Editor’s Note: Stimson’s Myanmar Project seeks a variety of analytical perspectives on issues relating to Myanmar’s civil war, domestic politics, foreign relations, and other topics. Hunter Marston, a PhD Candidate at Australian National University and Southeast Asia Associate at 9DASHLINE, is an expert on Southeast Asian politics and U.S. foreign policy with extensive experience studying Myanmar.
By Yun Sun, Co-Director, East Asia
U.S. Burma policy since the February 2021 military coup has been overly cautious, reactive, and as a result ineffectual. Despite legislation such as the 2022 BURMA Act authorizing the provision of non-lethal assistance for resistance groups in Myanmar, the Biden administration has largely avoided following through on Congressional mandates. The Trump administration has a meaningful opportunity to review and implement a more proactive and thereby effective strategy to bring about a peaceful end to the conflict in Myanmar and hasten the return of democracy.
Washington’s current Burma policy is premised on two misapprehensions. The first is that greater U.S. engagement will cross certain redlines in Beijing, risking a proxy war or at the very least prompting increased Chinese intervention. The second misconception is that refraining from becoming more involved and supporting an ASEAN-based diplomatic solution to the crisis is the best option for preventing Myanmar becoming a proxy for expanding Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
Both misconceptions ignore the uncomfortable reality that Washington’s lack of involvement in the conflict has not prevented Chinese concerns that the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) is a U.S. proxy and that ethnic armed groups have grown too close to the West. Beijing consistently misinterprets U.S. policy as far more forward-leaning than it actually is. The Chinese government stepped up direct engagement with the State Administration Council (SAC) the same month the U.S. Congress passed the BURMA Act as part of its annual defense authorization. As the bill neared passage in December 2022, Beijing appointed a new special envoy for Asian affairs, Deng Xijun, who met with commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw. The following week, Deng hosted a meeting of ethnic armed groups in Yunnan to push for ceasefire talks with the regime. Beijing has subsequently wielded pressure to advance negotiations between ethnic armed groups in the north, with whom it has influence, and the SAC.
The current lack of U.S. strategy has produced—or at least it has not prevented—the very end state which policymakers feared a more proactive approach would bring about: Western inattention has encouraged greater Chinese involvement in Myanmar, not less. As a result, Myanmar has become ever more dependent on China, Beijing’s influence has expanded across Southeast Asia, and ASEAN appears feckless.
The U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Integrated Country Strategy for Burma states, “Our principal goal is to restore Burma’s path to inclusive democracy, which will enhance the country’s long-term stability and advance U.S. interests.” It also declares, “Through positive engagement with the people of Burma, we will mitigate coercive external influences and ensure the United States remains the partner of choice” (emphasis added).
Yet Beijing has incrementally expanded its support for the Myanmar military junta and is now actively intervening in Myanmar’s internal affairs to safeguard its own strategic and business interests. Following the fall of Lashio to the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August this year, China closed off border checkpoints to send a signal of dissatisfaction to the ethnic armed groups for going too far in their fight against the SAC.
The fall of Lashio was strategically significant because it was home to the military’s northeast command headquarters. According to leaked details of a meeting between Chinese diplomats and representatives of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in late August, the MNDAA’s conquest of Lashio “deeply damaged China-Myanmar friendship,” and Beijing was acutely concerned that the widening conflict in the north was negatively impacting its interests in Myanmar. In mid-September, it became clear that MNDAA leader Peng Deren, who had not been seen publicly since August, had been detained in China. Beijing denied that Peng was being held against his will, insisting that he was in Kunming seeking medical care.
In a further sign that Beijing has thrown its support behind the junta, in November Min Aung Hlaing was officially invited to Kunming to attend several Mekong-related summits, marking the junta leader’s first trip to China since the coup nearly four years ago. Following the senior general’s trip, the BBC reported that the two sides had concluded an agreement to allow Beijing to operate private military companies in Myanmar, a highly controversial deal considering the history of the Myanmar military’s deep mistrust of China, dating back to China’s support for communist insurgency in northern Myanmar during the Cold War.
These developments have two significant implications for Washington. First, the current U.S. approach to Myanmar since the coup, marked by caution and overall neglect, has not only failed to compel the junta to restore democracy but has facilitated China’s deepening influence in the country. Second, from a more practical point of view, Washington could be a great deal more proactive while still operating below the threshold of crossing China’s redlines. Those redlines include directly arming resistance groups and, in particular, any Western presence in the northernmost part of Myanmar, especially Kachin State, which Beijing sees as its sphere of influence. According to two former U.S. ambassadors to Myanmar, Chinese counterparts pressured them not to travel to Kachin.
