broader trends that we are seeing just in terms of demographics in Afghanistan and in the wider region with increasing urbanization? This is everything from youth-seeking economic and educational opportunities. It can also be climate change induced as well. It seems like some of those trendlines in Afghanistan and more broadly in the region are moving the direction of greater urbanization. At the same time that seemingly overlaps with ISK’s evolved recruitment strategy. Help us understand the rural and urban dynamics of recruitment of ISK and where you see this trajectory headed.

Jadoon: Great question, Elizabeth. Thank you for that. To take a step back, because of the territorial losses and in terms of strength numbers, ISK is much weaker than its peak years. But what we see ISK do under its new visionary leader, who has yet to be killed, which is different than all the previous leaders of ISK, it took a number of steps. It also closely subscribes to the Islamic State (IS) insurgency model. We have to remember that it is after all an affiliate of IS. What we see immediately after the withdrawal of the US and the Taliban takeover that first, ISK expands the type of warfare that it is conducting. Again, we see some guerilla warfare but also more urban attacks. For terrorist groups, targeting civilians in urban areas tends to yield high number of casualties, which can be beneficial for a group in terms of reinforcing its image but also indicating its resolve, not just to the state but also to other militant groups and to various audiences that it is trying to recruit from.

ISK has focused on targeting or conducting attacks within urban areas because they are more deadly, but that also gives them an opportunity to target minorities, especially the Shi’a minorities and Hazaras, which is a fundamental part of its ideology and goals. What we also see is more targeted assassinations of Afghan leaders or various local level leaders as well, which again require fewer resources, but these are high impact attacks. What we saw also was attacks on foreign presence within Afghanistan, cross-border attacks into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and then finally this effort to recruit from afar. So using its global ideology to target audiences in the West who already may feel alienated from their home governments. This focus on urban attacks fits in nicely given ISK’s current strategy that it does not have any territory, but it still needs to create some impact.

You are right to say that we have more urbanization in all of these areas, which also means we have large populations of youth who also are deprived of opportunities. It is almost the perfect storm, which ISK is well positioned to exploit. Within Afghanistan, again, al-Muhajir has really emphasized guerilla warfare tactics, which again subscribe to the IS insurgency model, emphasizing secrecy, hit-and-run tactics until the group is strong enough again to start developing hideouts but also safe pockets of safe havens. But right now, the goal is to inflict the maximum harm upon the enemy, which is the Taliban through rural and urban warfare, targeted assassinations of government and religious leaders, and also conducting fewer but more sophisticated attacks to maximize the impact of it all.

Firdous: I wanted to add two bits to what Amira mentioned. In terms of trends, we look at ISKP’s internal recruitment patterns in Pakistan and Afghanistan based on old religious lengths. Some of the top leadership of ISKP came in from older jihadist entities such as Al-Qaeda, TTP, and Afghan Taliban. Majority of them were known and majority of them have been killed also in CT ops since 2000. By 2017, ISKP had lost almost 60% of its top known leadership. What has emerged after that is a much younger leadership as well as a much younger recruitment pattern. If you as a terrorist entity are looking to recruit between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and you do not have physical presence, your reliance on the internet means targeting the more urban space. There has been visible proof that ISKP has been using social media and even gaming platforms as well as such as PlayStation, as well as Nintendo also to recruit.

There is proof enough that people were motivated, from the more elite backgrounds in Pakistan and Afghanistan that were attracted to the ideology. But for its internal dynamic within the jihadist sphere, ISKP in its one-and-a-half-year term since 2021, started moving into a pattern where it took the war to the Taliban first based on its operational model on how the Taliban was. But now, you see since the beginning of this year that ISKP now is targeting the belief system of the Taliban. What it is trying to do is to ostracize the Taliban from the entire global jihadist entity along with Al-Qaeda. But there is still some capacity to talk to Al-Qaeda, but the Taliban as a movement, whether its Pakistani affiliates or the Afghan affiliates are being totally ostracized. I mean, there is no physical action against its Pakistani affiliates, whereas there are the attacks against the Afghan Taliban. But what it is trying to do is to recruit from within these groups that already exist based on the actions that have been pre-determined.

