Nuclear Security News and Member Updates Roundup, June 2025

Dear Friend,

As assessments of the damage from June’s Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites continue to swirl, the nuclear security and nonproliferation community once again wrestles with questions of how the strikes may affect the international landscape of norms, legal instruments, and multilateral regimes and institutions. We have seen this movie before, notably when Israel attacked Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s al Kibar suspected nuclear reactor in 2007. The United States also struck Iraqi nuclear installations in 1993. Despite numerous similarities, the Iranian situation is different, and the implications will be closely watched in the weeks, months, and years to come.

Meanwhile, the unique nuclear security challenges posed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including seizure and occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant (ZNPP), continue to play out. Damage to Ukraine’s broader electric power infrastructure has left the ZNPP with just one power line connecting the plant to critical external electrical supply for cooling for over a month, while drone and other threats continue to plague not just ZNPP but other NPPs around the country. Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s monitoring team at the Rivne NPP went to the air raid shelter three times during one particularly intense day; twice reportedly due to cruise missile alerts and the other due to a ballistic missile alert.

Nuclear power continues to be a focus of energy security efforts globally, however, with the World Bank ending its ban on funding nuclear energy projects in developing countries even as our member organization Nuclear Aware Africa held an event focusing on African interest in nuclear energy and the nuclear security regime and Meta joined the “big tech” race for nuclear energy to power growing numbers of data centers.

Be sure to explore all the other excellent work our members are doing as well as the list of job opportunities in nuclear security at the end of this newsletter.

Warmly,

Christina

Director, International Nuclear Security Forum

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Updates

• INSF hosted the first webinar of our summer series on June 26^th. Featuring attendees spanning North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, the webinar explored the changing NPT regime and its implications for nonproliferation going forward. Keep an eye out for our announcement on July’s webinar!
• FUNDING APPEAL: If you appreciate this newsletter, please consider a donation to ensure sustainability into the future. Donate here and specify where indicated that your gift is intended to support the INSF. Institutional funding for civil society’s nuclear security work is increasingly hard to come by, as many readers already know, and the International Nuclear Security Forum appreciates your support!

