Contents:
- Syria is free at last — now comes the real challenge
- Fall of Assad further upends the Middle East’s geopolitical balance
- A shattering of Iran’s Axis of Resistance
- Turkey and the new era in Syria
- Unexpected consequences: Israel enjoys the fall of the Assad regime
- America’s policy responses to the Assad regime’s collapse
Syria is free at last — now comes the real challenge
Charles Lister
Senior Fellow, Director of Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism programs
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has moved quickly to take over the instruments of governance in Damascus — a process divorced from and in many ways in contradiction to the power transition discussions happening at the international level.
The stark lack of exchange between domestic forces and outside actors augurs poorly for any level of international recognition of events in Syria, while HTS’s rapid and unilateral implementation of a transition in Damascus risks triggering domestic opposition and potentially internecine conflict.
At long last, Syrians are free of Assad regime rule. After 54 years, the iron grip that Hafez and then Bashar had built based upon fear melted away and a glimmer of light appeared at the end of the tunnel as regime control disintegrated in the north and then the south. The speed with which the collapse took place spoke volumes about the extent to which the regime had decayed from within, its security apparatus fragmented, and any prior ties of loyalty frayed by 14 years of debilitating conflict and humanitarian and economic collapse.
In the very early days of this astonishing development, Syria is witnessing a remarkable degree of societal unity. From inter-religious dialogues in Latakia and Tartus to localized reconciliation deals between the leading rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Christian, Ismaili, Kurdish, and Alawite bodies, the euphoria resulting from Syria’s sudden freedom from Assad is translating into a kind of solidarity that would have been unimaginable just weeks ago.
However, this is the honeymoon period for Syria. A huge challenge lies ahead in determining how the transition occurs and what shape it will take. Beginning in Doha this past weekend, the international community gathered in various bilateral and multilateral formats to discuss next steps. All actors appear to accept that despite its terrorist designation, HTS will require a seat at the table, and most are now proactively communicating with the group. The United Nations is preparing to host a hurriedly arranged Geneva meeting to begin the steps laid out by UN Security Council Resolution 2254 — including establishing a transitional governing body and creating conditions for free and fair elections — though the format, scope, and participant list are yet to be determined.
This externally negotiated process stands in stark contrast to the rapidly moving “transition” already underway in Damascus. In a process wholly under the control of HTS and its Salvation Government, power is being transferred from Assad’s regime to a transitional body led by Salvation Government Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir. An English-speaking engineer, Bashir’s first major role within the rebel group’s developing administration was as minister for development and humanitarian affairs in Idlib; as such, he spearheaded the establishment of ties with the UN, which now maintains a permanent aid office in that city.
To prepare the ground for the initial transition at the national level, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani held an hours-long meeting with Bashir and Assad-appointed Prime Minister Mohammed al-Jalali. Similar meetings have also been held between Assad-appointed ministers, particularly of justice, the interior, and the economy, and their Salvation Government counterparts.
For now, there is no connectivity between the international community’s UN-led plans and the HTS-led transition already playing out inside Syria. In fact, they are operating in direct contradiction with each other. This should not come as a surprise, given the profound distrust and criticism toward the UN and the international community inside Syria. But such a stark lack of exchange between domestic forces and outside actors augurs poorly for any level of international recognition of events in Syria, while HTS’s rapid and unilateral implementation of a transition in Damascus risks triggering domestic opposition and potentially internecine conflict. There are tough days ahead.
Follow: @Charles_Lister
Fall of Assad further upends the Middle East’s geopolitical balance
Paul Salem
Vice President for International Engagement
The end of the Assad dictatorship in Syria is another strong blow to Iran, which has lost a key ally it needed to sustain a heavily armed Hezbollah in Lebanon; Turkey is the regional winner, having backed the group coming to power in Damascus; while, Lebanon now has a chance to reclaim its sovereignty and build a path toward better governance and economic recovery.
The swift collapse of Bashar al-Assad at the hands of his own people, 14 years after his regime’s brutal response to the Syrian uprising, shows that one-way repression with no political accommodation or comprise actually does not work.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad, coming on the heels of a series of astonishing events since Oct. 7 of last year, further upends the geopolitical balance in the Middle East. For Syrians it is a long-awaited liberation from one of the most brutal regimes of modern times. The challenge now is to build a stable and positive transition and to avoid the descent into chaos that other Arab countries fell into after deposing a dictator.
Regionally, this is another strong blow to Iran after the decapitation and degradation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Assad regime in Syria has been Iran’s ally since the 1980s and was a necessary bridge and partner in building and sustaining the Lebanese militant group. With the fall of Assad, Iran not only potentially loses its strategic presence in Syria, but also loses its ability to sustain a heavily armed proxy in neighboring Lebanon.
How Iran will deal with this latest loss will be closely watched. On the one hand, Tehran might double down on its failing strategy of propping up militias in Iraq and Yemen; on the other, it is signaling that it is open to a new approach, including negotiation with regional powers and the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump. Gulf states and Turkey are coaxing Iran in the latter direction.
