“Tough on the Weak, Lenient on the Powerful”

Latin America has witnessed some of the highest homicide rates in the world, largely driven by gang violence and transnational criminal groups. Throughout the Western Hemisphere, states have experimented with many types of security policies; however, one stands out for its political popularity and the frequency with which it is employed—mano dura. Mano dura is defined by experts Lucía Dammert et al. as the stringent, hardline policies implemented by several Latin American governments to combat rampant gang violence and criminal activity. These strategies typically involve ramping up police and military presence, employing aggressive law enforcement tactics, conducting mass arrests, and imposing stricter penalties on those linked to criminal activities. In recent years, burgeoning violent crime has only strengthened the appeal of mano dura policies throughout the region.

In this context, in August and September 2024 the CSIS Americas Program and Latin America and Caribbean Learning and Rapid Response (LACLEARN)—an initiative of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—hosted a series of private roundtables to discuss various aspects of mano dura security policies. The first roundtable focused on the impact of such policies on democracy, human rights, and vulnerable groups and minorities. The second examined the narrative strategies and discursive power of those advocating for mano dura policies in Latin America. The final roundtable leveraged the previous two as points of departure to explore alternatives to mano dura security policies.

Throughout the roundtable series, the CSIS program put a particular emphasis on featuring local and diverse voices from Latin American countries affected by mano dura policies. The series covered countries in Central America, such as El Salvador and Honduras, as well as countries in South America, including Ecuador. The premise of the roundtables was that by assessing the impacts of mano dura policies, governments can develop alternative strategies to counter crime while ensuring transparency, strengthening the rule of law, and building law enforcement capacity focused on protecting human rights. A summary of the three roundtables is featured below, followed by the principal findings from the three events.

Part I: The Effects of Mano Dura on Democracy

Participants in the first roundtable shared insights on how mano dura policies have led to significant changes in governance, public security, and the relationship between the state and its citizens in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras. The overarching theme was the erosion of democratic norms and the centralization of power under the guise of addressing security concerns.

El Salvador exemplifies a country that has enjoyed success on certain public safety metrics while pursuing a highly performative security policy. While El Salvador’s experience with mano dura policies dates back decades and spans across multiple political parties, under President Nayib Bukele—who took office in 2019—these policies have evolved into a more centralized and authoritarian system. President Bukele’s government has been laser-focused on bringing down homicide rates, allowing the president to boast about having transformed El Salvador into purportedly the safest country in the Western Hemisphere. He has done so by allowing the military to play a dominant role in public security and by manipulating homicide statistics to exclude killings perpetrated by security forces as well as murders within the prison system. While this does not diminish the fact that homicides in El Salvador have decreased significantly under the state of exception, it illustrates the performative dimension of President Bukele’s security strategy, which is focused more on being “number one” than on providing consistent and comprehensive data on the full spectrum of violence and crime in El Salvador.

Participants in this roundtable noted that the Salvadoran military never fully extricated itself from politics following the civil war and that, in some respects, the declaration of the state of exception under Bukele has given the institution the latitude needed to return to its glory days. The centralization of Bukele’s power has been accompanied by the co-optation of public institutions, including the judiciary, which has weakened the checks and balances necessary for a functioning democracy. This centralization is popular among the public due to its perceived effectiveness in reducing crime, but it has also led to increased corruption and the erosion of democratic norms. The judiciary’s diminished independence has allowed for the unchecked use of emergency powers, with little transparency or accountability.

In Ecuador, participants noted that the increasing influence of organized crime has been met with hardline policies that include an increased role for the military and the armed forces in citizen security alongside the extended use of states of emergency. The current administration’s declaration of a state of exception raised concerns about the potential misuse of these temporary powers to suppress opposition and bypass democratic processes. Despite these concerns, a large portion of the population has supported these measures, prioritizing immediate security over long-term democratic stability.

Experts pointed out that discussions about mano dura policies and their popularity in the region are impacting political debates. One participant noted that security policy emerged as one of the key issues in Ecuador’s 2023 election cycle, with presidential candidate Jan Topić calling for the implementation of tough policies similar to those of Salvadoran president Bukele. While Topić was eventually defeated, his rhetoric helped to shift the conversation on security policy toward hardline options, potentially making it more likely that the election winner, Daniel Noboa, would go with a maximalist, tough-on-crime approach when the security situation in the country further deteriorated following his inauguration. As Noboa looks to his reelection efforts in February 2025, security is the crux of his political platform and the case for his reelection.