Nuclear Security News

Israeli and U.S. Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities

• Much of Iran’s Nuclear Program Remains After Israel’s Strikes. At Least for Now (June 13): Israel badly damaged one of Iran’s key nuclear sites and killed a startling array of top military and nuclear officials in the attacks that started on [June 13]. But when the sun rose after that devastating assault, it was also clear how much of Iran’s nuclear program remained, at least for now. The Israeli strikes appear to have destroyed an aboveground nuclear fuel production site and electrical supply centers at Iran’s largest uranium enrichment center, at Natanz. The killing of some of Iran’s top nuclear scientists continues a long-running Israeli campaign targeting the expertise needed to build a bomb. But the first phase of the Israeli attacks did not hit the most likely repository of Iran’s near-bomb-grade nuclear fuel — and that may have been deliberate. That stockpile is stored at a vast complex outside the ancient former capital of Isfahan, according to international inspectors who are charged with measuring and monitoring it. Israel’s 100 fighters and swarms of missiles and drones stayed away from Isfahan in their first wave, even though it is one of the largest nuclear sites in the country and, according to Western intelligence services, one of the centers of Iran’s secret weapons research programs. The Israel Defense Forces issued a news release on [June 13] saying that in a second wave of attacks, it had hit Isfahan, but not the fuel stockpile. Instead, it focused on laboratories that worked on converting uranium gas back into a metal — one of the last stages of building a weapon. But it said nothing about hitting the area where the fuel itself is stored.
• IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (June 16): Following [June 13] attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the military conflict continues. As I reported to the IAEA’s Board of Governors and then to the UN Security Council [on June 13], the IAEA is monitoring the situation very carefully. Our Incident and Emergency Centre has been up and running 24/7 from the start, ascertaining the status of Iran’s nuclear facilities and the level of radiation at relevant sites through constant communication with Iranian authorities. The IAEA is ready to respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency within an hour. Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. There has been no additional damage at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant site since the [June 13] attack, which destroyed the above-ground part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, one of the plants at which Iran was producing uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. Electricity infrastructure at the facility, which included an electrical sub-station, a main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators, was also destroyed. There has been no indication of a physical attack on the underground cascade hall containing part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. However, the loss of power to the cascade hall may have damaged the centrifuges there. The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact to the population or the environment from this event. […] No damage has been seen at the site of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant or at the Khondab heavy water reactor, which is under construction. Bushehr nuclear power plant has not been targeted nor affected by the recent attacks and neither has the Tehran Research Reactor. At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in [the June 13] attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor fuel manufacturing plant, and the UF4 to EU metal processing facility, which was under construction. […] [The week of June 9] the Board adopted an important resolution on Iran’s safeguards obligations. The resolution, while containing important proliferation-related provisions, also stressed support for a diplomatic solution to the problems posed by the Iranian nuclear program. Member States of the IAEA have a crucial, active role to play in supporting the urgent move away from military escalation towards diplomacy. I urge you to pursue every possible diplomatic avenue and I assure you that I remain ready to play my part, including by travelling at the earliest possibility to assess the situation and ensure safety, security and non-proliferation in Iran. […] For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idly by during this conflict. […] I will continue my constant communication with the opposing parties to seek the most appropriate way to make this happen and I ask Member States to support me in these efforts. I hope this Board, and especially Member States with the greatest capacity to do so, will heed this call to assist the IAEA in helping those who [on June 16] are exchanging fire, to avoid the worst. There is always time and there is always a place for diplomacy.
• Update on Developments in Iran (June 19): The [IAEA] is continuing to closely monitor and assess the situation regarding the Israeli attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran, providing frequent public updates about developments and their possible consequences for human health and the environment, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said [June 19]. Since the military attacks began […], the IAEA has been reporting on damage at several of these facilities, including at nuclear-related sites located in Arak, Esfahan, Natanz and Tehran, and their potential radiological impact. In his statement to the Board of Governors on June 13, the morning of the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Director General recalled the numerous General Conference resolutions on the topic of military attacks against nuclear facilities, in particular, GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provide, inter alia, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”. He also stated that, furthermore, the IAEA has consistently underlined that “armed attacks on nuclear facilities could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked”, as was stated in GC(XXXIV)/RES/533. […] IAEA inspectors remain present in Iran, ready to be deployed at nuclear sites when possible, even though the number of Agency staff has been reduced somewhat in light of the security situation, Director General Grossi said. […] The Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant site was targeted in attacks on June 13 that destroyed the above-ground part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, one of the facilities at which Iran was producing uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. Electricity infrastructure at the plant – including an electrical sub-station, a main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators – was also destroyed. The loss of power to the underground cascades may have damaged the centrifuges there, Director General Grossi told the Board on June 16. […] At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in [June 13]’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction. As in Natanz, off-site radiation levels remain unchanged at the Esfahan nuclear site. On June 18, the IAEA said in an update that it had information that two centrifuge production facilities in Iran – the TESA Karaj workshop and the Tehran Research Center – were hit. Both locations were previously under IAEA monitoring and verification under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). […] At the Tehran Research Center, one building was hit where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings were destroyed where different centrifuge components were manufactured. The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor, under construction, was hit on June 19. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, Director General Grossi said no radiological consequence was expected. While damage to the nearby Heavy Water Production Plant was initially not visible, it is now assessed that key buildings at the facility were damaged, including the distillation unit.
• Update on Developments in Iran (June 22): Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said he will call an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on [June 23] in light of the “urgent situation” in Iran following the latest attacks on the country’s nuclear facilities. “In view of the increasingly serious situation in terms of nuclear safety and security, the Board of Governors will meet in an extraordinary session tomorrow, which I will address,” Director General Grossi said. The Director General said the IAEA has been informed by the Iranian regulatory authorities that there has been no increase in off-site radiation levels after the recent attacks on three Iranian nuclear facilities, including the Fordow uranium enrichment site. “As of this time, we don’t expect that there will be any health consequences for people or the environment outside the targeted sites,” he said. “We will continue to monitor and assess the situation in Iran and provide further updates as additional information becomes available.” According to the most recent information verified by the IAEA before the attacks on Iran began on June 13, the three sites targeted by the United States – also including Esfahan and Natanz – contained nuclear material in the form of uranium enriched to different levels, which may cause radioactive and chemical contamination within the facilities that were hit.
• How Badly Have US Strikes Damaged Iran’s Nuclear Facilities? Here’s What to Know (June 23): Warplanes. Submarines. Cruise missiles. Bombs that weigh 30,000 pounds. After initially favoring diplomacy, US President Donald Trump resorted to an extraordinary use of force against Iran on [June 21], striking three of the regime’s key nuclear sites. Trump claimed Iran’s nuclear facilities had been “obliterated,” but some Iranian officials downplayed the impact of the strikes – just as they did when Israel first struck Iran’s facilities on June 13. With satellite imagery of the overnight strikes beginning to emerge, here’s what we know about the damage the US inflicted on Iran’s nuclear program.

