Russia has not been a good friend to Iran. Moscow gave Tehran little more than rhetorical support during one of the most serious crises in Iran’s history. Russia’s rhetoric serves as a reminder that the so-called “Axis of Upheaval” was never the type of unified threat that some commentators and government officials have suggested. Rather, Moscow is seeking to balance its partnership with Iran with longer-term interests in the Middle East, and those interests are winning out.
While Russia and Iran both oppose the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War world order, the Kremlin’s stance on the Israel-Iran war reflects more traditional interests: preserving regional stability, balancing relations with Iran’s Arab adversaries, criticizing U.S. actions as hypocritical, and asserting its status as a great power. In some cases, these interests are aligned with Iran’s. But none of them indicate that Tehran’s support has secured Moscow’s full commitment to Iran’s defense.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to a new era of defense cooperation between Russia and Iran and raised the possibility that Moscow would help Tehran against its many enemies. Tehran has provided considerable assistance to Russia, including unmanned aerial systems (UASs), artillery shells, and several hundred Fateh-110 short-range ballisticmissiles. Iran has also helped Russia build a sprawling UAS factory in Russia, which could produce thousands of UASs for battlefield use. In exchange, Russia has supplied Iran with Yak-130 pilot training aircraft, Mi-28 attack helicopters, aid to Iran’s space and missile programs, and domestic surveillance technology.
The relationship seemingly entered a new phase in early 2025 when Iran and Russia signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty. The agreement promised increased defense cooperation and included a clause committing both countries to “counter the application of unilateral coercive measures.” But Russian officials were careful to emphasize that the treaty did not constitute a military alliance and that Russia was not obliged to provide Iran with military assistance in the event of an attack on Iran.
This lack of obligation was on full display during and after June’s Israeli and U.S. attacks against Iran. Although Reuters reported, citing Iranian sources, that Tehran sought concrete assistance from Moscow during the conflict, both Russian and Iranian officials denied the claim. The Kremlin emphasized that it was prepared to provide “humanitarian support” and that it had offered to work with Iran on improved air defenses, but did not encounter “much interest.” Rather, Russia’s support for Iran has been primarily rhetorical.
Analysis of that rhetoric suggests that Iran plays a less central role in Russia’s thinking about the Middle East than officials in Tehran might hope. Russia’s interests in preserving Middle Eastern stability, maintaining positive relations with regional players, discrediting U.S. narratives, and increasing its prestige sometimes overlap with Iran’s interests but demonstrate that Moscow’s friendship with Iran is not of the “no limits” variety.
A major theme in Russia’s responses to the U.S. strikes was a call for regional stability. Russian statements consistently referred to the dangers of escalation and Moscow’s desire for a return to a diplomatic process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted on Telegram that “The Russian side has fully supported efforts to regulate the situation around the Iranian nuclear program peacefully. . . . Russia will continue to contribute to the de-escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel.” In multipleconversations with their counterparts in the Gulf states, Russian officials “emphasized the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities and the prevention of further geographical expansion.” These conversations also demonstrate Russia’s efforts to maintain its relationships with the Gulf states, which fear Iran.
Russia also has a long-standing interest in using the Middle East conflict to undermine U.S. rhetorical claims about international law and human rights. Many Russian statements appeared calibrated to undermine U.S. claims to be opposed to aggression. An article in Russian state media sought to draw connections between the actions of Iran and a variety of other regional and global powers: “Iran’s strategic goal is exactly the same as that of Russia, China, Turkey, India and dozens of other countries—the desire to take a worthy place in the new world order being formed right now.” Vladimir Putin underscored that statement by saying that the primary drivers behind the Israel-Iran war were: “Western countries [trying] to prevent the establishment of a fair multipolar world order and to preserve the model of globalization that is beneficial only to them.” President Putin also portrayed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as heroic resistance on behalf of those powers, one of which (Turkey) is a NATO member that has provided military aid to Ukraine.
Russian media portrayed the United States as the aggressor in the war against Iran. Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council Alexander Venediktov condemned the U.S. strikes, saying that “it is particularly alarming that the strikes were carried out by a country that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council” and called Israel’s attacks “unprovoked.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs described a June 12 International Atomic Energy Agency resolution, which declared Iran to be in breach of its nonproliferation obligations, as the result of “attempts of the Western camp to manipulate the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in order to settle political scores.”
Moscow’s rhetoric also suggests that Russia’s interest in being treated as a great power remains important. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized on its Telegram channel that the Russian government was ready to “provide mediation services in order to prevent further escalation.” First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Vladimir Dzhabarov said that “without Russia’s participation, it will be difficult for the Americans to balance all the positions of political players in the region.” However, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stressed that “the parties directly involved in the confrontation [must] ask for help.” While it is plausible that Russia seeks concessions on Ukraine in return for its support, the Kremlin expressed that it sees the situations in Ukraine and the Middle East to be separate. Russia’s interest in mediating stems both from its interest in regional stability and from its desire to play the role of a great power in international politics.
The main exception to these themes is a set of remarks by former Russian President and current Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitri Medvedev on Telegram. Most alarmingly, Medvedev seemingly threatened to transfer nuclear weapons to Iran. Such a move would mark an enormous shift for Russia, which has consistentlyopposed Iran’s pursuit of the bomb. But Medvedev has a history of provocative nuclearrhetoric, and his recent remarks are unlikely to signal a shift in official policy. Iran’s nuclear program is a major engine of regional instability, threatens Russia’s other would-be partners in the region, and undermines Russia’s preferred narrative of U.S.-Israeli aggression.
Of course, Russia has other reasons to limit its support for Iran. The war in Ukraine has placed enormous demands on Russia’s military capabilities, reducing what it can realistically send to Iran. In addition, the Kremlin may see benefits in minimizing confrontations with President Trump when his administration seems inclined to further reduce U.S. support to Kyiv, which serves Russia’s interests.
These interests are nothing new for Russia. Moscow will probably continue its long-standing policies in the Middle East, which involve a hands-off approach to sheltering countries like Iran from sanctions and other threats from the United States and U.S. partners. This means that Russia may not obstruct a new nuclear agreement. It also means that Iran might be ready to decrease its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine if it believes its aid to Moscow has not been reciprocated. These would both represent positive developments for the United States and its international partners. However, if President Putin attains his goals in Ukraine on the battlefield or the negotiating table, he might be more willing and able to risk a confrontation with President Trump by increasing military support to Tehran, where Russian and Iranian interests overlap.
Russia’s response to Israel and the United States’ attacks against Iran has emphasized traditional Russian desires for Middle Eastern stability, good relations with a variety of regional players, opportunities to discredit the United States, and the ability to play the role of a great power. These interests mark the limits of collaboration between Russia and Iran, and the United States should welcome any tensions that result from Tehran’s recent experience of those limits.
Alexander Palmer is a fellow with the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism (WITT) Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Sofiia Syzonenko is an intern with the WITT Program.
All quotes originally in Russian were translated by Sofiia Syzonenko. Special thanks to Madison Bruno and Phillip Meylan for editing and publication support.
