Editor’s Note: A former journalist in Iran who is also fluent in Arabic, Mohammad Mazhari brings a deep understanding of Iran’s regional and security policies and is a regular contributor to Stimson on these issues.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Donald Trump’s re-election brings sweeping international consequences, especially for Iran, which endured four years of his “maximum pressure” policy the last time he was in office. Within Iran, reactions among political figures and analysts are sharply divided: some see the outcome as an opportunity, while others view it as a looming threat to Iran’s foreign policy, governance, and future prospects.
The key question for Iran is whether Trump will intensify the maximum pressure campaign of sanctions as some of his associates have suggested, whether he will seek a new deal with Washington’s sworn enemy in the Middle East or try to do both.
Although Trump has repeatedly stated he has no problem negotiating with the Islamic Republic of Iran, any new agreement would likely require Israeli buy-in and a meaningful regional pullback by Tehran, including reduced support for militant anti-Israel groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Based on public statements from Iranian officials, there appears to be little willingness in Tehran for such negotiations at this time but that could change.
A key impediment to talks is Iranian fury at Trump for ordering the assassination of Iran’s most celebrated general, Qassem Soleimani, in Baghdad in early 2020. The killing followed an increase of tensions between Iran-backed Iraqi militias and Americans in Iraq after Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and reimpose sanctions. This prompted Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to adopt a “no war, no negotiations” policy toward the Trump administration. In 2019, Khamenei reinforced this position by rejecting Japan’s offer to mediate talks with Trump, telling the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “I have no answer for him, nor will I respond to him in the future.”
Though Iran managed to survive the U.S. sanctions campaign until Joe Biden took office in 2021, there was little meaningful change in the structure of American sanctions during the Biden administration. However, U.S. critics of Biden accused him of loosening sanctions enforcement, allowing Iranian oil exports – primarily to China – to recover sufficiently to keep the Islamic Republic’s elite afloat.
At the same time, hardline members of Iran’s parliament ratified a bill titled the “Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Iranian Nation’s Interests,” aiming to obstruct then-President Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to revive the JCPOA or negotiate a revised version of the deal. This was hardly the first instance of a hardline faction in Iran shaping foreign policy to serve a domestic agenda—namely, undermining the rival ruling group.
This tension between pragmatists and radicals goes back to the hostage crisis that followed the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when students supported by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s clerical ruler, seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days. The crisis, which led Iran’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Barzagan to resign, would go on to define a new era in Iran’s foreign policy that still reverberates today.
Iran continues to take hostages – primarily Iranian dual nationals – and to violate the sanctity of foreign embassies. In 2011, the British Embassy in Tehran was stormed by demonstrators, leading to the temporary closure of the facility. In 2016, protesters gathered at the Saudi Embassy in Tehran to denounce the execution of a prominent Saudi Shi’ite Muslim cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Some broke into the compound, starting fires, which prompted Riyadh to sever diplomatic relations – ties that were only restored in 2023.
Under Iran’s complicated political system, presidents are elected every four years but the country’s Supreme Leader – first Khomeini and since, 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – has the final say on foreign and security decisions. The pattern in Iran has been that governments led by presidents not closely aligned with Khomeini or Khamenei have faced serious foreign policy crises. These administrations, primarily pro-Western in outlook, have ranged from Bazargan’s technocratic cabinet to Rouhani’s government. Even hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Rouhani’s predecessor, clashed during his second term with the supreme leader over control of the country’s foreign policy.
With a second term Trump in a position of even greater power than in 2016, bolstered by a more decisive electoral victory, a Republican majority in the Senate, and likely control of the House of Representatives—the decision-making hierarchy on the Iranian side remains uncertain. Khamenei, even older than Trump at 85, appears to have reluctantly signed off on allowing reformist Masoud Pezeshkian to run for president after the death of his hardline predecessor in a helicopter crash. Pezeshkian’s administration is encircled by numerous revolutionary bodies controlled by Khamenei. Although Khamenei has initially shown support for Pezeshkian, the situation can shift quickly, particularly with Pezeshkian’s hardliner rivals lying in wait.
During the 2024 elections, one candidate disclosed that in 2016, a year after the JCPOA was implemented, former nuclear negotiator and hardliner Saeed Jalili blocked the acceptance of recommendations for Iran to comply with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing regulations required by the Financial Action Task Force, a global banking watchdog. Compliance with FATF rules was and remains a prerequisite for Iranian banks to be allowed to do business with foreign financial institutions. According to Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a candidate with an extensive background in security and a former minister of justice, Jalili refused to implement the FATF recommendations to undermine the Rouhani administration that had negotiated the JCPOA.
Any move by Pezeshkian to negotiate with the U.S. could easily become a political weapon for his rivals, who might use Soleimani’s assassination as a reason to thwart de-escalation with the president who ordered the general’s killing.