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine

• Update 293 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine (May 29):The off-site power situation at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains extremely fragile, with Europe’s largest such site currently relying on just one single power line for essential nuclear safety and security functions compared with ten before the military conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the [IAEA] said [on May 29]. The ZNPP’s last 330 kilovolt (kV) back-up line remains disconnected three weeks after the plant lost access to it on 7 May and it is unclear when it will be restored. As a result, the six-reactor plant depends entirely on its sole functioning 750 kV line to receive the external electricity it needs to operate the plants’ nuclear safety systems, and to cool its nuclear fuel.
• Rosatom Confirms Long-Term Plans to Restart Zaporizhzhya (May 28): Rosatom has a plan to bring the [ZNPP] to full capacity, and it is currently being approved, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev told Russia’s Federation Council (upper house). “We have developed a plan for bringing Zaporizhzhya NPP to full capacity. The plan is similar to interagency approvals from the regulators of the Ministry of Energy,” he said. He added that, in order to bring ZNPP to full capacity, it is necessary to solve four main tasks: restoration of water supply, replacement of power grids, restoration of railway infrastructure, and also it is necessary to solve the problem of American fuel.
• Update 294 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine (June 3): Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi was in Ukraine [on June 3] as part of the ongoing efforts of the [IAEA] to help prevent a nuclear accident during the military conflict, with the wail of air raid sirens forcing one of his meetings to be held in an underground shelter. One of the main priorities of the one-day visit to Kyiv – including a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – was to discuss how the IAEA could assist in rebuilding Ukraine’s damaged and degraded nuclear energy infrastructure. […] IAEA expert teams based at two of Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy and Rivne – were also told to seek shelter during a day of unusually frequent air raid alerts. The team at the Rivne NPP, in western Ukraine, went to the shelter three times, two of which were reportedly due to cruise missile alerts and the other due to a ballistic missile alert. […] Specifically, the Director General spoke to his hosts about the IAEA conducting a thorough safety assessment of the damaged New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl site, as well as the Agency’s safety assistance related to a government plan to build two new reactor units at the Khmelnytskyy site and its technical work to help keep the national grid stable, which is of crucial importance for the safe operation of NPPs. At Ukraine’s largest NPP, Zaporizhzhya, the IAEA team was informed that the nearby city of Enerhodar – where most plant staff live – had experienced several power outages since midnight, with intermittent tap water supplies also affecting the plant itself. The IAEA team was also informed that the city and its water pump station have relied on mobile diesel generators for power. The Zaporizhzhya NPP remained connected to off-site power at all times.
• Update 295 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine (June 5): The IAEA team based at Ukraine’s [ZNPP] [on June 5] heard repeated rounds of gunfire that appeared to be aimed at drones reportedly attacking the site’s training center, followed by the sound of multiple explosions, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said. It was the fourth time this year that the training center, located just outside the site perimeter, was reportedly targeted by unmanned aerial vehicles. “Drones flying close to nuclear power plants could threaten their safety and security, with potentially serious consequences. As I have stated repeatedly during the war, such incidents must stop immediately,” Director General Grossi said. The IAEA team on site reported hearing at least five explosions between 11:30am and 13:45pm local time, each preceded by gunfire. Additional gunfire was heard around 14:00pm. The ZNPP told the IAEA team that all incidents involved “drone neutralization” near the training center premises. There were no immediate reports of any damage to the center.
• Putin’s nuclear magic trick has no rabbit — Why Russia can’t actually use captured Ukrainian reactors (June 7): Concerns are growing over Russia’s efforts to restart the [ZNPP], the largest nuclear facility in Europe. While official statements suggest the plant could soon reconnect to Russia’s grid, the technical and political reality on the ground is far more complex. Meanwhile, Rosatom—the state-owned corporation now managing ZNPP—remains largely unsanctioned by the West, even though it plays a central role in Russia’s nuclear weapons program. In this in-depth report, energy analyst Mykhailo Gonchar explains what’s really happening inside the plant—and why it matters far beyond Ukraine.
