Assessing a Year of War in the Middle East

FROMAN: Hi. Good morning, everybody. Welcome. It’s a great pleasure to see you all here today. I’m Mike Froman, president of the Council. And it’s an honor to welcome you to this symposium, cohosted by the Council on Foreign Relations and Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. CFR and INSS have done a number of programs over the years. And Frank Lowy, who we’re pleased to have joining us today, has been a crucial part of that effort to work on our joint programming.

I’d like to also welcome a very familiar face in these hallways, let alone the set of Morning Joe, and that is President Emeritus Richard Haass. Welcome. He’s been a great source of guidance. I’m grateful to him for his continued support of the Council, particularly now that he’s making a private-sector salary. So welcome back. Welcome back, Richard.

Today’s conversations are centered around assessing more than a year of war in the Middle East and the pathways toward peace. And nobody was more central to that effort to pursue peace in the Middle East than our late colleague and friend Martin Indyk. A veteran diplomat and author, Martin was the Lowy distinguished fellow in Middle East diplomacy and a longtime Council member. He was also a beloved father and husband. And we’re joined today by Martin’s family, including his wife, Gahl. Thank you for being here. And today’s session on “The ‘Day After’ and the Future of the Peace Process” is very much dedicated to Martin. May his memory be a blessing.

About thirty years ago, Yitzhak Rabin and Mahmoud Abbas signed the Oslo Accords, which set in motion an incremental process of reconciliation. Martin was President Clinton’s special assistant for the Middle East at that time, and the closest the two parties have come to actually achieving a durable, lasting peace. Over time, Martin saw those accords break down, beginning with the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. And it did not survive the settlement expansion and a series of Intifadas. In his last piece for Foreign Affairs, Martin argued that the war that began with Hamas’ brutal attack on October 7 paradoxically resurrected the enthusiasm for the two-state solution. And although he recognized that the conflict had evolved over the last thirty years, and the promise of Oslo had never materialized, he argued that the war in Gaza cannot end without fashioning a more stable order for the region, including a credible path toward a two-state solution.

He acknowledged that while there were a rising chorus of voices in supporting enthusiasm for that solution, the situation on the ground was far from ready. And still, there was a need for a day-after strategy in Gaza. And that is one of the areas of focus of today’s symposium. We need to ask ourselves whether our Middle East policy, which has undergone so many changes since Oslo, should still be based on assumptions of the 1990s. It’s an area deserving of future work and I hope we’ll get to begin that conversation today. Certainly, this region is never boring, but we’re meeting at a particularly interesting and crucial time. Just last week, the United States helped broker a ceasefire between Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon—imperfect in its implementation, but still holding, to a certain degree.

Meanwhile, over the weekend, Syrian antigovernment rebels took control of most of Aleppo, and delivering a surprising setback for both Assad and his supporters of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Iran remains a wildcard in the situation. Closer to being able to produce nuclear weapons than ever before, it finds its primary pillars of deterrence and defense, its proxies, Hezbollah, and its own sizeable missile capability proving relatively feckless against Israel’s defenses and that of the United States and other allies and partners. U.S. policy towards Iran has not succeeded in curbing its nuclear program, nor its ambitions for destabilizing the region. Again, an area worthy of future work and part of our conversation this morning.

And meanwhile, there’s fundamental change going on elsewhere in the region, including the Gulf. I just returned from a factfinding mission with CFR term members through Saudi Arabia, where the crown prince has undertaken nothing short of a major transformation economically and socially of the kingdom. What he wants to create is a—what he calls, a normal country. Saudi’s relationship with the U.S., China, Iran, Israel are evolving in significant ways. And there’s much to understand about the potential implications of that for the broader region as well. So needless to say, the region is dynamic. And in response to that dynamism, we have a full day of sessions, including on U.S. Strategy Towards Iran, The Day After and the Future of the Peace Process, and Strategic Lessons from One Year of War.

As we look ahead to today’s discussion, I leave you with one more thought from Martin. In his final Foreign Affairs interview, where he sat down with editor Dan Kurtz-Phelan, Dan asked him why he devoted almost half a century and nearly all of his professional life, including his final days, to the pursuit of the peace in the Middle East. In response, Martin said the following: “I’ve had my Mount Nebo moment. Mount Nebo was when Moses was shown the promised land and told by God that he would not cross into it. And I’ve seen the promised land. And I’ve seen what it looks like. I’ve negotiated the details. I know where they will end up. There’s a lot more killing, unfortunately, but I can see it and how it will work out. And so even though I won’t cross over, I’m still confident that in the end, as all conflicts come to an end, this one will too. And its result will be a two-state solution.”

Let’s hope that Martin’s words about all conflicts coming to an end prove prophetic. Thank you, again, for joining us today. And with that, let me turn it over to Steven Cook, our first moderator, the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for the Middle East and Africa studies here at the Council. Steven.

COOK: Thanks very much, Mike. It’s a great pleasure to be with you here this morning.

I’m joined here in New York by my colleagues and friends Nazanin Boniadi, a human rights activist, actor, 2023 Sydney Peace Prize Laureate, and most importantly a CFR member; as well as Assaf Orion, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Israel. And on Zoom, my colleague, Elliott Abrams, who’s joining us from Washington, D.C.

I just want to reiterate this session is on the record. We also have about 180 members online. And I’ll engage the panel for about thirty minutes, and then we’ll open it to Q&A.

One late addition to our agenda today, at 12:15 Brett McGurk, who is the coordinator at the White House on Middle East policy, will be joining us via Zoom. And I’ll be engaging with him in a fireside chat about what’s going on in the Middle East. There’s a lot—(laughs)—that’s happening since we put these panels together. That conversation will be strictly off the record. But I promise you, it will be an interesting one.

I also—before we begin, I just want to thank the CFR Meetings team; Simone Lipkind, who had served as Martin’s research associate; as well as our friends and colleagues from INSS in Israel. It’s been a great pleasure working with you all in putting this together.

Let me start with Elliott. Elliott, as you well know—and I’ve just got back from the Middle East—President-elect Trump’s election has been welcomed throughout the region. And particularly in Israel. If the president-elect has never eschewed doing a deal with Tehran, and at moments during his first administration when he could have legitimately used military force against Iran for a variety of transgressions he decided to back off, are Israelis wrong to be optimistic about President-elect Trump’s Iran policy?

ABRAMS: Well, good morning. I don’t think they’re wrong. I guess there’s one place in the Middle East where perhaps his victory was not welcome. That’s to Iran. I think it’s worth saying that the Trump policy was not maximum pressure, period. It was maximum pressure, pushing toward a negotiation. His criticism of the JCPOA was that it was not comprehensive. That is, that it did not include missiles, and it did not, above all, include proxies, and that it was time limited. The goal of maximum pressure was to corner the regime in Iran, to push it hard enough to bankrupt it, so that it would have to engage in a negotiation. He was willing to use force. Though he didn’t hit Iran he did, of course, kill General Soleimani outside of Iran.

I make the assumption, looking at the people involved, that this is going to be the policy again. There will be a ramping up with sanctions, a freezing of funds whenever possible, with the longer goal of getting the Iranians to agree to stop their nuclear weapons program and their support of proxies. Whether any of that is attainable would only be determined if the pressure campaign can be remounted, it’s going to be harder this time, and if the regime is willing to engage in those negotiations and make those compromises. You know, the ground’s different. I mean, Hamas and Hezbollah are greatly weakened. It’s interesting that today there are reports that Iraqi Shia militias are going to the assistance of the Assad regime, not Hezbollah, which would have happened, say, a year ago. So it’s a different scene in the Middle East. But I do think that Trump’s Iran policy is going to look a lot like it did in, say, 2020.

COOK: Let me just follow up very quickly on that, Elliott. Under what circumstances do we think that the Iranians would be willing? Trump breached the JCPOA. Why would they—why would they negotiate with him?

ABRAMS: They would negotiate with him because he’s president of the United States and because he’s bankrupting them. Now, maybe he can’t do that. I mean, 95—roughly 95 percent of Iranian oil sales today are to China. It’s going to be a lot harder to interfere with those sales and with the money that comes out of them. But if you can do that—I mean, look, Iran is in a much worse position today than it was a year or so ago. Again, two of its key proxies—Hamas and Hezbollah—have been—we use the term “decimated.” That means 10 percent. They’ve been much more than decimated. And there is the threat of the use of force if they move forward with their nuclear weapons program. So they’d be crazy not to think carefully about whether they could gain something from a negotiation.

COOK: All right. Let me turn to domestic politics in Iran. Whenever there’s a protest or some explosion of public opposition to the regime in Iran, there’s a debate in Washington. The president should offer full-throated support for the protests. And then the other half of Washington says, no, we don’t want to do that because that will give the regime an opportunity to delegitimize the protests. What’s the better policy? You know Iran domestic politics better than anyone. What should the United States do, given the fact that Iran continues—as you have pointed out—continues to be roiled by protest and demonstration that began with Mahsa Amini’s tragic death and has continued ever since, even though it’s not in the headlines here in the United States?

BONIADI: That’s right, Steve. You know, it’s not only a moral imperative—I mean, for too long human rights has been a foreign policy soft topic, as you know. But as our friend Karim Sadjadpour says, are three pillars to—or, should be three pillars to U.S. foreign policy towards Iran. There’s the nuclear issue. There’s regional aggression. And there’s the domestic issue. And we’ve really neglected, definitely, one of those—the domestic side, sometimes the regional stuff, and we’ve focused wholeheartedly on the nuclear issue.

Now, what’s wrong with that is that in every other context where we’ve seen progress made, human rights has been at the center of that foreign policy. Whether it’s ending the Cold War, or South Africa—ending Apartheid South Africa. And we should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. And I think it was former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul who said that it wasn’t U.S. arms controllers who ended the Cold War with the Soviet Union. It was small-d Russian democrats. And similarly, the Achilles heel of this regime is the Iranian people. And we must invest in them.

COOK: But let me ask you the crux of the issue. There’s a protest. There’s demonstrations throughout Iran. And the president United States says: We support the Iranian people’s call for a more democratic, open, and just society. Can’t the regime use that then against those protesters? I mean, to what extent—we’ve seen that the regime has been able to marshal significant support for itself. Why is that—why would that be neutralized by the president of the United States making such a bold statement?

BONIADI: The truth is, they’re going to use that whether the president of the United States makes that statement or not. I mean, historically their narrative and their whole reason for being is death to America, death to Israel. And so that animosity is needed for their own survival. There’s no way that they’re going to, you know, change that narrative, whatever the U.S. president says. It’s not going to influence that. Nowhere in the national sort of agenda is long live Iran. It’s only ever been death to America, death to Israel. And so really, their Achillies heel right now is Iranian nationalism, patriotism. And if we don’t recognize that, it’s not just a moral imperative, as I said. It’s something that will benefit the world, and definitely the U.S. Global stability comes with a free and democratic Iran.

COOK: Fair enough.

Assaf, Israel and Iran are engaged in essentially warfare. I don’t know how many times since April I’ve heard the term Israel and Iran have crossed the Rubicon. That rather than fighting through proxies and other places, they have attacked each other. But after a year of war in which Hamas has been degraded, Hezbollah greatly weakened, as Elliott pointed out decimated is not actually the right term for this, there’s a belief that Iran is exposed. And there are those in Israel who are arguing that now is a unique moment for Israel to take matters into its own hands and to strike at Israel’s nuclear—at Iran’s nuclear facilities. Is that the appropriate way to go?

ORION: You know, in 2006 I joined the general staff. And since that time, I became more aware of the discourse and discussions of when is the right time to strike Iran. There’s an urban legend that Einstein’s students came to him and told him, professor, this year’s questions are just like last year. And he said, yes, but this time’s answer are totally different. So we need to revisit the changing and unchanging questions that we need to address. The unchanging questions is what are the prospects for success and what is the cost? And the changing are the context around it and actually feeding those two main questions.

