As China assesses its role in the Myanmar conflict, cyber scam centers in Myanmar and across Southeast Asia have become a central concern for Chinese officials. These centers use human trafficking along the China-Myanmar and Thailand-Myanmar borders to secure forced labor, targeting victims in Asia, the United States, and Europe. They have emerged as a complicating factor for China in its relations with Myanmar. In the last two months, Beijing has prioritized cyber scam centers in discussions between Chinese and Burmese officials, as well as stepped up cooperation with Thailand on cross-border security where major scam compounds operate. China had previously mentioned cyber scam centers in policy conversations with Myanmar, but they only recently became a focal point, often falling below larger issues like the upcoming 2025 elections and Chinese-mediated peace talks.
In a developing trend between China and Myanmar, Beijing is increasingly using its political clout to navigate outcomes in Myanmar that protect its interests. Last year, Beijing adopted a more pro-junta stance, not out of confidence in Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s leader but to avoid a central government collapse. China perceives the fall of Lashio as one of the most considerable blows to junta control, as well as a direct threat to China’s national security on their shared border. Beijing engaged diplomatically with Myanmar officials to maintain its leverage, brokered ceasefire talks in Kunming that could include the return of Lashio, and endorsed the election. Unsatisfied with the junta’s capabilities, China has shifted focus to preventing the Myanmar military’s collapse. The recent trafficking of Chinese citizens has renewed doubts about the junta’s ability to address transnational crime and protect Chinese interests.
Beijing placed a renewed emphasis on cyber scam centers at the onset of Operation 1027. Some experts would argue that China greenlit the October 2023 offensive because of the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s (3BA) commitment to cracking down on the scam centers along the China-Myanmar border in Shan State, an issue the Burmese Border Guard Forces turned a blind eye to, which strained bilateral relations. Since the 3BA’s successful offensive, disruptions to the scam centers have forced operations to shift south, now predominately operating along the Thai-Myanmar border. This has moved the problem away from China’s border, but it has not stopped the trafficking of Chinese citizens.
The proliferation of these scam centers—and growing public concern over the impact on Chinese citizens—has forced China to address the issue, resulting in initiatives with Thailand and Myanmar to attempt to shutter the operations.
The Case that Broke the Camel’s Back: Wang Xing
The abduction case of Chinese actor Wang Xing caused a public stir on Chinese social media like WeChat and Weibo over cyber scam compounds in Southeast Asia and their impact on Chinese citizens. Wang Xing reportedly went missing on January 3, 2025, in Mae Sot, lured by cyber scam operators under the false pretense of a film audition. Upon his arrival in Thailand, he was kidnapped and transported to a scam compound across the Myanmar border in Myawaddy. On January 7, Thai authorities located Wang after his family reported him missing.
Following Wang Xing’s abduction and rescue, Chinese netizens turned to social media to question China’s role in these scam compounds, asking “why gangs were mostly Chinese” and questioning whether there is systematic support from the Chinese bureaucracy behind these scam compounds, specifically in Belt and Road projects.
One Weibo user launched the “星星回家计划” (Stars Go Home Plan), a public spreadsheet tracking Chinese victims of scam compounds. It was quickly banned on Weibo the following day. By January 11, the X (formerly Twitter) account of Li Ying, known for tracking censorship and protests in China, transferred the spreadsheet to Google Docs, where it remains accessible. To date, it includes over 1500 victims and their families impacted by these centers. Li claims that out of the 1530 cases listed, the Chinese police are reportedly unwilling to investigate 41.7% of them. Mounting public pressure is pushing Chinese officials to take more decisive action against these centers.
A High-Level Call to Crack Down
In early 2025, Chinese, Thai, and Burmese officials heavily focused on cyber scam centers. Leadership from China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are actively engaging with officials from Myanmar and Thailand to deal with the scam centers.
In January, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with ASEAN leaders, calling for them to address the scam problem that continues to “threaten and harm” Chinese citizens and people in other countries. On February 6, Xi Jinping praised Thai Foreign Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra for Thailand’s efforts in combatting the centers, including cutting power to five scam hubs, including Myawaddy. These two high-level statements, each shedding light on the cyber scam centers, reflect the importance of this issue for China. January meetings also included discussions between the Thai and Myanmar Ambassadors to China, with Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs Liu Jinsong, placing the responsibility on them to never let “these criminals go unpunished.”