• Update 296 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine (June 12): Nuclear safety remains precarious at Ukraine’s [ZNPP] and its six reactors cannot be restarted as long as the military conflict continues to jeopardize the situation at the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi told IAEA Member States this week. Addressing the regular June meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General briefed them about his 12th mission to Ukraine during the current conflict, which took place in early June, followed by a visit to Russia, which also focused on nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP. Addressing the Board meeting, he highlighted “the extremely vulnerable” status of the off-site power supply at the site, which for more than a month now has relied on one single power line for the electricity it needs to cool its reactors and spent fuel. Before the conflict, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) had access to ten power lines. […] In addition, the ZNPP informed the IAEA about a planned project to pump water into the cooling pond from the Dnipro River in order to maintain a water level that is sufficient to cool one operating reactor initially, followed by a second unit, until the pond reaches its full capacity. According to the site, a pumping station will be constructed to supply water directly to the cooling pond until the plant can rebuild the Kakhovka dam. […] Separately [the week of June 9], the IAEA team was informed that that the Russian regulator, Rostekhnadzor, over the next two weeks will perform pre-licensing inspection activities at ZNPP reactor units 1 and 2, whose current operational licenses issued by Ukraine are due to expire in December this year and in February 2026, respectively. The IAEA team has requested to observe these activities and will seek additional information regarding items such as the scope of these undertakings and any criteria for assessing nuclear safety.
• Update 297 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine (June 19): The IAEA team based at Ukraine’s [ZNPP] has been informed that challenges related to the availability of cooling water and off-site power will need to be fully resolved before any of its reactors can be restarted, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said [on June 19]. Those pre-conditions for any future decision to take the ZNPP’s six reactors from their current cold shutdown status were communicated to the IAEA team during discussions with the plant and Rostekhnadzor, the Russian regulator which is this week conducting pre-licensing inspection activities at reactor units 1 and 2. The current operating licenses – issued by the Ukrainian State regulator, SNRIU, – are due to expire in December this year and in February 2026, respectively. Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) has not been generating electricity for almost three years now, and its location on the frontline of the conflict continues to put nuclear safety in constant jeopardy. Its off-site power situation also remains extremely fragile, with only one power line currently functioning compared with ten before the conflict. In addition, the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in mid-2023 means the ZNPP does not have sufficient water to cool six operating reactors. […] The IAEA team reported hearing explosions at various distances from the site on most days over the [week of June 16]. At Ukraine’s other nuclear sites, the IAEA teams at the three operating NPPs – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and the South Ukraine – and the Chornobyl site all reported hearing air raid alarms over the [week of June 16], with the IAEA team at the Khmelnytskyy NPP sheltering at the site [on June 18].
• Update 298 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine (June 26): Ukraine’s [ZNPP] remains reliant on one single off-site power line to receive the external electricity it needs to cool its six reactors and their spent fuel, some seven weeks after it lost the connection to its last back-up power line, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the [IAEA] said [on June 26]. “The extremely fragile external power situation as well as challenges related to the availability of cooling water after the Kakhovka dam was destroyed two years ago underline the fact that nuclear safety remains highly precarious at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. There are many important issues that must be addressed before it will be feasible to restart the plant,” Director General Grossi said. The 330 kilovolt (kV) power line was disconnected on May 7 due to military activities some distance away from the ZNPP, leaving Europe’s largest [NPP] dependent on one 750 kV line. Before the conflict, it had access to ten off-site power lines. Its six reactors have been in cold shutdown since 2024, but still require cooling water for their reactor cores. Almost every day over the [week of June 23], the IAEA team based at the ZNPP has continued to hear explosions at various distances away from the site, a constant reminder of the close proximity to the frontline of the conflict. The IAEA team has continued to conduct walkdowns across the site as part of the Agency’s mission to monitor and assess nuclear safety and security there. Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA teams at Ukraine’s three operating NPPs – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and the South Ukraine – and the Chornobyl site reported hearing air-raid alarms over the [week of June 23]. The teams at the Chornobyl site and the Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs have all rotated in recent days. Early on June 21, the IAEA team at the South Ukraine NPP observed a drone around one kilometer from their hotel

