In April 2023, China’s International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) published the first issue of a series devoted to the country’s international development cooperation practices, focused on emergency humanitarian assistance. The report shows that China’s refugee support, a subset of its humanitarian aid, has grown through increased funding to United Nations agencies, multilateral diplomacy, and civil society involvement.
Among the major targets of Chinese humanitarian assistance is Syria. After more than a decade of conflict, Syria’s refugee crisis remains the world’s largest. However, according to the UN’s 2024 Regional Strategic Overview of the Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), the critical needs of over 6.1 million Syrian refugees and 6.8 million members of host communities increasingly go unmet.
This article explores China’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis as it emerges as a major humanitarian actor, albeit not fully integrated into the global humanitarian system.
Situating China’s humanitarian response approach
China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) was the first time that “humanitarian assistance” was included in the national development plan, reflecting China’s determination to promote its humanitarian efforts, both at home and abroad.
In recent years, China’s humanitarian assistance infrastructure has been reshaped. Before 2018, foreign aid was dispersed among various ministries. But in April of that year, CIDCA was created to elevate the political importance of foreign aid, better integrate it with the country’s foreign policy, and improve coordination.
Additionally, the number of Chinese civil society organizations (CSOs) participating in humanitarian activities has grown, resulting in a more pluralistic Chinese humanitarian aid sector. Chinese government agencies, CSOs, and private companies have acquired significant domestic experience and technical expertise in natural disaster response, emergency preparedness, public health, and rural development.
Yet it is important to note that China’s approach to humanitarian aid fundamentally differs from that of traditional actors, both in its conceptualization and delivery. Conceptually, China regards humanitarian assistance as subsumed under, not separate from development aid. Regarding delivery, China typically provides aid bilaterally on a case-by-case basis, coordinating directly with host governments rather than through the international humanitarian system. Also noteworthy is that China prioritizes improving diplomatic relations when providing humanitarian aid, making its assistance preferential and not necessarily reflective of actual need. Additionally, China’s overseas humanitarian aid typically flows to natural hazards, food crises, and infectious diseases, rather than complex conflict-related emergencies.
In January 2021, China’s State Council released a White Paper, “China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era,” which details the country’s foreign aid practices and guiding principles, presents a forward-looking vision, and identifies four humanitarian aid priorities:
providing emergency disaster relief,
offering emergency food assistance,
responding to public health emergencies, and
addressing the migrant and refugee crisis.
China’s humanitarian action to assist refugees
China’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis should be viewed within the broader context of its evolving approach to humanitarian aid and its overall involvement and objectives in the Syrian conflict.
Humanitarian aid has traditionally been a lower priority for China compared to its developmental budget and economic capacity. Yet the country’s contributions to humanitarian aid have increased markedly, though they remain smaller than those of traditional donors. Between 2018 and 2022, China carried out more than 800 foreign emergency humanitarian aid projects in 40 countries, valued at around $2.26 billion. Partners such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have welcomed and encouraged China’s active participation and support.
China’s overseas efforts to aid refugees are part of its humanitarian assistance mission. In recent years, China has expanded its efforts to assist refugees through increased funding to UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement, and growth in the overseas activities of Chinese civil society. However, a 2022 Chatham House paper described China’s contributions to refugee relief as “sporadic and limited” in comparison to leading humanitarian donors. The paper also stated that China’s provision of aid to refugees is not systematic but often ad hoc and occurs through earmarked funding for specific situations that tend to align with other diplomatic priorities.
The fact that Chinese donations are focused primarily on natural hazards rather than conflict-induced issues such as refugee crises is reflected in their distribution among UN agencies, with the bulk going to the World Food Program (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO), far exceeding contributions to the UNHCR. Nevertheless, China’s annual contribution to the UNHCR, which was around $250,000 between 1990 and 2009, by 2021 had risen to over $5.3 million. While these amounts are smaller than those from leading donors such as the United States and Japan, they are comparable to contributions from other emerging donors like India.
China’s response to the Syrian displacement crisis
The Syrian refugee crisis marked a departure from China’s usual bilateral aid approach, as early on its contribution was directed through multilateral agencies. However, China’s contributions to the Syrian crisis fell well below global funding commitments. For instance, in 2014, China did not allocate any funds for Syrian refugees, whereas the global contribution totaled $3.5 billion.
Several European Union member states, notably Germany, sought China’s involvement in addressing the refugee crisis. German Amb. Michael Clauss stated in a 2015 South China Morning Post interview that “any contribution from China would be highly appreciated.” In a January 2016 phone call, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang discussed China’s possible role in responding to the refugee crisis.
Beijing’s public responses to these and similar appeals are revealing, framed in language that attributed responsibility for the conflict and resulting humanitarian crisis to the US and its European partners. A Xinhua editorial on Sept. 9, 2015, asserted, “The United States is accountable for the tragic refugee crisis in Europe due to its contentious Middle East policies, resulting in wars and disorder that displaced many.” People’s Daily echoed these sentiments. Wu Sike, China’s former special envoy to the Middle East, likewise remarked, “The interventionist policies of the United States, Europe, and other Western nations, seeking to impose their values and alter the Middle East, have perpetuated turmoil and served as a major catalyst for this refugee wave.”
Beginning in early 2017, there was a significant shift in Chinese Syrian refugee aid, driven by two factors: first, President Xi’s pledges at the 2016 UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, the January 2016 Arab League Summit in Cairo, and the 2017 Belt and Road Forum to increase support for international refugee assistance; and second, substantial territorial gains by the Syrian government and its allies, which likely assured Beijing of the Assad regime’s stability.