So saying that now is the time to attack Iran is actually addressing the cost issue. Because, well, we used to say it’s a buy-one get-one problem. If you strike Iran, you immediately get war with Hezbollah. So that we can take. We already had the war with the Hezbollah. And Hezbollah is off the table as a big deterrent against Israel. For many years, by the way, Iran waged and has been waging war against Israel, probably since ’79. But coming out of the twilight into broad daylight exchange of blows is a new phase. And it’s very informative, because we took two incoming ballistic and other missiles strikes into Israel with very limited success to the Iranians, and with a little help of our friends, which also says something about the strategic disposition of the Middle East. There is big potential here, at least on the defensive.

That being said, Israel has visited Iran twice. One just signaling and the other actually demonstrating what we—what we have in stock. And I think both sides now are better aware of the actual ratio between talk and walk, between what people, you know, blast in their announcement and what the kinetics actually dictate. So Israel can apparently go to Iran, get to Iran, fly in Iran, strike in Iran, do many things. There are many other operational—technical operational questions to ask. OK, how can we get to which side? What’s the penetration level? What’s the destruction? What will be the remaining capabilities? After such, what will be Iran’s options with the remains? Who will be standing by us, who follow suit to the last step?

All these, I think, are still valid questions. But certainly, Israel is, I would say, deeply transformed after October 7. Its risk appetite has been totally transformed. We used to say, OK, but this will lead to war. My chief of general staff and General Gantz used to say, operations we do when we can, wars we do when we must. We’re now fourteen months into a war. And it becomes almost a routine situation in Israel, which is a profound change. So I think in this sense the prospects of such a strike on Iran have risen. Looking at the general constellation on the grand strategic level I think all also drives this way. And if the U.S. doesn’t do it itself, Israel certainly seems far more leaning to do so than it’s been in the past.

COOK: So, if I get you correctly, what you’re suggesting is that an attack on Iran’s nuclear program would be a war of choice rather than a war of necessity at this point. But what is—what is the, to your mind, the prospects of this actually happening? Given everything that you know, recognizing that there are these questions that remain open, do you think that the prospects of an Israeli strike are greater now, with the Trump administration in office than they had been previously, and as a result of everything that’s happened over the course of the last year?

ORION: I think that over the years it became—the late Meir Dagan, chief of Mossad, used to say, “We need to do this not only when the sword is on the throat, but when it’s actually cutting our flesh.” So, you know, the absolute last resort. With the proximity of Iran to the nuclear decision, in this sense, from decision to implementation, with the assessment of what’s going on around, I think we’re closer to the throat, in a sense. And the deliberations of whether it will be a last resort or not are much thinner, so to speak. So I think we are closer even before figuring out the Trump administration approach to that, because it brings also some tensions. We don’t start new wars. If you don’t start new wars, how can you threaten me? Yes, but I’m unpredictable. So take into account.

COOK: But let me pick up on that. This is—before I get back to Elliott and Nazanin. Based on what Elliott was suggesting, is the president of the United States is interested in a deal. That maximum pressure is going to come back because he wants a better deal than the JCPOA. What you’re suggesting is, though, that Israel may, in fact, believe that it needs to undertake a strike on Iran’s nuclear program. How do you manage the differences between the Trump administration and Israel under these circumstances? The Trump administration has been welcomed widely by Israelis, but as you yourself point out there is this tension.

ORION: Strategy is ridden with tensions. If you want to do maximum pressure, well, guess what? The Iranians are not going to accept it sitting. Last time that such pressure was applied things started flying to Saudi Arabia, to the UAE. Look at the Houthi expansion, and so on. Things go ballistic when you apply economic pressure. So when you say, I want a deal, I’m going to pressure you on the economic side, guess what? Iran is going to say, OK, but I have those proxies still alive. I’m going to attack your friends, your partners. Whoever is in with Israel helping it will be struck. So immediately, America finds itself in an area, well, much more mined and complicated than just I will push you economically, and you will sign here, you know, under the line.

And a last, I think, saying is that in your question there is an implied dichotomy between diplomacy and military measures. I see them as one complex, when one is serving the other. When military pressure is used for diplomatic gains and diplomatic achievements are finalizing the military achievements. So I think it’s a complementary relations.

COOK: OK. Elliott, let me get back to you. In an article in Foreign Affairs last spring, 2023—2024, sorry—you argued that in order to deter Iran, Israeli victory in Gaza and Lebanon was necessary. Fair enough argument. My question is, is deterring Iran enough? I mean, doesn’t that leave the regime in place? And, as Nazanin has pointed out, the regime—this is a regime that is a legendary abuser of their own people and a source of instability throughout the region. Why leave this regime in place? Why is deterrence enough, from your perspective, given what we know about the Iranian regime, or what we believe about the Iranian regime?

ABRAMS: This is a very—I think a very fundamental question. I was thinking about it as Nazanin was talking, because I happen to agree with her analysis. But I think the danger here is that for people—that for President Trump himself, and some others around him, they hear what Nazanin was saying, or the question you just asked, and they say, uh-oh, regime change. Been there. Done that. We don’t like that. Endless wars. You know, we’re not for nation building. That’s the danger, I think. That that they say, OK, I get the nuclear part. I get the regional proxy terrorism part. But don’t talk to me about regime change in Iran.

There was, I would say, a continuity between Trump and Biden—maybe you could even say Obama, Trump, and Biden—on this question. In that all three were weak in giving real support to the Iranian people against the regime. And I think this is a real danger for Trump two, that he continues that policy of underestimating the strategic importance, as Nazanin explained it, of support for the Iranian people. That’s something I’d watch for.

COOK: That’s a—that’s a terrific pivot back to Nazanin. As you see it, there’s this discussion—maximum pressure, unique opportunities to strike Iran. Both of these things have an impact on the Iranian people. To your mind, one, what is it that the Iranian people want? And what’s the best way for people to actually help the Iranian people? They seem to be the ones who have no voice here. We don’t hear their voices. We hear Javad Zarif, who’s going to be—who’s in Foreign Affairs. We hear Iranians outside the country. And we hear policymakers in Israel and the United States, as well as other parts of the region, talk about Iran. But we never hear what Iranians themselves want. So is it maximum pressure, a unique opportunity, and human rights? Is it those things—not those things, and something else? What is—from your perspective as an advocate and someone who has tremendous insight, what’s the best way to go about this? And what’s the best way to help the Iranian people?

BONIADI: Excellent question. I mean, I’m in touch with people inside Iran on a daily basis. And one thing is very clear. This idea, this notion that regime change—it’s become a dirty term in Washington. And in this context, no Iranian is asking to be saved. We want to be clear. Nobody is saying, please come in and wage war and take this regime out. They are perfectly willing to do this. They’re saying, stop saving this regime. Stop platforming this regime.

I don’t mean to call anybody out in this room, but now that Javad Zarif is in Foreign Affairs I will quote him. He said he’s calling for a referendum for the Palestinian people. How about internationally we call for a referendum, an internationally monitored referendum, for the Iranian people. He talks about—in Foreign Affairs, he talks about why the Palestinian people will succeed. He says that when people have nothing to lose they cannot be defeated. We have to believe that about the Iranian people. It’s ironic that he talks about that in a different context.

Iran is ripe for change. And if we fail to seize the moment—and I don’t mean inciting regime change, I don’t mean going in and causing, you know, a shift—that will happen organically. We need to stop saving this regime. That means no business as usual. That means enforcing sanctions. You know, throwing out sanctions is fine, but if they’re not enforced then what good are they? And any entity that is sending surveillance technology—I mean, I’m now calling out German companies that send surveillance technology to the Islamic Republic. There must be punitive measures against them.

We must recognize gender apartheid under international law so that we can hold this regime to account. We shouldn’t be afraid of calling on our allies to use that term enough to normalize it enough so that it’s recognized under international law. And we have to find a long-term strategy to provide internet access to the Iranian people when there’s an internet blackout. These are tangible steps that we can take. And we really haven’t invested in it.

And finally, the propaganda issue. The Islamic Republic and its allies spend in the billions on their propaganda. The Islamic Republic ranks 177 of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index. Do you think an American official can write a piece openly in Iran? That’s not going to happen. And yet, we afford that same opportunity to Islamic Republic officials. We have former Islamic Republic officials working at Princeton University, formerly at Oberlin College. And that needs to stop. Meaning, sure, that people are entitled to their opinion, but can we please stop centering them on the world stage and actually countering their propaganda? Those are tangible things we can do.

COOK: Thank you. Thank you. It is just about 9:00. And that means we have an opportunity for questions from the audience and for those who are online. There are mics on the side of the room. Get my attention. I’ll call on you. Just one reminder, this is an on-the-record session. When I call on you, please identify yourself before asking your question. Thanks very much. Everybody’s shy this morning.

Well, while you are up—here, please. Wait for the mic.

Q: Ellen Chesler.

How about reform from within? Is that impossible at this juncture, in terms of the regime in Iran?

BONIADI: Thank you for the question. The forty-five-year case study on the Islamic Republic has shown us that reform is impossible. And the reason is because the very pillars of the system ensure its wrongs cannot be made right. So unfortunately—and that’s why the Iranian people are jaded. They know that reform is impossible. That’s why they take to the streets. That’s why they risk their lives. And so, no, unfortunately, reform is impossible in the current system.

COOK: Others? Right here.

Q: Nazee Moinian. Hi, Nazanin. Nice to see you again.

This is a question for probably Elliott. And it’s not about Iran but it it’s about Israel. What about the other H in the militia, terrorist group of groups—Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and now we have Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the rebels in Syria, that are Takfiris that are reactionary Islamists? Does that pose a threat to Israel, if they succeed?

ABRAMS: Well, one comment on the Houthis, first. I think that’s going to be a very interesting early test of the Trump administration. We know that CENTCOM, General Kurilla and the U.S. Navy, have complained to Washington over the last six or eight months that our Navy ships are basically sitting ducks, and that Iranian missiles are being shot at them constantly, and they’re playing defense. They have a fielder’s glove. They have no bat. What’s Trump going to do about that? Is he going to, if you will, unleash them, or order them to attack the Houthis? Is he going to threaten Iran, that if an Iranian-supplied missile hits an American naval ship then there’ll be an American strike on Iran? I think that’s something really worth watching between the end of January and, say, the summer.

As to Syria, my impression of the Israeli take on this is that they have a—remember the—I can’t remember whose statement this is—that states are cold monsters. Israel seems to have arrived at a kind of modus vivendi, as has the United States, as had the Gulf Arabs, with the Assad regime, under the theory that what would come next would be no better. My impression of the Israeli policy is that they were OK with where things stood two weeks ago, and their ability to keep hitting Hezbollah efforts through Syria, or Iranian efforts to resupply Hezbollah through Syria. I’d toss this back to Assad Orion. Is Israel prepared to see a change in that, potentially a significant increase in Turkish influence in Syria?

COOK: Elliott, you read my mind, because I was going to ask Assaf to respond as well.

ORION: Well, in in many cases we have a knee-jerk reflex going back to the last time we met this problem. And indeed, the last time was, well, better the devil you know. Assad had better stay. The fifty shades of black flags are very bad. All Takfiris were born equal, and things like that. I think we need to recognize several things. We’re not discussing who will govern Syria. We are now in the first skirmish of a new phase in the civil war. If we go on autopilot—so when the Western coalition goes after Daesh, when there is a pitched battle between the axis of Iran, Hezbollah, the regime—the Assad regime, and the Iraqi militias, and Fatemiyoun, and Zainabiyoun, and all the others, if the Western coalition goes after the black flags, the axis gains benefit. Actually, it has the U.S. forces fighting for it.

So I would divide the phases. Right now, when they’re in the middle of the skirmish, we wish success to all. At the same time, we shouldn’t drop our eyes from the ball, which is going after the axis, going after Iran in Syria, and all the militias, and the preparation it does to continue supporting Hezbollah. I think that’s where we should stand. But also, this is a discussion with Turkey. We’re having a very interesting Astana Summit, if you wish, but fought by bullets. So wait and see. Don’t rush to conclusions. We know both devils. We haven’t tried ISIS controlling Syria, nor do I think that it will happen very soon. This is the interim phase where we need to take stock. And, as the Chinese say, sit on the mountain top, watch the tigers fight it out.

