Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
With the targeted killings of numerous top military leaders, how much control do Iran’s supreme leader and his main regime factions still have over the country?
At this point, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to maintain sufficient control. But in the aftermath of this crisis, whenever that may be, his authority will likely be diminished. He will face particular criticism from the hardliners, especially among the weakened but still powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for his reluctance to weaponize the country’s nuclear program. The IRGC, which reports directly to Khamenei, enforces domestic controls and has had a growing role in projecting regional power through a series of now decimated proxies.
More on:
Khamenei has long supported the development of atomic power as an indication of the country’s modernity and for its economic benefits. But he has repeatedly denied any plans to develop nuclear weapons. He also allowed a previous president, Hassan Rouhani, to negotiate a deal with the United States and other Western powers that froze Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions.
What are the risks involved in targeting Khamenei and other members of Iran’s top leadership?
The country’s ruling elite is too multilayered for regime decapitation, with influential members among high-ranking Shia clergy and the merchant class as well as official government circles. While those generals and scientists who have been killed can be replaced, Khamenei’s assassination would create much confusion within the system and in the country about who is in charge. In such circumstances, President Masoud Pezeshkian would be nominally in charge under the country’s succession laws until a new leader is found. This would at least contribute to the continuity in government functions. Prospects for a coup are unlikely, but the IRGC could see a surge in influence because it holds most of the power in the country.
Despite ideological differences among the governing elite and moderate and reformist groups, political elites of all factions have presented a unified front in face of foreign attacks. However, this may change once the crisis passes and the reformers will certainly offer criticism about how a reckless foreign policy entangled Iran in such a crisis. The challenge for Khamenei, assuming he survives, is likely to come from figures who were always more attracted to the deterrent power of the bomb. The Iranian regime that emerges from this crisis should be expected to ramp up a clandestine program to build nuclear weapons.
What has been the Iranian public response to the Israeli attacks? Are they still under an information blackout?
At this point, the Iranian public—like its leadership—appears traumatized. The country is still in a media blackout today without internet services functioning, leaving around 90 million unable to communicate with the outside world or contact loved ones. There’s limited information on the conflict with Israel, with Iran’s state-run media and radio stations offering limited updates on strikes in the country.
Coming out of this crisis, there will be many who will be angered at a regime that spent billions of dollars on a program that now lies in ruins. Well before the past year’s escalations with Israel, the regime was widely unpopular among the Iranian public. Corruption, mismanagement, and the pursuit of a foreign policy whose costs are more obvious than any benefits has prompted a crisis of legitimacy. Despite the regime’s strict rule and tight grip on journalism, the public has surfaced mass protests against the country’s authoritarian rule. Notably, major protests erupted in 2022 following reports of Iranian-Kurdish Mahsa Amini’s death in the custody of the Iranian “morality police” for protesting hijab rules.
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This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
Iran’s Regime Rattled but Resilient—So Far
After a week of Israeli attacks on its top military leaders and nuclear infrastructure, Iran’s autocratic regime still appears capable of weathering the conflict. But a power struggle looms.
June 20, 2025 2:26 pm (EST)
- Expert Brief
- CFR scholars provide expert analysis and commentary on international issues.
Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
With the targeted killings of numerous top military leaders, how much control do Iran’s supreme leader and his main regime factions still have over the country?
At this point, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to maintain sufficient control. But in the aftermath of this crisis, whenever that may be, his authority will likely be diminished. He will face particular criticism from the hardliners, especially among the weakened but still powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for his reluctance to weaponize the country’s nuclear program. The IRGC, which reports directly to Khamenei, enforces domestic controls and has had a growing role in projecting regional power through a series of now decimated proxies.
More on:
Khamenei has long supported the development of atomic power as an indication of the country’s modernity and for its economic benefits. But he has repeatedly denied any plans to develop nuclear weapons. He also allowed a previous president, Hassan Rouhani, to negotiate a deal with the United States and other Western powers that froze Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions.
What are the risks involved in targeting Khamenei and other members of Iran’s top leadership?
The country’s ruling elite is too multilayered for regime decapitation, with influential members among high-ranking Shia clergy and the merchant class as well as official government circles. While those generals and scientists who have been killed can be replaced, Khamenei’s assassination would create much confusion within the system and in the country about who is in charge. In such circumstances, President Masoud Pezeshkian would be nominally in charge under the country’s succession laws until a new leader is found. This would at least contribute to the continuity in government functions. Prospects for a coup are unlikely, but the IRGC could see a surge in influence because it holds most of the power in the country.
Despite ideological differences among the governing elite and moderate and reformist groups, political elites of all factions have presented a unified front in face of foreign attacks. However, this may change once the crisis passes and the reformers will certainly offer criticism about how a reckless foreign policy entangled Iran in such a crisis. The challenge for Khamenei, assuming he survives, is likely to come from figures who were always more attracted to the deterrent power of the bomb. The Iranian regime that emerges from this crisis should be expected to ramp up a clandestine program to build nuclear weapons.
What has been the Iranian public response to the Israeli attacks? Are they still under an information blackout?
At this point, the Iranian public—like its leadership—appears traumatized. The country is still in a media blackout today without internet services functioning, leaving around 90 million unable to communicate with the outside world or contact loved ones. There’s limited information on the conflict with Israel, with Iran’s state-run media and radio stations offering limited updates on strikes in the country.
Coming out of this crisis, there will be many who will be angered at a regime that spent billions of dollars on a program that now lies in ruins. Well before the past year’s escalations with Israel, the regime was widely unpopular among the Iranian public. Corruption, mismanagement, and the pursuit of a foreign policy whose costs are more obvious than any benefits has prompted a crisis of legitimacy. Despite the regime’s strict rule and tight grip on journalism, the public has surfaced mass protests against the country’s authoritarian rule. Notably, major protests erupted in 2022 following reports of Iranian-Kurdish Mahsa Amini’s death in the custody of the Iranian “morality police” for protesting hijab rules.
More on:
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
