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This transcript is from a CSIS event hosted on October 8, 2024. Watch the full video here.
Seth G. Jones: Good morning. I’m Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Welcome to all.
On behalf of CSIS and the U.S. Naval Institute, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the next event in the Maritime Security Dialogue Series. This series is made possible through the generous support of our partner, HII. A big thanks to HII, and a great partnership along those lines.
Just a note before I introduce Admiral Pitts today. This session comes after two really good discussions recently, one with the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Franchetti, which you can watch. That sits on our website and on YouTube as well. Another most recently is with Congressman Mike Waltz and Senator Kelly from Arizona on the naval industrial base, which also sits online. And will be followed in November, and we’ll provide more information shortly, it’s a sit-down discussion with Admiral Kilby, the vice chief of naval operations.
But today we’re delighted to be joined by Vice Admiral James Pitts. Vice Admiral Pitts assumed the role of deputy chief of naval operations for warfighting requirements and capabilities, N9, in December of 2023. I am not going to go through all of your accomplishments, they are long and impressive. But let me just say a few things here. At sea, Admiral Pitts has served aboard several ships, including the USS Grayling, Hammerhead, Rickover, and Tucson, among many others. In addition, Vice Admiral Pitts served as director of warfare integration on the staff of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He’s a graduate from the U.S. Naval Academy. I’m not going to publicly say what year, but recently. He also holds a master’s degree from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
So thank you very much, Admiral Pitts, for joining us today. And now, to lead the discussion, I’m going to hand this over to Rear Admiral Ray Spicer. He’s the chief executive officer and publisher of the U.S. Naval Institute. Rear Admiral Spicer completed a very successful career in the U.S. Navy. During his time at sea, for example, he completed eight deployments, including combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
One final comment, for those of you who would like to ask questions that are in the room, please make sure you do that with a QR code which you can see on the screen in front of you. And Ray, sitting on the stage, will have access to those questions on his iPad. And for those of you online in real time, same issue on the website. You can ask questions, and they will come to Ray on his iPad. So with that, I will hand this over to Admiral Spicer. Over to you.
Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spicer, USN (Ret.): Thanks, Seth. And I’d also like to thank CSIS for being a great partner with the U.S. Naval Institute. And I’d also like to thank HII for your tremendous sponsorship. And Jon Rodgers is here today. So thanks to HII for supporting the Maritime Security Dialogue Series. So we’re very appreciative of that.
And then, finally, I want to thank Admiral Pitts – Admiral Jimmy Pitts, for being here with us today. We appreciate you escaping from the building so you can spend some time with us. I’m sure – I’m sure it’s a pleasure to be out of the building for once.
Vice Admiral James E. Pitts: It is. (Laughter.)
RADM Spicer: I want to start off with your role as the deputy CNO for warfighting requirements and capabilities. And in particular, in light of the CNO’s NAVPLAN, which was recently released. And if you’re not familiar with the NAVPLAN, it’s heavily focused on getting more players on the field in the near term, and it’s all about delivering more value from the Navy that we have, while we continue to pursue the Navy that we need. So that’s kind of a very broad summary of the NAVPLAN. But I’d like to ask you, Admiral Pitts, how it affects your role as the N9.
VADM Pitts: Yeah. Thank you, Ray. And, first and foremost, I want to thank CSIS and the Naval Institute for inviting me to get me out of the Pentagon. (Laughter.) And, two, for the opportunity to – you know, to have the discussion today.
So, to go with your question, so at the beginning of the year CNO Franchetti released America’s War Fighting Navy, which really was her vision and the priorities for our Navy. And the priorities were warfighting, so build combat credible capability, warfighters, you know, build and strengthen our Navy teams, and then the foundation that supports it. So build trust, align resources, and ultimately be ready. And as the N9, I fit squarely in that warfighting priority as, you know, building those enduring capabilities that we need to meet potential adversaries.