COOK: Granted, there is this interim dynamic period that I think it’s comfortable for Israel to—and the United States, quite frankly—to root for all sides. Like the Iran-Iraq War, everybody was for it. But is Israel prepared for the possibility of a Turkish-backed Islamist government in Damascus?

ORION: I think that’s a theory so far removed from current. Like, I don’t see the utter collapse of Assad immediately. And then I don’t think it’s a possibility that needs to—I would say, to dominate our thinking currently. We need to keep our eyes on the ball. The eyes is on the Iranian axis. If these enemies of my enemies are at work, it doesn’t mean that they are friends. But they are useful enemies.

COOK: But, again, focusing on the Iran and the axis leaves the door open to the possibility of a Turkish-backed Islamist government in Damascus. I know you don’t want to talk about it, so let’s go to—let’s go to questions. Right here. Right here. Oh, no, no, no. Not Elise.

Q: I’m Raghida Dergham, Beirut Institute.

And I would like to know—you decide who to allocate this to, this question. But Elliott, I’m interested—

COOK: I don’t want to decide for you, Raghida.

Q: All right. (Laughs.) I’ll decide for myself. Elliott, you’re proposing that the Trump administration is likely to give the offer of rewards to Iran in order to tempt it to cooperate, as part of the maximum pressure. How far is assessment in, as far as the Iran Iranian interests in receiving these rewards, and really reforming the doctrine? It’s about the doctrine of proxies. Do you trust that they will reform? Or do you agree that they will not reform? And therefore, what are you expecting now, for example, as a test of the will in Lebanon? Right now in Lebanon we have a very fragile ceasefire. Let’s see if it’s going to last. And I’d like to know if we think the Israelis are—it’s in their interest to maintain the ceasefire. Not only the Iranians, but I’d like to address both the Iranian and the Israeli element. And the impact, particularly after the events in Syria, and its extension into, like you said, Elliott, the Iraqi proxy that is—we’re not paying attention to as it operates in Syria and inside Iraq. Thank you.

ABRAMS: Well, first, Trump, when he talks about Iran, as far as I can remember, doesn’t use the word “reform.” This is the problem that I was mentioning before, that the domestic scene does not seem to be—did not seem to be of much interest. So the deal that he wants dealt, I think, with proxies, with missiles, and with the nuclear program. Why would Iran agree to such a deal? There aren’t really any carrots in it, except the removal of sticks. That is, much more economic pressure, as in his first term, perhaps some military pressure as well. And the removal of those sanctions and economic pressures would help the regime because it has a population that in large part hates it. And if the economy is in bad shape, that makes their domestic situation even worse. So I don’t think there are really carrots, except for the removal of sticks. I don’t think he—in his view of the negotiation, there is a requirement for—you know, for the release of political prisoners, for free press, for free elections. That doesn’t seem to be how he sees it.

COOK: I’m told we have a question online.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Aaron Miller.

Q: Yeah. Terrific panel.

To anybody who wants to venture a guess on the next administration’s policy in Iran. Our policy toward Iran is, by definition, transactional, because transformation, normal peaceful relations with a regime that is as heavily ideological and adversarial, doesn’t seem to be possible. So when we talk about diplomacy now, what are we really talking about? What’s a quid pro quo? Longer timelines to cap Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for what the Iranians would demand, massive relief from U.S. and international sanctions? Maybe, Elliott, you might want to comment, if you if you would. Is that the basis of the deal?

ABRAMS: Well, the deal would require Iran to stop trying to build nuclear weapons. So, for example, I mean, as you try to think what does that mean? It means the exportation of massive amounts of enriched uranium. In the four Biden years, they have really increased significantly the amount and the degree of enrichment of uranium, compared to four years ago. That has to stop. And they need to bring down significantly the amount that they have in Iran. They would need to restate, for whatever it’s worth, that they have no desire to have a nuclear weapon and are not seeking to be able, for example, to build a warhead.

I think the question on proxies is a really hard one. What is it that’s being asked? I mean, for example, under UNSCRs 1559 and 1701, they do not have the right to give one pistol to Hezbollah. They going to abide by that? Certainly any deal would require them to abide by those two U.N. Security Council resolutions, and any new deal in Lebanon. So they’ve got—they’ve got to abide by that. What would the deal require them to do with respect to the Houthis, as opposed to the legitimate government of Yemen? It would require them to stop shipping arms to Yemen. Now, do you think that’s realistic? I don’t think it’s very realistic. But I think if you say, well, what could the outlines of a deal be, that’s what you’re talking about.

COOK: I mean, let me bring that around to Nazanin. Do you think that the regime is capable of negotiating such a deal? I mean, that’s basically asking the regime not to be the regime. (Laughter.)

BONIADI: I mean, you nailed it. That’s exactly right. And that risks putting themselves in a position where they’re no longer themselves. So, you know, essentially, it’s their downfall. But I do want to add one thing, if I may. And that is when we talk about foreign policy towards Iran and how it can shift that balance of power towards—from the regime towards freedom seekers inside Iran, I refer to academics like Jack Goldstone and others who talked about the conditions necessary for a revolution. I’m not talking about regime change. I’m talking about empowering the Iranian people.

Fiscal and economic strain exists in Iran. Popular discontent and injustice exists in Iran. We need fissures at the top in the ruling elite, which is starting to happen. There are signs of it, but that needs to happen at a far greater degree. And then there are—there is a unified opposition that is lacking. And that is really on us. And, finally, favorable foreign relations. And so we cannot neglect that fifth point, which is that we do have a responsibility. It’s not—the onus isn’t only on the U.S. and the West and the world to tip that balance of power towards—in favor of the Iranian people, but it is—it plays a large part in in creating that favorable atmosphere for a revolution to occur. So when we talk about regime change, we’re not talking about enforced regime change in the context of Iraq, or Afghanistan, or other places that we’ve seen. We’re talking about tangible steps that we can take to empower civil society inside Iran.

COOK: Great. Elise Labott. You’ve been patient. Thank you.

Q: Thank you. Excellent panel. Elise Labott. I’m the Edward R. Murrow press fellow here at the Council. Also a member.

Assaf, I wanted to follow up on what you were talking about, about Syria. And I understand that you’re not talking—you don’t want to get involved in the civil war, but you’re suggesting that the West maybe should think about going after ISIS in favor of kind of focusing on the axis. And I’m wondering if—you know, the proliferation of ISIS throughout Syria and Iraq was really what kind of led to this splintering of smaller groups around the world that were threatening the West, the U.S., you know, and the region itself. And so are you asking the Western coalition to, you know, prioritize Israel’s security over, you know, potentially a threat that could be a much more global threat? I understand that Iran, to some degree, is a global threat, but it’s much more of a threat to Israel. Whereas a group like ISIS and all of its affiliates are a much greater threat to the rest of the world. Thanks.

ORION: Let’s go back to the last decade. The last decade, we saw the Syrian civil war waged between the regime and the axis. And ISIS and other affiliates, some of them secession factions like Osbatil (ph), Jabhat, Tahrir al-Sham, and so on. The Western pursuit of the rebels because they had black flags actually assisted the axis dominance in the civil war. And that’s something I think that needs to be avoided at this point. It’s not that immediately those guys in Idlib are threatening the West. Let’s look at statistics. What we’re seeing is that the whole global shipping is going around Africa because of the axis. We are seeing actually the nexus of the axis of resistance—Iran, Hezbollah, regime, Houthis, and so on—with the axis of the Euro-Asian powers—China, Russia, Iran again, and North Korea. We’re seeing the products of the Iranian defense industries enriching the skies across the Middle East, but also in Ukraine and Europe.

So when we are looking at this convergence, I think we need to be well aware of the wide picture and not focus on al-Qaida cell which might be planning something. And, by the way, in this case, go after them and kill them. It doesn’t mean that you need to intervene systemically on your target list, regardless of the emerging context. I think we need to be laser focused. Iran is a serious problem for Israel, on the verge of existential. Why? Because they’re obsessive with our destruction. And we’re quite fond of our survival. And in this sense, America can afford dealing with Iran later. Maybe China should come first. But in fact, when you look at Ukraine, Middle East, Indo-Pacific, Iran is combined in all of these. So you can’t just disregard it. And as the late Omar Suleiman said, according to WikiLeaks, we can’t afford addressing Iran issue by issue. It’s a parallel problem. It needs to be addressed in a parallel manner.

COOK: We’ve got another—no? OK. Over here, there was a question. Sir.

Q: Military action against Iran. Does that strengthen the regime or does that weaken the regime, in its relationship with its internal issues? Is a revolution more likely if Israel continues to attack Iran successfully, or is it less likely?

BONIADI: Is that a question for me?

COOK: Yeah.

BONIADI: I would say that the people who are opposed to the regime will become more opposed to the regime. And I think the people who are pro-regime will likely become more fond of the regime, or adhere more closely to the regime. You know, at this point the Iranian people are risking everything, including their own lives, to oppose this regime. Nobody I speak to wants war with Iran. I mean, that’s just a fact of life. Nobody wants war in their own country. But I think they welcome—the idea of this regime suffering appeals to many people who have been suffering at the hands of this regime. And that’s understandable. It’s completely understandable.

And if I may add one thing, that is that we’re missing—when we talk about foreign policy towards Iran, we forget to assess how it’s managed to stay in power for forty-five years. And I think it has a three-prong survival strategy. One is repress. And its catalog of repression at home and abroad is well documented. I won’t—I don’t need to tell you what they’ve done. The second is deflect. So whenever they do something they deflect attention away from it, whether it’s the downing of the Ukrainian passenger flights, and then it becomes evident that they, the IRGC was responsible for that, the murder of Mahsa Amini. Of course, U.N. factfinding mission exposed that to be true. The rape and murder of sixteen-year-old Nika Shakarami. BBC expose exposed that to be true. But they always deflect.

And the last one is divide. They divide not only opponents of the regime. They’ve managed to keep all of us dissidents separate and opposed to each other. That’s how they survive. And they divide you. They divide Western countries. They subvert U.N. bodies that with GONGOs. They subvert your institutions, our democracies. And the only response to that is resolve, accountability, and unity. That’s how we counter those three things. That’s how we counter their survival strategy. If a genius in government can come up with a way to address that with these three survival—countering those survival strategies with these three points, I think we have the winning ticket.

COOK: Right in the back.

Q: Tom Graham, Council on Foreign Relations.

Quick question. What are the expectations in Tehran for assistance from Russia or China in dealing with the—what has become a much more complex complicated situation for Iran over the past several months?

COOK: Assaf, you work on China as well. You pick up anything on this?

ORION: Well, China has no allies. So if the Iranians hope that China will come to the rescue on the defense side of life, they can forget it. What they can see is strategic support at the Security Council. They can see oil gushing from Iran to China. And China is Iran’s number one oil importer. It can see, by the way, quite a lot of support on repression, because surveillance state is, well, it’s not Iran if you go for the world league. And with Russia, you could see some technology flowing there. The first Sukhoi 35 are reportedly delivered to Iran these days. They will find it difficult to replace the S-300 batteries, the air defense batteries that four of them Israel destroyed since April—one in April and three in October. There are limitations to what Russia can provide on hardware, but a lot of things can go on technology, including nuclear. So I think we need to look at that as part of a comprehensive great-power competition, in which Iran tries to play as—you know, to punch above its weight.

COOK: Well, unfortunately, that has to be the last word. We’re just upon 9:30. And since the previous CFR president’s here, and the current CFR president’s here, and I’m graded on how well I manage meetings, I’m going to bring it to an end. We’re going to take a fifteen-minute break. And then we’ll come back at 9:45 for The Day After and the Future of the Peace Process. This session will be available on CFR.org. And there is some breakfast and coffee in the back of the room. Thank you very much to Nazanin, Assaf, and Elliott. (Applause.)

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcrip

ZACHARIA: Welcome, everyone, to the second session of CFR’s symposium “Assessing a Year of War in the Middle East.” This session is titled “The Day After and the Future of the Peace Process.”

We are joined by CFR members and INSS guests here in New York and over a hundred-fifty joining online. I am Janine Zacharia, the Carlos Kelly McClatchy lecturer at Stanford University, and I will be presiding over today’s discussion.

To start I’d like to introduce our distinguished panel.