Honduras was cited in the first roundtable as a case study in how mano dura policies can be used to justify corruption and the entrenchment of criminal networks within the state. The prosecution and conviction of a former president in the United States for leading a criminal organization highlights the extent to which organized crime has infiltrated the highest levels of government. Funds intended for public security have been misappropriated and are often spent with little oversight or transparency, exacerbating the country’s challenges. The situation in Honduras underscores the dangers of relying on repressive measures without addressing the root causes of violence and corruption. The roundtable discussion also emphasized the role of corruption in these dynamics, as mano dura policies can come with a “security tax” that forces citizens to bear the brunt of ballooning security budgets, which are oftentimes diverted to line the pockets of the security forces.

In all three countries discussed, participants concluded that while mano dura policies may provide short-term gains in public security, they often come at the cost of democratic principles and long-term stability. The centralization of power, militarization of public security, and erosion of judicial independence were recurring themes that raise questions about the sustainability of such approaches.

One major area of analysis throughout the first roundtable was the role of mano dura policies in exacerbating human rights violations. This is because these policies prioritize punishment and control over the checks and balances typical of democratic governance. During his first term, President Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party reduced the number of legislature seats from 84 to 60, and after having won the legislature, President Bukele dismissed judges in the national constitutional court as well as over “a third of the country’s judges” and replaced them with party loyalists. Participants argued that such actions, which tend to emerge from populist impulses and a collective demand for security, can result in an unchecked expansion of punitive measures that violate basic human rights, such as the freedom of movement, freedom of association and assembly, and the right to privacy.

The broader implications for the human rights movement, which has struggled to adapt to the pervasive popularity of mano dura security policies, was also an important point of discussion. Participants suggested that human rights organizations need to reconsider their strategies, adopting more pragmatic approaches that go beyond traditional normative and moral frameworks. This adaptation is necessary to address the structural factors that lead to inequality and support policies that truly uphold human dignity. Moreover, there appears to be insufficient focus on less extreme but equally critical human rights violations, such as unwarranted searches and seizures and restrictions on the freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and the right to protest. When civil liberties are curtailed, they not only erode democratic values but also violate the fundamental rights of all citizens.

A recurring theme in the discussion was the disproportionate targeting of marginalized communities. Participants described the “chronic tendency” of penal systems in the region to prosecute crimes associated with poverty, such as drug-related offenses and property crimes. In Ecuador, for instance, the establishment of military bases in high-conflict zones has led to the stigmatization of entire communities. Several participants underscored the phrase “tough on the weak, lenient on the powerful” to describe a troubling throughline in many hardline security policies. The cycle of marginalization could deepen when such policies not only criminalize poverty but also exacerbate social inequalities.

The first roundtable went on to discuss the varying impacts of hardline policies on marginalized groups, including young people, women, and vulnerable communities. The participants described how such policies often lead to the further stigmatization and criminalization of these groups and exacerbate their marginalization and the structural violence they already endure in fragile societies. For example, with the large numbers of soldiers on the streets, women are particularly vulnerable to harassment and sexual violence by the armed forces. And because the policies target young men and incarcerate them in large numbers, women are often left to provide for their families outside and inside of prisons—with corrupt prison systems at times demanding bribes for basic needs and even for family visits.

The impact on young people was also emphasized. Under mano dura policies, youth are criminalized merely for being young—and particularly, young and poor. Yet these policies do not consider that in a system where young people do not have economic opportunities, education, or a strong social fabric, they feel hopeless and can become an important force that challenges the government. In the long term, these types of policies lead to high dropout rates, massive emigration, disintegration of families, abandonment of ideals, hopelessness, and general distrust and disillusionment with the state and the authorities. Furthermore, rising levels of incarceration combined with a lack of employment opportunities have created a vicious cycle that young people are often unable to escape.

Lastly, participants emphasized the role of the media in these dynamics. In many countries employing mano dura policies, the media is controlled or influenced by the government. Content produced by state-controlled traditional media and social media outlets creates a narrative that young people who “look” a certain way are inherently dangerous. Media can be complicit in repressive policies, distorting reality to justify hardline approaches.

Part II: Narratives and Discourse Around Mano Dura

Another characteristic of mano dura policies is their opacity despite their wide-reaching and constant propaganda campaigns. In El Salvador, the Territorial Control Plan, a seven-phase plan that is supposedly guiding the Salvadoran security forces as they seek to combat organized crime and insecurity, is not available to the general public. Each phase of the plan is kept secret until it is ready to be implemented, and the seventh and final phase remains under wraps, with only vague statements regarding its alleged purpose. This stymies public debate around the right course for security policy and further centralizes the executive as the keeper of the keys to an opaque, at times amorphous, public safety strategy. The same opacity is true for President Noboa’s “Plan Phoenix” security plan in Ecuador.