Turkey is the regional winner in this development, as the main backer of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that led the toppling, and is left with the most influence over the triumphant rebels and opposition groups. Engaging with Ankara will be key in the regional and international effort to help Syrians engineer a successful transition.
The fall of the Assad regime lifts a long dark shadow from Lebanon. The Syria of Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, sent troops into Lebanon in 1976 and ended up engineering — along with Iran — the corrupt and militia-compromised order that arose from the ashes of the civil war that ended in 1990. The lingering effects of this outcome have been dragging the country down ever since. Without the nefarious Assad regime domination, and without the overwhelming Iranian influence that it enabled, Lebanon has a chance to reclaim sovereignty and build a path toward better governance and economic recovery.
Iraq might face the strongest political challenge in the months ahead. The Tehran-friendly government in Baghdad will need to grapple with potential Iranian attempts to build up its levers of influence inside Iraq as a way to compensate for its losses elsewhere. But some Iraqi political parties and movements that have already bristled against Iranian influence will instead want to seize this moment — like they have seen Syria and Lebanon — to reclaim national independence and sovereignty.
Both Lebanon and Jordan, along with Turkey, look forward to the opportunity for millions of Syrian refugees in their countries to return to their liberated homeland.
Most of the Gulf leaders and their allies in Jordan and Egypt got it wrong, thinking that Assad was here to stay and rolling out the red carpet for his regime to rejoin the Arab League. But their level of frustration with him has been high, and they will not shed tears at his departure. They will be key players in bringing about a successful transition and essential partners in the rebuilding of Syria and its economy.
At the political level, the fall of Assad at the hands of his own people will reverberate throughout the region and resurrect the concern other Middle Eastern governments felt about the events of the Arab Spring. That fear, however, will likely be strongest in Tehran. Assad’s brutal, Iran-backed response to the Syrian uprising of the last decade became the template of how Iran would deal with any dissent in its own country. Both regimes proved that they were willing to go that far, and the tactic seemed to have worked in Syria for a while. The events of the last week, however, showed the reverse: that while a brutal response to a large-scale uprising might temporarily stem the tide, it would leave the regime bereft of any legitimacy — a hollowed-out husk ripe for collapse in the face of a renewed revolt.
It shows that one-way repression with no political accommodation or comprise actually does not work. Hopefully, some other regimes in the region are taking note.
Follow: @paul_salem
A shattering of Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Fatemeh Aman
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
The sudden downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime not only disrupts Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant but also undermines its influence in the broader Middle East region.
While Tehran will work to adapt to the loss of its Syrian ally, the challenges posed by this development are substantial and will require a combination of military, diplomatic, and domestic measures to effectively navigate.
The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria marks a significant and unexpected development for Iran, comparable in its surprise to the Taliban’s swift takeover of Kabul in 2021. Iran has been a steadfast ally of Assad, who thought “the cost of resistance is less than the cost of compromise.” Tehran provided Damascus with substantial military and financial support throughout the Syrian civil war. The sudden downfall of Assad’s government not only disrupts Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant but also challenges its influence in the broader Middle East region.
The rapid fall of the Western-backed government in Kabul — with which Tehran had sought to engage diplomatically to maintain stability along Iran’s eastern border — similarly caught the Iranian leadership off guard. This event as well as Assad’s toppling both underscore the volatility of regional alliances and the complexities Iran faces in navigating its foreign policy objectives amid rapidly changing political landscapes.
While Iran had at least prepared for a scenario of the Taliban’s return and established some contacts and exchanges with the group even before the latter returned to power, the collapse of the Assad regime, described as a key link in the Axis of Resistance, came more suddenly. Only a few days before the fall of Damascus to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Iran started evacuating its key assets and personnel, including high-ranking military advisors and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to save critical resources. It is vital for Iran at this point to secure a role in shaping the future of Syria’s political landscape to prevent an adversarial government and to be able to preserve some level of strategic influence in the region.
Although the common border with Afghanistan is perhaps the number one security concern for Iran to the east, Syria’s strategic value cannot be overstated when it comes to Iran’s western flank. Syria was the “heart of the resistance,” which provided a direct link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and supported Iran’s deterrence against Israel. Thus, losing Syria not only disrupts the Axis of Resistance but also weakens Iran’s ability to project power in the region. In the absence of Iranian proxies on the ground, the resulting power vacuum is likely to be filled by Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which in turn could force Iran to redirect its focus to defending its interests in other places.
At home, the legitimacy of the Iranian regime was severely damaged by its violent crackdowns on the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022-early 2023. At the same time, Iran’s broad and substantial investments in Syria and elsewhere, which many Iranians saw as a costly miscalculation, intensified public criticism and political dissent over neglected economic issues.