To my left, Richard Haass, who needs no introduction, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, a prolific author, and veteran U.S. diplomat who served in multiple administrations and is now a senior counselor at Centerview Partners.

On the screen we have Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich, vice chair of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, a former ambassador to the United States, and a former head of peace negotiations for Israel with Syria.

And Mara Rudman is a distinguished professor and director of the Ripples of Hope Project at UVA’s Miller Center, and a former deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs and a former deputy U.S. Middle East peace envoy.

And we will be joined shortly by Salam Fayyad, a visiting senior scholar and lecturer at Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs and a former Palestinian prime minister and minister of finance in the Palestinian Authority.

Before we begin I’d like to say personally how honored I was to be invited to moderate this discussion in memory and in honor of Ambassador Martin Indyk, who I knew well and who I interviewed many times as a journalist. His wise counsel is missed at this critical, most difficult moment in the Middle East, and I wanted to share my condolences to his family and loved ones.

I’m going to engage the panelists in conversation for thirty minutes, and then we will take questions from our audience in New York and via Zoom from those joining remotely. And as a reminder, this event is on the record.

This session is focused on the day after and the future of the peace process, but before we can go to the day after I think we need to see whether an end to the wars in Gaza is possible and, if so, how.

So just briefly, Ambassador Rabinovich, I’m wondering if you could talk a bit about what I would say is the conventional wisdom that Prime Minister Netanyahu is in some ways perpetuating the war out of coalition pressures.

On the other hand, another argument that the IDF is, perhaps, moving section by section through Gaza to try and dismantle Hamas militarily and that work’s not quite done. How do you see the military phase of this coming to an end so we can move to the day after?

RABINOVICH: The military phase continues not because the IDF is interested in it or because it is busy dismantling the last vestiges of Hamas military presence in Gaza. It’s a political decision by the prime minister, not—I’d say not crudely, as some people put it, just to stay in power but because at this point Hamas’ conditions are still difficult to accept—an end to the war, a disengagement or a withdrawal from Gaza. For Israel and the Netanyahu government to end the war and withdraw from Gaza and leave Hamas in power would mean that the war ends in defeat or at least not with a victory.

So a formula will have to be devised. I personally think that we should link the initial stage, namely, a ceasefire, release of hostages, and then a transition to more long-lasting, durable arrangements for the future of the Gaza Strip. I guess we’ll have an opportunity to elaborate on that a little later on.

And let me just say before I return the microphone, like you I’m moved by the fact that we are holding this session in memory of my friend and colleague Martin Indyk.

Thank you.

ZACHARIA: Mara or Richard, do you want to speak about this prospect for ending the hostilities first before we move to the day after? Richard?

HAASS: Happy to. Good to be back, particularly in this event dedicated to Martin.

The one thing I’d say is, you know, what Itamar laid out is, if you will, the traditional path to get the ceasefire, hostages back, and Hamas and Israel don’t exactly agree on complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and so forth.

Let me say that’s probably, I think, the wrong way to think about it because what that continues to do is give Hamas a veto over the future of Gaza and it seems to me after fourteen or fifteen months the one thing we ought to realize is we do not want to give Hamas a veto over the future of Gaza.

Bad enough they controlled the past of Gaza. So what I would say is ignore it, and it’s time for Israel—and this is where I do think coalition politics are front and center—to set in motion a process with the Arabs, with the Saudis, and so forth, getting in an Arab stabilization force. It wouldn’t be a peacekeeping force. It would be a peacemaking force.

You’d have to get a stabilization force in there. Israel would have to provide enough political cover for the Saudis and the Arabs to do it. Israel is unwilling to do it under this government, and I think it’ll be a real challenge—an opportunity I’ve argued—for Mr. Trump to basically go to Mr. Netanyahu and say, your political fortunes have recovered, have revived. You can build on what you’ve accomplished in the north to do what I want you to do now in Gaza, and I think it’ll be up to the new American president working with the Israeli prime minister to see whether they can break the logjam.

But, otherwise, a year from now we’re going to be having this same conversation. If you give Hamas a continued veto over the future, we’re not going to get to the future.

ZACHARIA: Mara, do you want to add?

RUDMAN: Sure. Well, I agree that ending the current conflict and figuring out a day after are very much linked and I would take elements of what the ambassador and what Richard both suggested in doing so.

I would also go back to the panel right before this because I think that part of the link to getting a regional force into Gaza that is a peacemaking force goes to having Israel and the countries in the region see it as in their national security interest to be working together and that is in part to counter Iran in various ways and it’s clear that for other countries in the region part of the political cover, and I also happen to think is a necessity for all sorts of reasons if the region is to have a pathway to a Palestinian state.

And we can talk about what that pathway is but I think those are some of the elements that are required both to end the conflict as it is and to get the region, the United States, other interests aligned in a way that actually protects everyone’s security and long-term—(off mic).

RABINOVICH: Janine, may I—

ZACHARIA: Just a quick follow-up, Ambassador Rabinovich? Itamar, go ahead. Yeah.

RABINOVICH: Yeah. I just wanted to comment on Richard’s statement. I missed the hostage issue. The hostage issue is a huge emotional, public issue. To conclude the war without resolving it one way or the other is inconceivable in Israeli terms so we need to take that into account.

ZACHARIA: Itamar, just one quick clarification. Does the IDF still have more to do there, though? Do you think they need more time, that President Trump—a future President Trump’s going to have to agree to give the Israelis more time militarily or do you feel like that mission has been accomplished—

RABINOVICH: No, they—

ZACHARIA: —to the point that it will be able to be accomplished?

RABINOVICH: No, they don’t. They don’t need to hunt down the last Hamas soldier. They say they don’t. They simply say that.

ZACHARIA: OK. The next question I wanted to ask was about the psychology in Israel right now. I mean, you mentioned how profound the hostage issue is. Even before October 7 Israelis were largely post-Palestinian. They would say aֵyn lanvi partner, “we have no partner.” And now after the horrors of October 7 it’s hard for me to see how Israelis would be willing to consider even a new peace process with the Palestinians.

Can you talk about how that may be an impediment to future discussions—negotiations?

RABINOVICH: Would you like me to address this?

ZACHARIA: Yeah. Yeah. Sorry.

Itamar?

RABINOVICH: Yeah. OK.

Right now it is an impediment and right now I think the two parties are not ready. The Israeli public—I mean, first of all, we do have a very right-wing government and the Israeli public’s feeling towards the Palestinians is skeptical and hostile, and we need time to get out of that.

The Palestinian Authority is not in the best of shapes. We have an old leader on his way out. We hear words about—statements about corruption and inefficiency. So I think they also need to do some work at home to get themselves ready for a statehood.

So I think we need to talk not about an immediate two-state solution but about the prospect of a two-state solution to renew the negotiations with that prospect in mind, and I would say one of the important points in bringing the PA as part of a stabilizing force to Gaza is that if they do good work in Gaza they will acquire or reacquire the trust of the Israeli public.

So this is like two in one. You bring them to Gaza and when—if they are successful in Gaza it also helps resolving the larger Palestinian issue.

ZACHARIA: Yeah?

HAASS: I think it’s a good point. In peace processes, you know, if the situation is, to use my favorite word, ripe then diplomats have something to work with, and the reason we just got a ceasefire in Lebanon is, quite honestly, the work of the Israeli military and the intelligence services so weakened Hezbollah that the situation became ripe for diplomacy.

It wasn’t that U.S. diplomats suddenly got more talented. They suddenly had a situation they could exploit. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians, it wasn’t ripe before October 7. It’s decidedly less so in the aftermath. So to proceed as if you had great opportunities you would be banging your head against the proverbial stone wall.

So the real challenge is how do we ripen things—how do we get to the point where then diplomats do have some opportunity to—some things to work with, and I think what—you know, Itamar suggested one path. Palestinian involvement in Gaza is a way of Palestinians to some extent proving that they are a potential reliable partner and I think, you know, that would be part of it.

I would actually have the conversation with the Israelis. If I ran a polling firm I would go to Israel and if I were doing consultation what would be the five, ten things that Palestinians would have to do—to say and do to convince you that maybe this time was a bit different, that you do have a potential partner, and I’d go to Palestinians and talk about what are the things you would need to see, and so forth.

But I think we’re in that phase. It’s pre-negotiations, not negotiations, and each side needs to set certain conditions and set certain—well, I don’t know how to call it—points they want the other side to demonstrate in speech and action to get to the point where you could have then some negotiations. But to go directly from where we are there is, I think, would not only be—not only would fail but it’d be counterproductive.

I don’t think we need more failures in the Middle East because I’m worried that we’ve kind of exhausted them and then people will say diplomacy has no chance—let’s now move to a post-diplomatic world, and I don’t think that would be good for anybody.

And so I think now we need a kind of—a ripening process, a pre-diplomacy process in the region.

ZACHARIA: Mara, you had this great phrase when we spoke earlier about it’s time for parallel play. Can you talk about that?

RUDMAN: Sure. Sure, and it builds on what Richard was just saying and I’ll credit it also comes from the conversation I had with Salam Fayyad at University of Virginia a couple months ago and some of what he was proposing, which hopefully he will be here at some point in one way or another to talk about.

But I would—it’s part of what I meant when I was talking about defining the pathway to a Palestinian state because I wouldn’t even say—I would not say it’s negotiation as Itamar was suggesting. I would not say it’s pre-negotiations. I would say it’s a couple steps before that. Because before you ask both parties what they expect of the other I think you have to talk to both Palestinians and Israelis about what they need from their own governance entity and in which ways, what they need and what they’re not getting, to help inform how both peoples can move to a place where it’s possible to engage with one another on a pathway.

So, for example, and Itamar said there’s—or I believe Itamar said it that there’s no partner on the Palestinian side. I think there are many people who would say there are a number of different reasons and actors who are responsible, not only the Palestinians, and I would say not only the Israelis but in part the Israelis for the fact that there’s not a partner—that the Palestinian Authority leadership at this point and President Abbas is not in a place where people consider them a viable partner.

So I think there needs to be work done in asking those tough questions and then for those in the region and for the United States and Europe to have things to offer that can help the parties in both cases help to achieve some of what they’re looking for internally and then get to the important questions that Richard was raising about what they hope and expect from one another to then pave the way to get to discussion.

But in the meantime you need to have both. I think both Israelis and Palestinians need to see tangible differences on the ground in the near term that will make them feel more secure, that will allow them to invest in risk and having the conversations with one another.

And so this gives you some of the kind of database to be able to do that with and to work with, again, other parties in the region and in Europe, and I actually think that President-elect Trump does have an opportunity here. I’m not sure—it’ll be interesting to see with those he’s appointed—he’s nominated to be on his Middle East team how much they’re able to carry through on that.

But he was the last person after President Clinton, who I had the honor of serving with with Martin and others, to actually put out a plan, and I may not agree with his plan for a Palestinian state but in 2020 he did put that out and so he has a place to start. I got to say neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis embraced the plan he put out, also not unusual, and—but he’s got a starting point for the discussion and I think the Saudis at this point have a lot of leverage.

And so it’d be very interesting to me if the Saudis talking to the Trump administration early on or now hold true to what they said about the importance of a Palestinian—of a pathway to a Palestinian state and suggest ways forward on that including ways of reviving as a starting place, not an ending place, the plan that President Trump put out before he left office in 2020.

ZACHARIA: Right. But, again, I think if we’re talking about even the 2020 plan, like, it’s sort of—it’s in conflict with what we’re saying, right, about parallel play, about getting the leaders ready, right? Like, what are we going to look at the plan for now?

RUDMAN: So the reason—I actually don’t see it as in conflict because when you talk about—I don’t think things are ready for negotiation but I actually think that to get things moving forward you have to define a horizon. You have to say—and that’s part of talking about a pathway to a Palestinian state—and I think Israelis need to hear that and need to hear that from an incoming administration to be able to get the other pieces in play because otherwise you’re asking people—otherwise it sounds more like confidence-building measures which is—

ZACHARIA: Oh, boy.

RUDMAN: Right, which, you know, you have to say generally where the horizon is. You don’t have to outline it in detail but you got to be able to say where it is and then everything you’re doing is working in concert to get to that. And to me, the combination of the horizon is the Palestinian state but the impetus behind it is some of the security strategy and being able to put together a security and economic coalition that can counter Iran effectively.