There are myriad options available to Washington that fall below both redlines, such as providing technical assistance, communications equipment, and radar technology to the resistance, as well as publicly convening talks bringing together representatives of armed groups and civil society actors in Myanmar in a neutral location (such as neighboring Thailand, which has already hosted similar dialogues) to establish a shared vision for the country’s future. In any event, it is high time for Washington to reexamine the assumptions behind its current policy toward Myanmar and pursue a less risk-averse strategy.
So, what might U.S. Myanmar policy look like in the second Trump administration? While there is little indication yet of who will fill the most important Asia positions in Trump’s team, we can make several conclusions based on existing personnel and Trump’s comments on foreign policy during the campaign.
Trump has surrounded himself with China hawks including Rep. Mike Waltz, his pick for national security advisor, Jacob Helberg, whom he has tapped to lead the State Department’s economic policy, and Sen. Marco Rubio as secretary of state. Rubio has a strong record on human rights and is also seen as an institutionalist who is likely to use all of the levers of state available to him. He could work with colleagues on the Hill such as Sen. Todd Young, who used his position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to pressure the SAC to restore democracy in Myanmar.
There is as yet no information on who will fill influential Southeast Asia-related posts. However, the president-elect’s advisers will almost certainly advocate a confrontational approach toward China, and that might extend to taking the fight to Beijing’s backyard, including Myanmar. The administration is unlikely to lend greater material support to the resistance, which would run counter to President Trump’s stated commitment not to involve the United States in more overseas conflicts. More likely, the administration will consider expanding sanctions on Chinese companies with links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as Chinese companies involved in resource extraction in Myanmar, which bankrolls the Myanmar military and prolongs the conflict.
However, Trump’s willingness to cut a deal with Xi Jinping may increase the likelihood that Washington may make concessions to respect a Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. In such a scenario, the people of Myanmar and the resistance are likely to lose support as China strengthens its influence over the country and supports the junta’s fraudulent elections, expected to take place in November 2025.
In short, several competing interests within the Trump administration will complicate a coherent U.S. Myanmar policy. Nevertheless, the incoming administration’s Asia advisers should take this opportunity to review Washington’s current policy, reflect on the underlying reasons for its failure, identify the United States’ long-term goals in Myanmar, and design a new strategy that better aligns ends, ways, and means.
Editor’s Note: Stimson’s Myanmar Project seeks a variety of analytical perspectives on issues relating to Myanmar’s civil war, domestic politics, foreign relations, and other topics. Hunter Marston, a PhD Candidate at Australian National University and Southeast Asia Associate at 9DASHLINE, is an expert on Southeast Asian politics and U.S. foreign policy with extensive experience studying Myanmar.
By Yun Sun, Co-Director, East Asia
U.S. Burma policy since the February 2021 military coup has been overly cautious, reactive, and as a result ineffectual. Despite legislation such as the 2022 BURMA Act authorizing the provision of non-lethal assistance for resistance groups in Myanmar, the Biden administration has largely avoided following through on Congressional mandates. The Trump administration has a meaningful opportunity to review and implement a more proactive and thereby effective strategy to bring about a peaceful end to the conflict in Myanmar and hasten the return of democracy.
Washington’s current Burma policy is premised on two misapprehensions. The first is that greater U.S. engagement will cross certain redlines in Beijing, risking a proxy war or at the very least prompting increased Chinese intervention. The second misconception is that refraining from becoming more involved and supporting an ASEAN-based diplomatic solution to the crisis is the best option for preventing Myanmar becoming a proxy for expanding Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
Both misconceptions ignore the uncomfortable reality that Washington’s lack of involvement in the conflict has not prevented Chinese concerns that the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) is a U.S. proxy and that ethnic armed groups have grown too close to the West. Beijing consistently misinterprets U.S. policy as far more forward-leaning than it actually is. The Chinese government stepped up direct engagement with the State Administration Council (SAC) the same month the U.S. Congress passed the BURMA Act as part of its annual defense authorization. As the bill neared passage in December 2022, Beijing appointed a new special envoy for Asian affairs, Deng Xijun, who met with commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw. The following week, Deng hosted a meeting of ethnic armed groups in Yunnan to push for ceasefire talks with the regime. Beijing has subsequently wielded pressure to advance negotiations between ethnic armed groups in the north, with whom it has influence, and the SAC.
The current lack of U.S. strategy has produced—or at least it has not prevented—the very end state which policymakers feared a more proactive approach would bring about: Western inattention has encouraged greater Chinese involvement in Myanmar, not less. As a result, Myanmar has become ever more dependent on China, Beijing’s influence has expanded across Southeast Asia, and ASEAN appears feckless.