Sharifi: From what I am seeing, this may be slightly different from what Amir and Iftikhar said. Number one, I have not seen — at least over the past three years — any indication of ISKP engaging in guerilla warfare. In fact, quite the opposite. Before the takeover by the Taliban, they did hold some ground and they did engage in some guerilla warfare tactics against the Afghan government. Now, it is the opposite. They do not have territory. In fact, my assessment is that it’s a deliberate decision by Sanaullah Ghafari, [also known as] Shahab al-Muhajir, the leader of ISKP, to really change it from a semi-insurgent, semi-terrorist group into a fully terrorist group after the Taliban takeover. Because when the Taliban were fighting the Afghan government, much of the Afghan government’s pressure was really against the Taliban because they were the larger force, the bigger enemy, which allowed ISKP to hold some territory and engage in some guerilla warfare.

Engaging in guerilla warfare does require some territory. Over the past three years, I have not seen any empirical signs of that. Second, at least for the past year, and this may go a little bit against what Iftikhar was saying, there has not been any spectacular ISKP attack against the Taliban. Before that they did. They killed a number of commanders; they killed a number of governors. But now, their operations inside Afghanistan over the past year has been very limited and that’s been specifically focused on soft targets, really targeting the Shi’a Hazara community in Afghanistan.

And then they have been focusing on external operations where they recruit individuals. This happened, to me, for obvious reasons. It may not be that obvious, but definitely reasons of Central Asian origin across the world. The information I have is over the past six months, at least 12 ISKP cells in Europe, in Madrid, in Strasbourg, in Berlin, in Bonn, in London, and in a few other places have been apprehended and individuals have been arrested, and all of those individuals had actually been recruited by ISKP from afar in Europe, and all of them were of Central Asian origin.

Threkeld: Thanks, Arian.

Jadoon: Sorry, I just want to jump in. I would agree with what Arian is saying and I just wanted to clarify that. I think if you look at some of the published work coming from ISKP’s leader, I think this is what they are sort of emphasizing. “The tactics that we are using now will be different from what we have used in the prior years.” Absolutely, there was a time when ISK was targeting state actors much more than civilians, but now civilian targets and attacks outnumber their state targets, which is more terrorist tactics. I would also say that I think ISK does respond too, whenever it faces some counter-terrorism pressure, if you can call what the Taliban have been doing towards ISK counter-terrorism pressure. There’s no doubt that the Taliban did come under pressure because they were denying the level of threat that they faced from ISK.

But then, there were these very public assassinations of Taliban leaders by ISK, and they responded to that with their own targeting of ISKP leaders. ISK obviously responds to that pressure, but it also adapts in certain ways. At certain times, we’ve seen an increase in attacks in Pakistan but that’s the time that we also see more of a focus on expanding its regional influence and international influence. But this is something that ISK does. It adapts to its environment, especially when it faces different types of counter-terrorism pressures which also is one of the factors that makes it resilient.

Threkeld: That’s really interesting, Amira. I want to come back to that briefly and then we can go to Iftikhar and the rest of you. Help us understand ISKP’s target selection. If I’m understanding, Amira, what you were just laying out very helpfully, am I correct that you see ISKPs focus on more external targets, be it in Pakistan or maybe even these recent attacks that we’ve seen in Kerman in Iran, in Moscow? Is that in part a response to the pressure that ISKP was coming under from the Taliban and a shift in strategy to set their sights outside of Afghanistan? Is it motivated by something else? Help us understand how we can judge the logic, the strategy driving what does seem to be more of a focus on external attacks versus working and conducting major attacks in Afghanistan proper. Maybe go to Iftikhar first, and then back to Amira and Arian.

Firdous: Thank you, Elizabeth. Just for the clarification of Mr. Arian, what I actually meant to say was that since the attacks against the Taliban have reduced, the propaganda to recruit from within the Taliban has increased. The physical attacks have now transitioned into more propaganda attacks against the group’s belief system to bring more manpower onto ISKP’s side. Coming back to your question, Elizabeth, ISKP in terms of its agenda: as a referential point, the caliphate in Syria and Iraq has always been definitional for the attacks that it has managed to carry out in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Whether there are attacks against Shi’as, or the Taliban, or Russia or Iran, the reference point is always that some parts of these elements were responsible for the downfall of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and that’s when the responsibility and the propaganda work together to quantify each other when they are claiming certain attacks.