HAASS: Listen, it’ll be very interesting because they’ll be asked very early on whether the Trump administration still stands by if not the details of the 2020 plan a two-state solution. That will be really important because then it gives them the basis for incentivizing certain behavior, discouraging other behavior, even penalizing other behaviors that they see as inconsistent with that goal.

So, again, the territorial details and the rest are irrelevant at this point, but simply as a restatement that the United States sees that as the essential future to the diplomatic enterprise I actually think that’s an important point to establish early on.

ZACHARIA: You know, I remember when I actually interviewed Martin after the United States moved its embassy to Jerusalem and—under Trump and he said, I’m all in favor of that, Janine, but the mistake that the administration made was that they didn’t say, and we also recognize that the Palestinians aspire to have their capital in East Jerusalem, too.

RUDMAN: They gave it away for nothing.

ZACHARIA: Hmm?

RUDMAN: They gave it away for nothing.

ZACHARIA: Right. And so the question is how the Palestinians would even regard the Trump administration as a mediator now after that, which I guess is—

HAASS: That’s the position, and then we’re into Abba Eban territory of giving up opportunities. I mean, look, you’ve only got one—

ZACHARIA: You have to live with the world that you live—right.

HAASS: Yeah. I mean, the hand you’re dealt is Donald Trump’s going to be the president of the United States in the next four years. United States is still going to have a large potential—we’ll see how much actual influence—on the situation.

So the Palestinians, if they’re wise here and they’ve got to—to get from here to there is going to be tough in terms of just what the processes are. But, yeah, if they want to partner with the U.S. and also with the Saudis and others. I mean, I think you’ve got to—the idea that—you know, peacemaking in the Middle East has often failed when the table wasn’t set enough by outsiders and that would be—

ZACHARIA: Well, we go back to Camp David, right? Yeah.

HAASS: Exactly. Yeah. So the question now is with the Abraham Accords, with the Saudis more than anxious to play—and their demands, shall we say, are not unlimited to get involved—there’s potential here to create a context in which there is a little bit more upside, not in the naive sense but in the real, possible sense and they clearly want it.

ZACHARIA: So one of—

HAASS: Oh, Itamar probably wants to—

ZACHARIA: Oh, Itamar, go ahead. Yeah.

RABINOVICH: Yeah. Yeah.

Mara, I never said—used the term there is no partner on the other side. This is not something I shared. Right now the partner is weak. If our fourth panelist were the candidate, Salam Fayyad, he was an excellent prime minister. He created credence and trust on the Israeli side. He was too successful, in fact, to the point that Abu Mazen removed him. So if individuals like Salam Fayyad move to the front on the Palestinian home front it would make a difference.

Second, with regard to the 2020 Trump plan it included the notion of two states and the notion of swaps. Now, the numbers were not very attractive to the Palestinians but they were told with a wink by Jared Kushner and others that the details could be worked out later.

So, you know, one major speech by the president-elect putting on the table a reasonable plan would remove all Palestinian anxieties and suspicions with regard to him and he could easily do that if he chooses to do it, and the temptation is there because we know that the Israeli-Palestinian issue or Arab-Israeli peacemaking issues are a very good path leading to a visit in Scandinavia.

HAASS: And Itamar—what he suggested in the idea of a Trump speech would also, besides reassuring Palestinians, would signal the Israelis that it is not—U.S. support is great but not, shall we say, without condition and that is also—that needs to be part of the mix.

ZACHARIA: Well, I’m going to just say one more—ask one more question and then we’re going to open it up for questions here.

You know, Salam Fayyad wrote twice in Foreign Affairs about advocating for a newly reformed Palestinian Authority that would definitely not be run, I believe, by Prime Minister Abbas but incorporating all factions including Hamas, but somehow this coalition was going to be committed to nonviolence.

So one of the things I hope we get a chance to talk to him about is how we assemble this. But I know, Mara, you also interviewed him about this.

And also, Itamar, Prime Minister Netanyahu has said he won’t accept the PA in Gaza, right? So even maybe this newly reformed—even if it was run by Salam Fayyad do you think he would accept that?

RABINOVICH: If you’re asking me, Prime Minister Netanyahu has made so many statements and if you watch Israeli TV you see statements. For instance, why a commission of inquiry is mandatory after a war, why a prime minister at the time of Ehud Olmert who was in the court could not function as a prime minister.

So, you know, he has said many, many things and he can say the contrary without blinking.

ZACHARIA: OK. Mara, just quickly.

RUDMAN: So I actually—I wish Elliott Abrams was here in the room and the reason I say this is because I think part of what Salam is considering when he thinks about this plan is a cabinet of technocrats that were very short lived but I think existed for two or three months at the end of President Bush’s—W’s administration and, of course, Salam came in in the finance minister role and then ultimately became prime minister while Bush was president and worked very closely with Elliott in the role that he had.

And so the reason I wish Elliott was here is because I would like to know his answer to that because I’m very aware of the amount of U.S. laws that preclude direct assistance going to the Palestinian Authority or a Palestinian entity if there’s any Hamas participation.

There is—again, getting into the weeds there—

ZACHARIA: And getting the waivers—(inaudible).

RUDMAN: Yeah, and there’s—and, well, I worked one of the waivers for water, for being able to get stuff into Gaza during the Obama administration. So I know it’s—and it was at Israel’s request so I know it’s possible but it’s difficult and I think part of—and, hopefully, we’ll have Salam here before the end because I think he’s thinking of that time period and thinking of some way of maneuvering in terms of technocrats politically for the United States. Separate from Israel I’m not sure it’s possible in terms of the assistance.

ZACHARIA: OK. I would like to take a question here in New York. The mic’s coming around. Right there in the white sweater. Please introduce yourself.

Q: Hello. Yes. Hi. Kimberly Marteau Emerson, Human Rights Watch.

Actually, Richard, I’d love to go back to your thought about asking the Trump administration, you know, what do you guys really think of the two-state solution—are you going to support that.

It seems to me that that question is—and the whole concept is a pipe dream if the leader of the country that would have to be participating in the two-state solution has always opposed it. Netanyahu has never, never supported a two-state solution and it seems to me we can bring a horse to water but we can’t make it drink.

HAASS: Well, we have a slightly different recollection because Bibi Netanyahu, getting back to Itamar’s point, he’s been on every side of this issue, supporting it, not—opposing it, and in between.

Again, at this point what I think our position ought to be we want to not rule certain things out either in words or in behaviors and one of the challenges, by the way, for a new administration will be whether they do any better than the last five or six on dealing with land appropriations and settlements.

It’s a pretty dismal record in the United States and seeing, if you will, a lot of the prerequisites of a Palestinian state be gradually be eroded. But no, I think what the United States ought to be doing is just put out its expectation.

Look, I think Donald Trump has enormous—I wrote the other day that it’s—he’s seen as such a friend of Israel and in some ways unlike Joe Biden and Kamala Harris that I think he’s in—the analogy I drew was Nixon and China.

If Donald Trump wants to move this, if he wants to make this deal, then I think he has enormous leverage because where is Israel going to go to his right in the United States? Trump has an evangelical base. Mike Huckabee is ambassador. He’s got—you know, 20 percent of the Jewish vote he just got. A lot of those are, shall we say, in a certain camp.

I think Israel does not want to have a fight with Donald Trump where they basically say he is not supportive enough of Israel. I actually think he has enormous leverage, enormous if he chooses to use it. But I actually think—and that’s why a lot of Israelis were not so sure they wanted him to be president because they see the possibility in his unpredictability and the rest that he could ask things of them and they would not be able to do an end run the same way they could do an end run around the Biden administration.

There’s no place to go there. So I actually think—I don’t know what’s going to happen and I find conversations about what Trump is going to do kind of useless. But I do think there’s—I do think there—if he were to act in certain ways he actually has a lot of leverage.

ZACHARIA: OK. A reminder that our conversation is on the record and we’re going to take a question via Zoom.

OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question from Krishen Sud.

Q: Yes. Hi. This is Krishen Sud. I’m a member of the CFR.

It’s just kind of a follow-up to the previous question. You know, if you—I don’t know if these are factual opinions but what is the public opinion in Israel at this point? You know, you hear comments about this administration, the Netanyahu administration, planning to take over northern Gaza. Obviously, they’ve done a lot more of settlement building and land acquisition in the West Bank.

Is that supported by the general Israeli population at this point in time? And then if you look at it from the Trump—you know, the Trump administration’s standpoint, obviously, Jared Kushner was a big player. Jared Kushner seems to imply that he is in favor of reentering or having settlements or owning property by the—or having the Israeli government run more of Gaza.

So I’m just—you know, we talk about a lot of it—a lot about this from the Palestinian side. From the Israeli side where is the public opinion on all these issues? That would be helpful.

Thank you.

ZACHARIA: Go ahead, Itamar.

RABINOVICH: Yeah. Actually, public opinion polls show that if elections were held today the government would lose. Opposition would win. But a sizable portion of Israeli public opinion veers to the right and here I would add the important sweetener, peace with Saudi Arabia. Peace and normalization. This needs to be part of the package.

And then if Netanyahu signs a deal that includes that and goes for election because the extreme right wing would then withdraw from the coalition he could stand a chance of being reelected because he would have been the Israeli prime minister who made peace with Saudi Arabia, with large parts of the Muslim world—in a way, would have brought the Arab-Israeli conflict almost to an end. This would be a very strong ticket to run on.

ZACHARIA: Want to add, Mara? Yeah.

RUDMAN: Yeah, I just—I think, again, we cannot underscore how much the Saudis are in an incredible position with leverage, speaking of leverage. From the what—from where I sit the Trump—the interests are of the coming Trump administration, what they’ve said, what they might be willing to do, to all the points that Itamar just made. I really—and speaking of Jared Kushner, you know, he’s got considerable investment in his equity fund from the Saudis as well. So there are a lot of different interests that could align in a variety of ways.

ZACHARIA: Can I, yeah, sort of come over here next to this gentleman here. But just quickly on the Sunni Arab allies can we just have a moment for Egypt here and what their role is, or not, has been in this whole thing? Because for the past year I’ve been a bit flummoxed by the Egyptians in terms of what they haven’t—

RUDMAN: Just the past year?

ZACHARIA: Well, yeah, I guess—

HAASS: Get Steven—

ZACHARIA: Get Steve to come up here. (Laughs.) But no, I mean, Mara, do you want to say a word about the Egyptians, or?

RUDMAN: Yeah. I mean, they are important players. I think they have a lot to deal with. And I think of it just in terms of ceasefire negotiations and Hamas, where I think that Qatar actually punches way above its weight—(inaudible)—in some senses to do that in various negotiation situations, not just with Hamas. And Egypt at least comes across from afar as punching under its weight.

HAASS: I think something slightly different. When I was in government working on these issues, Egypt and Jordan were the two most important regional partners of the United States. I would say now and going forward the UAE and Saudi Arabia are the two most important regional partners of the United States. That’s a real change. And—

RUDMAN: Wouldn’t you say Qatar’s also?

HAASS: Qatar, but I think the other two. But basically it’s moved to the Gulf, if you will, away from the neighboring countries and I think that’s a real change in the—in sort of the diplomatic makeup of the situation for the United States.

ZACHARIA: I was just meaning in terms of the immediate crisis that we’ve been in, you know. But all right.

HAASS: Disappointing is what they are.

ZACHARIA: For another panel.

Q: Mark Rosen.

I wanted to ask the panel about Hamas more and how it can be marginalized in any peace negotiations. I think that the Palestinian Authority officials were meeting with Hamas officials in Moscow not that long ago. They’ve talked—continued to talk about a unified government or whatever, which I assume is never going to be acceptable to the Israelis or to the U.S.

So how does the Palestinian Authority implement and encourage or how do we encourage that to happen? There’s a separation. But also how do they become more marginalized within Palestinian society?

I know that their support has, obviously, dramatically declined in Gaza and I’m not sure about the West Bank. I haven’t seen any polls recently. But it’d be interesting to hear from you all how that should all happen.