These performative and opaque characteristics mean that mano dura models are not easily transferred to other contexts, and indeed, evidence from other countries suggests that the successes enjoyed by one country in reducing homicide and extortion rates may be due as much to coincidence as to any breakthrough in citizen security provisions. The cases of Honduras and Ecuador illustrate this point. In Honduras, which faced many of the same gangs and criminal structures as El Salvador, a multi-month state of exception proved ineffective at reducing extortion over the long term. Meanwhile, despite embarking on an even more intensive anticrime crusade than El Salvador by declaring a state of internal armed conflict against criminal gangs, Ecuador has yet to see the same dramatic reductions in crime and violence after nearly eight months of hardline security policy.

Although mano dura policies are not new, the digitalization of media outlets, as well as the ubiquitous nature of social media, has allowed Latin American governments that favor these policies to present a one-sided narrative of their results. Likewise, these governments are empowered to control counterarguments to their narratives by using disinformation campaigns, bots, and alternative narratives to discredit the analysis of journalists and human rights experts on the security situation in their countries.

The findings of the second roundtable highlighted the systematic use of propaganda and digital communication, particularly in El Salvador. These discussions highlighted the intensity of the government’s propaganda machinery and its effects on democracy, freedom of expression, the media ecosystem, and disinformation. The meeting concluded by emphasizing the need for alternative tactics and the importance of social media in reaching and persuading audiences about the effectiveness of mano dura.

During this roundtable, experts on information networks presented the results of their research on political sentiment in El Salvador, focusing on digital communication and propaganda analysis. Using social media analytics tools to uncover digital networks that reinforce one another, the experts identified key actors in El Salvador’s social media ecosystem and outlined the argumentative flow of pro–mano dura narratives. Another key area they highlighted was the importance of opinion networks in promoting and replicating government messages, noting that these networks often lack accountability and verification mechanisms. Whereas early in El Salvador’s state of exception the government used bots and trolls to disseminate its message, one key insight was the transition away from such engagement in later phases of the state of exception to the use of mainstream media and YouTube videos.

Narrative and discourse experts also highlighted how different algorithms impact the communication strategies used by advocates of mano dura policies. President Bukele, for example, popularized his policies, dubbed “Plan Bukele,” by using hashtags and posts primarily on Twitter (now known as X), a platform that thrives on engagement networks. TikTok is the preferred platform of Ecuador’s President Noboa, where he constantly shares his administration’s achievements in matters of security as well as videos showcasing arrests, narcotics seizures, and his new prison complex.

Journalists specializing in propaganda narratives in Latin America note that long-form content on platforms like YouTube helps in creating a positive narrative around mano dura by continuously publishing content throughout the day. One statistic from this roundtable stood out: according to one analysis, 69 pro-government accounts in El Salvador published around 350 videos on YouTube on mano dura daily and collectively had “more followers than the population of El Salvador.” This constant stream of content, aided by the proliferation of bots, is also effective at suppressing discourse around human rights violations during the ongoing state of exception—a trend that has continued throughout 2024.

The second roundtable placed an emphasis not just on modes of dissemination but also on the content of messages. Key narratives in posts advocating for mano dura in El Salvador tend to focus on the achievements of the Bukele administration in matters of security, in particular on the decreasing number of homicides and increasing number of arrests and detentions. In other words, President Bukele uses social media to focus the narrative on areas where the numbers are indicative of a tangible improvement in security. The overwhelming focus on homicide statistics tends to reduce the importance of other crime statistics—such as extortion, robbery, and kidnapping—in an overall assessment of security gains in El Salvador. Within the security themes, images of alleged gang members and President Bukele’s new prison system, the Terrorist Confinement Center (CECOT), tend to be central points of the messaging campaigns.

One interesting area of discussion was the convergence of religious or messianic messaging with political narratives favoring mano dura policies. Experts highlighted the frequency with which terms such as “President Bukele” and “God” appear in rhetoric surrounding security policy decisions. Relatedly, rapid results in the security domain have led to the creation of a “rock star” image by the Salvadoran head of state. Indeed, the emergence of improved security in a country like El Salvador lends itself to the apotheosizing of President Bukele. This narrative has been replicated by other leaders in Latin America, albeit with less success. In Ecuador, for example, President Noboa has used militaristic imagery and strongman rhetoric to bolster his position and justify authoritarian measures, including—like Bukele—sharing images from prisons on his social media accounts.

