Editor’s Note: Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a specialist on Maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. He has previously written for Stimson about Saudi Arabia’s efforts to bolster its navy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
As threats of regional war rise in the aftermath of the Israeli assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran, Middle Eastern nations are also confronting a growing threat from the trafficking of weapons and drugs.
On May 23, 2024, while patrolling the Arabian Sea, the British Royal Navy destroyer HMS Diamond intercepted an unflagged fishing vessel smuggling 2,382 kilograms of hashish. The seizure was the ninth interdiction of narcotic substances this year by the Combined Maritime Forces, a U.S.-led naval coalition of 44 countries.
On June 5, 2024, Jordan’s Anti-Narcotics Division conducted counter-smuggling operations at Jordan’s Al-Omari border crossing with Saudi Arabia, foiling two attempts to smuggle 9.5 million Captagon pills and 143 kilos of hashish in construction vehicles into the Saudi Al Jawf region.
On Aug. 5, the Jordanian state news agency Petra said it blocked a new attempt to smuggle drugs into the country from Syria. Petra said several of the traffickers were injured by Jordanian security forces before retreating across the border.
Criminal networks have also increasingly used maritime routes off the Arabian Peninsula to traffic weapons. In January 2024, U.S. CENTCOM forces seized two dhows carrying arms and other lethal and dual-use items bound for the Houthis in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216.
Criminal syndicates have exploited the limited law enforcement capabilities of Persian Gulf Arab countries as well as security vacuums in Yemen and Syria to conduct illegal activities. The trade poses a multipronged threat to the Middle East’s long-term security and the well-being of its citizens.
The Combined Maritime Forces, launched in February 2002 as an anti-terrorist coalition, has gradually broadened its scope to include counter-smuggling. The command of it military arm, the Combined Task Force 150, rotates among coalition members every six months. CTF 150 patrols more than two million square miles from the Suez Canal to the Bab al-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz. Its area of operation also covers the so-called “hash highway,” a route linking smuggling hotspots in the northwestern Indian Ocean.
Using shipborne helicopters, satellite images, and unmanned aerial vehicles, CTF 150 gathers intelligence on potential smugglers. Once a suspicious dhow is spotted, CMF naval assets dispatch a boarding team. Refusal to open a communications channel or the presence of floating packages near the dhow are among the most common indicators that the wooden sailing vessel is transporting an illicit haul. If inspection leads to the discovery of illegal substances, the boarding team seizes the cargo and destroys it at sea.
Over the past three years, the monetary value of drugs seized has soared. The CTF150’s narcotics seizures were valued at $48.5 million in 2019. The coalition confiscated nearly $1 billion worth of illicit substances between 2021 and 2022. In 2023, the British and French commands intercepted illegal hauls with an estimated street value of $320 million and $600 million, respectively. The smugglers’ shift to methamphetamines and heroin is primarily responsible for the uptick in value.
Since January 2024, CTF 150 has foiled at least nine smuggling attempts and seized 8,800 kilos of drugsaccording to date this analyst compiled from task force press releases. The naval coalition has also made significant strides in foiling weapons smuggling attempts. On January 11, 2024, naval forces from the USS Lewis B. Puller operating off the Somali coast seized Iranian arms, including critical components for ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles.
Similarly, on January 28, 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Clarence Sutphin Jr. confiscated advanced military components bound for Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen. The haul included ballistic missile assemblies, items to manufacture underwater and surface drones, military-grade communications equipment, and anti-tank guided missile launchers.
Since 2015, Iran has resupplied the Houthis by means including overland trafficking across the Yemen-Oman Shahn border crossing and seaborne transfers to Yemen’s southern governorates of Shabwah, Hadramawt, and Mahra. The arms have enabled the Houthis to continue their campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, which they began after Israel invaded Gaza following the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel last year.
Smoking hashish and chewing khat leaves have deep roots in the Arabian Peninsula. Drugs such as Captagon are more recent vices.
Initially synthesized in the 1960s to treat behavioral disorders, Captagon was later banned due to its severe side effects. Consumption of the synthetic stimulant by Islamic State fighters and its massive production by militia groups close to Syria’s Assad regime in the Levant region have fueled the drug’s rising popularity and profitability in the Middle East.
Young people and wealthy expatriates have driven up demand and turned the Arabian Peninsula into a lucrative destination for narcotics traders. Captagon users generally take the narcotic to evade boredom, cope with social pressures, and heighten focus ahead of professional or educational challenges.
Close to regional drug-producing hubs, located at the intersection of shipping routes and endowed with advanced logistics infrastructures, the Arabian Peninsula has also turned into a re-export point for smugglers.