In addition to rhetorical pressure, there is also action. China’s Deputy Minister of MPS, Liu Zhongyi, has been meeting with Thai and Burmese representatives to collaborate on eradicating the scam operations. On January 27, Liu led a delegation to Bangkok, proposing and later agreeing to a joint coordination center between China and Thailand to fight scam centers. Liu reported that there are 36 Chinese gangs operating scam centers that use 100,000 people in forced labor. On February 20, China and Thailand coordinated the return of 200 cyber scam suspects back to China, which is the largest repatriation between the two countries to date. This flight will likely be the first of many, as thousands of suspects sit in limbo waiting for deportation to China from Thailand, an issue China, Myanmar, and Thailand agreed to further address on February 28 as more citizens are rescued from cyber dens. In March, coordination between Thailand and China persisted to repatriate suspects.
Conclusion
The recent spotlight on cyber scam centers, the transnational criminal networks that run them, and their impact on Chinese nationals has prompted China to address the issue proactively. In the past two months, China has used its diplomatic clout to address cyber scam centers operating in Myanmar, viewing them as a significant threat to regional security and as a source of domestic concern as awareness of the issue grows in China. With the cooperation of Thailand and Myanmar, China has used diplomatic pressure, collaborative law enforcement efforts, and the repatriation of criminal suspects to demonstrate its commitment to eradicating these centers. Although progress has been made, challenges persist due to the complex political and military situation in Myanmar that enables the ongoing presence of transnational crime networks. As cross-border trafficking continues, especially in areas beyond the junta’s control, fighting cyber scam centers will remain an ongoing battle. Cases of cyber scamming have moved well beyond the borders of Southeast Asia to impact victims in the U.S. and Europe. The centers add another layer of complexity in bringing order to Myanmar and reveal the Myanmar junta’s incapability or unwillingness to address the issue, leaving China little choice but to engineer its own solutions to promote regional stability and protect its interests.
For more from the Stimson Center on this issue, check out our Myanmar Project and Countering Cyber Scam Operations Project, contributing to Stimson’s research on Southeast Asia.
As China assesses its role in the Myanmar conflict, cyber scam centers in Myanmar and across Southeast Asia have become a central concern for Chinese officials. These centers use human trafficking along the China-Myanmar and Thailand-Myanmar borders to secure forced labor, targeting victims in Asia, the United States, and Europe. They have emerged as a complicating factor for China in its relations with Myanmar. In the last two months, Beijing has prioritized cyber scam centers in discussions between Chinese and Burmese officials, as well as stepped up cooperation with Thailand on cross-border security where major scam compounds operate. China had previously mentioned cyber scam centers in policy conversations with Myanmar, but they only recently became a focal point, often falling below larger issues like the upcoming 2025 elections and Chinese-mediated peace talks.
In a developing trend between China and Myanmar, Beijing is increasingly using its political clout to navigate outcomes in Myanmar that protect its interests. Last year, Beijing adopted a more pro-junta stance, not out of confidence in Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s leader but to avoid a central government collapse. China perceives the fall of Lashio as one of the most considerable blows to junta control, as well as a direct threat to China’s national security on their shared border. Beijing engaged diplomatically with Myanmar officials to maintain its leverage, brokered ceasefire talks in Kunming that could include the return of Lashio, and endorsed the election. Unsatisfied with the junta’s capabilities, China has shifted focus to preventing the Myanmar military’s collapse. The recent trafficking of Chinese citizens has renewed doubts about the junta’s ability to address transnational crime and protect Chinese interests.
Beijing placed a renewed emphasis on cyber scam centers at the onset of Operation 1027. Some experts would argue that China greenlit the October 2023 offensive because of the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s (3BA) commitment to cracking down on the scam centers along the China-Myanmar border in Shan State, an issue the Burmese Border Guard Forces turned a blind eye to, which strained bilateral relations. Since the 3BA’s successful offensive, disruptions to the scam centers have forced operations to shift south, now predominately operating along the Thai-Myanmar border. This has moved the problem away from China’s border, but it has not stopped the trafficking of Chinese citizens.
The proliferation of these scam centers—and growing public concern over the impact on Chinese citizens—has forced China to address the issue, resulting in initiatives with Thailand and Myanmar to attempt to shutter the operations.
