Amid rising tensions in Northeast Asia, the second Trump administration provides an opportunity to re-evaluate and reshape US policy towards North Korea. As the stakes and risks of conflict in the region grow, the United States’ strategic objectives and policy for the Korean Peninsula need to adapt to the new environment.
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Introduction
The election of Donald Trump to a second presidential term provides an opportunity to reevaluate American policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), especially given the President’s summitry with Kim Jong Un during his first term in office. Although the Biden administration’s approach focused on reinforcing deterrence, the risks of conflict have grown. Tensions between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow; Pyongyang’s shift to closer relations with America’s rivals and the growth of its WMD arsenal; as well as a burgeoning regional arms race, have only heightened the dangers.
These developments have increased the risk of:
- Greater polarization of East Asia and an accelerating regional arms race;
- Nuclear proliferation in the region which will weaken or destroy the non-proliferation regime;
- Proliferation outside of the region if Pyongyang decides to peddle its WMD wares elsewhere;
- Conflict due to misperception and miscalculation;
- Nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula that could spill over into East Asia and even the continental United States.
A new, pragmatic US policy should focus on continuing to bolster deterrence, reducing the risk of war—particularly nuclear war—and building an architecture of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Pursuing these objectives will require: 1) summit-driven diplomacy, including negotiated agreements and unilateral steps; 2) the support of Russia and China; 3) convincing Pyongyang to return to talks despite its shift away from seeking better relations with the United States and the expansion of its WMD arsenal; 4) identifying North Korea’s priorities for talks; 5) and new realistic US objectives, including a near-term focus on reducing the risk of war instead of denuclearization.
None of this will be easy. Aside from needing to address more pressing foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and Europe, a new initiative will be time consuming and require a high degree of policy coordination at home and abroad. However, the dangers cited above make launching a new initiative imperative.
Read the full report on 38 North.
Amid rising tensions in Northeast Asia, the second Trump administration provides an opportunity to re-evaluate and reshape US policy towards North Korea. As the stakes and risks of conflict in the region grow, the United States’ strategic objectives and policy for the Korean Peninsula need to adapt to the new environment.
Download
Introduction
The election of Donald Trump to a second presidential term provides an opportunity to reevaluate American policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), especially given the President’s summitry with Kim Jong Un during his first term in office. Although the Biden administration’s approach focused on reinforcing deterrence, the risks of conflict have grown. Tensions between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow; Pyongyang’s shift to closer relations with America’s rivals and the growth of its WMD arsenal; as well as a burgeoning regional arms race, have only heightened the dangers.
These developments have increased the risk of:
- Greater polarization of East Asia and an accelerating regional arms race;
- Nuclear proliferation in the region which will weaken or destroy the non-proliferation regime;
- Proliferation outside of the region if Pyongyang decides to peddle its WMD wares elsewhere;
- Conflict due to misperception and miscalculation;
- Nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula that could spill over into East Asia and even the continental United States.
A new, pragmatic US policy should focus on continuing to bolster deterrence, reducing the risk of war—particularly nuclear war—and building an architecture of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Pursuing these objectives will require: 1) summit-driven diplomacy, including negotiated agreements and unilateral steps; 2) the support of Russia and China; 3) convincing Pyongyang to return to talks despite its shift away from seeking better relations with the United States and the expansion of its WMD arsenal; 4) identifying North Korea’s priorities for talks; 5) and new realistic US objectives, including a near-term focus on reducing the risk of war instead of denuclearization.
None of this will be easy. Aside from needing to address more pressing foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and Europe, a new initiative will be time consuming and require a high degree of policy coordination at home and abroad. However, the dangers cited above make launching a new initiative imperative.
Read the full report on 38 North.