But three weeks ago, as you mentioned, the CNO rolled out the updated NAVPLAN, which is strategic guidance to the Navy. And it builds on the America’s War Fighting Navy vision and priorities. And it really has two strategic ends: To improve our readiness to be able to face potential high-end conflict in 2027 and build the enduring Navy advantages that we need from now into the future. The means to accomplish those ends are two mutually reinforcing thrusts or avenues.
The first is the P33 targets that the CNO identified as here are some critical areas that we can make quick – relatively quick gains to improve our readiness by 2027. That’s the P33 targets. The other means is to continue work that was established in CNO Gilday’s 2022 Navigation Plan to identify those key capabilities and key enablers that align to the Joint Warfighting Concept, and key battles for advantage, and help us build that enduring advantage from now through the future.
And so I fit in both the P33 targets. Of those seven targets that, you know, you’ve probably already discussed and the CNO discussed in the rollout, I own two of them. In scaling robotic and autonomous systems, and getting those operationally into the hands of the warfighters and to our fleet commanders so that they use robotic and autonomous systems. The other one is to enhance our training capability, invest in warfighter competency through the use of live, virtual, and constructive training, which allows then our sailors to be able to train at a higher level, at an integrated level using live, virtual, and constructive so that we’re better prepared to face that integrated fight that we will potentially face in the future. And it’s an effort to make sure that we still maintain the best-trained sailors in the world, which we have today. That’s on the P33 targets.
Then, on the enduring advantages and those critical capabilities, they continue the efforts that had started: long-range fires, how we shoot; counter-C5ISRT, how we maneuver; terminal defense, how we defend ourselves; and contested logistics, how we sustain ourselves, these capabilities. What is new in this NAVPLAN update is nontraditional sea denial, which is how we deny others – other people’s use of the sea. And as N9, I own the long-range fires, the nontraditional sea denial, and terminal defense on that aspect.
Those key capabilities are enabled by four key enablers: live, virtual, and constructive training, mutually reinforcing from the P33 targets of how we train; the naval operational architecture, how we communicate; artificial intelligence, how we outthink; and then robotic and autonomous systems, how we scale. And so those two are mutually reinforcing with the P33 targets.
And what is also new on that enhance part is how we integrate and synchronize those key capabilities and enablers better, aligning to how we’re going to fight and those critical kill chains. And so by integrating and synchronizing, we can better identify where are our true gaps across those kill webs and then pull the right levers to invest in as we move forward. And that is an update also to the NAVPLAN.
So as you can see, I fit into a lot of the warfighting capabilities, the P33 targets from this NAVPLAN, and continuing in this NAVPLAN those enhanced capabilities that we must build for our Navy now and into the future.
RADM Spicer: Great. Well, thank you very much for that.
As the N9, you pretty much see it all in the E-ring. You’ve got all the warfare domains. You got – you think about air, sea, subsurface, IW, cyber, everything, and then you’re responsible for integrating all of that and delivering priorities that then need to be funded. So it’s kind of where the magic happens, is the N9 in the building, so we thank you for that.
If we’re – if we’re looking at the NAVPLAN, on the longer-term side of the NAVPLAN there’s a – there is an identification of a need for a 381-ship Navy. And as budgets go, the budgets that we’re seeing now – 3 to 5 percent growth in the budget annually – we’re not going to get to a 381-ship Navy. And there are some who would say we need 20 percent more budget to achieve that. So how are you thinking about that on the longer term as the N9?
VADM Pitts: Well, it’s one of the challenges that we face, and part of my job is to work through said challenge, right? I will say the NAVPLAN specifically – CNO Franchetti in the NAVPLAN specifically addresses that this NAVPLAN is rightfully focused on near-term readiness and improving our capabilities so that we are ready for potential combat in 2027. But this enhancing the warfighting advantage aspect is also that longer-term focus of how we build the future Navy fleet and the capabilities that go along with it. Working in tandem with my fellow DCNOs – my N7, who develops the force design of our future, and we’ll continue to iterate through campaigns of learning through that force design – and by focusing now with the realities of kind of where we sit fiscally over, you know, the last few years, where we sit with our industrial base capacity right now, but knowing that we still have a requirement based on the National Defense Strategy and the approved defense planning scenarios to achieve a 381-ship Navy and the appropriate mix that goes along with it, then part of our job is to continue advocating for the Navy the nation needs. And it fits perfectly within, you know, our Title 10 responsibilities to be prepared for prompt and sustained combat operations incident to sea and to conduct operations that support national security initiatives and our prosperity.