The Case that Broke the Camel’s Back: Wang Xing
The abduction case of Chinese actor Wang Xing caused a public stir on Chinese social media like WeChat and Weibo over cyber scam compounds in Southeast Asia and their impact on Chinese citizens. Wang Xing reportedly went missing on January 3, 2025, in Mae Sot, lured by cyber scam operators under the false pretense of a film audition. Upon his arrival in Thailand, he was kidnapped and transported to a scam compound across the Myanmar border in Myawaddy. On January 7, Thai authorities located Wang after his family reported him missing.
Following Wang Xing’s abduction and rescue, Chinese netizens turned to social media to question China’s role in these scam compounds, asking “why gangs were mostly Chinese” and questioning whether there is systematic support from the Chinese bureaucracy behind these scam compounds, specifically in Belt and Road projects.
One Weibo user launched the “星星回家计划” (Stars Go Home Plan), a public spreadsheet tracking Chinese victims of scam compounds. It was quickly banned on Weibo the following day. By January 11, the X (formerly Twitter) account of Li Ying, known for tracking censorship and protests in China, transferred the spreadsheet to Google Docs, where it remains accessible. To date, it includes over 1500 victims and their families impacted by these centers. Li claims that out of the 1530 cases listed, the Chinese police are reportedly unwilling to investigate 41.7% of them. Mounting public pressure is pushing Chinese officials to take more decisive action against these centers.
A High-Level Call to Crack Down
In early 2025, Chinese, Thai, and Burmese officials heavily focused on cyber scam centers. Leadership from China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are actively engaging with officials from Myanmar and Thailand to deal with the scam centers.
In January, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with ASEAN leaders, calling for them to address the scam problem that continues to “threaten and harm” Chinese citizens and people in other countries. On February 6, Xi Jinping praised Thai Foreign Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra for Thailand’s efforts in combatting the centers, including cutting power to five scam hubs, including Myawaddy. These two high-level statements, each shedding light on the cyber scam centers, reflect the importance of this issue for China. January meetings also included discussions between the Thai and Myanmar Ambassadors to China, with Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs Liu Jinsong, placing the responsibility on them to never let “these criminals go unpunished.”
In addition to rhetorical pressure, there is also action. China’s Deputy Minister of MPS, Liu Zhongyi, has been meeting with Thai and Burmese representatives to collaborate on eradicating the scam operations. On January 27, Liu led a delegation to Bangkok, proposing and later agreeing to a joint coordination center between China and Thailand to fight scam centers. Liu reported that there are 36 Chinese gangs operating scam centers that use 100,000 people in forced labor. On February 20, China and Thailand coordinated the return of 200 cyber scam suspects back to China, which is the largest repatriation between the two countries to date. This flight will likely be the first of many, as thousands of suspects sit in limbo waiting for deportation to China from Thailand, an issue China, Myanmar, and Thailand agreed to further address on February 28 as more citizens are rescued from cyber dens. In March, coordination between Thailand and China persisted to repatriate suspects.
Conclusion
The recent spotlight on cyber scam centers, the transnational criminal networks that run them, and their impact on Chinese nationals has prompted China to address the issue proactively. In the past two months, China has used its diplomatic clout to address cyber scam centers operating in Myanmar, viewing them as a significant threat to regional security and as a source of domestic concern as awareness of the issue grows in China. With the cooperation of Thailand and Myanmar, China has used diplomatic pressure, collaborative law enforcement efforts, and the repatriation of criminal suspects to demonstrate its commitment to eradicating these centers. Although progress has been made, challenges persist due to the complex political and military situation in Myanmar that enables the ongoing presence of transnational crime networks. As cross-border trafficking continues, especially in areas beyond the junta’s control, fighting cyber scam centers will remain an ongoing battle. Cases of cyber scamming have moved well beyond the borders of Southeast Asia to impact victims in the U.S. and Europe. The centers add another layer of complexity in bringing order to Myanmar and reveal the Myanmar junta’s incapability or unwillingness to address the issue, leaving China little choice but to engineer its own solutions to promote regional stability and protect its interests.
For more from the Stimson Center on this issue, check out our Myanmar Project and Countering Cyber Scam Operations Project, contributing to Stimson’s research on Southeast Asia.
