The United States faces a decision of utmost consequence: Does it join Israel in attacking Iran or instead continue to pursue talks to curb Iran’s nuclear program? U.S. military action would increase security risks, without eliminating Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. It would also hurt prospects for U.S. diplomacy and non-proliferation efforts around the world.
The past week’s missile exchanges between Israel and Iran have placed the United States at a crossroads—it can militarily join Israel in its efforts to significantly set back Iran’s nuclear capacity and perhaps topple the regime, or it can search for off ramps and emphasize that Israel took these actions unilaterally, and against U.S. wishes. President Trump has vacillated between restraint and intervention, and there are signs that his administration is divided on which option to select. The choice should be obvious. U.S. intervention against Iran risks undermining U.S. security and diplomacy beyond the Middle East, without any guarantee that it will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in the longer-term.
Even if the United States resisted a ground invasion and regime change at the outset, joining the Israeli war would create three significant costs. First, it would increase the likelihood that Iran, as well as other states pursue nuclear proliferation or other asymmetric retaliation options. Second, it would seriously imperil U.S. credibility in future bilateral negotiations in the region. And, third, it would contribute to the false impression that U.S. and Israeli interests are perfectly aligned, which could lead to others launching wars and expecting the United States to join, even if doing so would run counter to U.S. strategic goals, including a need to prioritize, draw down in the Middle East, and focus more time and attention to the Indo-Pacific.
The initial U.S. response to the Israeli strikes was an unambiguous embrace of restraint. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the action as “unilateral,” denied U.S. involvement, and advised only that Iran not target U.S. personnel. Since then, however, President Donald Trump has taken seemingly contradictory stances. He has advocated for peace while threatening Tehran and asserting that the “America First” agenda was committed to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He has gone as far as to contradict his own Director of National Intelligence’s assessments of Iran’s nuclearization. But in the past two days, Trump has changed his tack, repeatedly stating that the United States would not accept Iran having any nuclear program and calling for “unconditional surrender.” While Trump alone does not have the authority to unilaterally launch a war on Iran, his off-hand comments and social media posts suggest he might plunge the United States into military action, daring Congress to try to withdraw U.S. forces once they are committed.
It is unlikely that U.S. involvement would definitively end Iran’s nuclear aspirations. The United States would have to utilize B-2 bombers and GBU 57/B bombs (so-called “bunker busters”) to damage the Iranian enrichment site at Fordow, and doing so successfully is far from trivial. Even if attempts to destroy Iran’s nuclear stockpile were successful this time around, it is probable that Iran would covertly pursue a new program, since U.S. strikes would only strengthen the desire for a credible deterrent against future such attacks.
American involvement is even less likely to bring about regime change in the country, and certainly not stability to the region. Much of Iran’s population — even dissidents — have lent their support to the regime, with many concluding that resistance to Iranian leadership at this time would only help Israel. Furthermore, there is no history of bombing campaigns alone successfully leading to regime change. The United States would need to launch a massive ground war well beyond air strikes to have even the faintest prospect of removing both the ability and political will of Iran to pursue nuclear weapons.
The United States joining Israeli attacks on Iran would not merely fail to permanently eradicate Iran’s program; it would increase the likelihood that other states would make arrangements for their own security. Covert nuclear weapons are a logical option. States with a nuclear arsenal, or those that are considering acquiring one, have historically been influenced by what happens to other nations that pursued and abandoned nuclear programs. North Korea’s unwillingness to relinquish its nuclear arms has in part been attributed to the fate of Muammar Gaddafi, who gave up Libya’s nascent program in the early 2000s and was deposed and murdered less than a decade later. States may conclude the only way to avoid a devastating air campaign like the one Iran is being subjected to right now is to obtain nuclear weapons — and fast.
To be sure, much of the damage has already been done. Even if the United States doesn’t join the war, Israel’s attacks have increased the premium on obtaining a nuclear deterrent. But the U.S. decision still matters; the extent of the destruction in Iran influences whether nuclear weapons are seen as truly existential or merely useful. If the United States negotiates an off-ramp, other countries might be less worried about the prospect of total devastation; many would continue to believe that a nuclear deterrent is unnecessary.
