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Friday, April 4, 2025

The Trump-Putin Phone Call: Some Promise, Some Disappointments, and Many Questions


President Trump and President Putin had a long (estimated at two or more hours) phone call today, March 18. Ukraine was the focus, but discussions covered a variety of topics. It followed a U.S. meeting with Ukraine where President Zelensky agreed to a 30-day ceasefire. Here is a line-by-line analysis of the White House statement, along with insights from the separate Russian statement.

Today, President Trump and President Putin spoke about the need for peace and a ceasefire in the Ukraine war. Both leaders agreed this conflict needs to end with a lasting peace.

The tone of the conversation seems to have been cordial. Putin likely adjusted his strident demands for Ukrainian subjugation as they focused on the more near-term problems.

The Kremlin’s readout also stresses a prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine scheduled on March 19: 175 people for 175 people, along with an additional 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian servicemen as a goodwill gesture.

While this is a very welcome development, earlier rounds of prisoner exchanges also occurred under the Biden administration, without any ceasefire discussions.

They also stressed the need for improved bilateral relations between the United States and Russia.

Russia is particularly anxious to revive some of its diplomatic activities in the United States, for example, opening closed consulates in San Francisco and Seattle.

The blood and treasure that both Ukraine and Russia have been spending in this war would be better spent on the needs of their people.

Although diplomatic communiques are full of such pieties, it is encouraging that there was no “but” in the statement.

This conflict should never have started and should have been ended long ago with sincere and good faith peace efforts.

President Trump has made this point many times. Russia and Ukraine disagree about who started the war, though nearly all Western observers blame Russia for the unprovoked invasion. There have been no serious peace negotiations since the first two months of the war, and neither belligerent has been open to negotiations because there is little overlap in their stated positions. Russia’s minimalist goals include full control of the four invaded provinces—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia—and a demilitarized Ukraine. Russia’s maximalist goals remain some sort of regime change in Ukraine and election of a more pro-Russian presidential candidate. Ukraine wants all of its territory back, security guarantees from NATO, reparations, and a reckoning for war crimes.

The leaders agreed that the movement to peace will begin with an energy and infrastructure ceasefire, as well as technical negotiations on implementation of a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, full ceasefire and permanent peace. These negotiations will begin immediately in the Middle East.

This is the key element. The headline is that there is no 30-day ceasefire as had been discussed previously and as Ukraine had agreed to. There will be a ceasefire limited to ceasing strikes on energy infrastructure. Ukraine has been running an ongoing campaign to attack facilities on Russian soil that are “involved in ensuring armed aggression against Ukraine,” successfully damaging Russian oil refineries, the Kerch Bridge, and some urban targets. Russia has been attacking Ukrainian electrical production and cities. These target sets form the bulk of the countries’ attacks on each other’s territory.

It remains to be seen whether Ukraine agrees and whether both sides adhere to these requirements. However, deep attacks against military targets will likely continue, and nothing will change on the front lines. There, the artillery will still fire, the drones will still fly, the infantry will still shoot at each other, and people will keep dying. This partial ceasefire, if implemented conscientiously, will reduce civilian casualties but have little effect on military casualties. Notably, a similar energy infrastructure ceasefire was discussed in August 2024 under the Biden administration, which again suggests caution in interpreting this achievement as a radical breakthrough. The next priority will be a maritime ceasefire, which will ease some pressure on Ukrainian grain shipments. Russia would get relief from the sting of Ukrainian attacks against its naval forces, which have sunk a ship every few months.

After that, there would be a “complete ceasefire,” which might have a 30-day temporary ceasefire ahead of it. Finally, there’s some sort of “permanent peace.” The communique doesn’t mention where in the Middle East the talks will be, but the last meeting was in Saudi Arabia. That will likely be the venue for future meetings.

This paragraph does show that achieving even a ceasefire is a step-by-step process. Moreover, the Kremlin readout flags Russia’s requirement for solving the conflict through “a complete cessation of foreign military aid and the provision of intelligence information to Kyiv,” suggesting that Putin plans to stick to his original demands calling for Ukraine’s “demilitarization,” to which Ukraine is unlikely to agree. Notably missing from the readouts is the talk of Ukraine’s territorial concessions, which was rumored to be part of the phone conversation between Trump and Putin.

