Thus far, Israeli strikes on Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility have been limited. At first glance, this might seem like a curious omission, given that Israel’s justification for the strikes was, “If not stopped, Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time. . . . It could be a year. It could be within a few months.” Fordow has long been recognized as a critical component in Iran’s nuclear matrix, as a site for enriching uranium to 60 percent, well beyond what is required for civilian purposes. Further attacks on Fordow, potentially with U.S. support, could be imminent.
But the success of those attacks is just one of many factors that will determine Iran’s future nuclear status. While Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently indicated Iran would be willing to return to nuclear talks (“Iran has never left the negotiating table”), and the Trump administration has indicated they are still pursuing dialogue, the potential of resolving the status of Iran’s nuclear program seems grim. The sticking point of past negotiations was over whether or not Iran could continue to enrich uranium. The ongoing crisis appears unlikely to have changed either side’s views on this crucial issue; if anything, it may cause them to be even more adamant in their opposition.
Status of Fordow
Fordow is believed to be central to Iran’s nuclear activities. It is buried deep underground in a mountain, and its primary function is uranium enrichment using 6 cascades of older IR-1 centrifuges, along with the 10 cascades of more advanced IR-6 centrifuges. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran was prohibited from enriching at Fordow; however, following U.S. withdrawal, Iran resumed enrichment activities there in 2018 and was producing 60 percent enriched uranium.
The status of Fordow at present or following any further strikes will be essential for Iran’s nuclear future, as it is believed to be the facility that could increase enrichment from 60 to 90 percent for weapons-grade uranium. Of particular concern is that in March 2023, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collected samples from Fordow that found uranium enriched to 83.7 percent; however, this was never confirmed. An additional concern is that Fordow could be one of the sites where Iran has been stockpiling 60 percent enriched uranium or where the stockpile could be transferred. Some of Iran’s stockpile is believed to be stored in Isfahan, but the IAEA has not disclosed its full location.
Fordow is believed to be buried 80–110 meters underground, near Qom, and was built to withstand airstrikes. It is believed that Israel would either need U.S. support to destroy the facility or repeated airstrikes. U.S. support could include the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, which is a 30,000-pound bomb carried by B-2 bombers. Israel could attempt to take out the facility with multiple rounds of smaller payload weapons. But neither of these options guarantees that Fordow can be destroyed, which may require even stronger ordnance or sustained strikes. Additionally, Israel may resort to unconventional methods for attempting to wipe out Fordow, such as cyberattacks, similar to the 2010 Stuxnet attacks, or other means of sabotage.
Whether or not Iran continues to pursue a nuclear program will depend on what remains of its previous enterprise, given that Natanz has been destroyed, according to the IAEA, with damage to other facilities, including Isfahan and Arak. The status of Fordow, likely to be decided in the coming days and weeks, will be decisive.
Iran’s Nonproliferation and NPT Status
A day before Israel’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the IAEA, which is responsible for monitoring states’ compliance with their international nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, found Iran to be in breach for the first time since 2005. Specific concerns included traces of uranium at undeclared sites, which could not be explained. According to the IAEA, Iran had stockpiled over 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent, and, according to General Michael Kurilla of the U.S. Central Command, “it is estimated that current stockpiles and the available centrifuges across several enrichment plants are sufficient to produce its first 25 kg of weapons-grade material in roughly one week and enough for up to ten nuclear weapons in three weeks.” Iran’s Foreign Ministry and Atomic Energy Organization met the findings with defiance, claiming the IAEA had no legal basis, and said it would build new facilities that were more secure and would introduce advanced sixth-generation centrifuges at Fordow. The IAEA finding coincided with President Trump’s deadline for an agreement in the ongoing nuclear talks, suggesting Iran’s nuclear activities would continue unchecked.