RADM Spicer: Yeah. Great. Thank you.
It’s kind of a tall order to do the job that you do because part of the job, as I understand it, is you have to be able to predict the future threat. And in this case, a big, big part of that is the PRC and what’s going on there. And then you have to place bets against that future threat, hoping that your predictions are roughly accurate. But today we’re facing near-term threats at the same time. So if you’re looking at the Red Sea or the war in Ukraine, those are near-term, lower-end comparatively, but also big cost drivers. So how do you balance all that, placing the future bets against what you’re going to need way down the road versus what you need today?
VADM Pitts: Well, I guess part of that balance is the requirements process itself, starting from what is – what is it that we have in our baseline, so what are those key capability gaps to meet potential future threats. And that’s part of where we derive some of the requirements for even current activities and our future Navy.
And it is a team effort, right, that we have the right experts from the threat side, from ONI and DIA aspect; we have the right experts from our acquisition community; and then our – you know, our requirements community in developing these requirements. We work with industry on establishing some of the requirements to make sure that what we’re asking for is actually achievable and can be produced in a reasonable time, assuming it’s a material solution.
And generally, what we do is we say – we set for the realistic highest threat which we think will cover some of those lower-end threats. And what we’ve been seeing in the Red Sea over the last almost year is that our surface ships, our airplanes have been performing superbly in being able to meet the threat that’s being presented by the Houthis. So I count that as a win, and my job is to not screw it up and, as we keep moving forward, set the right requirements.
RADM Spicer: Yeah.
VADM Pitts: (Laughs.)
RADM Spicer: We’re going to talk more about the Red Sea. And you know, there’s been lots of discussion about the cost curve and are we on the wrong side of the cost curve; I’m not going to go there because I – you know, what price do you put on sailors’ lives? So –
VADM Pitts: Right.
RADM Spicer: But I know there’s lots of activity ongoing right now to see about kind of making that cost curve a little bit more equal, if you will.
But I want to shift right now. I know the budget isn’t part of necessarily your role, but you have to think about it because, you know, we can’t afford everything. So we’re in a scenario right now where the nation needs to recapitalize the Navy leg of the nuclear triad. So that’s the ballistic missile submarine, Columbia-class, to replace the Ohio-class. And that happened in the ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, essentially, but the budget isn’t representative of what it was like in the – say, the ’80s, where we were seeing 7 percent or so increase in budget year over year. We’re not seeing that today; 2010 to 2020, the budget was relatively flat. Today, we’re seeing operations and support costs 2 ½ percent above inflation. We’re on this trajectory of defense spending that’s going to get us to about 2 percent of GDP. Which is – if we get there, it’s going to be the lowest level since the 1920s. So the question is, is there a disconnect between the National Security Strategy goals and the resources needed to deliver that strategy? And how are you dealing with that, as the deputy CNO for warfighting requirements?
VADM Pitts: So, Ray, first I would say what we’ve been developing in our budgets that are being submitted do support the National Defense Strategy. We would like – as a Navy – we would like to see a little bit more resources available to help us grow and expand our Navy, as articulated in the NAVPLAN and our shipbuilding plans. But given where we are – and in the NAVPLAN, the CNO also articulates that the current priorities are readiness, capability, and then capacity, in that order. And so we’re focusing on readiness. And our ’25 budget that is being worked on fully funds the readiness that – the fleet that we have.
The capability, or all those things that we work on in the N9, and N2 and (N)6, information warfare, and N4, is logistics, but the number one capability is the Columbia-class submarine. So that we – that is the highest priority amongst capability, in that that is our Navy’s contribution to the strategic deterrent mission of the United States, closely followed by TACAMO and some recap that we have to do there, and our NC3 apparatus, at N2 and (N)6. So inside capability there’s, you know, a priority. And Columbia is at the very top.