Accordingly, the administration’s talk about peace in the first 100 days was commendable as an aspiration but not realistic as a goal. Negotiations to end the Korean War took two years, and there has never been a permanent peace settlement. Possible dangers include Putin prolonging such talks indefinitely while providing the U.S. government with something to present as an achievement (such as a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure), without any significant breakthroughs occurring as Russia continues to carve off portions of Ukraine piece by piece.

The leaders spoke broadly about the Middle East as a region of potential cooperation to prevent future conflicts. They further discussed the need to stop proliferation of strategic weapons and will engage with others to ensure the broadest possible application.

This could be more pious rhetoric, but important nonproliferation issues have arisen. The United States is worried that Russia will transfer nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran as compensation for their material support during the war. In the last few weeks, there have been rumblings in several countries—South Korea, Poland, Japan, and even Germany—about developing their own nuclear capabilities because the U.S. nuclear umbrella now seems less reliable.

The two leaders shared the view that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.

This is an extraordinary declaration if carried through. The only way Iran could destroy Israel is with nuclear weapons. It has failed to even damage Israel with conventional munitions despite twice launching maximum attacks. Preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons has been a long-standing U.S. goal and supported by most countries in the region. It is questionable, however, how eager Moscow is to move toward that goal, considering its deepening partnership with Iran in recent years. Iran remains one of the key enablers of Russia’s war effort, providing Russia with drones and missiles that are subsequently deployed in Ukraine.

The two leaders agreed that a future with an improved bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia has huge upside. This includes enormous economic deals and geopolitical stability when peace has been achieved.

This is classic Trump economics. He sees major economic gains to be had when two leaders meet face-to-face and agree to an economic arrangement. However, the underlying economics and politics may not support such an expansive view. Russia has relatively little that the West wants other than energy and raw materials. Unlocking either requires large capital commitments over years, even decades. It is not clear that Russia can provide the geopolitical stability necessary to empower these kinds of partnerships. Past Western energy projects in Russia ended in disappointment, and Western companies remain cautious about the investment opportunities present in Russia today.

Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.

President Trump and President Putin had a long (estimated at two or more hours) phone call today, March 18. Ukraine was the focus, but discussions covered a variety of topics. It followed a U.S. meeting with Ukraine where President Zelensky agreed to a 30-day ceasefire. Here is a line-by-line analysis of the White House statement, along with insights from the separate Russian statement.

Today, President Trump and President Putin spoke about the need for peace and a ceasefire in the Ukraine war. Both leaders agreed this conflict needs to end with a lasting peace.

The tone of the conversation seems to have been cordial. Putin likely adjusted his strident demands for Ukrainian subjugation as they focused on the more near-term problems.

The Kremlin’s readout also stresses a prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine scheduled on March 19: 175 people for 175 people, along with an additional 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian servicemen as a goodwill gesture.

While this is a very welcome development, earlier rounds of prisoner exchanges also occurred under the Biden administration, without any ceasefire discussions.

They also stressed the need for improved bilateral relations between the United States and Russia.

Russia is particularly anxious to revive some of its diplomatic activities in the United States, for example, opening closed consulates in San Francisco and Seattle.

The blood and treasure that both Ukraine and Russia have been spending in this war would be better spent on the needs of their people.

Although diplomatic communiques are full of such pieties, it is encouraging that there was no “but” in the statement.

This conflict should never have started and should have been ended long ago with sincere and good faith peace efforts.

President Trump has made this point many times. Russia and Ukraine disagree about who started the war, though nearly all Western observers blame Russia for the unprovoked invasion. There have been no serious peace negotiations since the first two months of the war, and neither belligerent has been open to negotiations because there is little overlap in their stated positions. Russia’s minimalist goals include full control of the four invaded provinces—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia—and a demilitarized Ukraine. Russia’s maximalist goals remain some sort of regime change in Ukraine and election of a more pro-Russian presidential candidate. Ukraine wants all of its territory back, security guarantees from NATO, reparations, and a reckoning for war crimes.

