Following last week’s terrorist attacks in the disputed Kashmir region, India and Pakistan have taken escalatory moves that have placed the two nuclear-armed powers on the verge of conflict. The two exchanged cross border fire, expelled diplomatic personnel, closed land border crossings, conducted military drills, and suspended trade. On Wednesday, April 30, a top Pakistani military official stated he believed New Delhi would carry out strikes within the next 24–36 hours.
This signaling closely resembles steps taken in 2019, when a terrorist attack by a Pakistan-based Islamist group led India to launch an air strike that stopped short of sparking a major conflict. As a result, some believe this episode will similarly deescalate following a token Indian strike. Such thinking is overly optimistic; the situation facing India and Pakistan today is far different than the one six years ago and the odds of conflict are now higher.
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For starters, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made the transformation and stabilization of Kashmir a central pillar of his legacy. After the 2019 attacks, which were seen as a major security failure and a stain on his leadership, Modi militarized Kashmir and revoked many of the rights of those who lived in the territories. His aggressive posture towards Pakistan, and the relative peace enjoyed in the last five years, has given him a political boost domestically. Therefore, Modi will likely feel pressure to demonstrate that he is standing up to Pakistan. These dynamics may compel him to pursue a more aggressive strategy.
This logic is already reflected in the bold actions Modi has taken over the past week that he did not take in 2019. For instance, he withdrew from a 1960 treaty that obligates India to let water from its rivers flow to Pakistan, which Islamabad relies on to support its agriculture-based economy. In response, Pakistani officials have accused India of water terrorism and made pleas to the Hague. New Delhi’s military brass has also doubled down on linking the terrorist attacks to Pakistan without presenting evidence supporting this claim. India’s botched response to the 2019 terrorist attacks may be forcing Modi’s hand; Modi has pointed to Pakistan’s history of supporting terrorism as de facto evidence.
Adding to this already unstable climate are two broader developments in India-Pakistan relations. First, security asymmetries in India-administered Kashmir and Pakistan-administered Kashmir heighten the likelihood of violence. Direct rule by India has resulted in less violence but a highly militarized zone. On the flip side, Pakistan’s portion of Kashmir is largely ungoverned. Second, several factors have led to the near total elimination of military and diplomatic backchannels between the two countries. With Pakistan’s closer embrace of China and the deterioration of its relations with the United States, few avenues for discreet communication exist, raising the chance of miscalculation.
Broader geopolitical trends are also undermining potential guardrails that have previously succeeded in preventing war. Since the 2020 Ladakh Crisis, the deadliest Sino-Indian military clash since the 1960s, Indian military policy has focused on competition with China along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC). In fact, Modi pursued detente with Pakistan shortly after the crisis because India considered China a more urgent border challenge. In the years since this strategic shift, New Delhi has accelerated military modernization to account for Beijing’s military advantages and to prepare for a potential war with China. And while the two recently agreed to pull troops back from the disputed border, the LAC remains heavily militarized.
Against this backdrop, last week’s terrorist attack provides New Delhi an opportunity to signal to Beijing just how far along its military modernization is and whether or not it can wage a two-front war.
More on:
Decisive military action may also poke holes in China-Pakistan cooperation. In the last five years, Islamabad has inked several arms transfer agreements with Beijing. The Pakistan Armed Forces are now heavily reliant on PLA-made platforms across all three services, and the two conduct regular military exercises and exchanges. While Pakistan was a flagship partner of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has since grown frustrated by Pakistan’s inability to prevent terrorist attacks on Chinese projects and protect its workers. India, therefore, may see an interest in damaging Chinese military kit and demonstrating to Beijing that Islamabad is a reckless ally and a liability.
Like China, the United States as a variable in India-Pakistan dynamics has evolved since 2019. For decades, Washington and Islamabad cooperated on counterterrorism and enjoyed strong security relations. However, since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, military engagement between the United States and Pakistan has rapidly deteriorated. Still, President Trump has floated the idea of revitalized security cooperation and is trying to strike a mineral reserves investment deal. Pakistani officials even asked the Trump administration to mediate the dispute shortly after the terrorist attack.