Fears that their country could follow a path toward civil war, similar to those in Syria and Libya, deterred some from advocating for regime change at any cost. If Syria now descends into another civil war with further destruction, it could validate these concerns. However, if Syria manages to form an inclusive and stable government free of revenge, it could inspire Iranians.
In the aftermath of Assad’s collapse, Tehran will likely recalibrate its regional strategy, strengthening its militia networks, particularly Hezbollah and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq as the primary focus. These will need to serve as Tehran’s primary tool for projecting power in the absence of a friendly Syrian government. Iran may also attempt to expand its regional alliances with Russia and China to sustain its ambitions. However, given the outcome of its previous reliance on Moscow to protect the Assad regime, Iran may need to recalculate the level of Russian support it can truly expect. Rethinking its Syria policy may additionally encourage Tehran to shift from overt to covert approaches — a potentially challenging aim due to Iran’s over-stretched resources.
Assad’s downfall marks a significant setback for Iran’s regional strategy, disrupting the latter’s network of alliances and diminishing its influence in the Levant. While Tehran will work to adapt, the challenges posed by this development are substantial and will require a combination of military, diplomatic, and domestic measures to effectively navigate. The collapse of one of its most critical allies underscores the limits of Iran’s ability to maintain its influence in the face of shifting geopolitical realities, forcing a critical reassessment of its regional ambitions.
Follow: @FatemehAman
Turkey and the new era in Syria
Meliha Benli Altunışık
Non-Resident Scholar
Given its longstanding support for the opposition forces, Turkey may see itself in an advantageous position in the new Syria, but the situation will continue to pose challenges for Ankara.
With a lengthy shared border, a large Syrian refugee population, Turkey’s military deployment in parts of northern Syria, and the presence of the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), Syria undoubtedly remains one of the most important issues for Ankara, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic politics.
Given how rapidly the balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting of late, with the weakening of Iran and the Axis of Resistance in general, Turkey has likely been expecting changes in Syria as well. When coupled with Russia’s increasing preoccupation with its war against Ukraine and the expectations of what the incoming Trump administration may bring, this has only heightened the need for Ankara to prepare for this shift. Moreover, unlike many other regional actors, Turkey is present on the ground in Syria, in rebel-held areas, which must have given it a perspective on what might happen, even if it looks like Ankara did not expect the rebel takeover of the country to proceed so swiftly.
As the only actor that has continued to support the opposition forces since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011, Turkey may see itself in an advantageous position in the new Syria. Indeed, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, in his only response so far to developments in Syria, that “Turkey is on the right side of history, as it was yesterday.” There is also an expectation in Turkey that at least some of the nearly 4 million Syrians in the country will now return home.
But the situation in Syria will continue to pose challenges for Turkey. Managing a successful and orderly transition in a country that has suffered years of war will not be easy. Turkey also remains concerned about how the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) might respond to these developments. Thus, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has also emphasized the importance of Syria’s territorial integrity. US policy will be crucial in this regard as well. Similarly, Israeli interventions in the south and attempts to create a buffer zone could jeopardize stability in the country. Thus, for Turkey also, the Syrian issue has just entered a new phase with new challenges.
With a more than 900-kilometer-long shared border, a population of millions of Syrian refugees, Turkey’s military deployment in parts of northern Syria, and the presence of the YPG, which has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Syria undoubtedly remains one of the most important issues for Ankara, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic politics. The recent calls by Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), a de facto partner of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), for the PKK’s jailed leader to give a speech to parliament and declare the end of the PKK’s war against Turkey, underscore the complexity of the situation. One thing, however, notably reflects a change in the style of Turkey’s foreign policy, including on Syria: there is less fanfare and less discourse about unreasonable expectations and achievements.
Unexpected consequences: Israel enjoys the fall of the Assad regime
Paul Scham
Non-Resident Scholar
Israel takes credit for weakening Hezbollah and Iran over the past year, paving the way for the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s lightning offensive.
Israel Defense Forces occupy deserted Syrian positions in the Golan Heights buffer zone as the United States and Israel bomb military and Islamic State targets in Syria.
There is little doubt that the 10-day offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other groups that culminated in the flight of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the collapse of his government was precipitated by Israel’s crippling assault on Hezbollah, commencing with the pager explosions on Sept. 17, followed by its humiliating attacks on Iran’s military infrastructure on Oct. 27. Nevertheless, neither Israel’s Mossad nor any Western intelligence agency apparently had any inkling that the fall of the House of Assad was imminent.
As it became apparent on Thursday and Friday that Damascus was about to fall to the rebels, Israel strengthened its military deployment on the Golan Heights. On Sunday, Israeli infantry and armored units pushed beyond the 1974 disengagement lines and occupied deserted positions on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, “as well as several other locations deemed essential for stabilizing control of the area.” The Times of Israel reported that Defense Minister Yisrael Katz on Sunday ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) “to create a ‘security zone free of heavy strategic weapons and terror infrastructure’ in southern Syria, including beyond the buffer zone, that could pose a threat to Israel.”