RADM Spicer: Yeah. OK. Thank you. CNO was recently here at CSIS. Talked about the NAVPLAN. When she was here, she mentioned that she needed a budget of, say, 3 to 5 percent above inflation in order to accomplish her goals. So how do you start to go after the CNO’s goals when you’re both under resourced and, on top of that, throw in the fact that we’re in a CR. Now, I know CRs are not foreign to us, unfortunately. But can you talk a little bit about how you’re addressing that, and what the impact is of the CR?
VADM Pitts: Yeah. Yeah. So, yes, as the CNO said, to achieve the 381-ship Navy we recognize that we need about 3 to 5 percent above inflation in order to be able to resource that. We also need the industrial capacity to be able to produce a navy of that size. And one of the ways – and so I said before, and I’ll kind of reiterate, it’s how we continue to advocate and raise awareness for what the Navy needs in order to be the – to meet the requirements that are facing us, and to be that critical sea aspect of the joint warfighting force, and how we enable the rest of the joint force from the sea by bringing our sea control aspects to it.
The secretary of the Navy has been a tremendous advocate and has, you know, unveiled, a number of months ago, his Maritime Statecraft Initiative to push a whole-of-government issue, looking at where we stand as a maritime nation and our capabilities for our Navy, also for our merchant marine capabilities, and where we might need to improve as a nation through Maritime Statecraft Initiative. So it’s – that’s part of the advocacy. So then we have to deal with the reality of, you know, for the 14th year out of the past 15 years, we’re starting the fiscal year off with a continuing resolution.
And, you know, a continuing resolution, it really just means that you’re kind of slower out of the gate because there may be a mismatch in, you know, what was – what’s being put forward with the president’s budget and the funding that you had last year. And this year is no different. There is a mismatch. There’s misalignment amongst the appropriations, because there might be some new starts in some things. There’s places where we’re ramping up production capacity, in the Navy’s case predominantly in our critical weapons procurements. And so the longer the CR goes, the longer it takes to get started in ramping up those capabilities, the longer it takes to get new starts moving. And that’s just a couple of examples. So it becomes very inefficient to execute the plan that was in place.
RADM Spicer: Yeah. Thank you.
Just a reminder for our audience here to use the QR code if you have questions that you want to start firing away. And then, for our viewers that are virtual, you should be able to do your questions or submit questions via the website. So I’m sure you all have great questions teed up for Admiral Pitts. I already see some coming in, sir, so.
VADM Pitts: Ok.
RADM Spicer: I want to shift topics a little bit and talk about lessons learned. I think one of the benefits – and despite the fact that there’s conflict – but one of the benefits is we’re seeing some pretty innovative technology in use today. And while what’s going on in the Red Sea and what’s going on in Russia-Ukraine are very different types of conflicts, there’s lots of similarity. And one of the similarities is the use of unmanned vehicles, relatively inexpensive vehicles, that are changing the way nations wage war. So for, you know, a very limited amount of cost, they’re having great impact.
And, you know, a good example is in the Ukraine, the use of unmanned surface vessels as weapons. And they’ve essentially wiped out a third of the Russian Black Sea fleet without, you know, a navy, essentially. So the question is, are we learning from these conflicts in how we might adopt some of these technologies in our own warfighting, as you think of the way forward?
VADM Pitts: Yeah. Absolutely. Ray, yeah, we are – we’re learning from the Russia-Ukraine aspect, and the ability to employ robotic and autonomous systems in all domains. We see it in the air. We see it on the surface. And, in fact, I would say, because we’ve learned that lesson, we’ve done two major things. One, as documented in the NAVPLAN, we stood up a nontraditional sea denial NAVPLAN implementation team – that’s being led by N95, here in the front row – where we’re taking some of those lessons from Ukraine and applying it to our own capabilities in order to deny an adversary use of the sea that they want to use.