International Architecture

• World Bank Ends Its Ban on Funding Nuclear Power Projects: The world’s largest and most influential development bank said on [June 11] it would lift its longstanding ban on funding nuclear power projects. The decision by the board of the World Bank could have profound implications for the ability of developing countries to industrialize without burning planet-warming fuels such as coal and oil. The ban has been formally in place since 2013, but the last time the bank funded a nuclear power project was 1959 in Italy. In the decades since, a few of the bank’s major funders, particularly Germany, have opposed its involvement in nuclear energy, on the grounds that the risk of catastrophic accidents in poor countries with less expertise in nuclear technology was unacceptably high. The bank’s policy shift, described in an email to employees late on [June 11], comes as nuclear power is experiencing a global surge in support. Casting nuclear power as an essential replacement for fossil fuels, more than 20 countries — including the United States, Canada, France and Ghana — signed a pledge to triple nuclear power by 2050 at the United Nations’ flagship climate conference two years ago.
• Global Nuclear Emergency Exercise Concludes, Testing International Response in Simulated Reactor Accident: The [IAEA], in collaboration with over 75 countries and 10 international organizations, successfully concluded a 36-hour simulation that tested global readiness and response mechanisms to a severe nuclear emergency scenario at Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant. The ConvEx-3 (2025) exercise began on June 24 and concluded [on] June 25, at about 17:45 CEST. Such exercises are held every three to five years and are based on simulated events hosted by IAEA Member States. The exercise simulated a significant release of radioactive material, prompting participating nations and organizations to engage in real-time decision-making, information exchange, public communication and coordination of protective actions, including medical response and cross-border logistics. “The ConvEx-3 (2025) demonstrated the strength of international cooperation in nuclear emergency preparedness,” said Carlos Torres Vidal, Director of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre. “By working together in realistic scenarios, we enhance our collective ability to protect people and the environment.”

Threats

• FBI Continues to Track Down Plutonium Allegedly Sold by Hadley Man: [U.S.] Federal investigators told a judge last week that they are continuing to assess what the customers who allegedly purchased small amounts of plutonium from a Hadley [Massachusetts] man did with the material. On April 22, a federal grand jury indicted Jacob Miller, 43, on charges of being a felon in possession of explosives and ammunition. Prosecutors said when investigators searched Miller’s home, they found firearms, hazardous chemicals and radioactive materials, including plutonium taken from Soviet Union-era smoke detectors. Prosecutors said Miller ran an online business called Collect The Periodic Table. A website that appears to be connected with the enterprise lists a full periodic table for $140. A small amount of plutonium alone was listed for $500. The affidavit filed with the federal court in Springfield last week disclosed the FBI’s ongoing investigation into the matter. Miller allegedly shipped out plutonium about 60 times between December 2020 and March 2025, FBI Special Agent Darrell Hunter said in the affidavit dated June 20. “The defendant’s distribution of Plutonium to a broad series of individuals, with no apparent vetting of these customers, poses a particular danger to public safety,” Hunter wrote. Miller, the affidavit said, shipped the material across the United States and out of the country. So far, only 10 of the customers gave the material they purchased from Miller to the FBI, Hunter said. “The FBI’s investigation into this matter, including the extent to which the defendant distributed Plutonium and what the defendant’s customers did with the Plutonium, is continuing,” Hunter wrote.