But even within core ISKP ideology, trying to carry out attack in Irman on the death anniversary of Qasem Soleimani is a symbolic gesture by the group to show that it has the capability of carrying out such bigger attacks. Moscow, of course, is a shock for the world, in terms of how a group could within the heart of Russia manage to carry out such attacks. But in terms of identification of ISKP’s attacks, the leader Shahab al-Muhajir’s three books that he has written in terms of what the next eight year plan is for the group (and this book was written somewhere in 2018) it is very clear that in four years’ time, ISKP was going to engage in external operations. Part of it is also a reflection of the propaganda that the group has been disseminating, which clearly shows that it is actually now looking at loosely affiliated migrants as the best to actually carry out attacks because it wants to build up its reputation as the sole jihadist entity that can react to news headlines against the Muslim world globally.

Whether it is the issue of the Palestine or the burning of the Quran in Sweden, or any other incident that appears that has Islamic influence attached to it, ISKP will always jump the ship to find people who the group can facilitate to carry out the attacks. But what we’ve seen is, and I think that this is one of the successes that the group and even more dangerous than then actual terrorists carrying out attacks, during the last few attacks (which were in Dagestan as well as Belgrade) these are all inspirational attacks. When the group itself also says that they neither financially supported them, neither was there any direction given, it clearly shows that they have managed to steer the mindset of a population through their propaganda within the Western sphere in a way that could actually aid the group’s propaganda even further.

Threkeld: Amira and Arian, anything to add there?

Jadoon: Yeah, just a couple of quick thoughts. I agree with Iftikhar’s analysis on that. I think that this was always a part of ISK’s plan because immediately, as soon as the US withdrew and the Taliban took over, we saw ISK expand its recruitment-oriented propaganda and make a concerted effort to further widen its militant base. It was already diverse, but we see more focused and localized narratives in additional languages. Also, they started their Voice of Khorasan Magazine. ISK’s propaganda very closely reflects its strategy. It was always ISK’s plan to expand regionally and inspire or remotely be connected to some of these attacks overseas. I think based on the propaganda in Tajik and Uzbek language, it’s pretty apparent that this was a part of their plan.

But I also think that with their linkages to these external attacks, especially against Western powers or other major powers like Russia, Iran, they really serve to unify or create a common thread or motivation for this very diverse militant base. An Uzbek militant may not necessarily care so much about an attack on the Pakistani Army. But I think all of these militants who have grievances against even their own governments or governments in the West can get behind the fact that their local governments are puppets of these various other major powers, an idea which they comment on in their propaganda. I think it also has a unifying effect, a way to make their militant base or even supporters  stay focused and coherent to the extent possible.

Threkeld: Thanks so much. Arian, please.

Sharifi: Just quickly to add to what Amira and Iftikhar said, my assessment is that, of course, ISKP did have the plan but also, as Iftikhar mentioned, this rise of ISKP attacks at the global level, to me, has more to do with the downfall of IS Central in the Middle East, and we see a lot of evidence of that. For instance, the al-Sadiq office that was responsible for financial support for ISKP in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We see that it is now receiving much more assistance from the other 10 or 11 ISIS branches across the world. The al-Karrar Office that is in Somalia did not really have a lot to do with ISKP prior to the Taliban takeover. But now we see clear evidence of the al-Karrar Office really ramping up its activities in collecting financial dues from across the world and sending it to ISKP.

The third factor is that over the past several months, at least over the past year, every attack that ISKP has conducted across the world outside of Afghanistan has not actually been claimed by ISKP. They have been claimed by IS in general, even though we know that they were ISKP. To me, with the downfall of IS Central in the Middle East, ISKP, out of the 11 provinces that IS has across the world, seems to be the most legible one to really take the role of the leadership as we go into the future.

Threkeld: Great point, Arian, and I’m glad you brought up this funding question that dovetails with a few questions from the audience that we’ve received. One in particular that I’ll highlight, from a viewer named Kashmala Dilawar, is what are the funding strategies that are currently being used by ISK? Where are they getting the resources they need to exist? We somewhat know through reporting that’s been done–there was a piece that just came out in the last couple of days that shed some light on these groups. But help us understand, is this a franchise model? How much of this is being driven by donations? The role of new technologies like cryptocurrencies that create problems for countering terrorism financing, and maybe put that in perspective: Is ISKP’s model similar to or different from some other groups that are operating in this region as well? Arian, do you want to give it a start, and then we’ll go to the others?