A U.S. decision to strike Iran would undo years of diplomacy in the region. There are two interpretations of the possible linkage between Israeli strikes and U.S. negotiations with Iran. The first is that Israeli strikes were meant to disrupt good faith negotiations, a deliberate effort to thwart Trump’s desire for a solution. Others speculate that the negotiations were meant to lull Iran into a false sense of security to clear the way for Israel’s attack. It is hard to say which is true —while Trump has retroactively endorsed the strikes, he could be doing so opportunistically because he perceives them as potentially improving his negotiating position. The United States actively joining Israel’s attack would remove all doubt, signaling to countries around the region — and the world — that the United States uses negotiations as a prelude to war.
On the other hand, if Trump were to commit to further talks even while Iran is weak, that could demonstrate the United States’ commitment to diplomacy, thus putting distance between the United States and Israel’s unilateral decision to launch the war. Indeed, Donald Trump has an opportunity to demonstrate that U.S. foreign policy is not one and the same as Israel’s by calling for de-escalation at a moment when Israel would like to expand the war. If, on the other hand, President Trump joins Israel’s military campaign, especially after repeatedly affirming his opposition to U.S. regime change wars, his commitment to “America First” will come under even greater scrutiny.
Whether President Trump decides to escalate or de-escalate with Iran, the consequences for the United States are certain to be far-reaching—and unpredictable. Those urging him to enter the conflict would do well to think not just in terms of Iran and Israel, but more broadly about how such a war serves U.S. interests. Even in the most optimistic scenario, where the very survival of the Iranian government is severely challenged, the many other threats to U.S. security will still be there, and new ones will have been created, including the prospect of a protracted land war in the Middle East. In light of these concerns, the best option is restraint, a search for a diplomatic off-ramp, and a swift end to the war.
The United States faces a decision of utmost consequence: Does it join Israel in attacking Iran or instead continue to pursue talks to curb Iran’s nuclear program? U.S. military action would increase security risks, without eliminating Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. It would also hurt prospects for U.S. diplomacy and non-proliferation efforts around the world.
The past week’s missile exchanges between Israel and Iran have placed the United States at a crossroads—it can militarily join Israel in its efforts to significantly set back Iran’s nuclear capacity and perhaps topple the regime, or it can search for off ramps and emphasize that Israel took these actions unilaterally, and against U.S. wishes. President Trump has vacillated between restraint and intervention, and there are signs that his administration is divided on which option to select. The choice should be obvious. U.S. intervention against Iran risks undermining U.S. security and diplomacy beyond the Middle East, without any guarantee that it will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in the longer-term.
Even if the United States resisted a ground invasion and regime change at the outset, joining the Israeli war would create three significant costs. First, it would increase the likelihood that Iran, as well as other states pursue nuclear proliferation or other asymmetric retaliation options. Second, it would seriously imperil U.S. credibility in future bilateral negotiations in the region. And, third, it would contribute to the false impression that U.S. and Israeli interests are perfectly aligned, which could lead to others launching wars and expecting the United States to join, even if doing so would run counter to U.S. strategic goals, including a need to prioritize, draw down in the Middle East, and focus more time and attention to the Indo-Pacific.
The initial U.S. response to the Israeli strikes was an unambiguous embrace of restraint. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the action as “unilateral,” denied U.S. involvement, and advised only that Iran not target U.S. personnel. Since then, however, President Donald Trump has taken seemingly contradictory stances. He has advocated for peace while threatening Tehran and asserting that the “America First” agenda was committed to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He has gone as far as to contradict his own Director of National Intelligence’s assessments of Iran’s nuclearization. But in the past two days, Trump has changed his tack, repeatedly stating that the United States would not accept Iran having any nuclear program and calling for “unconditional surrender.” While Trump alone does not have the authority to unilaterally launch a war on Iran, his off-hand comments and social media posts suggest he might plunge the United States into military action, daring Congress to try to withdraw U.S. forces once they are committed.