ZACHARIA: You want to take it? Itamar, do you want to start there?

RABINOVICH: Yeah. Thank you. I will.

Including Hamas in a new Palestinian structure will be a no-no from an Israeli point of view, not just because of the brutality of what they did on October 7 and 8 but because they don’t even meet the EU conditions for talking to them, which is to commit not to engage in violence and to recognize Israel.

Now, by their own constitution and doctrine they cannot do that because they are a radical Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood—the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. For them, any territory that was Muslim-controlled and is now controlled by Christians or Jews needs to be brought back under Islamic rule. It’s (a walk ?) that needs to be taken back.

So they are not partners to the peace process and including them in a Palestinian structure that needs to be our partner would be a very negative development from an Israeli point of view.

Now, what the PA or Fatah need to do in order to beat Hamas is not so much to beat Hamas but to improve their own act. If they act well and the West Bank is run better than it’s run today and they perform well on other fronts they would again take the lead.

There was a time when they were definitely by far the leading force in Palestinian politics but years of neglect, corruption, and inefficiency pushed them back and they need to dig themselves out of that hole.

HAASS: But the Israeli government could help bring that about.

RUDMAN: Absolutely.

HAASS: I mean, the reason—Hamas has been so weakened militarily but they also need to be marginalized politically, and as you say in elegant Hebrew Arabic, you can’t beat something with nothing. So there needs to be political alternative.

Palestinians right now, as bad as Hamas has been and is and will be—and Itamar is right, they’re a nonstarter—you’ve got to basically begin the process of showing if you support these Palestinians there’s a chance of getting some of what you want.

I mean, the Northern Ireland parallels are really strong here when we—essentially, what the British and others said to the provisional IRA, no way—you can’t shoot your way to power but there’s going to be a separate path and through negotiations and all that and that’s what’s missing from Israeli policy is that there’s a way for an entity—perfect timing—for Palestinians to emerge where you create, if you will, a political alternative for Palestinians who have political ambitions to rally around and these ambitions can be realized at least in part diplomatically and peacefully rather than militarily.

But you can’t marginalize Hamas only with the military instrument. They’ve got to be marginalized politically and that’s in part up to Palestinians, as Itamar said. But Israel has to create a space where that is more likely to happen and this government refuses to create that space because they’re scared of starting that dynamic out of fear for where it may lead, and that’s the reason we’re stuck where we are.

ZACHARIA: Welcome.

FAYYAD: Thank you. Sorry for the delay.

ZACHARIA: No problem. Well, we were just—

FAYYAD: Three and a half hours from Princeton to here. Looks like a lot of New Yorkers decided to take Monday off for an extended Thanksgiving. (Laughter.) But I’m here.

ZACHARIA: Well, we were just talking about your idea of a reformed Palestinian Authority, and I said that would include Hamas in it but it would be committed to nonviolence and I said I wasn’t sure how that was going to come about.

FAYYAD: Well, thank you very much and, again, I’m sorry for the delay. It’s a pleasure to be with you all.

Let me first agree with something that Richard said. I caught the tail end of his remarks when he said something about the need for Israel to create space for us Palestinians in order for us to be able to move forward in the hope that at some point there’ll be resolution that’s satisfactory and mutually agreed to by all.

As part of that, though, we Palestinians need to be proactive in trying to create that space. And in my own thinking about the need for us to unite our policy as an integral component of that, I expressed those ideas repeatedly on a number of occasions for the past decade—and especially after October 7, when questions were raised first maybe third week of October of last year as to what could be done with regard to postwar governance in Gaza.

And I thought, even though it was late, but it was—the answer to that would have been reconfigured for a renewed Palestinian Authority. That actually was taken to mean as a reformed Palestinian Authority and—or maybe revitalized Palestinian Authority.

But what I had in mind, and I wrote about that, was reconfigured in a political sense, meaning to make the Palestinian Authority and its main organ, that being the government, subject to national consensus, a government that is not of the factions or even by the factions but a government that is formed in accordance with the Palestinian Authority’s basic law and the way that should be actually observed.

Then took a long time, but, again, the idea of reforming the Palestinian Authority as a way of getting it there kind of reigned supreme and continued to be the main point of interest. Not that I’m opposed in any way to the idea. Obviously, the Palestinian Authority is in need of reform and I—my friends said that it was curious that it was only on October 8 that the world discovered that the PA needed to reform. That’s something that goes without saying. It’s obviously the case.

But what we should be looking for is a Palestinian Authority that can be in Gaza physically to handle the Palestinian people in the aftermath of the war or even include during the war, just to be—to form an added instrument—to constitute an added instrument that would have brought some pressure to bring the war to an end sooner. It has not ended so far.

Fast forward, a few months ago the Palestinian factions meeting in Beijing actually agreed to a formulation of the kind that I had proposed. It required the convening of a dormant organ of the PLO called unified leadership framework and it includes—in addition to the executive committee members currently there it includes factions that are not a part of PLO and their key task, immediate task, was to actually consent to a government that is not of the factions.

So what you said about Hamas in it, Hamas is not going to be in it. It was never—

ZACHARIA: Because none of the factions have an identity in—

FAYYAD: Pardon me?

ZACHARIA: Because none of the factions have come in with their factional identities?

FAYYAD: A government of no factions. It’s the PLO sitting, like, on top, all right, and it would serve as the organ to agree or to consent to the government that is not of the factions to serve for a number of years, to end—to culminate with national elections at a date certain to be agreed to at the outset of this transitional period. And that would have been and still can be an important contribution toward creating that space and utilizing it as it is created in order for that transition to move us from where we are now, the catastrophe that’s Gaza, but also in the West Bank in a way that could lead to conditions being better than what they are today.

ZACHARIA: OK. So Hamas is very popular right now I think was one of the questions that we were getting from the audience as well, and Fatah—the Palestine Authority is not.

RUDMAN: There’s a difference in West Bank and Gaza on that, though. So—

ZACHARIA: Right. OK. So in the West Bank the Palestinian Authority has lost a lot of legitimacy, correct?

FAYYAD: That’s true.

ZACHARIA: That’s wrong?

FAYYAD: That’s true.

ZACHARIA: That’s true. Yes. So the question then is as part of this building up the—I just want to see if we can say something specific right now that the Israelis can do to—I mean, first, this thing has to happen that you’re talking about—this meeting, this new organization.

FAYYAD: Yes.

ZACHARIA: We don’t help the current Palestinian—the Israelis and the United States don’t help the current Palestinian Authority under your plan because we need the new group.

FAYYAD: The Palestinian Authority will be the Palestinian Authority except that it is renewed politically in the way that I propose. So it’s the same organ that was—that came into being in 1994 in the aftermath of the signing of the Oslo Accords, as you know.

So this is not about a different Palestinian Authority or it’s—but it’s renewed in that sense to make it a matter of consensus as—or broad national support and acceptance as it was when it was first introduced in 1994.

As you rightly pointed out, it lost a lot of ground over time. You called it legitimacy. It’s true in part, in no small measures, due to the failure of the peace process to deliver on its promise of Palestinian statehood five years after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Not that statehood was explicitly mentioned in the Oslo Accords themselves. Everybody knows that.

But that was the expectation or the premise from our point of view, the Palestinians. It did not happen and it was a good part of why the PA lost a lot of ground—legitimacy, if you will—and with it certainly the PLO that was a signatory of that agreement with Israel.

So I think the responsibility applies a lot more with us Palestinians to initiate, to take the first step in the direction of actually bringing back unity to our land, making Gaza and West Bank one political entity as we must if, in fact, we’re serious about the goal of Palestinian statehood.

So that’s key. Regardless of where Israel is on this issue, we know that the government of Israel was hostile to the idea of Palestinian Authority showing up in Gaza. It’s on record several of its cabinet officers, prime minister also included, having expressed not doubt but utter rejection about the Palestinian Authority being the answer to a post-war Gaza governance arrangement.

But that’s not reason for us not to do it. It’s in our interest, first and foremost, to do it. The current catastrophic situation in Gaza requires no less than to move to put the policy back together. It ruptured, as you know, back in 2007. We know the background to all of that.

It lasted way too long. And there’s not any seriousness about Palestinian statehood, about national liberation, about one day Palestinians being able to get to a point where we’re able to live as free people with dignity in a country of our own. Gaza has to be brought back into the fold of Palestinian Authority.

And my suggestion actually is a transitional arrangement. It’s to get us from where we are today to a date certain to be agreed on right now for elections to be held. It’s a multiyear transitional period, what’s going to be an iron clad commitment to nonviolence by all, not only in or around Gaza but throughout.

This is long enough period for there to be a restructuring, you feel, maybe a change of a mindset, and for us to really get busy doing what is expected of Palestinian Authority. It’s not—it’s a duty, as a matter of fact. And I’m really utterly surprised, particularly after the factions themselves, fifteen of them, Hamas and Fatah included, signed onto this declaration in Beijing a few months ago saying what we need to do is to convene this framework—it’s called the unified leadership framework—which, by the way, was last convened in July of 2023.

So it’s not something that does not happen. But it has not happened since the war in Gaza. And it always ended with some declarative statements about things that would not really materialize. But if we’re not really serious about making something come out of this significant in the direction of putting the country back together I don’t know when will the time be for us to do that.

So I think I’m here to tell you that failure to do this is solely Palestinian responsibility. I know that Israel—the government of Israel is opposed to the idea, at least they have been for the length of time; I’ve been following their statements since October 7 about the PA and its role. But that’s no reason for us, no excuse not to do that. Even if the war were to continue, which it should not, I think we should have a government that shows up in Gaza as soon as possible.

ZACHARIA: Richard, you wanted to say something or—

HAASS: Well, actually I want to ask Salam, you mentioned one thing, a commitment to nonviolence. I have a question on both sides.

What more could you see Palestinians putting forward in the way of principles that would, perhaps, get Israel to create the space that you would like them to create with the Palestinians? There’s a reciprocity here, a mutuality, and the question is how do we potentially reintroduce a somewhat positive dynamic and what is it you would need from Israelis, in a sense, to then get Palestinians to the point that they could say and do things that Israelis would want to hear if your goal is to create space for diplomacy.

RUDMAN: Can I just add a two-finger on that just because of a prior conversation and the parallel play? Because what I hear you say is not what Israel does, it’s what the Palestinians—that Israelis need to take care of Israeli stuff, Palestinians need to take care of Palestinian stuff, and not wait for one another.

So is there—to Richard’s thing is there additional stuff that you need or would you say what you said before, that Palestinians need to do their own thing without it?

ZACHARIA: Itamar, let’s let him ask those—answer those two and then you can ask your question. Yeah? Are you raising your hand to add to that?

RABINOVICH: I will, yeah. No, I’d like to address a slightly different angle. We are focusing on Israeli-Palestinian but of, course, it’s all unfolding in a larger context, and Hamas and Islamic jihad are also Iranian proxies. I think as the Trump administration comes into office and develops a larger Middle East policy it needs to address the two aspects of the Iranian issue, the nuclear and the regional role they play. If Hamas and Islamic jihad do not have an Iranian patron their power will weaken considerably.

ZACHARIA: OK.

FAYYAD: As to the question of reciprocity and all, without wanting to sound pessimistic or anything like that, but it’s not only since October 7 that conditions have become very difficult for there to be the reconciliation needed or rapprochement or getting back on a track that promised delivery at some point.

For a number of years before October 7 the peace process has been on at best life support for a variety of reasons, without getting into those now. And I do not want to as for, either, get too much into projecting the idea that it was only after the current government of Israel took office that conditions became difficult when it comes to methods of reciprocity.

But if we want to take that as the point of departure in terms of where the government of Israel currently stands, and it’s the government that we Palestinians have to deal with, regardless whether it’s this government or any other government, the fact of the matter is that the current government of Israel has demonstrated in words and deeds substantial animosity toward the idea of Palestinian statehood, to say the very least, and that position—this may come as news to some but it shouldn’t—it actually predated October 7 and it’s not the current government.