We also have learned and realized we need to adapt faster to some of the challenges that we see. And so we stood up a Disruptive Capabilities Office earlier – I guess, late last year, early this year, building on the success that we had already started with the Unmanned Task Force of being able to rapidly identify some capability gaps or pieces of a key operational problem that the fleet brings up to us, and then swarm the problem using all key personnel from requirements side, from technology side, from acquisition, contracts, industry, et cetera, to get a solution that, in the Unmanned Task Force realm, was predominantly unmanned or robotic and autonomous. We’ve scaled it to the Disruptive Capabilities Office to go beyond just unmanned, but that’s the thrust – to rapidly swarm a problem and try and get a solution delivered to the fleet, definitely within two years, and faster if at all possible. And have had some success there.
And so that’s another example of how we’ve learned from what we’re seeing in the current events. And then in the Red Sea, we’re learning – we’ve learned how to get data off the ships faster. We’ve learned how to turn that data faster, so that we can make adjustments to either tactics, techniques, or adjustments to how you set up your system, to make sure that we’re better prepared for the next thing, as we watch our adversaries adjust their own tactics. So, it’s a nice move-countermove that we’re learning how to adapt much quicker.
RADM Spicer: Yeah. A race who can apply analytics more rapidly. And, you know, as far as the OODA loop goes, if it’s faster than the OODA loop. And I know there’s lots of activity. You mentioned Task Force 59. There’s activity in SOUTHCOM. There’s the Replicator Initiative. SecDef just came out and said countering UAS is going to be the priority for Replicator 2. So lots of activity going on there. That’s great.
Questions are coming in. So I think I’m going to pivot a little bit. I’ve got one question here from Caleb Thompson, U.S. Navy. It says: How does AI, artificial intelligence, play a role in the new NAVPLAN, as well as the priorities of the N9?
VADM Pitts: Right. Well, thank you for the question, Caleb.
So artificial intelligence is one of our key enablers – our critical key enablers that help support those key capabilities that we develop. And it’s enduring. So every one of our domains at the TICOM level has taken on efforts to incorporate AI into some aspect of their systems. The one I’m most familiar with is the submarine aspect, in that we’re using AI to help improve – at the tactical level – help improve our sonar operators to be able to detect, track, and classify targets. That’s at the tactical level.
We’re moving to the operational level of how we use AI in more operational decision making, battle management aids, et cetera. Both at each domain level, and will play in, in the how we fight from the mock P33 – the Maritime Operations Center P33 target. So it’s a piece of enabling all of our key capabilities. While I’m not the DCNO directly responsible, I use AI in just about every one of the platforms that we produce. And whether it’s relatively simple on the algorithm side, and as we continue to advance it’ll be more advanced.
RADM Spicer: Got it. Thank you. I’m going to start hitting the questions that are coming in, so please get them in if you – if you’ve got them. I do see some piling in here. This one is from a guy whose name rings a bell, Vice Admiral, Retired, Pete Daly, who happened to be the guy I relieved at the Naval Institute.
He says: When you receive requirements inputs from your platform sponsors, how do you overcome potential bias in favor of building more of what we are building now? How specifically do you, as requirements and capabilities czar, ensure we are innovating and fully embracing different concepts, futures, and solutions?
VADM Pitts: Yeah. Well, thank you, Admiral Daly.
So the requirements process itself, while the platform sponsor is the one who tees up here’s what I need, we basically put it through the ringer of a collaborative O6 level. Then a ringer of a one- and two-star level review to make sure that we’re actually moving forward with the right thing. And then ultimately, as the N9 responsible, as the CNO’s been – you know, delegated the authority to me to approve requirements, with the option for the CNO or vice chief to actually be the one that that heads it. But it’s all collaborative.
It’s all working with the entire team to ensure that we’re not, one, just blindly following a path that doesn’t necessarily make sense. Two, that, once again, the solution that’s being presented is actually achievable, that there’s a clear delta outcome to what this requirement will produce to – back to our capability gaps. And, invariably, a lot of these require some joint work that also, you know, goes in to, whether it’s the analysis of alternatives or the sufficiency reviews, et cetera.
