The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2006 offers some useful lessons for Israelis, and for the United States, as a ceasefire in Lebanon begins.
As a reminder, Ariel Sharon’s government proceeded in 2004 and 2005 with his plans to remove all settlements and military installations from Gaza. As implementation got closer, Benjamin Netanyahu resigned from the cabinet on August 7, 2005. The evacuation of settlers was completed on August 22, and of the IDF by September 12.
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During the withdrawal, on August 25, Hamas fired two Kassam rockets into Israel. On September 24, five Israelis were injured when thirty rockets struck from Gaza. The invasion of Israel and the capture of Gilad Shalit on June 25, 2006 led to Operation Summer Rains, starting on June 28. By then, according to the IDF, 757 rockets of various kinds had been fired by Hamas and Islamic Jihad since Israel’s departure from Gaza the previous year.
Pressure Points
Abrams gives his take on U.S. foreign policy, with special focus on the Middle East and democracy and human rights issues.
Prime Minister Sharon had warned against rockets being fired during the withdrawal or after. He told the visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July, 2005 that “our reaction (to attacks) will be of a different kind, with the addition of very harsh means, both if it takes place during the evacuation, or after we evacuate the Gaza Strip.” In a public speech in August, while the withdrawal was underway, he said “”The world is waiting for the Palestinian response — a hand stretched out to peace or the fire of terror. To an outstretched hand we shall respond with an olive branch, but we shall fight fire with the harshest fire ever.”
But Sharon did not do it. He had a minor stroke on December 18, 2005 and a massive one on January 4, 2006, that put him into a vegetative state for the rest of his life. Still, he did not respond either to the August 25 attack or the much larger September 24 attack with the kind of force he had threatened. By the following Spring, an emboldened Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) were firing dozen of rockets every month, and finally invaded via tunnels Israel in June.
This would be a terrible error to repeat with respect to Lebanon. Israel’s government is promising immediate action if (or more realistically, when) Hezbollah violates the new agreement. It is critical that Israel keep that promise. Prime Minister Netanyahu has said the Israel “reserves its right to act against any threat to its security,” and would “respond severely” if Hezbollah breaks the terms of the agreement. President Biden said that Israel retains the right to self-defense, adding that “What is left of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations will not be allowed — I emphasize, will not be allowed — to threaten the security of Israel ever again.”
But what happens when Hezbollah starts trying to rebuild arsenals or warehouses or bunkers in southern Lebanon, or bring in missile, rockets, guns, and ammunition? Who exactly will stop them? The notion that UNIFIL troops or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will shoot at Hezbollah forces is fanciful—as it has been for decades. Enforcement will in reality fall to Israel—and one can expect that the first time Israel strikes Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, there will be a world of criticism: a UN Security Council meeting, complaints from the usual suspects in the UN system and among “human rights groups,” and pro-Hezbollah demonstrations in the Middle East and Europe as well as on American campuses.
More on:
But the agreement will fail unless the IDF enforces it—starting now. The early days will set expectations and will signal what the real rules are. Israel must not hesitate to hit at Hezbollah forces when it sees them back in southern Lebanon. Yes, a procedure has been established for Israel to inform the United States and France of the violations—but then what? Will Israel’s information be accepted? Will the LAF and UNIFIL then be informed, and ask for time to investigate, and then more time, and then start negotiating with Hezbollah or denying what Israel has said? I would give them one chance, at an early date—but once they fail to confront Hezbollah at gunpoint if necessary, the IDF must act.
Otherwise we will see this agreement collapse in a few months. Just as Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza led to repeated confrontations with Hamas, today’s much-heralded Lebanon agreement can easily collapse when Iran and Hezbollah begin rebuilding all that Hezbollah has lost in the last few months. It is up to Prime Minister Netanyahu to remain resolute, and up to President Biden, and in two months President Trump, to give him the support Israel will need. There will be peace between Israel and Lebanon only if Hezbollah is prevented from rebuilding its military establishment in southern Lebanon. That should be the Israeli goal, and the United States should give full support to Israel in acting to achieve it.