Sharifi: Sure. There are two offices that are responsible for collecting dues and financial means for ISKP. Of course, the al-Sadiq office is responsible for collecting financial assets from inside Afghanistan and Pakistan area. The al-Sadiq office existed before and they did that. But over the past three and a half years since Sanaullah Ghafari took over the leadership, I see a diversification and increase in the sources of financing. ISKP prior to Sanaullah Ghafari taking over never really delved into the drug business. But now we see clearly that they are involved, though not in opium trade because opium is decreasing. What is increasing in Afghanistan is methamphetamine and amphetamine trade. There’s a lot of evidence suggesting that ISKP right now is involved in both the production and in the smuggling of methamphetamines and amphetamines, which overall seems to be overtaking the heroin business in Afghanistan. It’s a multi-billion-dollar business, and ISKP controls a good chunk of that.

One other main source that they had in the region before was illegal logging in Eastern Khorasan. As you know, we have very dense forests in Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangarhar and ISKP was involved in the illegal cutting and selling of logs, and that continues. Extortion was there and continues. Some legal businesses, in the travel industry and the internet provision industry in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There’s a lot that is really being collected and generated locally in Afghanistan and Pakistan region, but also globally through the al-Karrar Office in Somalia. Now, when I was in the former Afghan government, we would see very little evidence of any funding really coming from IS Central to ISKP. But now we see the flow of funding.

What I see much of that flow of funding is getting collected by the al-Karrar Office in Somalia, but then it’s getting channeled into Afghanistan and Pakistan region through Turkey, really. Turkish authorities arrested a few months ago a Tajikistani national named Dodihudoevich. He was known also as Abu Miskin. He was responsible for, channeling all that al-Karrar money into ISKP. As you mentioned, Elizabeth, they are also extensively and heavily using cryptocurrency, which makes it very difficult to track. What I am seeing right now, they are do not lack money and are unfortunately fully funded.

Threkeld: Iftikhar, anything to add there?

Firdous: Just a couple of thoughts. Initially, I remember when ISKP was first formed in 2014 and 2015, and some of the earlier cells when they were investigated because they were following in Zarqawi’s footsteps. So when Zarqawi was released from jail in the ’90s, the first thing that he did was he got a visa for Pakistan and came down as a honey trader. We saw that some of the ISKP cells were involved in trading honey and dates, and they were heavily invested into the part of Afghanistan trade as well as the transit trade, initially. There is enough evidence of that. But, that has now died down and between 2018 and 2019, between Pakistan and Afghanistan, we did see that the Islamic State’s forerunners had actually set up NGOs that were working somewhat in the capacity of philanthropic workers and looking for funding, which was obviously being sent to the Islamic State.

A lot of details have been given by Arian, so I do not want to go into more details. But one thing that we do see is it is not just hidden Bitcoin platforms that IS is using to fund itself. It’s even open-source funding such as gofundme.com. Usually, the way that it is shown is that there’s an account that is set up showing that somebody in Afghanistan is a widow and requires an amount of assistance. That is usually floated amongst ISKP members to share that this is the account that is present. It’s our account and sort of start funding towards it and it will be sent to ISKP. That’s one of the tactics being used. But  large-scale funding is done through cryptocurrencies, which are openly available on ISCKP’s encrypted channels.

But also some of the research that we did into the monetary side of the Islamic State, not just within Pakistan but in other places as well found that only 20% of the group is involved in the operational side of attacks as well as the planning. The remaining 80% is propaganda and logistics, which is much larger than what we actually see. If you go by numbers of known ISKP member or numbers of attacks, that number explains the extent of the organization, not just its financial part, but also the number of languages and translations, and the entire media setup put forward by the group.

Threkeld: Great point. All right. We can do a lightning round of questions here.  I’m wondering about how the situation in the Middle East today, which obviously is quite focused on developments in Israel and Gaza, Iran, Lebanon,, and I have not heard much about the role of IS Central there. To what extent have you seen messaging or outreach related to developments in the Middle East and the war in Gaza? Is that being used as an animating strategy for either IS Central or ISKP? Do you expect any downstream effects within the region based on that? Is there anything that we can learn in terms of where attacks are likely to be targeted or the focus of ISK going forward?

Jadoon: Based on what I’ve seen, it’s not just ISKP but also AQIS for example, or TTP. I think TTP has been trying to generally convince the international community that its agenda is very much Pakistan-based and is not interested in external targeting. Its commentary on what is going on in the Middle East specifically with regards to the Hamas attack and subsequent conflict has been fairly muted. Where you see AQIS come in is fresh material for their propaganda, and also to justify their narratives that the West or the non-Muslim world is targeting Muslim communities around the world. “Therefore, this justifies our agenda and using jihad as a platform to fight these injustices against Muslim communities.” I think what we may be seeing more in the APAC [Asia-Pacific] region is using whatever is coming out of the Middle East to justify their own narratives and to mobilize support.