So the whole process is built to help make sure that we aren’t blindly stovepiping something, one. Two, in the NAVPLAN, the CNO has specifically charged us to think, act, and operate differently, and to look at different ways of accomplishing that same delta outcome, or a similar delta outcome. A good example is the nontraditional sea denial, where we’re building capabilities that accomplish the same mission of what, say, your classic naval mine might do, but with different capabilities and platforms to accomplish that same mission.
RADM Spicer: Excellent. Thank you. All right, questions are coming in. I want to talk a minute about deterrence, and the Navy’s role in deterrence. And in particular, in the Red Sea. And now, as the N9, you essentially have to sell requirements and capabilities to folks who will support it. So the scenario in the Red Sea, though, is a challenging one, because the Navy is essentially there. They’re doing wonderfully. They’re playing defense primarily. There is some offense involved. But if you think about why our Navy is there, and why our allies and partners are there with us, it is to ensure the free flow of commerce through the –through the Red Sea.
It’s down 90 percent, the flow of commerce through the Red Sea. So does that present challenges to you, when you’re trying to sell, you know, why we need a navy, why we need more – why we need more requirements, when, essentially, we’re very successful, tactically – highly successful – but we’re not doing so great on the strategic side because we’re not deterring, essentially. Does that present problems for you, or challenges for you as you try to sell requirements and capabilities down the road?
VADM Pitts: No. Not really.
RADM Spicer: OK. (Laughter.)
VADM Pitts: Yeah. (Laughs.) I think, you know, what’s happening in the Red Sea actually is helping, you know, us show why we need a navy or – and I would say, even in combination with our Marine Corps partners – a naval – why we need naval forces to do what Title 10 tells us we’re supposed to do. And we’re executing it. I think part of your question is a policy question that isn’t really in my lane. And so – but what our Navy does every day, day-in and day-out, and what is happening in the Red Sea right now, to me, is just more of that advocacy of, you know, why a navy exists for the American people.
RADM Spicer: Yeah. OK, great. We’ve got lots of industry represented, both here in person and virtually.
Let me ask this question that just came in. Bob Dishman, Sierra Nevada Corporation: Disruptive Capabilities Office has been difficult for industry to engage. Seems more like a closed enclave for a few instead of a broad market research tool. Is there room for increased industry engagement? And I would just pile on top of that is, are there ways that industry can help you in your role as the N9?
VADM Pitts: Yeah. So thank you for the question. Yes, absolutely, there’s room for industry to engage with the Disruptive Capabilities Office. The director of the Disruptive Capabilities Office is Mr. Michael Stewart. Feel free to reach out directly to him. (Laughs.) You know, he works directly for the vice chief. But I’m in that C2 lane, if you will. So and if – and if for some reason you’re not – you feel like you’re not getting active returns from Michael, just reach out to me. We can work it out. Because that is part of what Disruptive Capabilities Office is supposed to do, is to engage with industry on these once the problem has been identified. And potential solutions to – industry is a key piece of it.
I think, to the second part of your question of how can – how can industry help? I view it as a two-way street, that we work collaboratively with industry. And we should do it on the upfront side of requirements, in stride. If things start, you know, falling behind, we need to have a discussion about whether it’s the big-R warfighting requirements or some of the little-R system specifications or tech authority aspects. And it’s a team effort between industry, the requirements side, our acquisition community, that we all work together. Because working together is the only way we’re going to accomplish the NAVPLAN goals that the CNO has put in front of us. And, you know, how we can help industry and how industry can help us should be a continuous conversation.
RADM Spicer: Great.
Well, speaking of working together, I got a question about collaboration as you were answering that. Captain Dan’l Steward, U.S. Navy, retired: Can you speak to the degree of collaboration between your directorate and those who wargame strategic future naval engagements?
VADM Pitts: Yeah. Thank you for that question.