Security Culture

• Ghana Reviews Nuclear Security Plan to Strengthen Safeguards: Ghana has commenced a high-level review of its Integrated Nuclear Security Sustainability Plan (INSSP) to strengthen national measures against emerging threats, including terrorism and cyber-attacks, safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, and technologies. The INSSP, covering the period 2025-2028, is being developed based on identified areas for improvement and national priorities. Speaking at the meeting in Accra, Mr. Kwamena Essilfie Quaison, Director for Science, Technology and Innovation, Ministry of Environment, Science, and Technology (MEST), described the review as crucial, given the current complex security landscape. “The peaceful use of nuclear science and technology continues to expand, offering enormous benefits in medicine, energy, agriculture, and research. However, this growth also demands enhanced vigilance,” he stated. 

Emerging Technologies

• Culture, Security And Radioactive Waste: Challenges Abound For Nuclear-Powered Data Centers: When the Labour Party came to power in 2024, Keir Starmer immediately relaxed the UK’s planning laws, thus opening the gates for a data centre construction boom. The move wasn’t just a way to attract international investment in a shaky economy – it was part of a larger strategy to make the UK a leader in AI technology. AI systems are fueled by data, so as these systems proliferate, more data centers will be needed to support them. But the challenge then becomes fueling those data centers, which require significant energy resources to operate. In the UK, data centers already use 2% of total power supplies. By the end of 2025, data centers worldwide could guzzle as much as 23 gigawatts (GW) of power – or twice the amount consumed by the Netherlands. Lacking suitable infrastructure to support their soaring resource demands, data centers are competing with population centers for power (and water) supplies. Cost too is threatening future data centre operations. Wholesale electricity in the UK is already expensive compared with peer countries in the EU. And, although energy prices worldwide have fallen from peaks in 2021-22, they are still higher than in pre-Covid years for most developed economies. As power demands rise alongside AI use, hyperscalers are feeling the pressure on their bottom lines. To stay competitive, companies such as Microsoft and Google are slashing costs and boosting revenue. To avoid hypocrisy, they are dropping some long-standing commitments to net zero and sustainability.
• Meta Signs 20-Year Deal With Nuclear Plant, Signals AI’s Growing Energy Needs: Meta’s deal to help revive an Illinois nuclear power plant was one way of signaling that the parent company of Facebook and Instagram is preparing for a future built with artificial intelligence. Meta’s 20-year deal with Constellation Energy follows similar maneuvers from Amazon, Google and Microsoft, but it will take years before nuclear energy can meet the tech industry’s insatiable demand for new sources of electricity. AI uses vast amounts of energy, much of which comes from burning fossil fuels, which causes climate change. The unexpected popularity of generative AI products over the past few years has disrupted many tech companies’ carefully laid plans to supply their technology with energy sources that don’t contribute to climate change. Even as Meta anticipates more nuclear in the future, its more immediate plans rely on natural gas. Entergy, one of the nation’s largest utility providers, has been fast-tracking plans to build gas-fired power plants in Louisiana to prepare for a massive Meta data center complex.

Member Organization Announcements and Updates

Bellona Foundation

• Bellona published its latest monthly Nuclear Digest for April 2025, which examines nuclear security developments in Ukraine, the involvement of the Russian nuclear industry and Rosatom in these developments, and Rosatom’s influence in international markets. Read the digest.
• Bellona expert Dmitry Gorchakov also contributed to the Financial Times article “EU seeks to sever nuclear energy ties with Russia”, which discussed the current situation and the EU’s intentions to reduce its dependence on Russia in the energy sector. Read the article.