As governments and political leaders lean into social media strategies to control the narrative and advocate for mano dura policies, another theme experts emphasized was the mounting challenges faced by independent media and journalists in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Honduras. Participants discussed tactics—including financial pressure (e.g., withholding advertising revenue) and legal threats—that have led to the closure of critical media outlets and the self-censorship of journalists. Despite these obstacles, some journalists have found ways to resist, either by lowering their public profiles, using alternative digital platforms like TikTok to reach broader audiences, or, in extreme cases, operating from exile or using artificial intelligence (AI) bots bearing their likeness to continue their work without direct threats to their safety.

Throughout the roundtables, participants mentioned the lack of opportunities and safe spaces to openly discuss and dissent from the official government line. As the civic space becomes more constrained, it has become difficult to present a counternarrative to mano dura, in particular reports that could expose the policy’s impacts on human rights and the vibrancy of democracy. Experts from several countries expressed concern over “authoritarian learning,” whereby repressive tactics are replicated across the region and transplanted from one country to the next. Some noted that the self-exile of many journalists, as well as continuous online harassment and attacks, ultimately have contributed to a media ecosystem that allows the government’s message to spread with few constraints or counternarratives in place. In the digital space, experts also expressed concern about the ongoing harassment and smear campaigns by pro-government accounts, which endanger journalists’ safety and mental health.

Part III: The Search for Alternatives to Mano Dura

The third and final roundtable tackled the difficult challenge of developing short-term alternatives. The overall takeaway was that there is no “magic wand” for citizen security. Further, another key finding was that there is no “one-size-fits-all” alternative to mano dura. Participants noted that alternative strategies in Latin America historically have been characterized by a high degree of variation, in terms of both their level of detail and impact on crime and violence. While participants broadly agreed that community-level interventions, data-driven law enforcement, and social and economic programs were all important for delivering sustained reductions in violence, the feasibility of these interventions varied on a country-by-country basis. Participants also highlighted that the failure to convincingly articulate alternative strategies to mano dura could have negative effects for democracy and human rights in the hemisphere more broadly, increasing the narrative appeal of hardline security policies in the absence of other options.

Participants began the discussion by highlighting the history of public safety policy in the Americas. In Central America, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica were all mentioned as cases of countries that experimented with alternative strategies to varying degrees. For instance, Honduras under President Carlos Roberto Flores (in office 1998–2002) introduced a law aimed at helping rehabilitate and reintegrate gang members, while El Salvador under President Tony Saca (2004–2009) pursued policies known as mano amiga and mano extendida, also intended to reduce violence through the rehabilitation, rather than incarceration, of criminals. However, particularly in the latter case, the programs were chronically underfunded and intended more as political posturing than a true vision for an alternative security strategy.

Another participant highlighted Costa Rica as a case in which an alternative strategy produced significant reductions in violence. Under the presidency of Laura Chinchilla (2010–2014), Costa Rica invested heavily in education and mental health in communities at high risk of violence. However, with the administration of Guillermo Solís (2014–2018), Chinchilla’s successor, funding for these efforts was significantly curtailed, and crime and violence slowly began to tick up once again, highlighting the fragility of these strategies.

Troublingly, participants in this roundtable noted that alternative strategies at times even backfired, citing the example of Ecuador, which under President Rafael Correa (2007–2017) recognized certain gangs like the Latin Kings as community organizations in a bid to reduce violence in 2007. In Ecuador’s case, tacit toleration by the state subsequently allowed the gangs to expand their presence and further entrench themselves in communities, contributing to the current explosion of violence in the country. Such failures have increased the appeal of mano dura security policies by comparison.

Another common thread in the discussion focused on the role of states of exception, that is, the temporary suspension of certain constitutional rights as well as habeas corpus, both in mano dura strategies and in promoting alternative approaches. Participants noted that in some cases, such as Ecuador in early 2024 when gang violence reached a fever pitch, there may be no other option than declaring a state of exception in order to regain some level of control over the security situation. Alternative approaches to mano dura may be best suited when they acknowledge the need for occasional states of exception, especially to constrain violence in the short term, provided there is a long-term plan that is not simply the extension of mano dura. Accordingly, a general sentiment in the discussion was that states of exception are not inherently incompatible with alternative policies to mano dura. However, the discussion went on to stress the importance of keeping states of exception time-bound and based on clear objectives to ensure that they do not become a permanent fixture in society—as they have in El Salvador.