Yes, we work incredibly closely together. As I said, my fellow deputy chief of naval operations for N3, (N)5, and (N)7, and N7 is the organization that works our force design, that works the wargaming and experimentation that we’ll do to support our force design efforts – force design 2045, and as we look at what that future Navy needs to look like, building off the NAVPLAN, where we know that we have to incorporate robotic and autonomous systems and build a more hybrid fleet. So that collaboration is very tight, because from the force design then flows battle force structure assessments, which then flows shipbuilding plans, which then flows also the capabilities that we need to put on those ships, and that mix of platforms for our future Navy.
RADM Spicer: Thank you.
One from Peter Ong from Naval News. And Peter submitted several questions. Thank you, Peter. There is concern that the U.S. Navy will not have enough VLS cells for Tomahawk with the retirement of the SSGNs. The Virginia payload module is a slow remedy start. Why hasn’t the U.S. Navy built Arsenal ships, more Mark 70 payload modules, armed LUSVs, or bought adaptable deck launchers?
VADM Pitts: Peter, thank you for that question. In the near term, I will tell you that we have plenty of VLS cells for the Tomahawk missiles that we have in inventory, both on the surface and under the sea. But I readily admit we are losing some significant capability when we decommission our SSGNs in the coming years. And we’re exploring options to what some follow-on capability may or may not be. And, as you point out, in the interim the replacement capability is building the Virginia payload module Virginia-class submarines. And we’ll build a number of them to help mitigate the loss of the SSGN.
And on the surface side, we’re continually looking and exploring our family of unmanned systems on the surface side, from small all the way up to large, and how the payloads that we put in each and every one of them may contribute to replacing or providing some additional VLS capability. But in the near term, we have enough VLS cells for the munitions that we have in inventory.
RADM Spicer: Great. Thank you.
All right, we’re going to take you to the Arctic now. David Redpath, Canadian Joint Warfare Centre: What do you see as the most interesting capabilities required for the Arctic area of operations?
VADM Pitts: David, thank you for the question. As a submariner, I will show my bias a little bit in saying that our undersea capability is interesting. It may not be the most interesting, but it is interesting in facing, you know, the potential adversaries that may want to operate on or under the Arctic. But the joint force still has to have all the capabilities it needs to fly, sail, operate in Arctic environments. And we can’t – we can’t lose sight of that. And I believe that, as a joint force, we’re still developing, you know, capabilities to execute what’s required.
RADM Spicer: Thank you.
One from Benjamin Massengale, Stimson Center: What is your level of collaboration with your equivalents with the other services to meet joint requirements and potential cover NAVPLAN – or, potentially cover NAVPLAN objectives?
VADM Pitts: Yeah. Thank you for that question. I would say we have a pretty close relationship with our – with my service counterparts. In my previous job as director of warfare integration, I was the Navy representative to the Joint Capabilities Boards. And now I support the vice chief at the JROC level. But a perfect example is between the Department of Navy and the Department of Air Force.
We started a joint long-range fires office, where it’s collaboration with the Department of Air Force – Space Force, and the Air Force, and then the Navy, and Marine Corps on how we collectively partner to bring to life our long-range fires kill webs. We have recently, as part of that work, have also added the Army, and the long-range fires capabilities that they bring. So that is really a tangible example of how we’re collaborating across the services to execute the joint warfighting concept and bring to life the joint key battle for advantage of long-range fires.
RADM Spicer: Thank you.
One from Jim Hossell (ph), U.S. Navy: How do you foresee seabed warfare playing a role in the Navy’s future strategy?
VADM Pitts: Mmm hmm. I see it playing a role. We have a number of sub seabed warfare efforts ongoing. Most of them are at a classification that we can’t talk about in – you know, in this venue. But it will be – I fully expect it to be a part of our future. And in a sense, it’s really a – could be a subset of either long-range fires or nontraditional sea denial.
RADM Spicer: OK. Thank you.
I want to shift topics to a little bit about operational availability and how that influences, or how that is calculated in your role in developing requirements and capabilities. So the example is, you know, we have 50 SSNs, but at any one time 19-20 of them are in some kind of maintenance or are waiting to go into maintenance. So does operational availability weigh in to your calculations about what we need for future requirements? Is that a consideration, I guess, is the question.