Sharon, Netanyahu, and the Lebanon Deal
The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2006 offers some useful lessons for Israelis, and for the United States, as a ceasefire in Lebanon begins.
As a reminder, Ariel Sharon’s government proceeded in 2004 and 2005 with his plans to remove all settlements and military installations from Gaza. As implementation got closer, Benjamin Netanyahu resigned from the cabinet on August 7, 2005. The evacuation of settlers was completed on August 22, and of the IDF by September 12.
More on:
During the withdrawal, on August 25, Hamas fired two Kassam rockets into Israel. On September 24, five Israelis were injured when thirty rockets struck from Gaza. The invasion of Israel and the capture of Gilad Shalit on June 25, 2006 led to Operation Summer Rains, starting on June 28. By then, according to the IDF, 757 rockets of various kinds had been fired by Hamas and Islamic Jihad since Israel’s departure from Gaza the previous year.
Pressure Points
Abrams gives his take on U.S. foreign policy, with special focus on the Middle East and democracy and human rights issues.
Prime Minister Sharon had warned against rockets being fired during the withdrawal or after. He told the visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July, 2005 that “our reaction (to attacks) will be of a different kind, with the addition of very harsh means, both if it takes place during the evacuation, or after we evacuate the Gaza Strip.” In a public speech in August, while the withdrawal was underway, he said “”The world is waiting for the Palestinian response — a hand stretched out to peace or the fire of terror. To an outstretched hand we shall respond with an olive branch, but we shall fight fire with the harshest fire ever.”
But Sharon did not do it. He had a minor stroke on December 18, 2005 and a massive one on January 4, 2006, that put him into a vegetative state for the rest of his life. Still, he did not respond either to the August 25 attack or the much larger September 24 attack with the kind of force he had threatened. By the following Spring, an emboldened Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) were firing dozen of rockets every month, and finally invaded via tunnels Israel in June.
This would be a terrible error to repeat with respect to Lebanon. Israel’s government is promising immediate action if (or more realistically, when) Hezbollah violates the new agreement. It is critical that Israel keep that promise. Prime Minister Netanyahu has said the Israel “reserves its right to act against any threat to its security,” and would “respond severely” if Hezbollah breaks the terms of the agreement. President Biden said that Israel retains the right to self-defense, adding that “What is left of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations will not be allowed — I emphasize, will not be allowed — to threaten the security of Israel ever again.”
But what happens when Hezbollah starts trying to rebuild arsenals or warehouses or bunkers in southern Lebanon, or bring in missile, rockets, guns, and ammunition? Who exactly will stop them? The notion that UNIFIL troops or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will shoot at Hezbollah forces is fanciful—as it has been for decades. Enforcement will in reality fall to Israel—and one can expect that the first time Israel strikes Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, there will be a world of criticism: a UN Security Council meeting, complaints from the usual suspects in the UN system and among “human rights groups,” and pro-Hezbollah demonstrations in the Middle East and Europe as well as on American campuses.
More on:
But the agreement will fail unless the IDF enforces it—starting now. The early days will set expectations and will signal what the real rules are. Israel must not hesitate to hit at Hezbollah forces when it sees them back in southern Lebanon. Yes, a procedure has been established for Israel to inform the United States and France of the violations—but then what? Will Israel’s information be accepted? Will the LAF and UNIFIL then be informed, and ask for time to investigate, and then more time, and then start negotiating with Hezbollah or denying what Israel has said? I would give them one chance, at an early date—but once they fail to confront Hezbollah at gunpoint if necessary, the IDF must act.
Otherwise we will see this agreement collapse in a few months. Just as Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza led to repeated confrontations with Hamas, today’s much-heralded Lebanon agreement can easily collapse when Iran and Hezbollah begin rebuilding all that Hezbollah has lost in the last few months. It is up to Prime Minister Netanyahu to remain resolute, and up to President Biden, and in two months President Trump, to give him the support Israel will need. There will be peace between Israel and Lebanon only if Hezbollah is prevented from rebuilding its military establishment in southern Lebanon. That should be the Israeli goal, and the United States should give full support to Israel in acting to achieve it.
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