This series—featuring scholars from the Futures Lab, the International Security Program, and across CSIS—explores emerging challenges and opportunities that NATO is likely to confront after its 75th anniversary.
In the future, NATO countries must step up their efforts to protect against Russian-backed extremists as well as Russian hybrid warfare.
Countries in NATO have long-battled against terrorist and other violent extremist organizations. Ethnic terrorism plagued Northern Ireland and Spain for many years, and left-right violence troubled many European states. State-sponsored groups, Hezbollah, and various Palestinian organizations targeted Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Well before 9/11, France saw a series of jihadist terrorist attacks that emerged out of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. In the post-9/11 era, Al Qaeda prioritized attacks on Europe, launching devastating strikes in London, Madrid, and other areas, and after 2014 the Islamic State followed suit with strikes throughout much of Europe. Europe also sees regular anti-immigrant and other white supremacist violence.
NATO itself, however, has played only a limited role in fighting terrorism in Europe. Much of the struggle has involved intelligence cooperation, and that has usually been done bilaterally. In addition, domestic intelligence services have often played the leading role, and these are not integrated with NATO. The alliance did play important roles in fighting jihadist-linked violence in out-of-area operations, however. Wars in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and in Syria against the Islamic State involved NATO forces.
Jihadist and right-wing violence will remain concerning, and intelligence agencies should rightly focus on these dangers. NATO similarly has an important role to play in combating the emerging threat of Russian hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare involves a mix of conventional and unconventional security instruments, ranging from traditional conventional warfare to information warfare and support for terrorism. Before Moscow’s outright invasion of Ukraine in 2024, it was already employing a mix of methods—including assassinations, disinformation, subversion, and support for insurgents—to undermine its adversaries.
If and when the conventional war in Ukraine ends or the fighting dies down, the threat of Russian hybrid warfare may actually increase. Russia’s conventional forces have suffered heavy losses in the Ukraine war, while NATO countries bordering Russia have built up their capabilities. At the same time, Russia sees itself as locked in a long-term existential struggle with NATO and seeks revenge for European and U.S. support to Ukraine. This combination—Russia’s limited conventional power mixed with its desire to punish its enemies—is likely to lead the Kremlin to turn to hybrid war.
Indeed, Russia has long conducted limited hybrid war in Europe and seems to be stepping up its activities. Russia has ties to numerous far-right organizations, some of which are violent, and has provided them with money, limited training, encouragement, and other support. In addition, Russia has long flooded Europe with disinformation, trying to bolster pro-Russian far-right parties, worsen preexisting tensions around contentious issues such as immigration, and undermine institutions, particularly confidence in elections. Most menacingly, Russia has stepped up sabotage in Europe as payback for European support to Ukraine. The New York Times reports that Russia has conducted or attempted arson attacks on a warehouse in the United Kingdom, an Ikea store in Lithuania, and a paint factory in Poland, as well plotting attacks against a U.S. military base in Europe, among other targets.
NATO’s response to Russian hybrid warfare should involve several measures. First, it needs to integrate domestic intelligence services better into the alliance to ensure that their information is widely shared and that the services of member states are cooperating to protect NATO equities. Domestic services will often be the first to detect disinformation, support for extremism, and other Russian-linked activities.
NATO must also prepare for military operations and countering sabotage and terrorism in an environment rife with disinformation. Russia is likely to use a variety of outlets and methods to sow confusion and fear. This may include deepfakes to confuse command and control and to discredit leaders, or disinformation after a terrorist attack to whip up fears and undermine confidence in leadership. This will complicate decisionmaking and potentially generate public suspicion regarding military operations and public security measures.
Improving resilience across NATO is also vital. Some countries, such as Finland, have long invested in ensuring that domestic society is prepared for cyberattacks that lead to electricity outages, rocket strikes, sabotage, and other threats that span the conflict spectrum. Finland, for example, has 50,500 shelters spread out across the country and extensive plans for countering disinformation. Other NATO members, however, are less prepared for hybrid warfare, and their ability and willingness to fight may suffer as a result.
Finally, NATO must improve its options for coercive diplomacy. Currently, Russia’s use of sabotage, disinformation, and support for violent extremists meets with limited pushback from NATO countries. The alliance must develop a suite of options to put pressure on Russia, using its collective power to strengthen its overall influence.
Daniel Byman is a senior fellow with the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