Firdous: There’s obviously propaganda, as Amira mentioned, by groups like AQ and Jamaat Ansarullah as well as by other, smaller organizations. But ISKP, I think, is very anti Hamas. They are not very forthcoming and there have been individual efforts by ISKP to produce doctored videos showing that it is the Islamic State attacking Israeli soldiers. They were not actual incidents that took place. Obviously, for the Islamic State, their agenda for that is totally different and in its anti-Iran stance as well. It is difficult for the group to actually place itself into that frame. But there is material to suggest that some of the motivations that have been engaging a younger audience in the West is based on the Palestinian cause. And the recent operation that the Islamic State Central launched globally—which was that they are from us and we from them—, is one of the theme lines that was obviously in operations for the liberation of Palestine.

Threkeld: Arian coming to you with what you mentioned in terms of the leverage that you think the U.S., the international community have, based on your conversations with the Taliban, specifically with regards to the commitments the Taliban made under the Doha Agreement. Help us understand where you think those areas of leverage are, not just for the U.S. but, for other countries that have been impacted here, Iran, Russia, China. Take us through how you think the international community might be able to work with, to pressure the Taliban on these issues.

Sharifi:                   In three areas, specifically the United States has quite a lot of leverage over the Taliban. Number one is diplomatic leverage. I see that the Taliban are really willing and they are putting a lot of importance on building good diplomatic relations with the US. They see their relations with everybody else on one side and relations with the US on the other. This is more important to them than anything else, really. Diplomatic leverage is substantial, and I think the US can use that diplomatic leverage if it decides to.

Now, the Biden administration doesn’t really have the will to do so given President Biden’s personal views on Afghanistan and how disastrously he handled the withdrawal. President Biden has not really been willing to even talk about Afghanistan. But with the elections coming up and a new team coming into the White House, the hope is that they would actually recognize that diplomatic leverage. I’m hoping that both for the sake of Afghanistan, the sake of the region, and the sake of the U.S.’s interest that they will actually use that diplomatic leverage in a positive way.

Second is financial leverage. As you know, between $40 and $50 million have been airlifted into Kabul every week over the past three years. Now, that money is going through the United Nations, but 75% of that is donated by the United States. $50 million every week is$ 200 million per month, $1.2 billion per year. That’s a substantial amount of money. Now, it doesn’t go directly into the Taliban, but much of that is being used and utilized by them in one way or another. That financial assistance is key and the US has a lot of leverage in how it could play that.

Third, is limited military leverage. I have two hats: I’m an Afghan, I’m an American. I am not suggesting at all nor do I think it is in the interest of the United States to deploy troops again to Afghanistan. We had troops there for 20 years and we saw the results. But even Over-the-Horizon counterterrorism operations with the drones that the US has provides leverage. I’m not suggesting that we use it against the Taliban leadership, but from a deterrence perspective, it has a lot of leverage, and the Taliban do understand that leverage, and that threat, and that deterrence effect. Many of the countries in the region seem to be dealing with the Taliban on a day-to-day basis. They know that they cannot trust this type of a system for long-term engagements.

Many of the countries in the region, even the Iranians, are really waiting to see what the United States will do with regard to the Taliban regime and the future of Afghanistan. In this case, it is really the U.S. that has the leverage, and the US can have that leadership. In fact, I think the United States government does have both the moral responsibility and the strategic responsibility for US interests to engage, and to resume the Doha talks, and to ensure that the Doha accords are fully implemented. The good news is—and I know it is tough to sell anything to do with Afghanistan in Washington—is that it does not require much investment neither financial, nor military, nor diplomatic. Things can change there for the better, bringing more stability to the region and ensuring longer-term US interest in the region.

Threkeld: Iftikhar, help us understand how this is viewed in Pakistan, which has struggled to try to use a mix of engagement and coercion with the Taliban to shape their behavior, particularly with regards to TTP but also ISK to an extent. Help us understand any lessons learned over the past three years and where you see any prospects going forward and leverage that might exist. Also, if I could ask you to bring in the China angle as well. Obviously, CPEC [China Pakistan Economic Corridor] is deeply implicated here. We’ve seen the TTP attacks against CPECassets. Help us understand both Pakistan’s and China’s own attempts to shape the CT space in Afghanistan.