There has been ongoing debate as to whether or not Iran had an active nuclear weapons program, including among Trump officials. A nuclear weapon requires fissile material, such as highly enriched uranium, which Iran was not only developing but also stockpiling for further enrichment. It also requires a means of delivery, such as a ballistic missile like the Shahab-3, which is based on a North Korean design, or cruise missiles, such as the Soumar, which is derived from Russia’s dual-capable Kh-55. The final factor is knowledge, including weaponization and converting fissile material into a bomb, along with mating a warhead to the delivery vehicle. There is ample evidence that Iran was working on weaponization technology, such as neutron initiators and high-explosive compression tests, through 2003. What is less definitive, however, is whether or not Iran continued these activities, and if its research up through 2003 was sufficient for weaponization at a later date. Some analysts, such as the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, for example, assess that some of these capabilities are “likely ready.”
In a less-covered news item, on June 16, it was reported that the Iranian parliament was drafting a bill to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Withdrawal requires a 90-day notice and can be invoked under Article X of the treaty in response to “extraordinary events.” According to an Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson, “In light of recent developments, we will take an appropriate decision. Government has to enforce parliament bills but such a proposal is just being prepared and we will coordinate in the later stages with parliament.” Iranian withdrawal from the NPT would signal a decisive and unequivocal step towards pursuing a nuclear weapons program, contrary to its past position of hedging under the auspices of a 2005 fatwa by the Ayatollah banning the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons, which many experts interpreted as being irreversible even if the security conditions change for Iran.
Iranian withdrawal from the NPT would also be a major blow to the global nuclear order and norms against nonproliferation. The NPT is the foundation of the nuclear order, which is already facing one of its biggest crises in decades. The NPT is rooted in a “grand bargain,” whereby the majority of states will refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons programs, and in return five nuclear possessors (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) will take steps towards “general and complete disarmament” and provide access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses. Iran’s nuclear program presented numerous challenges for the NPT, as Tehran insisted on its right to enrich for peaceful purposes but engaged in activities with clear military implications. Iranian withdrawal could prompt a proliferation cascade and end its relationship with the IAEA, as identified by nuclear experts Jamie Kwong and Nicole Grajewski in a recent analysis on the risks of Iranian withdrawal from the NPT.
Iran’s Friends
The IAEA Board of Governors’ June 12 report found Iran was in breach of its NPT obligations; however, three countries voted against this finding, including Russia and China. Iran is part of an axis of aggressors, including Russia, China, and North Korea, that have been testing the international system for years and have been increasingly cooperative with each other on nuclear issues. For example, in 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Chinese individuals and entities because they had “conducted financial transactions and facilitated procurement of sensitive and critical parts and technology for key actors in Iran’s ballistic missile development.” In January 2025, Iran and Russia signed the Iranian–Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and a 2022 intelligence report suggests Iran was asking Russia for help with its nuclear program, specifically with acquiring additional nuclear material that might shorten a breakout period to build a nuclear weapon. And a January 2025 report found that Iran was building nuclear-capable missiles using designs provided by North Korea.
The future of Iran’s nuclear program will particularly be shaped by the response from Moscow and Beijing, both technically and politically. In technical terms, they may assist if Tehran decides to rebuild its nuclear enterprise following Israeli strikes. China and Russia have historically provided training and support for Iran’s nuclear experts, with China providing small reactors in the 1990s, and Russia completed and fueled Iran’s Bushehr reactor. Given the extent of Iran’s nuclear program and the IAEA findings, such support would fly in the face of the international nonproliferation regime and put the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis at odds with the wider international community that continues to oppose nuclear proliferation.
But Moscow and Beijing could also provide political and diplomatic cover for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, similar to their vote against the IAEA Board of Governors’ finding. The global nuclear order, to include the NPT, works on consensus; therefore, particularly given their veto power on the UN Security Council, Russia and China could hinder attempts to generate multilateral diplomatic pressure on Tehran. Reactions from Moscow and Beijing thus far have largely stressed the need for de-escalation in the conflict, but if Israeli strikes continue and Trump changes position to offer U.S. support, the region could become the stage for a great power standoff.
Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
