Amid Turkish statements about normalization with the Syrian regime and Damascus’s hesitant response, it appears as though the process is progressing slowly through security and political arrangements between the two sides, in preparation for a potential meeting of the two presidents under Russian, and possibly Russian-Arab, sponsorship.
Ankara played the role of mediator between Moscow and Kyiv in the Ukraine war, enhancing its position with Russia, which sees Turkey as a key player in Syria, especially in light of Arab states’ rapprochement with the regime and the regional repercussions of the Gaza war. Moscow is now attempting to support normalization between Ankara and Damascus, exploiting internal pressure on the Turkish government over the issue of refugees, Turkish national security concerns, and the upcoming US elections. Russia hopes to impose a new reality that opens a different political path from the Western-supported Syrian Constitutional Committee process in Geneva, thereby strengthening the Syrian regime, by harnessing Turkey’s desire to realize its economic, political, and security aims.
Through normalization with the Syrian regime, Turkey seeks to achieve two main goals: The first is the return of 3.6 million Syrian refugees, under temporary protection after obtaining guarantees from the regime, to alleviate internal political pressure, including from opposition parties, many of which have blamed the refugees for Turkey’s economic woes and vowed to send them home. The second is to reach security and military understandings to eliminate fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Turkey considers an arm of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist group. Turkey aims to secure its southern border by eliminating or pushing the self-administration, a local governance system established by the SDF in northern and eastern Syria (also known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria), further away with the cooperation of the Syrian regime.
Turkey views the self-administration experiment as a step toward establishing a canton governed by the PKK, which it sees as a direct threat to its national security. To achieve its goals, Turkey launched two military operations: the first in 2018 (Olive Branch) to control Afrin, and the second in 2019 (Peace Spring) to control Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad. Recently, it also threatened to launch a new military operation if the self-administration insists on holding local elections.
The position of the Syrian Democratic Forces
The self-administration affiliated with the SDF has made it clear that it rejects any steps toward rapprochement between Ankara and the Syrian regime, considering any reconciliation between the two parties a “major conspiracy” against the Syrian people. This stems from its fear of the impact any steps toward rapprochement might have on its areas of control and the possibility that the regime might acquiesce to Turkish demands to cooperate in fighting the SDF and weakening or eliminating its self-administration.
The self-administration announced the postponement of local elections scheduled for mid-June to mid-August, due to international and local pressure, US rejection of the vote (which Washington sees as contradicting UN Resolution 2254 and the transition plan it outlines as well as potentially undermining stability and encouraging Turkey to launch a military operation against the SDF), and Turkish threats. Speaking to the author, a member of the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the SDF, revealed that the elections will not take place this year and might be postponed indefinitely, awaiting changes in international and regional dynamics.
The self-administration has started to de-escalate with Turkey through statements by Mazloum Abdi, the SDF’s general commander, on July 19, and Mahmoud al-Masslat, the president of the Syrian Democratic Council, earlier this year, expressing a readiness for dialogue with Ankara and affirming that it does not seek hostility with any party. At the same time, the SDF has said it is ready for battle if the areas under its control are attacked. In addition, it is also working to strengthen its internal front and gain the community’s trust by holding tribal meetings, accepting tribal mediation, and issuing an amnesty for 1,500 people accused of terrorism, as well as making promises to release Syrian families from al-Hol camp. However, the self-administration continues to restrict public freedoms by arresting activists from Kurdish parties and Arab activists who oppose or criticize its policies, suppressing any protests. Additionally, the Revolutionary Youth groups affiliated with the PKK also pose a security problem as they continue to kidnap PKK opponents, attack the party headquarters of opposing groups, and recruit children for the PKK.
Indicators and conditions of normalization
Based on initial data from the Turkish-Syrian normalization negotiations, it seems that Ankara hopes the regime will play a pivotal role in bringing about the end of the SDF or at least pushing it further away from the Turkish border, relying on the historical relationship between the regime and PKK leaders and the role the regime played in the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan by the Turkish government in 1999.
According to multiple sources from the Syrian opposition, during the security negotiations with the regime, Turkey stated three main requests: first, imposing economic pressure on the SDF; second, inciting and supporting Arab tribes in SDF-controlled areas to revolt against it; and third, preparing for a joint military operation against the SDF if necessary, while ensuring Turkish political and economic interests in any upcoming political settlement talks. Meanwhile, the regime wants Turkey to normalize political and economic relations as they were before 2011, reopen and secure roads, stimulate trade along the M4 and M5 highways, and stop supporting opposition factions. The regime has set a timeline for Turkish forces to withdraw from Syria while recognizing the full sovereignty of the regime over all Syrian territory.
From a close examination of the regime’s policies and cross-referenced sources, it seems the regime will not be able to provide what Turkey wants. Closing the crossings between regime- and SDF-held areas — to undermine the SDF’s economic power — will pose a significant challenge for the regime, which receives large quantities of crude oil from the SDF, up to 30,000 barrels per day, at low prices. Additionally, militias affiliated with Iran and warlords run these crossings, making them difficult to control completely. The regime also lacks the capacity to expel the SDF from Manbij given the presence of US forces. Furthermore, the regime maintains historical and security relations with PKK-affiliated SDF leaders and wants to retain these ties to ensure its influence within the party in the future.