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar tweeted on Saturday that Israeli forces had entered the buffer zone because attacks had been carried out against United Nations monitors and that Israel feared violations of the 1974 lines might occur. In a briefing on Monday, he reiterated the reasons for the air strikes and emphasized that “the IDF has taken a limited and temporary control of strategic areas near the border to prevent a scenario similar to October 7th occurring from Syria.”
Israel has stated its forces would withdraw to the agreed-on disengagement positions once it satisfies itself that there is a stable Syrian military and civil presence in southwestern Syria that intends to respect the 1974 lines. This could well take weeks or months as Israel and the rest of the regional and international actors with an interest in Syria scramble to assure themselves that HTS and its leader, who goes by the nom de guerre Abu-Mohammed al-Jolani (also spelled Golani, as in Golan Heights, where his family apparently came from), has definitively repudiated his al-Qaeda background.
Both Israel and the United States engaged in widespread strikes on Syrian targets over the last few nights. Israel blew up a chemical weapons factory to keep the rebels from capturing it, and the US sought to deter Islamic State forces from taking advantage of the situation. Israel has reportedly been attempting to contact militant groups operating near the border.
HTS has been sponsored in recent years by Turkey, the clearest winner in the emerging state of affairs. However, it does not appear that either HTS or Jolani are prepared to serve as a proxy for Turkish ambitions. Turkey’s relations with Israel are frosty, but it certainly does not seek military confrontation.
Should a Syrian government of the future actually succeed in revitalizing the country and wish to repatriate the portion of the Golan Heights still controlled by Israel, there could be a problem. Israel effectively annexed it in 1981, and most Israelis consider it integral to the country. But any such scenario is obviously quite a way off.
Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, in an article published online on Dec. 9, wrote, “The swift collapse, after 54 years, of Syria’s al-Assad dynasty has just transformed the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.” He warned that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might use this as an excuse to “topple” Iran as well.
Influential Israeli journalist Ehud Ya’ari celebrated the events, asserting that “Assad’s downfall was made possible by a year of Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, military industries and air defense systems in Syria.” He advised the government to expand contacts with rebel factions near the Golan and extend humanitarian assistance. He also suggested that Israel urgently press the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump to maintain the US military presence in the Kurdish-controlled area in northeast Syria and in the Tanf enclave, and to mend fences with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Israel is clearly enjoying taking credit for initiating the events culminating in the fall and flight of the Middle East’s most hated dictator. Beyond that, its attitude so far, like that of the whole region, is to wait and see.
America’s policy responses to the Assad regime’s collapse
Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy
The Assad regime’s ouster prompted two different responses from the Biden administration and the incoming Trump team, but the future of Syria will be shaped by actors on the ground and in the region
US Middle East policy has not prioritized Syria in recent years beyond a few key issues like the fight against the Islamic State and tactical questions related to development aid, and it is difficult to forecast how the second Trump administration might approach Syria given its inconsistent track record in the first term.
The stunning collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad after nearly 14 years of civil war this weekend prompted two very different responses from the current US administration and the incoming one, but what was said by either US administration is not likely to matter much in the short term when it comes to Syria.
Speaking to the media on Sunday, President Joe Biden confirmed that the United States had conducted airstrikes against several Islamic State camps in Syria, stressing that the US will remain vigilant against threats posed by terrorist groups. Biden then continued by outlining a policy of US engagement on Syria’s transition, articulating a number of measures Washington would pursue, including engaging Syrian groups with the United Nations-led process to establish a transition to an independent, sovereign Syria. Biden also said that the United States would continue to support Syria’s neighbors, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel, to safeguard against any threats that might emerge in this period.
A senior Biden official offered even more details in a background briefing about where US policy might be heading on Syria in the coming weeks, including thorny questions about the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its links to terrorist organizations. This was one of the most detailed briefings the Biden administration has given on Syria since it came to office in 2021, a fact that is noteworthy because it underscores just how reactive to events US policy in the Middle East has become.
President-elect Donald Trump had a much different message, writing in all capital letters on Truth Social, “THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” Vice President-elect JD Vance reinforced Trump’s message and expressed reservations about those who were celebrating the rebel victory.
The reality is that neither of these two contrasting statements is likely to matter that much, since events are being driven by actors on the ground and in the region. Furthermore, the United States has essentially strategically disengaged on many of the big-picture issues plaguing Syria outside of a few key files like the fight against the Islamic State — a process that began under the Obama administration and has continued to this day.
Syria has entered a period of uncertainty, and the United States is about to have a new president that prides himself on his unpredictability. How much US policy on Syria might matter beyond the counterterrorism fight against the Islamic State remains an open question and will be determined by the incoming Trump administration given the short time that the Biden administration has left in office.