Regional authorities have tried to clamp down on supply by intensifying law enforcement operations at border zones and scaling up domestic raids to locate warehouses and intercept drugs before they are distributed. On June 19, 2024, for instance, Saudi security patrol forces conducted three drug busts in the Asir and Jazan provinces, leading to the seizure of over 7,200 amphetamine tablets, 750 kilos of khat, and 196 kilos of hashish. The Saudi Zakat, Tax and Customs Authority conducted major operations including the interception of over 841,000 Captagon pills in iron boxes at the Saudi Arabia-Jordan Haditha border crossing, the confiscation of over 1 million Captagon pills stashed in a melon truck at the Tabuk province’s Duba Port, and the seizure of more than 1.6 million amphetamine tablets hidden in an iron equipment consignment in Jeddah.
On June 22, 2023, a joint Omani-Saudi operation led to the seizure of over 6 million Captagon pills bound for export markets. In mid-September 2023, Dubai police thwarted an attempt to smuggle over 86 million Captagon tablets concealed in shipping containers carrying furniture. The illicit cargo had an estimated street value of over $1 billion.
Criminal syndicates have become increasingly nimble, concealing drugs among produce, furniture, and construction items. Drug busts might lead to conflicts with local tribes that control border zones and for whom drug trafficking represents a significant source of income in disenfranchised areas.
One way Arab states have sought to curtail the trade is by mending fences with Syria. While geopolitical and economic considerations topped the strategic calculus in supporting Syria’s readmission to the Arab League, the Persian Gulf Arab states are also believed to have attempted to leverage diplomatic normalization to convince the Syrian leadership to crack down on narcotics smuggling.
Saudi Arabia offered $4 billion to Bashar al-Assad’s regime to rein in drug trafficking, according to a Reuters report which Saudi officials denied. Ultimately, Syria’s return to the Arab camp was not publicly conditioned on efforts to curb the amphetamine trade.
The drug trade between the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula continues unabated, leading to more frequent outbursts of armed violence at the Jordan-Syria border.
To ensure durable, effective, and comprehensive solutions, counter-trafficking strategies should focus on intelligence-gathering, law enforcement and policies that better tackle the security, social, and economic factors fueling the demand for weapons and drugs.
Recent U.S. intelligence reports about weapons smuggling between the Houthis and the Somali terrorist group Al Shabaab are another worrisome development. If small arms trafficking between the shores of the Red Sea represents a recurrent feature of intra-regional illicit trade, more cooperation between the two militias extending to more sophisticated weapon systems risks further destabilizing a region already plagued by escalating violence.
Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is an independent research analyst who focuses on the security and defense affairs of the Persian Gulf region. He is also an analyst at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy. Leonardo tweets at @mazz_Leonardo.
Editor’s Note: Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a specialist on Maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. He has previously written for Stimson about Saudi Arabia’s efforts to bolster its navy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
As threats of regional war rise in the aftermath of the Israeli assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran, Middle Eastern nations are also confronting a growing threat from the trafficking of weapons and drugs.
On May 23, 2024, while patrolling the Arabian Sea, the British Royal Navy destroyer HMS Diamond intercepted an unflagged fishing vessel smuggling 2,382 kilograms of hashish. The seizure was the ninth interdiction of narcotic substances this year by the Combined Maritime Forces, a U.S.-led naval coalition of 44 countries.
On June 5, 2024, Jordan’s Anti-Narcotics Division conducted counter-smuggling operations at Jordan’s Al-Omari border crossing with Saudi Arabia, foiling two attempts to smuggle 9.5 million Captagon pills and 143 kilos of hashish in construction vehicles into the Saudi Al Jawf region.
On Aug. 5, the Jordanian state news agency Petra said it blocked a new attempt to smuggle drugs into the country from Syria. Petra said several of the traffickers were injured by Jordanian security forces before retreating across the border.
Criminal networks have also increasingly used maritime routes off the Arabian Peninsula to traffic weapons. In January 2024, U.S. CENTCOM forces seized two dhows carrying arms and other lethal and dual-use items bound for the Houthis in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216.
Criminal syndicates have exploited the limited law enforcement capabilities of Persian Gulf Arab countries as well as security vacuums in Yemen and Syria to conduct illegal activities. The trade poses a multipronged threat to the Middle East’s long-term security and the well-being of its citizens.
The Combined Maritime Forces, launched in February 2002 as an anti-terrorist coalition, has gradually broadened its scope to include counter-smuggling. The command of it military arm, the Combined Task Force 150, rotates among coalition members every six months. CTF 150 patrols more than two million square miles from the Suez Canal to the Bab al-Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz. Its area of operation also covers the so-called “hash highway,” a route linking smuggling hotspots in the northwestern Indian Ocean.
Using shipborne helicopters, satellite images, and unmanned aerial vehicles, CTF 150 gathers intelligence on potential smugglers. Once a suspicious dhow is spotted, CMF naval assets dispatch a boarding team. Refusal to open a communications channel or the presence of floating packages near the dhow are among the most common indicators that the wooden sailing vessel is transporting an illicit haul. If inspection leads to the discovery of illegal substances, the boarding team seizes the cargo and destroys it at sea.