Yet despite Trump’s ostensible desire for a “responsible solution,” the United States may choose not to mediate the conflict and instead give India a free hand to retaliate. For starters, several members of the Trump administration have expressed strong support for India, including Vice President JD Vance and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who both spoke of American support of India’s fight against terrorism. As the United States seeks to build a stronger relationship with India, it may see little upside in mediating this conflict.
Can Trump pull Modi from the brink?
The Trump administration should balance its interest in bolstering U.S.-India relations with its interest in defusing a potential conflict. It has to remain clear-eyed that Modi will respond to the terrorist attack: the question is how he does so. Instead of using muscular kinetic action and modernized platforms, which can trigger a wider war and risk Chinese retaliation, the Trump administration should encourage a response that keeps the conflict contained. This would look like a series of calibrated strikes against military targets in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Washington can help contain limited retaliation by providing intelligence and other assistance to prevent spillover.
The United States should simultaneously signal to India its commitment to finalizing a comprehensive economic and trade deal and its belief that a wider India-Pakistan war would undermine such progress. The United States can also play the Pakistan angle, using this opportunity to rebuild a sullied relationship with a former friend and perhaps present itself as an alternative to China. Washington should condition its floated minerals deal with Islamabad on curtailing any escalatory response to a potential Indian military strike. The United States should also work with Pakistan’s military leadership to resurrect backchannels absent since the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Cooler heads may still prevail. The presence of nuclear weapons could make New Delhi and Islamabad act more cautiously. The United States could convince India to step back from the edge and instead focus on bolstering U.S.-India relations and addressing the shared China threat. China may also feel it does not need the distraction of an India-Pakistan conflict, which could spill over to the disputed LAC. But for now, India and Pakistan are taking all the steps indicative of military escalation.
India and Pakistan: On the Brink of Conflict Over Kashmir
Following a terrorist attack in Kashmir, India and Pakistan are heading toward a conflict, with few signs of de-escalation.
April 30, 2025 10:36 pm (EST)
- Post
- Blog posts represent the views of CFR fellows and staff and not those of CFR, which takes no institutional positions.
Following last week’s terrorist attacks in the disputed Kashmir region, India and Pakistan have taken escalatory moves that have placed the two nuclear-armed powers on the verge of conflict. The two exchanged cross border fire, expelled diplomatic personnel, closed land border crossings, conducted military drills, and suspended trade. On Wednesday, April 30, a top Pakistani military official stated he believed New Delhi would carry out strikes within the next 24–36 hours.
This signaling closely resembles steps taken in 2019, when a terrorist attack by a Pakistan-based Islamist group led India to launch an air strike that stopped short of sparking a major conflict. As a result, some believe this episode will similarly deescalate following a token Indian strike. Such thinking is overly optimistic; the situation facing India and Pakistan today is far different than the one six years ago and the odds of conflict are now higher.
More on:
For starters, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made the transformation and stabilization of Kashmir a central pillar of his legacy. After the 2019 attacks, which were seen as a major security failure and a stain on his leadership, Modi militarized Kashmir and revoked many of the rights of those who lived in the territories. His aggressive posture towards Pakistan, and the relative peace enjoyed in the last five years, has given him a political boost domestically. Therefore, Modi will likely feel pressure to demonstrate that he is standing up to Pakistan. These dynamics may compel him to pursue a more aggressive strategy.
This logic is already reflected in the bold actions Modi has taken over the past week that he did not take in 2019. For instance, he withdrew from a 1960 treaty that obligates India to let water from its rivers flow to Pakistan, which Islamabad relies on to support its agriculture-based economy. In response, Pakistani officials have accused India of water terrorism and made pleas to the Hague. New Delhi’s military brass has also doubled down on linking the terrorist attacks to Pakistan without presenting evidence supporting this claim. India’s botched response to the 2019 terrorist attacks may be forcing Modi’s hand; Modi has pointed to Pakistan’s history of supporting terrorism as de facto evidence.