Follow: @Katulis
Photo by Murat Sengul/Anadolu via Getty Images
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Contents:
- Syria is free at last — now comes the real challenge
- Fall of Assad further upends the Middle East’s geopolitical balance
- A shattering of Iran’s Axis of Resistance
- Turkey and the new era in Syria
- Unexpected consequences: Israel enjoys the fall of the Assad regime
- America’s policy responses to the Assad regime’s collapse
Syria is free at last — now comes the real challenge
Charles Lister
Senior Fellow, Director of Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism programs
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has moved quickly to take over the instruments of governance in Damascus — a process divorced from and in many ways in contradiction to the power transition discussions happening at the international level.
The stark lack of exchange between domestic forces and outside actors augurs poorly for any level of international recognition of events in Syria, while HTS’s rapid and unilateral implementation of a transition in Damascus risks triggering domestic opposition and potentially internecine conflict.
At long last, Syrians are free of Assad regime rule. After 54 years, the iron grip that Hafez and then Bashar had built based upon fear melted away and a glimmer of light appeared at the end of the tunnel as regime control disintegrated in the north and then the south. The speed with which the collapse took place spoke volumes about the extent to which the regime had decayed from within, its security apparatus fragmented, and any prior ties of loyalty frayed by 14 years of debilitating conflict and humanitarian and economic collapse.
In the very early days of this astonishing development, Syria is witnessing a remarkable degree of societal unity. From inter-religious dialogues in Latakia and Tartus to localized reconciliation deals between the leading rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Christian, Ismaili, Kurdish, and Alawite bodies, the euphoria resulting from Syria’s sudden freedom from Assad is translating into a kind of solidarity that would have been unimaginable just weeks ago.
However, this is the honeymoon period for Syria. A huge challenge lies ahead in determining how the transition occurs and what shape it will take. Beginning in Doha this past weekend, the international community gathered in various bilateral and multilateral formats to discuss next steps. All actors appear to accept that despite its terrorist designation, HTS will require a seat at the table, and most are now proactively communicating with the group. The United Nations is preparing to host a hurriedly arranged Geneva meeting to begin the steps laid out by UN Security Council Resolution 2254 — including establishing a transitional governing body and creating conditions for free and fair elections — though the format, scope, and participant list are yet to be determined.
This externally negotiated process stands in stark contrast to the rapidly moving “transition” already underway in Damascus. In a process wholly under the control of HTS and its Salvation Government, power is being transferred from Assad’s regime to a transitional body led by Salvation Government Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir. An English-speaking engineer, Bashir’s first major role within the rebel group’s developing administration was as minister for development and humanitarian affairs in Idlib; as such, he spearheaded the establishment of ties with the UN, which now maintains a permanent aid office in that city.
To prepare the ground for the initial transition at the national level, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani held an hours-long meeting with Bashir and Assad-appointed Prime Minister Mohammed al-Jalali. Similar meetings have also been held between Assad-appointed ministers, particularly of justice, the interior, and the economy, and their Salvation Government counterparts.
For now, there is no connectivity between the international community’s UN-led plans and the HTS-led transition already playing out inside Syria. In fact, they are operating in direct contradiction with each other. This should not come as a surprise, given the profound distrust and criticism toward the UN and the international community inside Syria. But such a stark lack of exchange between domestic forces and outside actors augurs poorly for any level of international recognition of events in Syria, while HTS’s rapid and unilateral implementation of a transition in Damascus risks triggering domestic opposition and potentially internecine conflict. There are tough days ahead.
Follow: @Charles_Lister
Fall of Assad further upends the Middle East’s geopolitical balance
Paul Salem
Vice President for International Engagement
The end of the Assad dictatorship in Syria is another strong blow to Iran, which has lost a key ally it needed to sustain a heavily armed Hezbollah in Lebanon; Turkey is the regional winner, having backed the group coming to power in Damascus; while, Lebanon now has a chance to reclaim its sovereignty and build a path toward better governance and economic recovery.
The swift collapse of Bashar al-Assad at the hands of his own people, 14 years after his regime’s brutal response to the Syrian uprising, shows that one-way repression with no political accommodation or comprise actually does not work.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad, coming on the heels of a series of astonishing events since Oct. 7 of last year, further upends the geopolitical balance in the Middle East. For Syrians it is a long-awaited liberation from one of the most brutal regimes of modern times. The challenge now is to build a stable and positive transition and to avoid the descent into chaos that other Arab countries fell into after deposing a dictator.
Regionally, this is another strong blow to Iran after the decapitation and degradation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Assad regime in Syria has been Iran’s ally since the 1980s and was a necessary bridge and partner in building and sustaining the Lebanese militant group. With the fall of Assad, Iran not only potentially loses its strategic presence in Syria, but also loses its ability to sustain a heavily armed proxy in neighboring Lebanon.
How Iran will deal with this latest loss will be closely watched. On the one hand, Tehran might double down on its failing strategy of propping up militias in Iraq and Yemen; on the other, it is signaling that it is open to a new approach, including negotiation with regional powers and the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump. Gulf states and Turkey are coaxing Iran in the latter direction.
