Two U.S. designated terrorist groups manned by thousands of Iran-paid Afghans and Pakistanis have been aided by the Iraqi government with material support since the fall of the Assad regime in December.
When the Assad regime imploded in December 2024, one of the key unanswered questions was what happened to the large numbers of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-controlled Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters who retreated from Syria in Iraq. These fighters – brigaded under the Liwa Fatamiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun militias – are both U.S-designated terrorist organizations; Liwa Zainabiyoun is also banned in Pakistan, where the group recruits its fighters.
In December, some Liwa Fatamiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun militias entered Iraq via al-Qaim, an area controlled by Qassem Muslih, the commander of the Iraqi government-funded Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 13th brigade (Liwa al-Tafuf). Muslih leads the Anbar-based PMF units, taking orders from U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, Kataib Hezbollah’s (KH’s) Jazira Operations Command. Liwa Fatamiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun troops were initially hosted by the PMF and KH commands in complexes in al-Qaim that have historically been used as transshipment hubs for Iranian military shipments and ballistic missiles transiting Iraq on their way to Syria and Lebanon.
Other reports have emerged that Liwa Fatamiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun militias are also present in Camp Ashraf (also known as named the Martyr Abu Munthadher al-Muhammadawi Camp) in Diyala governorate. This PMF base is formally under the control of the Iraqi government but it actually run by the Iran-formed Badr Organization, and was formerly used by Saddam Hussein to house the Mujaheddin-e Khalq organization (MeK). Ashraf was reportedly bombed by Israel in 2019 due to the presence of Iranian missile and drone systems at the base.
Background on Liwa Fatamiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun
Liwa Fatamiyoun consists of mainly Hazara Shia fighters recruited from a large pool of Afghan migrant and refugee population in Iran. The fighters were armed, trained, and funded by the IRGC-Qods Force then deployed in 2013 to support the now toppled Assad government. Liwa Fatamiyoun also oversaw critical supply chain routes for weapons, drones, missile parts, and other technology flowing from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Liwa Fatamiyoun was estimated to have had 5,000 to 10,000 fighters in Syria at the time of Assad’s fall.
Liwa Zainabiyoun, composed of Pakistani Shia fighters organized to protect Sayyeda Zainab shrine in central Damascus and support the Assad regime’s operations in Latakia, Aleppo, and Damascus. Liwa Zainabiyoun comprised 2,500 to 4,000 fighters.
Is Iraq’s government providing material support to terrorists?
The U.S. government might well ask why Iraq, a U.S. economic partner and aid recipient, is providing material support to terrorist groups by providing them with housing and life support, requiring the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iraq’s government.
Also, the U.S. might ask who approved their entry into Iraq and their remaining in Iraq. Constitutionally, only Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, has the legitimate authority to give valid consent (meaning, inter alia, that the consent must be freely given and actually expressed).
Either Sudani gave terrorists permission to enter and stay in Iraq, or these steps were taken without his permission, underlining how little control he has of the security environment and cross-border movements dictated by Iran-backed militias. The U.S. might ask: which is it?
If Iraq has elected to formally host Liwa Fatamiyoun and Liwa Zainabiyoun, then their presence also either violates the Iraq’s constitutional prohibition on non-state militias, or it represents Iraqi government provision of consent to Iran to base its “troops” on Iraqi soil. Again, the U.S. government might ask which of these is correct?