Adding to this already unstable climate are two broader developments in India-Pakistan relations. First, security asymmetries in India-administered Kashmir and Pakistan-administered Kashmir heighten the likelihood of violence. Direct rule by India has resulted in less violence but a highly militarized zone. On the flip side, Pakistan’s portion of Kashmir is largely ungoverned. Second, several factors have led to the near total elimination of military and diplomatic backchannels between the two countries. With Pakistan’s closer embrace of China and the deterioration of its relations with the United States, few avenues for discreet communication exist, raising the chance of miscalculation.
Broader geopolitical trends are also undermining potential guardrails that have previously succeeded in preventing war. Since the 2020 Ladakh Crisis, the deadliest Sino-Indian military clash since the 1960s, Indian military policy has focused on competition with China along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC). In fact, Modi pursued detente with Pakistan shortly after the crisis because India considered China a more urgent border challenge. In the years since this strategic shift, New Delhi has accelerated military modernization to account for Beijing’s military advantages and to prepare for a potential war with China. And while the two recently agreed to pull troops back from the disputed border, the LAC remains heavily militarized.
Against this backdrop, last week’s terrorist attack provides New Delhi an opportunity to signal to Beijing just how far along its military modernization is and whether or not it can wage a two-front war.
More on:
Decisive military action may also poke holes in China-Pakistan cooperation. In the last five years, Islamabad has inked several arms transfer agreements with Beijing. The Pakistan Armed Forces are now heavily reliant on PLA-made platforms across all three services, and the two conduct regular military exercises and exchanges. While Pakistan was a flagship partner of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has since grown frustrated by Pakistan’s inability to prevent terrorist attacks on Chinese projects and protect its workers. India, therefore, may see an interest in damaging Chinese military kit and demonstrating to Beijing that Islamabad is a reckless ally and a liability.
Like China, the United States as a variable in India-Pakistan dynamics has evolved since 2019. For decades, Washington and Islamabad cooperated on counterterrorism and enjoyed strong security relations. However, since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, military engagement between the United States and Pakistan has rapidly deteriorated. Still, President Trump has floated the idea of revitalized security cooperation and is trying to strike a mineral reserves investment deal. Pakistani officials even asked the Trump administration to mediate the dispute shortly after the terrorist attack.
Yet despite Trump’s ostensible desire for a “responsible solution,” the United States may choose not to mediate the conflict and instead give India a free hand to retaliate. For starters, several members of the Trump administration have expressed strong support for India, including Vice President JD Vance and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who both spoke of American support of India’s fight against terrorism. As the United States seeks to build a stronger relationship with India, it may see little upside in mediating this conflict.
Can Trump pull Modi from the brink?
The Trump administration should balance its interest in bolstering U.S.-India relations with its interest in defusing a potential conflict. It has to remain clear-eyed that Modi will respond to the terrorist attack: the question is how he does so. Instead of using muscular kinetic action and modernized platforms, which can trigger a wider war and risk Chinese retaliation, the Trump administration should encourage a response that keeps the conflict contained. This would look like a series of calibrated strikes against military targets in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Washington can help contain limited retaliation by providing intelligence and other assistance to prevent spillover.
The United States should simultaneously signal to India its commitment to finalizing a comprehensive economic and trade deal and its belief that a wider India-Pakistan war would undermine such progress. The United States can also play the Pakistan angle, using this opportunity to rebuild a sullied relationship with a former friend and perhaps present itself as an alternative to China. Washington should condition its floated minerals deal with Islamabad on curtailing any escalatory response to a potential Indian military strike. The United States should also work with Pakistan’s military leadership to resurrect backchannels absent since the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Cooler heads may still prevail. The presence of nuclear weapons could make New Delhi and Islamabad act more cautiously. The United States could convince India to step back from the edge and instead focus on bolstering U.S.-India relations and addressing the shared China threat. China may also feel it does not need the distraction of an India-Pakistan conflict, which could spill over to the disputed LAC. But for now, India and Pakistan are taking all the steps indicative of military escalation.