Turkey is the regional winner in this development, as the main backer of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group that led the toppling, and is left with the most influence over the triumphant rebels and opposition groups. Engaging with Ankara will be key in the regional and international effort to help Syrians engineer a successful transition.
The fall of the Assad regime lifts a long dark shadow from Lebanon. The Syria of Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, sent troops into Lebanon in 1976 and ended up engineering — along with Iran — the corrupt and militia-compromised order that arose from the ashes of the civil war that ended in 1990. The lingering effects of this outcome have been dragging the country down ever since. Without the nefarious Assad regime domination, and without the overwhelming Iranian influence that it enabled, Lebanon has a chance to reclaim sovereignty and build a path toward better governance and economic recovery.
Iraq might face the strongest political challenge in the months ahead. The Tehran-friendly government in Baghdad will need to grapple with potential Iranian attempts to build up its levers of influence inside Iraq as a way to compensate for its losses elsewhere. But some Iraqi political parties and movements that have already bristled against Iranian influence will instead want to seize this moment — like they have seen Syria and Lebanon — to reclaim national independence and sovereignty.
Both Lebanon and Jordan, along with Turkey, look forward to the opportunity for millions of Syrian refugees in their countries to return to their liberated homeland.
Most of the Gulf leaders and their allies in Jordan and Egypt got it wrong, thinking that Assad was here to stay and rolling out the red carpet for his regime to rejoin the Arab League. But their level of frustration with him has been high, and they will not shed tears at his departure. They will be key players in bringing about a successful transition and essential partners in the rebuilding of Syria and its economy.
At the political level, the fall of Assad at the hands of his own people will reverberate throughout the region and resurrect the concern other Middle Eastern governments felt about the events of the Arab Spring. That fear, however, will likely be strongest in Tehran. Assad’s brutal, Iran-backed response to the Syrian uprising of the last decade became the template of how Iran would deal with any dissent in its own country. Both regimes proved that they were willing to go that far, and the tactic seemed to have worked in Syria for a while. The events of the last week, however, showed the reverse: that while a brutal response to a large-scale uprising might temporarily stem the tide, it would leave the regime bereft of any legitimacy — a hollowed-out husk ripe for collapse in the face of a renewed revolt.
It shows that one-way repression with no political accommodation or comprise actually does not work. Hopefully, some other regimes in the region are taking note.
Follow: @paul_salem
A shattering of Iran’s Axis of Resistance
Fatemeh Aman
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
The sudden downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime not only disrupts Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant but also undermines its influence in the broader Middle East region.
While Tehran will work to adapt to the loss of its Syrian ally, the challenges posed by this development are substantial and will require a combination of military, diplomatic, and domestic measures to effectively navigate.
The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria marks a significant and unexpected development for Iran, comparable in its surprise to the Taliban’s swift takeover of Kabul in 2021. Iran has been a steadfast ally of Assad, who thought “the cost of resistance is less than the cost of compromise.” Tehran provided Damascus with substantial military and financial support throughout the Syrian civil war. The sudden downfall of Assad’s government not only disrupts Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant but also challenges its influence in the broader Middle East region.
The rapid fall of the Western-backed government in Kabul — with which Tehran had sought to engage diplomatically to maintain stability along Iran’s eastern border — similarly caught the Iranian leadership off guard. This event as well as Assad’s toppling both underscore the volatility of regional alliances and the complexities Iran faces in navigating its foreign policy objectives amid rapidly changing political landscapes.
While Iran had at least prepared for a scenario of the Taliban’s return and established some contacts and exchanges with the group even before the latter returned to power, the collapse of the Assad regime, described as a key link in the Axis of Resistance, came more suddenly. Only a few days before the fall of Damascus to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Iran started evacuating its key assets and personnel, including high-ranking military advisors and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to save critical resources. It is vital for Iran at this point to secure a role in shaping the future of Syria’s political landscape to prevent an adversarial government and to be able to preserve some level of strategic influence in the region.
Although the common border with Afghanistan is perhaps the number one security concern for Iran to the east, Syria’s strategic value cannot be overstated when it comes to Iran’s western flank. Syria was the “heart of the resistance,” which provided a direct link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and supported Iran’s deterrence against Israel. Thus, losing Syria not only disrupts the Axis of Resistance but also weakens Iran’s ability to project power in the region. In the absence of Iranian proxies on the ground, the resulting power vacuum is likely to be filled by Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which in turn could force Iran to redirect its focus to defending its interests in other places.
At home, the legitimacy of the Iranian regime was severely damaged by its violent crackdowns on the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022-early 2023. At the same time, Iran’s broad and substantial investments in Syria and elsewhere, which many Iranians saw as a costly miscalculation, intensified public criticism and political dissent over neglected economic issues.