The U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Integrated Country Strategy for Burma states, “Our principal goal is to restore Burma’s path to inclusive democracy, which will enhance the country’s long-term stability and advance U.S. interests.” It also declares, “Through positive engagement with the people of Burma, we will mitigate coercive external influences and ensure the United States remains the partner of choice” (emphasis added).
Yet Beijing has incrementally expanded its support for the Myanmar military junta and is now actively intervening in Myanmar’s internal affairs to safeguard its own strategic and business interests. Following the fall of Lashio to the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August this year, China closed off border checkpoints to send a signal of dissatisfaction to the ethnic armed groups for going too far in their fight against the SAC.
The fall of Lashio was strategically significant because it was home to the military’s northeast command headquarters. According to leaked details of a meeting between Chinese diplomats and representatives of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in late August, the MNDAA’s conquest of Lashio “deeply damaged China-Myanmar friendship,” and Beijing was acutely concerned that the widening conflict in the north was negatively impacting its interests in Myanmar. In mid-September, it became clear that MNDAA leader Peng Deren, who had not been seen publicly since August, had been detained in China. Beijing denied that Peng was being held against his will, insisting that he was in Kunming seeking medical care.
In a further sign that Beijing has thrown its support behind the junta, in November Min Aung Hlaing was officially invited to Kunming to attend several Mekong-related summits, marking the junta leader’s first trip to China since the coup nearly four years ago. Following the senior general’s trip, the BBC reported that the two sides had concluded an agreement to allow Beijing to operate private military companies in Myanmar, a highly controversial deal considering the history of the Myanmar military’s deep mistrust of China, dating back to China’s support for communist insurgency in northern Myanmar during the Cold War.
These developments have two significant implications for Washington. First, the current U.S. approach to Myanmar since the coup, marked by caution and overall neglect, has not only failed to compel the junta to restore democracy but has facilitated China’s deepening influence in the country. Second, from a more practical point of view, Washington could be a great deal more proactive while still operating below the threshold of crossing China’s redlines. Those redlines include directly arming resistance groups and, in particular, any Western presence in the northernmost part of Myanmar, especially Kachin State, which Beijing sees as its sphere of influence. According to two former U.S. ambassadors to Myanmar, Chinese counterparts pressured them not to travel to Kachin.
There are myriad options available to Washington that fall below both redlines, such as providing technical assistance, communications equipment, and radar technology to the resistance, as well as publicly convening talks bringing together representatives of armed groups and civil society actors in Myanmar in a neutral location (such as neighboring Thailand, which has already hosted similar dialogues) to establish a shared vision for the country’s future. In any event, it is high time for Washington to reexamine the assumptions behind its current policy toward Myanmar and pursue a less risk-averse strategy.
So, what might U.S. Myanmar policy look like in the second Trump administration? While there is little indication yet of who will fill the most important Asia positions in Trump’s team, we can make several conclusions based on existing personnel and Trump’s comments on foreign policy during the campaign.
Trump has surrounded himself with China hawks including Rep. Mike Waltz, his pick for national security advisor, Jacob Helberg, whom he has tapped to lead the State Department’s economic policy, and Sen. Marco Rubio as secretary of state. Rubio has a strong record on human rights and is also seen as an institutionalist who is likely to use all of the levers of state available to him. He could work with colleagues on the Hill such as Sen. Todd Young, who used his position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to pressure the SAC to restore democracy in Myanmar.
There is as yet no information on who will fill influential Southeast Asia-related posts. However, the president-elect’s advisers will almost certainly advocate a confrontational approach toward China, and that might extend to taking the fight to Beijing’s backyard, including Myanmar. The administration is unlikely to lend greater material support to the resistance, which would run counter to President Trump’s stated commitment not to involve the United States in more overseas conflicts. More likely, the administration will consider expanding sanctions on Chinese companies with links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as Chinese companies involved in resource extraction in Myanmar, which bankrolls the Myanmar military and prolongs the conflict.
However, Trump’s willingness to cut a deal with Xi Jinping may increase the likelihood that Washington may make concessions to respect a Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. In such a scenario, the people of Myanmar and the resistance are likely to lose support as China strengthens its influence over the country and supports the junta’s fraudulent elections, expected to take place in November 2025.
In short, several competing interests within the Trump administration will complicate a coherent U.S. Myanmar policy. Nevertheless, the incoming administration’s Asia advisers should take this opportunity to review Washington’s current policy, reflect on the underlying reasons for its failure, identify the United States’ long-term goals in Myanmar, and design a new strategy that better aligns ends, ways, and means.