Odesa Center for Nonproliferation

• On May 30, Ali Alkis was invited by Nuclear Aware Africa to speak during the “International Nuclear Security Regime and Newcomers in Africa” webinar. He emphasized that several African countries—including Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda—are exploring nuclear power to address energy deficits and support industrial growth. Egypt is already moving forward with nuclear plant construction. Ali noted that while the expansion of nuclear energy offers significant opportunities, it also introduces important nuclear security challenges.
• On June 20, Ali Alkis presented at BSWN’s ‘NucTalks Special Roundtable: Israel Escalation – Consequences for Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security.’ His remarks focused on Israel’s nuclear posture, covering the country’s policy of opacity, the Samson Option, and the Begin Doctrine. He also addressed the legal framework concerning the protection of nuclear facilities under international law.

Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

• On May 21, 2025, the VCDNP launched a new report, “The Balance of Confidence and Feasibility in Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament”. The report authors offer actionable recommendations to help the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) States Parties further develop the principle of irreversibility. Highlights include:
  • Practical steps that NPT States Parties could take in the NPT review cycle
  • Considerations States should take on the role of the IAEA in disarmament verification
  • The importance of further research on disarmament costs and managing institutional memory after nuclear weapons elimination
  • Read the report.
• On May 28, 2025, the VCDNP hosted a seminar with Dr. James Wells, Professor of Physics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan. The seminar highlighted key findings from the American Physical Society’s report, “Strategic Ballistic Missile Defence: Challenges to Defending the United States.” Dr. Wells presented a detailed technical assessment of the United States’ $400 billion investment in ballistic missile defense over the past seven decades, focusing on the system’s ability to counter nuclear-armed North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Read about the seminar.
• From May 26 to 30, 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held the first International Conference on Stakeholder Engagement for Nuclear Power Programmes. VCDNP experts actively participated in the conference, contributing to a panel discussion and delivering two short presentations, so-called “flash talks.” Read about the conference.
• The fourth International Digital Security Forum (IDSF) took place in Vienna from June 4 to 6, 2025. VCDNP Executive Director Ms. Elena K. Sokova delivered keynote remarks on digitalization and new technologies in the nuclear sector. Senior Fellow Dr. Sarah Case Lackner organized and moderated a workshop on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, and participated in a panel discussion, “Digital Transformation and the Security Impact on Nuclear Ecosystems and Non-Proliferation”. During the Forum, VCDNP and the Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT) also formalized their collaboration by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Read about the forum.

Individual Member Updates

• Bahram Ghiassee, Associate Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, published an op-ed piece in The Telegraph, “I’m a nuclear scientist. This is the significance of Israel’s airstrikes.” Read the op-ed.
• Natasha Karner of the Allen Turing Institute recently co-authored a piece on “Solving the Radiological Waste Disposal Riddle”, in BASIC Think Tank’s latest Emerging Voices Network Anthology on nuclear policy. Read the piece.
• Natasha Karner was a panel member at the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) Symposium in The Hague. The symposium was held on June 26^th, and she was featured on the panel, “From Principles to Practice: Governing the Technical Realities of Military AI.”  
• Ludovica Castelli of Istituto Affari Internazionali published an op-ed in The Loop, “How can we protect nuclear facilities?” It explores the longstanding problem of how to protect nuclear facilities against attacks, particularly in light of the war in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Middle East. Read the op-ed.
• Zoha Naser of King’s College London’s (KCL) Centre for Science & Security Studies, Department of War Studies, shares the establishment of a new research group at KCL, the EVIDENCE Network. EVIDENCE stands for The ‘Ensuring Validation & Investigation of Deceptive Narratives on CBRN Events’ Network, with an aim to challenge disinformation and misinformation surrounding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) issues. They are forming a hub of scholarly experts who can challenge false narratives, provide credible sources of information, and promote critical thinking skills around this topic. They will facilitate collaboration between researchers at all levels, as well as policymakers and practitioners. By emphasizing interdisciplinary expertise, the network bridges the divide between theory and practice, and it will build collaborative relationships with programs and institutions dedicated to similar themes. The EVIDENCE Network is actively inviting scholars to contribute to their research and new blog. Find out more about the network.

