The United States is preparing for a confrontation with China even as U.S. officials meet with their counterparts for the 2025 NATO Summit. NATO members can, and should, play an important role in the event of a crisis over Taiwan, in the Philippines, or other confrontations with China. NATO members’ roles are less about fighting side-by-side with the United States, though signaling their commitment to doing so is important, and more about helping the United States manage other security commitments around the world to free up U.S. forces to concentrate on Asia.
Getting Europe more involved in Asian security will be difficult. European states trade extensively with China—China remains the European Union’s second largest trade partner (after the United States), with an average daily trade of $1.5 billion. Geography also matters: The United States is a Pacific as well as Atlantic power, while European states focus more on their Russian neighbor, not far-away China. Even if European states wanted to play a greater role, their military capabilities are limited. There are doubts about how much the continent can contribute to Ukraine’s defense and that of post-war Europe, a far more straightforward task than projecting power halfway across the world to Taiwan, the South China Sea, or other areas.
NATO’s policy in Asia is further complicated by the lack of member-state unity in their individual relationships with China, ranging from boasting of close economic ties (Hungary) to those concerned with Beijing’s influence (United Kingdom). The first major NATO statement addressing China was released in December 2019 and stated that the country presented “both opportunities and challenges.” However, following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, and China’s support for the former, NATO has become more willing to critique China, as demonstrated during the 2024 NATO Summit and in the NATO 2030 agenda.
This shift toward critical language on China comes as NATO increases its partnerships with the IP4 (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea). Japan is at the center of this strategy, with Tokyo first participating in a NATO ministerial meeting in 2020 and frequently attending meetings since 2022.
If a conflict with China breaks out, the United States will want the support of its NATO allies. China and Russia hold a “no limits” partnership and aid one another in conflicts that do not directly impact each other, making it critical for the United States to have the support of allies.
Although their own capabilities do not offer much significant help militarily in Asia, European states can play several important roles in various contingencies involving China. Before a conflict breaks out, Europe can join with the United States to conduct freedom of navigation operations and military exercises in the Indo-Pacific, signaling their presence and support for the United States. A symbolic military role matters politically even if it is militarily negligible. If a UK frigate is fired on or deployed German forces are killed, these countries would then be implicated in any war, thus increasing the risk to China—and bolstering deterrence.
Second, although European states currently have weak military capabilities relative to their past strengths, their potential is considerable given their large economies and populations. The Russia-Ukraine war has reinvigorated NATO members, with several states continuing to increase their defense spending. European states have provided Ukraine with air defense systems, tanks, and cruise missiles. In addition, they have trained over 70,000 Ukrainian troops. A redirection of U.S. support to other conflicts would still leave gaps, largely in artillery rounds, air defense systems against ballistic missiles, and intelligence. Washington should encourage further NATO production and innovation to prepare for a scenario where the United States must quickly redirect its military resources.
Third, European states can provide arms to mutual allies and partners in Asia, join in economic sanctions, and otherwise bolster the United States and its Asian allies and weaken China. The conflicts in Ukraine and Israel have at times significantly depleted U.S. stockpiles, raising concerns about the United States’ ability to respond to a potential conflict in Asia. European states could use their defense industrial bases to provide additional weapons and free up U.S. systems from their own arsenals if necessary. The United States and European Union have coordinated sanctions against Russia and China in the past, and preparation for further steps—and communicating these in general terms to China to bolster deterrence—is necessary.
Fourth, the presence of allies bolsters political support in the United States for intervention, enabling administrations to sustain support for operations in Asia through the inevitable ups and downs of public opinion.
In addition to assisting directly against China, European states can also take on more of the burden in the Middle East and especially within Europe. This might include further stepping up military production to aid Ukraine as the United States sends its limited stockpiles to the Pacific, working more with Gulf states to deter Iran, and otherwise using European forces to free up U.S. forces. For operations in the Middle East, European states would need to expand basing and access in the region, and the United States should encourage Gulf states and other regional partners to cooperate more with Europe.
Whichever role Europe plays, however, affects which capabilities they should build—and the United States should make its expectations crystal clear. Calls for “doing more” offer little guidance. Instead, the United States should identify which roles are vital for Europe to take on and bring them into the broader planning process. Europe can do much in terms of signaling political and materiel support and assisting in other spheres to allow the United States to turn its attention to Asia. The 2025 NATO Summit should be the starting point for such discussions.
Iselin Brady is an intern with the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at CSIS.