Relatedly, the conversation touched on the value of transparency as a corrective to the limits on civil and political rights that occur under a state of exception. Participants noted that both President Bukele’s Territorial Control Plan, which has guided El Salvador’s security policy, and President Noboa’s “Plan Phoenix”—announced alongside his declaration of war on gangs—were kept secret from the general public. In both cases, no plan exists on paper for researchers, the media, or voters to examine. This level of secrecy impedes civil society and the media’s efforts to understand the policies and hold the government accountable. It also stymies public discussion of the specific goals of the state of exception, allowing these periods to drag on even if limited progress has been made in improving public security conditions.

One interesting point of discussion centered around the relationship between regime types and public security accomplishments. Participants noted that the countries with the lowest levels of violence tend to be highly consolidated democracies or full autocracies. In Latin America, where flawed democracies are relatively common, conditions permit organized crime to thrive and pose major challenges to social and political stability. Participants found that Bukele may be exhibiting characteristics of “penal populism,” a theory developed by scholar Máximo Sozzo, which refers to the idea that harsh punishments and mass incarceration can act as a powerful deterrent to criminal activity while garnering high levels of political support. The discussion also underscored that the lack of a clear or proven alternative that can be readily adopted by multiple countries may be having corrosive effects on Latin American democracies and contributing to an uptick in support for Bukele’s model. In particular, more authoritarian-minded leaders may be at risk of implementing heavy-handed restrictions on civil liberties under the penal populist guise of improving public safety and may then use these to cement their control and dismantle institutional guardrails.

Key Takeaways and Recommendations

Throughout the three roundtables, several key takeaways and recommendations emerged. The conversation on the effect of mano dura policies on security focused significantly on the performative element of these policies. Such policies tend to emphasize sweeping statements of purpose and ambitious objectives but are light on specific details or transparency that would give citizens and observers tangible insight into the plans’ implementation. As a result, understanding how and why countries that have pursued mano dura approaches have experienced different results, and what can be done to improve outcomes, remains challenging.

Based on the roundtable discussions, below are three sets of recommendations that seek to reduce the appeal of mano dura, contain misleading narratives surrounding mano dura, and provide credible alternatives to mano dura policies that could achieve sought-after security objectives. These recommendations are representative of the discussions with participants from El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Chile, and Venezuela, among others, representing the views of human rights defenders, lawyers, nongovernmental organizations, journalists, academics, and security experts.

Reducing the Appeal of Mano Dura Throughout Latin America

First, to reduce the appeal of mano dura in contexts in which high levels of crime and violence occur, pro-democracy governments in Latin America must work with civil society and the international community to expose the long-term effects of these policies. The Bukele model in particular, which was the focus of conversation in many roundtables, must be examined closely for its role in eroding democratic institutions and the rule of law. Effectively assessing these policies can enable governments to develop alternative strategies to counter crime while ensuring transparency, strengthening the rule of law, and building law enforcement capacity that protects human rights:

1. Reduce the asymmetry of information regarding current mano dura There is an overabundance of information about the purported efficacy of mano dura models. Meanwhile, there is much less information about the costs associated with these measures, such as human rights abuses, skyrocketing debt, ballooning security budgets, and a permanent state of exception. To balance the narrative around mano dura models, it is crucial to highlight the hidden costs to contextualize their perceived achievements.
2. Disseminate information about the distinct qualities of the Bukele model. Countries in Latin American and the Caribbean need to have greater appreciation for the unique nature of their security environments. There needs to be more education about how the Bukele model is contingent upon first negotiating with gangs, a key element of the plan’s “success” that may not be an option for other countries in the region.
3. Invest in social prevention. Current mano dura models feature no investment in programs to mitigate the social impact of hardline policies such as disturbances in education, the removal of heads of households, and a decrease in social services. For example, as a consequence of mass incarceration, it is estimated that around 40,000 children in El Salvador are without one or both parents. This looming crisis may not directly affect the current administration, but it will create significant challenges for future governments. Investing in rehabilitation, education, and community support is critical to prevent this cycle from worsening.
4. Promote transparency in security spending. Establish clear mechanisms for tracking and reporting on police and military budgets to prevent corruption and ensure resources are effectively utilized. This transparency would include publicly accessible reports on spending, independent audits, and accountability measures for mismanagement. Balancing security with sustainable economic development is essential for future stability.
5. Expose corruption to highlight the shortcomings of concentrated power.Despite promises to eliminate crime and corruption, evidence shows that high-ranking officials in El Salvador, for example, have been implicated in corrupt activities, including money laundering and secret deals with gang leaders. Investigating and exposing these corrupt practices will reveal that the mano dura approach only perpetuates a system where political favors and illicit activity thrive under the guise of a security crackdown.
    