The current prime minister of the state of Israel ever since he started running for office, going back to 1996, he made no secret of his opposition to Oslo with its promise of statehood. Oslo did not provide for statehood specifically. Rabin said that he was opposed to it, and he repeatedly in every campaign he ran for office said, famously, not on my watch. Not on my watch, meaning no Palestinian statehood—state on his watch. Also, many times repeatedly saying there’s not going to be ever sovereignty anywhere in the territory between River Jordan and Mediterranean but for Israel.

So when you have that kind of attitude toward the process it’s very difficult to begin to think about steps that could be taken here and there when there is this much of opposition to the idea of Palestinian statehood.

Worse, the current government of Israel is actually—some members of it, to be exact—are opposed to the Palestinian Authority itself, that feeble self-governance body that was created by Oslo. They want to see it actually destroyed.

So the list is long. But I really go back to what I said. I’m not really saying this to absolve us of responsibility. What we should do to begin to change the dynamic, certainly on our side but to maybe begin to effect some transformation within Israeli body politic in the direction of changing the dynamic completely, is for us to move and act on the basis of what our national—where our national interest lies.

Our national interest lies, if there is at all any truth to what it is we say we want, must require, particularly given the horrible situation in Gaza, that we unify our polity immediately. And there are conditions under which that can happen in a way that could bring a measure of acceptance of that both regionally and internationally.

But first things first. First, war has to stop, and war has gone way too long and it has become certainly now—I mean, there are many who look at where things stand and they talk to you about Hamas having degraded and all. There’s no question that Hamas’ capabilities have been, certainly, weakened substantially. There’s no question about that.

But who is here to say that there’s not going to be an insurgency in Gaza? Some signs of that are actually taking place. Israel itself has experience with that both in Gaza and elsewhere, in the West Bank and in Lebanon, for sure over the period 1982 through 2000.

So we are not—if we’re not moving in the direction of stability that is going to come through brute force. What we need is a process of accommodation. There is a part of this, the responsibility for which resides with us solely, and I’m really focused on that. But there’s a lot that needs to be done.

There is also, to Itamar’s point, about where the United States can do things. I think one of the things that I lament the most is that the current administration actually did very little up until October 7 to change or act on changing or toward changing things that happened during the course of the first Trump administration, things that it could have reversed.

You know, Biden ran on a platform or the platform for the Middle East, actually—or, the reporting to the incoming administration is that—going back to 2021 was, let’s not really get back into a political process and reform that was taking place before up until the last round of diplomacy under Secretary Kerry kind of came to an end. Let’s first do a few small things here and there to restore confidence, get things back on track, and then look for a propitious moment in time where we can resume the process.

Trouble with that—it was sensible. It made sense, given the failures of the past. The trouble is that every little thing became a big thing. Nothing was done. In addition to the embassy having been moved under Trump the consulate was closed down. The U.S. consulate was closed down, and there were also some declarative statements made by former Secretary Pompeo, one actually in November 2019 and another was in November 2021 after the election, literally on Israel.

The first one was a declaratory statement by the State Department saying that settlements—Israeli settlements are not illegal under international law and the second one was a requirement that goods produced in Israeli settlements must be labeled made in Israel. And if that’s not accepting Israel’s annexation of parts of the West Bank, I don’t know what is.

ZACHARIA: They were disappointed—they were disappointed that the Biden administration didn’t reverse it.

FAYYAD: What I’m saying is that, of course, we should have reversed those steps.

ZACHARIA: Right. They should have reversed it.

FAYYAD: Should have reversed those things. They said, we’re not going to be doing big things immediately but small things to restore confidence, et cetera, et cetera. Nothing happened until October 7 and that, I think, was very damaging.

ZACHARIA: OK.

FAYYAD: And, actually, if something is to be taken away from this, it is that this process cannot be left alone. Even when progress in a big way cannot be achieved, I think it requires attention full time. We have seen what could happen.

ZACHARIA: Yeah. Itamar, you wanted to respond there?

RABINOVICH: Yeah. Yeah. Actually, it’s implied in what Salam said that we don’t have to rush. It needs to be gradual, and I think we need to have a roadmap. I think we all agree the current Israeli government is not for a two-state solution, even though I’d say parenthetically Netanyahu did give the very long speech during the Obama years in which he accepted the notion of a two-state solution. He did that once, maybe not mercifully—I mean, merrily, but he did.

RUDMAN: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.)

RABINOVICH: There has to be—there will have to be changes in Israeli politics. There have to be changes in Palestinian politics and in the PA and, therefore, I think what we need to see is a roadmap that points the way forward and gradual implementation. Rushing into an enforced solution could be disastrous.

ZACHARIA: OK. We have time for one last question from the audience if anyone has one. Otherwise—OK.

Q: Hi. Nazee Moinian again, Middle East Institute.

This is a question for the panel. I want to talk about the day after after. So say that peacekeeping and peace enforcing have done their job. Gaza is stabilized and elections are held.

Who are the viable candidates? Is it Dahlan? Is it our panelist Salam Fayyad?

It seems to me that candidates have to be vetted in a way that they’re not too close to the West because the Palestinians won’t vote for them. They’re not pro-Iran. The Americans won’t let it happen. The Israelis won’t let it.

So who’s ideal and who is out there?

ZACHARIA: OK. We’re going to end with auditions for—with a member of the PA. (Laughter.)

RUDMAN: I think it’s too soon to ask that question because I think if you’re playing out how things develop on both sides you may have ideas but if you start—frankly, it’s not unlike our politics. I think it’s way too soon for us to start talking about who the candidates would be in four years here, even if people are doing that.

FAYYAD: I think it’s a mistake and it’s not something that had just happened to actually frame even thinking about what needs to happen in the region in terms of who. I, for one, have maintained it was important to focus on how, on the process and, to your point, to avoid any situation where somebody is seen as being imposed on anyone. I think really this should be left up to our own internal processes to produce with focus first on mechanism with the who being secondary.

The proposal that I have made is to leave it up to the faction which are significant even if they are weak, this or that, and they have been dysfunctional in many ways. But that’s our political system. That’s how it’s defined.

My idea is to really get them all around the table and for them, Palestinians, to decide regardless of what Israel prefers, what the international community prefers. Let them really come to a consensus and then let that person then act on the basis of our own basic law, not that of the United States Constitution or laws or wishes or desires or anything like that.

That, I think, would be a good step in the direction—a good step in the direction of getting it right. But then that’s also transitional because ultimately you need to go to—(inaudible). And my proposal has in it as an integral element agreement to a date certain for elections after this transitional period and let people have the ultimate say in terms of who leads them.

ZACHARIA: Itamar, you have a leader in mind for the Palestinian Authority?

RABINOVICH: No. I absolutely agree. If you have a good idea, keep it confidential because by airing the name you will do that candidate damage.

ZACHARIA: Richard?

HAASS: Listen, what they—premature—

FAYYAD: Can I—can I just add one last point on this? There’s been really excessive preoccupation with the question of who on our side, not so much on who on the Israeli side, although that’s a subject whether—of another—

ZACHARIA: Well, the—yes, Itamar, do you have a favorite Israeli future leader?

FAYYAD: —conversation and all of that—

HAASS: It’ll sink his career.

FAYYAD: As if—if we Palestinians were to do something that’s really ideal from the point of view of the international community or something like that, (it’s got to really be enough to get us all there ?). After all, what you’re looking for is something that’s not solely a Palestinian interest. It’s also an Israeli interest, it’s a regional interest, and it’s an international community interest and interest of peace and security.

And I think it’s important as the world looks at us that it spends equal time at least looking at the Israeli—the state of Israeli politics and who’s running the show there.

ZACHARIA: Richard, last word here?

HAASS: Yeah. I mean, we’ve talked about a process and we’ve talked about the who. I actually think the most important thing is the what. What are the principles?

And, ultimately, Palestinians are going to have to lay—essentially, put forward principles about what they’re prepared to do, what they’re looking for, in a way that persuades a majority of Israelis that they have a partner here, that—now, you’ll never persuade some Israelis who don’t want a partner because they have goals of annexation and transfers. Let’s put them aside.

I think we have to work under the assumption that there is the possibility—we don’t have to ascribe odds to it—of persuading Israelis that they have a partner to work with and coexist with and it’s better than the alternatives, and vice versa—at some point that Israelis are going to have to have that conversation on the Palestinian side and that’s where, again, you get into a little bit of a dynamic between the two.

But, you know, we begin from a point where there’s zero trust and the question is, again, how do you begin a process of each side talking about what they want to see from the other and then what you really want to do is stimulate debates within each community.

You want to have an intra-Palestinian debate about what are Palestinians prepared to offer Israel, and vice versa. You want to have Israelis have a real conversation, and I think that’s where outsiders can play a role—the Saudis, the Americans, and so forth. We can incentivize certain positions and we can suggest if you go down other paths it’s going to be really problematic for your relationship with us. There’s an inside game and there’s an outside game, and let the games begin.

ZACHARIA: Well, we’re just about out of time. And thank you for joining this session and thank you to our speakers. (Applause.)

Know that the video and transcript of the symposium will be posted on CFR’s website. And please join us for a coffee break. The third session, “Strategic Lessons From One Year of War,” will begin in fifteen minutes.

And for attendees in person, as Steven mentioned but in case you missed it, we have an adjustment to the schedule for this afternoon. Brett McGurk, the deputy assistant to the president and coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa at the NSC, will speak with Steven Cook from 12:15 to 12:45, and lunch will follow. And that session will be strictly off the record with the audience in person. Thank you.

(END)

This is an uncorrected transcript.

LABOTT: Good morning. I’m Elise Labott. I’m the Edward R. Murrow press fellow here at the Council on Foreign Relations. I’m also a member here at CFR. And I’m thrilled to be here. 

But last year, on October 5, we were sitting here talking about the fifty-year anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. And this was a symposium planned by Martin Indyk. And we are all thinking about him today. And we miss his wise counsel. And we send our condolences to Gahl and the rest of the family. But we also kind of say to ourselves, how would Martin see this one-year milestone of the war with Gaza, and what’s happening in the region? And we are thinking of him today. Of course, we had no idea a day later the region and, indeed, the world would be changed forever by the attacks on October 7.  

So joining us today is a wonderful panel to take a look back, building on what we heard this morning, take a more strategic, big-picture look, and see if we can take—you know, to Tamir and I don’t like to use the phrase “lessons learned,” but kind of take a strategic kind of balance sheet of where we are, a snapshot if you will, and chart a way forward. Salam Fayyad is back with us, because we didn’t get enough of him in the last panel, obviously. (Laughter.) Tamir Hayman is the former director of Israel military intelligence and currently the managing director of the Institute for National Security Studies. He brings unmatched expertise in analyzing complex, multiflight conflicts, and Israel’s evolving strategic calculus. Audrey Kurth Cronin is the director of Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology, and one of the leading scholars on terrorism and counterterrorism. Robert Pape is the professor of political science at the University of Chicago and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats. And he’s got some groundbreaking work as well on insurgencies and will offer us a lens as to some of the military operations.  

So we’re going to—as I said, we’re going to take a big-picture look at these panels. This session, again, is on the record. We have our CFR audience here, and then over 150 people joining us online. I’ll be in conversation with the panelists for a half hour, and then we’ll open it up to your questions. We want to take a look at whether the objectives of the war have been met, the strategic balance in the region, and the implications of a new U.S. administration, as we challenge ourselves to think what a strategic forward—path forward might entail. Let’s dive in.  

Tamir, let me start with you. We’re in a year now of this war. Take a look at evaluating the alignment between the military operations over the course of the year and Israel’s long-term national interests. Do we see a divergence or convergence between the military objectives, the national security interests, and the political goals? 

HAYMAN: Well, it seems like one of the lessons learned, if I may, is that the exact things that you are mentioning right now is the compliance or the coherence between the military effort and overall framework of the political and national security interests. It seems like from the 7th of October, due to the atrocities, the trauma, the surprise, we were pushed out of balance. And the only thing available back then was operational pressure and military activity. The one thing that was clear that needed to be an intensive operational effort in order to try to return back the hostages and to crush back Hamas over what it did.  