Opportunities

• The United Nations is hiring a Political Affairs Officer (P-3 level) in New York for its Office for Disarmament Affairs, specifically within the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch. The role involves monitoring political developments related to WMDs, supporting intergovernmental processes, drafting reports, and engaging with international stakeholders. Candidates should have an advanced degree in political science or a related field, at least five years of relevant experience, and fluency in English. Read more.
• The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is hiring a Program Assistant for its Nuclear Policy Program in Washington, DC. This full-time role supports scholars by managing administrative tasks, coordinating events, handling travel and expenses, maintaining databases, and assisting with grant reporting and budgeting. The position also involves helping organize the 2027 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference. Ideal candidates will have a bachelor’s degree, strong organizational and multitasking skills, and experience in logistics or event support. Knowledge of nuclear policy is a plus but not required. Read more.
• The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is hiring a Research Associate for its Nuclear Security program in Washington, DC. This full-time position supports a senior fellow by conducting research, managing events, and handling administrative tasks. Ideal candidates will have a bachelor’s degree in international relations, political science, or a related field, strong research and writing skills, and a demonstrated interest in nuclear policy and global security. Experience with data analysis or foreign policy research is a plus. Read more.
• The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is hiring a Senior Program Officer or Director (title based on experience) for its Global Nuclear Policy Program (GNPP) in Washington, DC. This full-time hybrid role involves leading efforts to reduce nuclear risks, shape U.S. nuclear policy, and promote international cooperation to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons. Responsibilities include policy development, stakeholder engagement, project management, and outreach to Congress and international partners. Candidates should have a bachelor’s degree (master’s preferred) in international relations or a related field, and at least 6-8 years of relevant experience in government, U.S. Congress, the non-profit or private sector, or an international organization. Read more.
• Allied Universal is hiring a Nuclear Security Training Instructor. The Security Training Instructor (STI) implements the regulatory required Training and Qualification program. An instructor leads training for Security Force Members, conducts qualifications, tracks compliance requirements, develops lesson plans and training materials, and provides training administration including record keeping. The STI is responsible for conducting live-fire training as well as drills and exercises using simulated training weapons and maintains all necessary armorer and firearms instructor qualifications. The STI employs a systematic approach to training using the elements of Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation. The STI utilizes the Corrective Action Program to systematically initiate, trend, analyze, and resolve training improvements. This position is responsible for State of Florida required licensing training. Read more.
• Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is accepting applications for a Postdoctoral Research Fellow for the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR). Given LLNL’s mission to support nuclear deterrence, CGSR’s core topics are related to nuclear matters, including strategic deterrence, international stability, arms control, and nonproliferation. The Center also conducts work on other topics related to the changing security environment such as emerging and potentially disruptive technologies, energy issues, and biosecurity. In the position, you will conduct research on politically significant national security topics in line with CGSR research thrust areas, publish papers via CGSR’s in-house publication options and/or external outlets such as peer-reviewed journals, among other responsibilities. Read more.
• The European Commission is seeking a data scientist for nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. The position is for a data scientist in the Data Pole of the Digital Systems for Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Unit, strengthening the Unit’s activities on the side of Digital Transformation with applications in nuclear safeguards, non-proliferation and security analysis. Read more.
• MELE Associates is hiring a Nuclear Security Expert to assist with crisis management, informing public health and safety, and providing data to support attribution in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident. They will plan, coordinate, and manage operations with the Crisis Management team, DOE Watch Officers & NNSA Emergency Response Officers, DOE laboratories, and the interagency partners, among other responsibilities. Read more.
• PGS is seeking applicants for their Research Internship. The intern will primarily focus on researching nuclear security, nuclear energy, and transnational governance issues. Current research projects that interns will support include: exploring the nexus of climate change, nuclear power growth and global security; understanding the growth of nuclear energy in the Middle East and East Asia; tracking the evolution of nuclear security policies and governance structures; using existing voluntary frameworks as a model for nuclear security governance structures; and examining cybersecurity and other potential threats prompted by new technology developments. Read more.
• IB3 Global Solutions is seeking talented nuclear security/nonproliferation professionals, especially around the DC area, to support various programs under some of the national labs. Specific positions are not posted but those interested should apply to IB3’s general application. Read more.