Fears that their country could follow a path toward civil war, similar to those in Syria and Libya, deterred some from advocating for regime change at any cost. If Syria now descends into another civil war with further destruction, it could validate these concerns. However, if Syria manages to form an inclusive and stable government free of revenge, it could inspire Iranians.
In the aftermath of Assad’s collapse, Tehran will likely recalibrate its regional strategy, strengthening its militia networks, particularly Hezbollah and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq as the primary focus. These will need to serve as Tehran’s primary tool for projecting power in the absence of a friendly Syrian government. Iran may also attempt to expand its regional alliances with Russia and China to sustain its ambitions. However, given the outcome of its previous reliance on Moscow to protect the Assad regime, Iran may need to recalculate the level of Russian support it can truly expect. Rethinking its Syria policy may additionally encourage Tehran to shift from overt to covert approaches — a potentially challenging aim due to Iran’s over-stretched resources.
Assad’s downfall marks a significant setback for Iran’s regional strategy, disrupting the latter’s network of alliances and diminishing its influence in the Levant. While Tehran will work to adapt, the challenges posed by this development are substantial and will require a combination of military, diplomatic, and domestic measures to effectively navigate. The collapse of one of its most critical allies underscores the limits of Iran’s ability to maintain its influence in the face of shifting geopolitical realities, forcing a critical reassessment of its regional ambitions.
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Turkey and the new era in Syria
Meliha Benli Altunışık
Non-Resident Scholar
Given its longstanding support for the opposition forces, Turkey may see itself in an advantageous position in the new Syria, but the situation will continue to pose challenges for Ankara.
With a lengthy shared border, a large Syrian refugee population, Turkey’s military deployment in parts of northern Syria, and the presence of the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), Syria undoubtedly remains one of the most important issues for Ankara, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic politics.
Given how rapidly the balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting of late, with the weakening of Iran and the Axis of Resistance in general, Turkey has likely been expecting changes in Syria as well. When coupled with Russia’s increasing preoccupation with its war against Ukraine and the expectations of what the incoming Trump administration may bring, this has only heightened the need for Ankara to prepare for this shift. Moreover, unlike many other regional actors, Turkey is present on the ground in Syria, in rebel-held areas, which must have given it a perspective on what might happen, even if it looks like Ankara did not expect the rebel takeover of the country to proceed so swiftly.
As the only actor that has continued to support the opposition forces since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011, Turkey may see itself in an advantageous position in the new Syria. Indeed, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, in his only response so far to developments in Syria, that “Turkey is on the right side of history, as it was yesterday.” There is also an expectation in Turkey that at least some of the nearly 4 million Syrians in the country will now return home.
But the situation in Syria will continue to pose challenges for Turkey. Managing a successful and orderly transition in a country that has suffered years of war will not be easy. Turkey also remains concerned about how the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) might respond to these developments. Thus, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has also emphasized the importance of Syria’s territorial integrity. US policy will be crucial in this regard as well. Similarly, Israeli interventions in the south and attempts to create a buffer zone could jeopardize stability in the country. Thus, for Turkey also, the Syrian issue has just entered a new phase with new challenges.
With a more than 900-kilometer-long shared border, a population of millions of Syrian refugees, Turkey’s military deployment in parts of northern Syria, and the presence of the YPG, which has ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Syria undoubtedly remains one of the most important issues for Ankara, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic politics. The recent calls by Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), a de facto partner of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), for the PKK’s jailed leader to give a speech to parliament and declare the end of the PKK’s war against Turkey, underscore the complexity of the situation. One thing, however, notably reflects a change in the style of Turkey’s foreign policy, including on Syria: there is less fanfare and less discourse about unreasonable expectations and achievements.
Unexpected consequences: Israel enjoys the fall of the Assad regime
Paul Scham
Non-Resident Scholar
Israel takes credit for weakening Hezbollah and Iran over the past year, paving the way for the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s lightning offensive.
Israel Defense Forces occupy deserted Syrian positions in the Golan Heights buffer zone as the United States and Israel bomb military and Islamic State targets in Syria.
There is little doubt that the 10-day offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other groups that culminated in the flight of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the collapse of his government was precipitated by Israel’s crippling assault on Hezbollah, commencing with the pager explosions on Sept. 17, followed by its humiliating attacks on Iran’s military infrastructure on Oct. 27. Nevertheless, neither Israel’s Mossad nor any Western intelligence agency apparently had any inkling that the fall of the House of Assad was imminent.
As it became apparent on Thursday and Friday that Damascus was about to fall to the rebels, Israel strengthened its military deployment on the Golan Heights. On Sunday, Israeli infantry and armored units pushed beyond the 1974 disengagement lines and occupied deserted positions on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, “as well as several other locations deemed essential for stabilizing control of the area.” The Times of Israel reported that Defense Minister Yisrael Katz on Sunday ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) “to create a ‘security zone free of heavy strategic weapons and terror infrastructure’ in southern Syria, including beyond the buffer zone, that could pose a threat to Israel.”