VADM Pitts: Ray, yes, absolutely. It either becomes one of the key performance parameters or a key, you know, system attribute of the operational availability built – you know, designed and built from the ground up to improve that over what it may be replacing.
Also, one of the P33 targets specifically is ready our platforms, with the target goal of achieving essentially 80 percent operational readiness of our aircraft, submarines, and ships. And we have a number of efforts with our current fleet attacking that problem to improve the operational availability.
So new requirements work to improve operational availability. The existing fleet – we are doing a number of performance-to-plan efforts to improve the operational availability of our existing platforms.
RADM Spicer: Right.
VADM Pitts: And you know, the one that we like to discuss of the recently – over the previous two to three years – was improving aircraft, fighter aircraft, you know, uptime and availability from somewhere in the 50 to 60s to over 80 percent.
RADM Spicer: Right.
VADM Pitts: And similar efforts are moving forward in both the undersea community and the surface community, and we have a specific target that the CNO has charged us to get after, so.
RADM Spicer: Yeah. Yeah, she talked about that when she was here at CSIS, the 80 percent number, of –
VADM Pitts: Yeah.
RADM Spicer: – combat surge capability to support this, you know, get more players on the field.
VADM Pitts: Get more players on the field. That’s one of –
RADM Spicer: So I’ve got time ask one more question if you have one coming in. If not, I’m going to talk about one that you and I discussed previously that is about the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution – PPB&E – reform, which, as you know, there’s a commission that talked about PPB&E reform. We’ve been talking about it for a number of years. It needs to improve. I’m just wondering, you know, they came out – the commission came out with several recommendations, and – but I’m wondering if you’re starting to see any of that playing out in the requirements process or if it’s still too early to tell. Any thoughts on that?
VADM Pitts: Right. Thanks, Ray.
I would say it’s – for its impact on the requirements process, it’s still a little early. But I will tell you the Department of the Navy is moving out on at least exploring a couple of the recommendations and building options to look at a couple of the recommendations from the PPB team.
Those two are: budget restructure, so how we might restructure the budget – you know, the appropriations and line items in a more efficient or warfighting support role – some options are being looked at there; and then budget line item consolidation is also being explored. It’s still early in the process, but the Department of the Navy is moving out on some of those recommendations from the reform team.
RADM Spicer: All right. Thank you.
All right, I’ve got the last question here from Franca Limner (ph), MIT D.C. office: What are the opportunities and hurdles in working with NATO allies to reach the capabilities needed for a potential direct conflict, looking at, for example, icebreakers or AI technologies?
VADM Pitts: So I would – NATO is not my forte, and so I would – you know, these types of questions probably should go to NAVEUR.
But I will say I was just recently in – at STRIKFORNATO doing a visit as part of the REP(MUS), you know, unmanned systems exercise in Portugal. I will just tell you that the NATO team is incredibly excited by how well they’re collaborating together. They’re excited by the new members who have joined NATO. And so I – my takeaway was very positive.
I think everyone knows the inherent challenges of – that all members have to agree to most actions moving forward, but they seem to be working through it just fine. And any deeper questions I would defer to NAVEUR.
RADM Spicer: Yeah. I think more broadly, though, we were talking previously is about the importance of working with our allies and partners.
VADM Pitts: Oh, absolutely.
RADM Spicer: You know, we can’t do it our – alone. So both working with allies and partners and with the joint force, you know, we’re a piece of it, but it’s not just all Navy.
VADM Pitts: Yeah, it’s not just us. I completely agree.
RADM Spicer: Yeah.
VADM Pitts: And our NATO allies definitely bring lots of capability, and all of our allies and partners bring capability that we know that we will rely on should conflict arise.
RADM Spicer: Sir.
Well, questions are still coming in, but we’re, unfortunately, out of time. And that’s the sign of a great conversation, when we have more questions than we have time to answer.
So, again, I want to thank CSIS for the great partnership. I want to thank HII for the great sponsorship. But mostly I want to thank you, Admiral Pitts. And if you would please join me in a round of applause, I’d appreciate it. (Applause.)
VADM Pitts: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.)
(END.)