It is unlikely that U.S. involvement would definitively end Iran’s nuclear aspirations. The United States would have to utilize B-2 bombers and GBU 57/B bombs (so-called “bunker busters”) to damage the Iranian enrichment site at Fordow, and doing so successfully is far from trivial. Even if attempts to destroy Iran’s nuclear stockpile were successful this time around, it is probable that Iran would covertly pursue a new program, since U.S. strikes would only strengthen the desire for a credible deterrent against future such attacks.
American involvement is even less likely to bring about regime change in the country, and certainly not stability to the region. Much of Iran’s population — even dissidents — have lent their support to the regime, with many concluding that resistance to Iranian leadership at this time would only help Israel. Furthermore, there is no history of bombing campaigns alone successfully leading to regime change. The United States would need to launch a massive ground war well beyond air strikes to have even the faintest prospect of removing both the ability and political will of Iran to pursue nuclear weapons.
The United States joining Israeli attacks on Iran would not merely fail to permanently eradicate Iran’s program; it would increase the likelihood that other states would make arrangements for their own security. Covert nuclear weapons are a logical option. States with a nuclear arsenal, or those that are considering acquiring one, have historically been influenced by what happens to other nations that pursued and abandoned nuclear programs. North Korea’s unwillingness to relinquish its nuclear arms has in part been attributed to the fate of Muammar Gaddafi, who gave up Libya’s nascent program in the early 2000s and was deposed and murdered less than a decade later. States may conclude the only way to avoid a devastating air campaign like the one Iran is being subjected to right now is to obtain nuclear weapons — and fast.
To be sure, much of the damage has already been done. Even if the United States doesn’t join the war, Israel’s attacks have increased the premium on obtaining a nuclear deterrent. But the U.S. decision still matters; the extent of the destruction in Iran influences whether nuclear weapons are seen as truly existential or merely useful. If the United States negotiates an off-ramp, other countries might be less worried about the prospect of total devastation; many would continue to believe that a nuclear deterrent is unnecessary.
A U.S. decision to strike Iran would undo years of diplomacy in the region. There are two interpretations of the possible linkage between Israeli strikes and U.S. negotiations with Iran. The first is that Israeli strikes were meant to disrupt good faith negotiations, a deliberate effort to thwart Trump’s desire for a solution. Others speculate that the negotiations were meant to lull Iran into a false sense of security to clear the way for Israel’s attack. It is hard to say which is true —while Trump has retroactively endorsed the strikes, he could be doing so opportunistically because he perceives them as potentially improving his negotiating position. The United States actively joining Israel’s attack would remove all doubt, signaling to countries around the region — and the world — that the United States uses negotiations as a prelude to war.
On the other hand, if Trump were to commit to further talks even while Iran is weak, that could demonstrate the United States’ commitment to diplomacy, thus putting distance between the United States and Israel’s unilateral decision to launch the war. Indeed, Donald Trump has an opportunity to demonstrate that U.S. foreign policy is not one and the same as Israel’s by calling for de-escalation at a moment when Israel would like to expand the war. If, on the other hand, President Trump joins Israel’s military campaign, especially after repeatedly affirming his opposition to U.S. regime change wars, his commitment to “America First” will come under even greater scrutiny.
Whether President Trump decides to escalate or de-escalate with Iran, the consequences for the United States are certain to be far-reaching—and unpredictable. Those urging him to enter the conflict would do well to think not just in terms of Iran and Israel, but more broadly about how such a war serves U.S. interests. Even in the most optimistic scenario, where the very survival of the Iranian government is severely challenged, the many other threats to U.S. security will still be there, and new ones will have been created, including the prospect of a protracted land war in the Middle East. In light of these concerns, the best option is restraint, a search for a diplomatic off-ramp, and a swift end to the war.