In the past and under extreme duress, Iran has negotiated with mortal adversaries, including Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who started and waged an eight-year war on Iran from 1980-88. However, much depends on which government leads the negotiations, who represents Iran, how much pressure Iran can withstand, and whether there is full endorsement from the Supreme Leader.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021. Twitter/X: @epicoria
Editor’s Note: A former journalist in Iran who is also fluent in Arabic, Mohammad Mazhari brings a deep understanding of Iran’s regional and security policies and is a regular contributor to Stimson on these issues.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Donald Trump’s re-election brings sweeping international consequences, especially for Iran, which endured four years of his “maximum pressure” policy the last time he was in office. Within Iran, reactions among political figures and analysts are sharply divided: some see the outcome as an opportunity, while others view it as a looming threat to Iran’s foreign policy, governance, and future prospects.
The key question for Iran is whether Trump will intensify the maximum pressure campaign of sanctions as some of his associates have suggested, whether he will seek a new deal with Washington’s sworn enemy in the Middle East or try to do both.
Although Trump has repeatedly stated he has no problem negotiating with the Islamic Republic of Iran, any new agreement would likely require Israeli buy-in and a meaningful regional pullback by Tehran, including reduced support for militant anti-Israel groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Based on public statements from Iranian officials, there appears to be little willingness in Tehran for such negotiations at this time but that could change.
A key impediment to talks is Iranian fury at Trump for ordering the assassination of Iran’s most celebrated general, Qassem Soleimani, in Baghdad in early 2020. The killing followed an increase of tensions between Iran-backed Iraqi militias and Americans in Iraq after Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and reimpose sanctions. This prompted Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to adopt a “no war, no negotiations” policy toward the Trump administration. In 2019, Khamenei reinforced this position by rejecting Japan’s offer to mediate talks with Trump, telling the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “I have no answer for him, nor will I respond to him in the future.”
Though Iran managed to survive the U.S. sanctions campaign until Joe Biden took office in 2021, there was little meaningful change in the structure of American sanctions during the Biden administration. However, U.S. critics of Biden accused him of loosening sanctions enforcement, allowing Iranian oil exports – primarily to China – to recover sufficiently to keep the Islamic Republic’s elite afloat.
At the same time, hardline members of Iran’s parliament ratified a bill titled the “Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Iranian Nation’s Interests,” aiming to obstruct then-President Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to revive the JCPOA or negotiate a revised version of the deal. This was hardly the first instance of a hardline faction in Iran shaping foreign policy to serve a domestic agenda—namely, undermining the rival ruling group.
This tension between pragmatists and radicals goes back to the hostage crisis that followed the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when students supported by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s clerical ruler, seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days. The crisis, which led Iran’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Barzagan to resign, would go on to define a new era in Iran’s foreign policy that still reverberates today.
Iran continues to take hostages – primarily Iranian dual nationals – and to violate the sanctity of foreign embassies. In 2011, the British Embassy in Tehran was stormed by demonstrators, leading to the temporary closure of the facility. In 2016, protesters gathered at the Saudi Embassy in Tehran to denounce the execution of a prominent Saudi Shi’ite Muslim cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Some broke into the compound, starting fires, which prompted Riyadh to sever diplomatic relations – ties that were only restored in 2023.
Under Iran’s complicated political system, presidents are elected every four years but the country’s Supreme Leader – first Khomeini and since, 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – has the final say on foreign and security decisions. The pattern in Iran has been that governments led by presidents not closely aligned with Khomeini or Khamenei have faced serious foreign policy crises. These administrations, primarily pro-Western in outlook, have ranged from Bazargan’s technocratic cabinet to Rouhani’s government. Even hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Rouhani’s predecessor, clashed during his second term with the supreme leader over control of the country’s foreign policy.
With a second term Trump in a position of even greater power than in 2016, bolstered by a more decisive electoral victory, a Republican majority in the Senate, and likely control of the House of Representatives—the decision-making hierarchy on the Iranian side remains uncertain. Khamenei, even older than Trump at 85, appears to have reluctantly signed off on allowing reformist Masoud Pezeshkian to run for president after the death of his hardline predecessor in a helicopter crash. Pezeshkian’s administration is encircled by numerous revolutionary bodies controlled by Khamenei. Although Khamenei has initially shown support for Pezeshkian, the situation can shift quickly, particularly with Pezeshkian’s hardliner rivals lying in wait.
During the 2024 elections, one candidate disclosed that in 2016, a year after the JCPOA was implemented, former nuclear negotiator and hardliner Saeed Jalili blocked the acceptance of recommendations for Iran to comply with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing regulations required by the Financial Action Task Force, a global banking watchdog. Compliance with FATF rules was and remains a prerequisite for Iranian banks to be allowed to do business with foreign financial institutions. According to Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a candidate with an extensive background in security and a former minister of justice, Jalili refused to implement the FATF recommendations to undermine the Rouhani administration that had negotiated the JCPOA.
Any move by Pezeshkian to negotiate with the U.S. could easily become a political weapon for his rivals, who might use Soleimani’s assassination as a reason to thwart de-escalation with the president who ordered the general’s killing.
In the past and under extreme duress, Iran has negotiated with mortal adversaries, including Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who started and waged an eight-year war on Iran from 1980-88. However, much depends on which government leads the negotiations, who represents Iran, how much pressure Iran can withstand, and whether there is full endorsement from the Supreme Leader.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021. Twitter/X: @epicoria