Over the past three years, the monetary value of drugs seized has soared. The CTF150’s narcotics seizures were valued at $48.5 million in 2019. The coalition confiscated nearly $1 billion worth of illicit substances between 2021 and 2022. In 2023, the British and French commands intercepted illegal hauls with an estimated street value of $320 million and $600 million, respectively. The smugglers’ shift to methamphetamines and heroin is primarily responsible for the uptick in value.
Since January 2024, CTF 150 has foiled at least nine smuggling attempts and seized 8,800 kilos of drugsaccording to date this analyst compiled from task force press releases. The naval coalition has also made significant strides in foiling weapons smuggling attempts. On January 11, 2024, naval forces from the USS Lewis B. Puller operating off the Somali coast seized Iranian arms, including critical components for ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles.
Similarly, on January 28, 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Clarence Sutphin Jr. confiscated advanced military components bound for Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen. The haul included ballistic missile assemblies, items to manufacture underwater and surface drones, military-grade communications equipment, and anti-tank guided missile launchers.
Since 2015, Iran has resupplied the Houthis by means including overland trafficking across the Yemen-Oman Shahn border crossing and seaborne transfers to Yemen’s southern governorates of Shabwah, Hadramawt, and Mahra. The arms have enabled the Houthis to continue their campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, which they began after Israel invaded Gaza following the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel last year.
Smoking hashish and chewing khat leaves have deep roots in the Arabian Peninsula. Drugs such as Captagon are more recent vices.
Initially synthesized in the 1960s to treat behavioral disorders, Captagon was later banned due to its severe side effects. Consumption of the synthetic stimulant by Islamic State fighters and its massive production by militia groups close to Syria’s Assad regime in the Levant region have fueled the drug’s rising popularity and profitability in the Middle East.
Young people and wealthy expatriates have driven up demand and turned the Arabian Peninsula into a lucrative destination for narcotics traders. Captagon users generally take the narcotic to evade boredom, cope with social pressures, and heighten focus ahead of professional or educational challenges.
Close to regional drug-producing hubs, located at the intersection of shipping routes and endowed with advanced logistics infrastructures, the Arabian Peninsula has also turned into a re-export point for smugglers.
Regional authorities have tried to clamp down on supply by intensifying law enforcement operations at border zones and scaling up domestic raids to locate warehouses and intercept drugs before they are distributed. On June 19, 2024, for instance, Saudi security patrol forces conducted three drug busts in the Asir and Jazan provinces, leading to the seizure of over 7,200 amphetamine tablets, 750 kilos of khat, and 196 kilos of hashish. The Saudi Zakat, Tax and Customs Authority conducted major operations including the interception of over 841,000 Captagon pills in iron boxes at the Saudi Arabia-Jordan Haditha border crossing, the confiscation of over 1 million Captagon pills stashed in a melon truck at the Tabuk province’s Duba Port, and the seizure of more than 1.6 million amphetamine tablets hidden in an iron equipment consignment in Jeddah.
On June 22, 2023, a joint Omani-Saudi operation led to the seizure of over 6 million Captagon pills bound for export markets. In mid-September 2023, Dubai police thwarted an attempt to smuggle over 86 million Captagon tablets concealed in shipping containers carrying furniture. The illicit cargo had an estimated street value of over $1 billion.
Criminal syndicates have become increasingly nimble, concealing drugs among produce, furniture, and construction items. Drug busts might lead to conflicts with local tribes that control border zones and for whom drug trafficking represents a significant source of income in disenfranchised areas.
One way Arab states have sought to curtail the trade is by mending fences with Syria. While geopolitical and economic considerations topped the strategic calculus in supporting Syria’s readmission to the Arab League, the Persian Gulf Arab states are also believed to have attempted to leverage diplomatic normalization to convince the Syrian leadership to crack down on narcotics smuggling.
Saudi Arabia offered $4 billion to Bashar al-Assad’s regime to rein in drug trafficking, according to a Reuters report which Saudi officials denied. Ultimately, Syria’s return to the Arab camp was not publicly conditioned on efforts to curb the amphetamine trade.
The drug trade between the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula continues unabated, leading to more frequent outbursts of armed violence at the Jordan-Syria border.
To ensure durable, effective, and comprehensive solutions, counter-trafficking strategies should focus on intelligence-gathering, law enforcement and policies that better tackle the security, social, and economic factors fueling the demand for weapons and drugs.
Recent U.S. intelligence reports about weapons smuggling between the Houthis and the Somali terrorist group Al Shabaab are another worrisome development. If small arms trafficking between the shores of the Red Sea represents a recurrent feature of intra-regional illicit trade, more cooperation between the two militias extending to more sophisticated weapon systems risks further destabilizing a region already plagued by escalating violence.
Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is an independent research analyst who focuses on the security and defense affairs of the Persian Gulf region. He is also an analyst at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy. Leonardo tweets at @mazz_Leonardo.