In 2018, China launched a record number of highly publicized refugee aid initiatives, including several addressing the Syrian crisis through UN agencies — the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Lebanon, UNHCR in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the WFP in Jordan. These projects, ranging from $1-2 million, were relatively small in scale. Since then, Beijing has funneled nearly all its humanitarian assistance directly to Damascus. China has used its modest humanitarian aid to bolster political ties with Damascus and has aligned with Russia in opposing Western attempts to isolate the Assad regime.
It is also important to emphasize that criticism of the West has remained a persistent theme in Chinese public statements regarding the ongoing Syrian humanitarian crisis and refugee policies in general. In March 2022, for example, spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused the West of hypocrisy, stating, “It is a double standard to sympathize with Ukrainian refugees while ignoring those from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America” — a claim that is demonstrably false, as shown by UNHCR Pledging Conference documents and US foreign assistance data. Such criticism has grown more frequent as US-China strategic rivalry has intensified and Beijing’s efforts to court Global South countries and challenge the US-led international order have gained momentum.
In addition, China, along with Russia, has consistently maintained that cross-border aid deliveries — authorized in June 2014 under UN Security Council Resolution 2165 without the Syrian government’s consent — undermine Syria’s sovereignty and should be replaced by “cross-line” assistance, which involves supplies delivered through Syrian government-held areas. China has also joined with Russia in claiming that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), neighboring countries, and the West exploited aid routes to undermine Assad. The two have advocated for centralizing humanitarian aid in Damascus, reducing the renewal timeline for cross-border access, and requiring operational status reports from the UN secretary-general. However, centralizing aid distribution through Damascus will intensify the problem China says it wants to avoid: aid will be prioritized for some and ignored for others.
The forgotten crisis
An estimated 6.8 million Syrians remain displaced in neighboring countries. Another 7.2 million are internally displaced, 3.4 million of them in non-regime-held areas in northwest Syria (NWS). They and those displaced in northeast Syria (NES) are in urgent need of multi-sector humanitarian assistance. On June 25, 2024, Najat Rochdi, the UN deputy special envoy of the secretary-general for Syria, warned that “Syria is in danger of being forgotten.” Filippo Grandi, head of the UNHCR, asserted that the Syrian government and international aid donors must both do more if they want millions of Syrians forced to flee the country by war to return home.
However, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria (COI) concluded in March that Syria remains unsafe for returns. So, too, have recent reports by the UN, EU, and Amnesty International. The regional momentum toward normalization with the Assad regime has not produced circumstances conducive to voluntary return but has merely thrust refugees into deeper uncertainty. Meanwhile, in Lebanon and Turkey, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees are at risk of deportation. There are also increased calls among EU countries for a reassessment of protection granted to them to allow for voluntary return.
Aid groups stress the need for sustainable solutions, including boosting “early recovery” efforts to repair infrastructure and create jobs in Syria, crucial for facilitating return. In mid-April, the UN announced plans for an early return trust fund (ERTF) for Syria, funded by non-traditional donors like Gulf countries. However, implementing this strategy raises concerns, particularly about preventing funds from being diverted by the Assad regime. Meanwhile, at the 8th Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, convened in May 2024, financial pledges decreased compared to previous years. Donor fatigue appears to have set in.
Amid these recent developments, China’s humanitarian actions have followed a familiar pattern: a prompt and generous response to the February 2023 earthquake; calls for international cooperation to address Syria’s humanitarian crisis and a political solution to the conflict, laced with sharp critiques of “unilateral sanctions”; and a helpful, though modest, joint initiative in the health sector.
Earlier this year, the Syrian government approved humanitarian aid deliveries through two Turkish border crossings — Bab al-Salam and Al-Ra’i — until May 13. Despite this extension, concerns persist over the reliability and sustainability of such consent-based access, a stance China advocates. In June 2020, China and Russia vetoed a proposal to renew approval for these crossings for a year. As for voluntary returns, which Beijing supports in principle, its specific actions to facilitate them remain unclear, apart from reiterating the need for a political resolution while contributing to UN deadlock on the issue.
Conclusion
China’s refugee assistance in the case of Syria reveals several aspects of its broader foreign aid strategy and diplomatic priorities. Firstly, it underscores China’s principle of non-interference and its preference for strengthening state-to-state relations, although working solely through Damascus impedes effective aid delivery. This approach aligns with Beijing’s broader geopolitical objectives, emphasizing sovereignty and stability over humanitarian intervention.
Secondly, while China has increased its international aid efforts, its contributions to refugee crises remain relatively small compared to traditional donors, indicating a lower prioritization of such crises.
Thirdly, China’s strategy often involves channeling aid through multilateral agencies for high-visibility projects, enhancing its global image without significantly increasing its financial commitments.
Additionally, China’s aid to Syrian refugees reflects its complex relationship with the West. By primarily providing bilateral aid, Beijing engages in humanitarian efforts while keeping a distance from Western-led initiatives. This strategy contrasts with Western interventionist policies and aligns China geopolitically with Russia in countering Western influence in the region.
To be sure, increased Chinese engagement in humanitarian assistance can strengthen global responses to displacement crises by offering substantial financial support, leveraging its infrastructure capabilities, and fostering South-South cooperation. This has the potential to promote sustainable development in affected regions. Yet as seen in the Syrian case, there are valid concerns about China’s adherence to international humanitarian principles like neutrality and impartiality, as well as apprehensions about potential political motivations behind its aid allocations.
Dr. John Calabrese teaches international relations at American University in Washington, DC. He is a Senior Fellow at MEI, the Book Review Editor of The Middle East Journal, and previously served as the director of MEI’s Middle East-Asia Project (MAP).
Photo by Zhang Lang/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images
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