The leaders agreed that the movement to peace will begin with an energy and infrastructure ceasefire, as well as technical negotiations on implementation of a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, full ceasefire and permanent peace. These negotiations will begin immediately in the Middle East.

This is the key element. The headline is that there is no 30-day ceasefire as had been discussed previously and as Ukraine had agreed to. There will be a ceasefire limited to ceasing strikes on energy infrastructure. Ukraine has been running an ongoing campaign to attack facilities on Russian soil that are “involved in ensuring armed aggression against Ukraine,” successfully damaging Russian oil refineries, the Kerch Bridge, and some urban targets. Russia has been attacking Ukrainian electrical production and cities. These target sets form the bulk of the countries’ attacks on each other’s territory.

It remains to be seen whether Ukraine agrees and whether both sides adhere to these requirements. However, deep attacks against military targets will likely continue, and nothing will change on the front lines. There, the artillery will still fire, the drones will still fly, the infantry will still shoot at each other, and people will keep dying. This partial ceasefire, if implemented conscientiously, will reduce civilian casualties but have little effect on military casualties. Notably, a similar energy infrastructure ceasefire was discussed in August 2024 under the Biden administration, which again suggests caution in interpreting this achievement as a radical breakthrough. The next priority will be a maritime ceasefire, which will ease some pressure on Ukrainian grain shipments. Russia would get relief from the sting of Ukrainian attacks against its naval forces, which have sunk a ship every few months.

After that, there would be a “complete ceasefire,” which might have a 30-day temporary ceasefire ahead of it. Finally, there’s some sort of “permanent peace.” The communique doesn’t mention where in the Middle East the talks will be, but the last meeting was in Saudi Arabia. That will likely be the venue for future meetings.

This paragraph does show that achieving even a ceasefire is a step-by-step process. Moreover, the Kremlin readout flags Russia’s requirement for solving the conflict through “a complete cessation of foreign military aid and the provision of intelligence information to Kyiv,” suggesting that Putin plans to stick to his original demands calling for Ukraine’s “demilitarization,” to which Ukraine is unlikely to agree. Notably missing from the readouts is the talk of Ukraine’s territorial concessions, which was rumored to be part of the phone conversation between Trump and Putin.

Accordingly, the administration’s talk about peace in the first 100 days was commendable as an aspiration but not realistic as a goal. Negotiations to end the Korean War took two years, and there has never been a permanent peace settlement. Possible dangers include Putin prolonging such talks indefinitely while providing the U.S. government with something to present as an achievement (such as a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure), without any significant breakthroughs occurring as Russia continues to carve off portions of Ukraine piece by piece.

The leaders spoke broadly about the Middle East as a region of potential cooperation to prevent future conflicts. They further discussed the need to stop proliferation of strategic weapons and will engage with others to ensure the broadest possible application.

This could be more pious rhetoric, but important nonproliferation issues have arisen. The United States is worried that Russia will transfer nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran as compensation for their material support during the war. In the last few weeks, there have been rumblings in several countries—South Korea, Poland, Japan, and even Germany—about developing their own nuclear capabilities because the U.S. nuclear umbrella now seems less reliable.

The two leaders shared the view that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel.

This is an extraordinary declaration if carried through. The only way Iran could destroy Israel is with nuclear weapons. It has failed to even damage Israel with conventional munitions despite twice launching maximum attacks. Preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons has been a long-standing U.S. goal and supported by most countries in the region. It is questionable, however, how eager Moscow is to move toward that goal, considering its deepening partnership with Iran in recent years. Iran remains one of the key enablers of Russia’s war effort, providing Russia with drones and missiles that are subsequently deployed in Ukraine.

The two leaders agreed that a future with an improved bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia has huge upside. This includes enormous economic deals and geopolitical stability when peace has been achieved.

This is classic Trump economics. He sees major economic gains to be had when two leaders meet face-to-face and agree to an economic arrangement. However, the underlying economics and politics may not support such an expansive view. Russia has relatively little that the West wants other than energy and raw materials. Unlocking either requires large capital commitments over years, even decades. It is not clear that Russia can provide the geopolitical stability necessary to empower these kinds of partnerships. Past Western energy projects in Russia ended in disappointment, and Western companies remain cautious about the investment opportunities present in Russia today.

Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.



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