Containing Misleading Narratives Surrounding Mano Dura Policies

Second, with respect to the narrative power of those advocating mano dura approaches, there are hopeful trends on communications platforms such as TikTok. Human rights organizations are gaining ground, given the organic engagement algorithm, and pro-government media is experiencing a decline in digital interactions. Successful counternarratives identified during the second roundtable contained several key elements:

1. Support grassroots efforts. Online counternarratives were successful when started by victims of family members of those affected by the mano dura An example of these type of grassroots efforts is MOVIR, or Movimiento de Víctimas del Régimen, in El Salvador, a Facebook and X account that shows the names and faces of those disappeared by the regime, as well as stories of those negatively impacted by the regime’s mano dura policies.
2. Focus on information systems used by the majority of the population. According to one expert, less than 15 percent of the total population in El Salvador uses the social media platform X. Identifying social media platforms and private messaging apps that are popular with the majority of the population will ensure counternarratives are received by the public.
3. Produce a high volume of content. Comparing the number of posts per day, there is a significant discrepancy in the reach of pro–human rights accounts in countries like El Salvador amid mano dura policies when compared to government-produced content and pro–mano dura A similar trend is apparent in Ecuador. Efforts to raise awareness of government abuses, as well as the democratic ethos of countries in Latin America, should include a coordinated, versatile strategy that can be used across the region as a collective effort by civil society organizations and those affected by mano dura policies.
4. Foster cross-border collaboration. There is a need to counter the media vacuum oftentimes left in countries with mano dura policies and emphasize the importance of supporting democratic resilience in the region by sharing best practices, fostering cross-border collaborations, and advocating for greater transparency and accountability in digital communication.
    

Creating Credible Alternatives to Mano Dura Policies

Third, with respect to creating alternative strategies to mano dura security policies, there are a number of elements that should be considered:

1. Base alternatives in tangible security gains rather than appeals to human rights. Alternative strategies must admit the failures of past models and the right of people to feel safe. They must also admit the right of the state to crack down during intense periods of violence while moving away from mano durain the medium and long term. These solutions must have human rights and rule of law concerns at heart, even if the messaging campaign around them does not focus on those elements.
2. Invest in education. Participants noted that dropouts from the education system are closely correlated with recruitment into gangs and that a lack of social and economic mobility further increases the role of organized crime in everyday life. In the case of Costa Rica, while the Chinchilla-era improvements in safety through social programming were not long-lasting, they nevertheless showed the potential impact such initiatives can have in not only lowering violence but increasing standards of living within a country. However, participants also cautioned that education-related interventions are much more likely to take time to bear fruit and may not work immediately in the most violent or gang-controlled environments.
3. Focus on the local. Participants also noted that often the worst security challenges are clustered in relatively small geographic areas. For this reason, security interventions need not always be sweeping nationwide programs; programs can deliver significant results through targeted and data-based law enforcement models. One participant highlighted ongoing work in Chile to better map where specific types of crimes were occurring in order to allocate resources more effectively and with a smaller footprint than mano dura policies often have. Other participants stressed the need to listen to and engage with communities, with one discussant highlighting Santa Marta in El Salvador as a neighborhood that has succeeded in keeping levels of violence low despite surges in other parts of the country, thanks to strong local leadership and community-level policing.
4. Get it in writing. Finally, participants reiterated the lack of formalized thinking on security policy as a key impediment to the development of alternative strategies to mano dura. The discussion noted that there are few policy documents in Central America stating the purpose of law enforcement and their approaches to tackling organized crime. Where such documents exist, as noted in the cases of El Salvador and Ecuador, they are often kept secret, limiting public discussion and accountability. The participants urged governments to undertake more transparent strategy making around public security as an important first step to developing better security policies across the board.
    

Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and senior fellow with the Americas Program. Juliana Rubio is an associate director with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program. Rubi Bledsoe is a research associate with the Americas Program. The authors would like to thank the journalists, academics, and members of civil society who participated in the roundtable series, and who risk their lives every day to report on the abuse by governments who pursue unrestricted mano dura policies.

This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the U.S. government.