Possible scenarios for the future of the SDF
Scenario One: The normalization negotiations succeed
If the normalization negotiations between Turkey and the regime succeed under Russian sponsorship, the two parties could amend the Adana Agreement signed between Damascus and Ankara in 1998, allowing Turkish forces to pursue PKK elements inside Syrian territory. They could also amend the Sochi Agreement of 2019, which stipulated the end of Turkey’s “Peace Spring” operation in exchange for a Russian commitment to move the People’s Protection Units (YPG) 30 km away from the Turkish border, including from Manbij and Tel Rifaat, alongside the deployment of regime border guards in the area and the initiation of joint patrols between the Turkish and Russian armies. The agreement could be revised and implemented by deploying more regime forces in the border area in northeast Syria and pushing the SDF to withdraw beyond the 30-km zone agreed upon south of the M4 highway, including Manbij and Tel Rifaat. This would achieve Turkey’s goal of securing its borders and ensure the regime regained sovereignty over border areas, including local administration. In turn, this would weaken the SDF’s authority, further distance it from the Kurdish areas considered its stronghold, and exacerbate the challenge of addressing its existing problems with the tribes.
However, this scenario would require Turkish, Russian, and Syrian pressure on the SDF while ensuring that Washington does not intervene in its favor. This includes closing the crossings between regime- and SDF-held areas and allowing Turkey to carry out significant strikes on the self-administration’s military and economic centers, forcing it to accept the agreement’s implementation and withdraw south. This scenario faces several challenges, the most significant of which is the role of the US and its unwillingness to see the SDF, its ally, attacked or weakened, as well as the desire to avoid a military conflict that could further ignite the region, given the Turks’ understanding that the regime is not ready to close the crossings due to its economic needs. Another critical challenge is the entry and spread of Iranian militias in the north, exploiting the vacuum left by the SDF, which the regime cannot fill itself.
Scenario Two: Stalled and slowed normalization process
In this scenario, normalization is tested partially by agreeing on several measures to be implemented to pressure the SDF, such as security coordination between the regime and Turkey, including intelligence sharing and coordinating security operations against the SDF. This could involve a Turkish air campaign similar to the one in October. The regime might partially close the crossings between the areas under its control and those of the SDF to tighten the economic stranglehold on the group. Additionally, Turkey and the regime will work to incite and support Arab tribes in SDF-controlled areas to revolt against it and carry out attacks, including applying political pressure on the self-administration, stopping security cooperation with it, and possibly having the regime designate the SDF as a terrorist organization, increasing its isolation.
This is further reinforced by Turkey’s launch of a military operation in northern Iraq, with reports indicating Turkish forces have penetrated up to 40 km to expel and pursue PKK fighters around Dohuk, thus cutting supply lines between eastern Syria and the PKK’s Qandil Mountain stronghold. According to the Turks, this is the first phase of achieving the goal of reaching Sinjar and nearly besieging SDF-controlled areas in Syria.
The success of these measures depends on several factors, most importantly how serious the regime is about pressuring the SDF and the effectiveness of efforts to draw on the support of and incite the tribes among which Iran has influence, especially given Tehran’s displeasure with the Ankara-Damascus rapprochement. US support remains a crucial factor as well, depending on its willingness to remain in the region after the upcoming elections in November. Nevertheless, this scenario appears most likely to be implemented, even partially, in the coming weeks and months as a confidence-building measure between the parties in exchange for reopening international roads in northwestern Syria.
Scenario Three: Failure of the normalization process
In this scenario, the normalization between Turkey and the regime fails, and the regime does not respond to Turkey’s demands regarding eastern Syria, leaving the situation unchanged. This means that the SDF will maintain its current control, but it will face increasing pressure to improve its relations with Turkey, and Ankara will continue to apply military pressure through drone strikes.
Under this scenario, the SDF might have the opportunity to open communication channels with Turkey through US and European mediation. The SDF could attempt to provide security and political guarantees to Ankara, such as ensuring that the territories it controls are not used to launch attacks against Turkey and taking concrete steps to break ties with the PKK.
However, it seems that Ankara will not easily enter into negotiations with the SDF, as it considers it a terrorist organization. Additionally, the SDF has not yet managed to rid itself of PKK cadres’ control, which could continue to obstruct any attempted reform efforts. The obstructive role of these cadres complicates the situation, making it difficult for the SDF to make the necessary concessions to start a dialogue with Turkey.
Conclusion
The future of the SDF and the self-administration in northeastern Syria largely depends on the Turkish-Syrian normalization path and associated regional and international developments. Given the current complexities and challenges, the SDF needs to adopt flexible strategies to adapt to the various possible scenarios. The SDF’s relationship with international powers, particularly the United States, and its ability to address internal issues, such as relations with local tribes and improvements to governance, remain crucial factors in maintaining the region’s stability and its ability to face future challenges.
Samer Al-Ahmad is a Syrian journalist and researcher focusing on developments in northeast Syria. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and has authored numerous reports and studies for Arab and international centers. You can follow him on Twitter @sameralahmadnq.
Photo by DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP via Getty Images
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