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar tweeted on Saturday that Israeli forces had entered the buffer zone because attacks had been carried out against United Nations monitors and that Israel feared violations of the 1974 lines might occur. In a briefing on Monday, he reiterated the reasons for the air strikes and emphasized that “the IDF has taken a limited and temporary control of strategic areas near the border to prevent a scenario similar to October 7th occurring from Syria.”
Israel has stated its forces would withdraw to the agreed-on disengagement positions once it satisfies itself that there is a stable Syrian military and civil presence in southwestern Syria that intends to respect the 1974 lines. This could well take weeks or months as Israel and the rest of the regional and international actors with an interest in Syria scramble to assure themselves that HTS and its leader, who goes by the nom de guerre Abu-Mohammed al-Jolani (also spelled Golani, as in Golan Heights, where his family apparently came from), has definitively repudiated his al-Qaeda background.
Both Israel and the United States engaged in widespread strikes on Syrian targets over the last few nights. Israel blew up a chemical weapons factory to keep the rebels from capturing it, and the US sought to deter Islamic State forces from taking advantage of the situation. Israel has reportedly been attempting to contact militant groups operating near the border.
HTS has been sponsored in recent years by Turkey, the clearest winner in the emerging state of affairs. However, it does not appear that either HTS or Jolani are prepared to serve as a proxy for Turkish ambitions. Turkey’s relations with Israel are frosty, but it certainly does not seek military confrontation.
Should a Syrian government of the future actually succeed in revitalizing the country and wish to repatriate the portion of the Golan Heights still controlled by Israel, there could be a problem. Israel effectively annexed it in 1981, and most Israelis consider it integral to the country. But any such scenario is obviously quite a way off.
Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, in an article published online on Dec. 9, wrote, “The swift collapse, after 54 years, of Syria’s al-Assad dynasty has just transformed the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape.” He warned that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might use this as an excuse to “topple” Iran as well.
Influential Israeli journalist Ehud Ya’ari celebrated the events, asserting that “Assad’s downfall was made possible by a year of Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, military industries and air defense systems in Syria.” He advised the government to expand contacts with rebel factions near the Golan and extend humanitarian assistance. He also suggested that Israel urgently press the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump to maintain the US military presence in the Kurdish-controlled area in northeast Syria and in the Tanf enclave, and to mend fences with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Israel is clearly enjoying taking credit for initiating the events culminating in the fall and flight of the Middle East’s most hated dictator. Beyond that, its attitude so far, like that of the whole region, is to wait and see.
America’s policy responses to the Assad regime’s collapse
Brian Katulis
Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy
The Assad regime’s ouster prompted two different responses from the Biden administration and the incoming Trump team, but the future of Syria will be shaped by actors on the ground and in the region
US Middle East policy has not prioritized Syria in recent years beyond a few key issues like the fight against the Islamic State and tactical questions related to development aid, and it is difficult to forecast how the second Trump administration might approach Syria given its inconsistent track record in the first term.
The stunning collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad after nearly 14 years of civil war this weekend prompted two very different responses from the current US administration and the incoming one, but what was said by either US administration is not likely to matter much in the short term when it comes to Syria.
Speaking to the media on Sunday, President Joe Biden confirmed that the United States had conducted airstrikes against several Islamic State camps in Syria, stressing that the US will remain vigilant against threats posed by terrorist groups. Biden then continued by outlining a policy of US engagement on Syria’s transition, articulating a number of measures Washington would pursue, including engaging Syrian groups with the United Nations-led process to establish a transition to an independent, sovereign Syria. Biden also said that the United States would continue to support Syria’s neighbors, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel, to safeguard against any threats that might emerge in this period.
A senior Biden official offered even more details in a background briefing about where US policy might be heading on Syria in the coming weeks, including thorny questions about the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its links to terrorist organizations. This was one of the most detailed briefings the Biden administration has given on Syria since it came to office in 2021, a fact that is noteworthy because it underscores just how reactive to events US policy in the Middle East has become.
President-elect Donald Trump had a much different message, writing in all capital letters on Truth Social, “THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” Vice President-elect JD Vance reinforced Trump’s message and expressed reservations about those who were celebrating the rebel victory.
The reality is that neither of these two contrasting statements is likely to matter that much, since events are being driven by actors on the ground and in the region. Furthermore, the United States has essentially strategically disengaged on many of the big-picture issues plaguing Syria outside of a few key files like the fight against the Islamic State — a process that began under the Obama administration and has continued to this day.
Syria has entered a period of uncertainty, and the United States is about to have a new president that prides himself on his unpredictability. How much US policy on Syria might matter beyond the counterterrorism fight against the Islamic State remains an open question and will be determined by the incoming Trump administration given the short time that the Biden administration has left in office.
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Photo by Murat Sengul/Anadolu via Getty Images
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