Firdous: I think Arian has put it very well. In the larger CT space, I think for the Doha Agreement to solidify and be exemplified as an agreement that was signed with approval from Pakistan as well. The United States does hold the moral ground for its implementation. There have been attempts to indulge the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We’ve seen the Pakistani ambassador recently pledging for more weapons from the United States, openly saying that there is a CT problem that is arising. In Pakistan, as over many years US diplomats have made it to Pakistan to have these discussions, the theme that surrounds them is that Washington and Islamabad agree more than they have agreed in the last 20 years on what the future of Afghanistan is.

I think it will take them another six to seven months, and one of the reasons is that an alliance between Pakistan and the US vis-a-vis Afghanistan has not been framed as a public phenomenon or an operational phenomenon yet—probably they will wait for the elections in the US, for the new administration to come in. But it will happen for sure, all the indicators are there. As far as China is concerned, it is clear that China looks at its relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan and with Pakistan as the State of Pakistan very differently. We have hardly seen any efforts from the Chinese to put them both together and judge them in terms of how it would be. And a very wonderful crystallization of this is the attack that took place on the Chinese engineers within Pakistan’s borders.

It was Pakistan that was held accountable for it despite the fact that Pakistan repeated that the attack stemmed from Afghanistan, where the TTP operates from. I think they are not very clear in terms of their diplomatic setup and how to deal with this problem. But not to say there have not been efforts. Even on the sidelines of the SEO meetings, Russia and China made gestures unofficially to Afghanistan as to not distort their relationship with the Afghan Taliban. In Pakistan, it’s still not completely understood by the public. I’m not saying the government set it up because there is an overconfidence there that the Taliban’s relationship with the TTP is very clear.

But for the last 20 years, the state narrative was that the TTP and the Afghan Taliban were two different entities. Undoing that in the public realm post-2021 is not easy. There is a history attached to it as well as the peace negotiation process— which is just three years old and still fresh within people’s memories—where the TTP was brought to the table. There is some distrust between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. But that distrust is seeping out on both sides of the borders as well. That is why we see some of the persistent problems from the Musab al-Zarqawi regime still lingering within the Taliban. Probably at that time, they were less violent, but they are becoming more violent by the day.

Threkeld: Amira, I’ll welcome any thoughts overall in response to what Arian and Iftikhar have shared, but particularly on this question of what can be done on CT cooperation with the Taliban. I think counter narcotics also comes to mind given what we were hearing about methamphetamine funding. Help us understand in your view the policy takeaways from your research, particularly on the ISK, but more broadly on the Afghan CT landscape as well.

Jadoon: That question does not have a straightforward answer. I think what this discussion overall has revealed is the problem of militancy in general in the region is complex. It has a long history. The landscape is very fragmented, and the environment is very conducive to militancy in general. The large informal economies across the region which allow collaboration between criminal networks and various militant groups because it’s mutually beneficial are a key problem. We have a lot of corruption and weak law enforcement across the countries in the region, which then feeds into making societies vulnerable to the extreme narrative that these groups put forward. Another issue which I think we need to be focused on, and I think this is the overall thought that I will leave our audience with, is we’ve had at least 20 years of conducting various counter-terrorism measures, CBE software approaches.We kind of have an idea of when tactics like leadership decapitation will work, when negotiations will work, which areas we need a softer approach, reintegration. But I think part of the problem is that there’s no coordination between countries. What we see now is a deep embeddedness of network terrorism where affiliations as Iftikhar mentioned are very fluid. These groups are opposing each other’s militants in addition to recruiting new ones from civilian populations. This network terrorism is not something that can be handled by just one country because they draw their resources and strength from a range of countries in the region.

What makes it difficult to come up with a coordinated response is that a lot of the countries have deep mistrust of other. There are so many conspiracy theories. Every time there’s an ISK attack, Iran is blaming Pakistan, Pakistan is blaming India, India is blaming, I do not know who in the latest round. What we really need is, first, trust-building measures between these state actors. I think that is where the U.S. can play a role to facilitate. I mean, the US has no interest in any deep involvement in Afghanistan or related issues, but what it can do is help with intelligence sharing, for example, or support mechanisms which allow these countries to engage in more trust-building measures, which can then lead to more coherent counterterrorism and CBE policies.

Threkeld: Thanks so much to all of you for joining us, and to our audience for tuning in. I have learned a lot in the course of this conversation, and I only wish we had more time. We will have to get back together soon. Many congrats again to Amira and Andrew Mines on their book. I would really encourage you all to check it out, it is a great resource.