We didn’t—as the war started, there was not enough attention to the political framework, to the diplomatic framework, to the overall interest of Israel and how we are going to face. So though we knew that we are not just confronting Hamas, although we knew that we are confronting Hamas and not the Palestinian Authority—it’s totally different situation than 2000—and we knew that Iran is behind that with its proxies, that three-layered, long-term designing of the end state was not that clear and was not held as a compass for the future operational achievements.  

LABOTT: OK. We’ve talked about this before. The original two-year plan, which you had involvement in designing, envisioned a three-month intensive campaign followed by a transition to a political and governance solution. So what caused that timeline to unravel? And how has this impacted the broader strategic objective? 

HAYMAN: Yeah. It was three months of intensive operations to destroy Hamas structure, nine months of working simultaneously on— 

LABOTT: This was the original plan. 

HAYMAN: This is the plan, of building an alternative civilian entity that runs Gaza, and the continuation of destruction of Hamas, what remains open after the first phase, and an additional one year of stabilization. The problem is, first of all, the three months didn’t last three months, but almost nine months, because of operational challenges, because of few, in my opinion, mistakes on conducting the operational level in the military dimension of the operation. And few of those because of interests of the political level to somehow manage the war in more long period of time. Those are the reasons.  

Secondly, the second period, we continue—which is—which we are doing right now—which we are doing right now—the element of the continuation of the destruction of Hamas in a military raid works well. But the other effort of rebuilding or building an alternative civilian entity, for example, that will be in charge of distributing the humanitarian aid, is a complete failure. We didn’t plan ahead. Back then when we thought that the revitalized Palestinian Authority will be somehow involved along the way, it was never approved by the Israeli government. So we are left out without a formal address. The international community and the Gulf states will not—refuse stepping in without the presence of any form of a future Palestinian Authority or some framework to a political horizon. So we are stuck with one leg of the operational effort continuing and the other leg missing at all, which may lead us into some sort of a (KO ?). 

LABOTT: I just want to remark, this is a former—and recently former—director of military intelligence talking about the failures of the operation, which I don’t really think we’ve heard that level of self, kind of, awareness and reflection. So I really appreciate that. 

Robert, what is your opinion about why Israel has struggled to meet the stated objectives of dismantling Hamas and stabilizing Gaza?  

PAPE: So I agree with Tamir quite a bit. I believe that October 7 was a strategic disaster for Israel. I believe what’s happened in the year two months since is a grand strategic disaster for Israel. I believe Israel’s security was, of course, at risk on October 7. I believe Israel’s security is going south day by day by day. I think the core issues here are that if we had followed anything close to Tamir’s plan—(laughs)—this would have been a much different picture. But if you just think back to what happened in the month after October 7, there was a tremendous amount of sympathy for Israel. This was not unanimous, of course, but a tremendous amount of sympathy for Israel. Israel was waging, I think quite appropriately, the initial operations, as Tamir laid out. I don’t think there’s any doubt that something along those lines should have happened.  

But if you then start to move forward, and if you take his timeline—that is, pretty much everything from December on—(laughs)—has just simply worked more and more against Israel’s grand strategic interests. So first of all, losing more and more support by the international community, to the point where now Netanyahu has indictments—you know, he’s now essentially a war criminal. And, what, he’s got 124 countries that he can’t travel to. I mean, this is really quite a stunning reversal of where things were in that first month on the international front. If you look at the three—I would say not just two. I wouldn’t just say it’s Gaza, and I wouldn’t just say it’s southern Lebanon.  

But if you just look at what’s happened here in the West Bank, you are seeing the rise of violent Palestinian resistance. It’s up over 130 percent in the last twelve months, compared to the twelve months before October 7. So what you are seeing in Israel’s grand strategic picture is really quite, I think, another grand strategic disaster. And then, if I can just say one more positive thing, because I don’t want to just leave this as everything’s going south. I believe the election of Donald Trump is offering Israel an opportunity for a reset. 

LABOTT: Right? That’s for the end of the panel. (Laughter.)  

PAPE: OK. All right. 

LABOTT: But I do want to—I do want to narrow down, go a little bit more micro. You’ve said—and we’re talking about the military objectives right now—you’ve said that one of the problems was Israel was not able to separate Hamas from the population. Would that have even been possible?  

PAPE: Well, we know—(laughs)—we know that dealing with a terrorist group, an insurgent group like Hamas, is incredibly challenging. We have no great records of—but what we know— 

LABOTT: This is one of the most dense areas in the world.  

PAPE: It’s also one of the most challenging strategic problems. But what we know is that if you’re going to succeed you’ve got to stop the pipeline. It’s not good enough to simply kill the existing mobilized fighters or topple the—kill the existing leaders. You’ve got to stop their next generation. It’s the next generation that’s really the issue. And the problem with what Israel’s military only strategy has done, unlike what Tamir had laid out, is that by following a military only strategy, rather than separating Hamas and the local population in Gaza, they become more bonded than ever.  

Now, we don’t have perfect public opinion data in Gaza, of course. But the data that we have shows that Hamas, among Palestinians, is actually more popular in the year after October 7 than before October 7. Before October 7, Hamas was basically neck and neck with Fatah. In that subsequent year, Hamas has now got double the support of Fatah. And this is important because this is the power of Hamas. Its popularity is its power to recruit, is its power to have ongoing operations. The plan that Tamir laid out would have been a far better plan, but by not doing that you’ve essentially made it easier for Hamas to maintain the power that really matters, the power to recruit. 

LABOTT: Right. Salam, pick up on that. Robert had—and we know in the days right after October 7, I mean, it didn’t last very long, right, but Israel had an incredible amount of goodwill and kind of sympathy. But, you know, the overwhelming military—and, I mean, even after—even on October 8, Hamas’ support was—even, you know, after conducting the attacks, their support was rising. How do you avoid this dynamic? How could this dynamic have been avoided in those early days? How could—and how can it be avoided now? 

FAYYAD: What could have been avoided in the early days, had Israel had a different definition of self-defense, for example. What constitutes a defensible strategy of self-defense? Driving people out of the country? Chasing them down into Gaza? With the experience of several rounds of escalations before October 7—October 7 was not the first time. Certainly, the most deadly—the deadliest of all times, but there were many rounds of escalation before. And the rhetoric coming out of government of Israel on October 7 and October 8 was certainly beyond anything that has said before. Nevertheless, we had some of that stuff going back to the previous rounds of escalation. 

Only to come to a point where a tenuous ceasefire agreement is agreed, and what amounted to little more than kicking the can down the road. This happens time and again. It was not hard to predict, to the professor’s point, that that’s where things were headed, once Israel decided to go into Gaza. Gaza is highly densely populated, as is well known. Not the most densely populated, Qalqilya in the West Bank is given the award, I’ll just remind everyone. But it was predictable. You are going into Gaza in the way Israel mounted its offensive on Gaza, just looking at those buildings come down, looking at vast majority of people displaced today, famine, conditions like that. I mean, how can you possibly ignore all of these consequences? They were certain. So what happened to Israel’s standing certainly was predictable.  

And if it was not adequately predictable early on, the government of Israel had enough time to really think about it. We’re more than a year into this. And since the very beginning it appeared, at least to me, with modesty, as a war to no end relative to the objectives set forth by the government of Israel itself. It was about retribution. It appeared that way. And restoration. Here, I’m talking about restoration of deterrence. But the extent to which that is successful depends on how, you know, this is underpinned in the end. If people are not thinking about political accommodation, you’re bound to really continue to repeat those mistakes again.  

LABOTT: Let me ask you— 

FAYYAD: I’m not—I’m not, by the way, here suggesting a return, as I suggested in the previous panel, that the answer to this is immediate, going back, hitting the reset button on the moribund peace process. I don’t think that’s the way. But I’m talking about first stopping what has been, like, most atrocious, savage war in our history. We know that, yeah. Yeah. 

LABOTT: But let me ask you—let me ask you something. What you just said, and why? I mean, the truth is, Hamas—not the Palestinian people, but Hamas—brought this on with the October 7 attacks. Why have we not seen any—you know, they’re not defending the Palestinian people. They’re hiding in tunnels underneath, most of them. Why is there not any outrage for Hamas? 

FAYYAD: Outrage where?  

LABOTT: In Gaza. 

FAYYAD: Well, you know that, obviously, people having been enduring the worst of conditions, living conditions, in Gaza. For lack of maybe—enough deaths to go around. Now second winter, for sure, people living in tents are not, how can there be not an erosion in the standing of Hamas? We know that, even if Hamas still registers high in opinion polls and all of that sort of thing. But clearly people want to see an end to this war. I mean, obviously. The Palestinian people are normal. They’re like everyone else around the world. And for sure, they would want to see this come to an end. And Hamas’ standing today is not what it was on October 8, or October 9th. That’s obvious. The question is, what is it going to be like when the war comes to an end?  

That’s why I always argued for the need for at least some serious thinking to go into postwar governance. Actually, to move on this very soon because in the absence of consensus on an arrangement of how to deal with, you know, internal Palestinian affairs, certainly including Gaza, the day after is going to be more of the same. We go back to status quo ante. People are going to come out, tunnels or no tunnels. The authority is going to be Hamas. Certainly matters of basic law and order, who’s going to be in the streets? It’s going to be Hamas. So that’s the reality. So we need to bring that into the discussion. 

LABOTT: Audrey, you’ve written about this too, that one of the reasons the war hasn’t ended is because there has been no plan for the day after, and that’s kind of why they keep going. I want you to—I want you to talk about that. And then also this kind of strategy to crush Hamas before addressing the hostages has also not succeeded. So it hasn’t forced Hamas to capitulate.  

CRONIN: Yes. OK. So, firstly, I don’t agree that there is no reaction against Hamas. We do not have good polls out of Gaza. You have people living in tents, under tarps, dying of starvation. You don’t have a lot of journalists in there. You don’t have people who can survive enough to be able to get good polls. So I actually think that there is a lot of anger about Hamas within Gaza, it’s just that we don’t know about it in the West. How could we know about it if we don’t have that kind of objective collection of polls. So, yes, you can get decent polls in the West Bank. I think the polls within Gaza are not good. So, firstly, Israel, I think it’s mistake in not following your plan, Tamir—you know, had it been a three-month intensive war, I think that would have been much better. 

But in any case, the mistake was not doing the classic things that we know work in ending terrorist organizations. And that is to make sure that in your response you don’t draw so much anger and desire for revenge against yourself that you don’t point out the fact that the attacks of October 7 were an enormous targeting error on behalf of Hamas. Hamas made the retribution that later arrived on non-Hamas Palestinian civilians inevitable. And there are a lot of Palestinian civilians who are very angry at Hamas. Let’s also remember that Hamas does not just exist within Gaza. Hamas is a transnational organization with representatives in other parts of the world.  

And now, unfortunately, considerably more sympathy, or at least expressions of support, in places like Europe and the United States. Something that I find personally shocking. Why? Because the anger has been directed against the Israelis. And as you watch Palestinian civilians dying of starvation, children dying of starvation, that does not allow for any space, as the last panel talked about, for anger against Hamas.  

LABOTT: You want to pick up on that? 

HAYMAN: Just one quick recommendation to our discussion. To deal with the effects of the war and the operational crisis that inflicted by the world will get us nowhere in the discussion, because nobody in Israel wanted the war, OK? It was forced upon us in the most barbaric ever assault on Israel. But that caused this drama. If you—you know how Hamas is built inside Gaza. You will understand that there’s no way of achieving the goals of the war to dismantle Hamas without the collateral damage that that goes with it. They are embedded in the civilian infrastructure, uses the humanitarian sensitive establishment in order to build its most fortified hiding place.  

And they know exactly our rules of engagement. So they use that and they’ve built that over years of preparation. And the assault that Israeli created creates that kind of a damage. We know that. But it’s inevitable because there was no other means or ways in terms of operational tactics to achieve this first goal of the war, which is to destroy or dismantle Hamas. Secondly, I truly believe, although I don’t have accurate figures, that Hamas lost most of its support in Gaza. On the contrary, in the West Bank—the West Bank, because of the sentiment of resistance and the sort of proud it gave to the some form of Palestinian sentiment, it gained some form of approval rate that’s higher in the West Bank. But it’s totally this different in the West—in Gaza.  

Regarding the—just a quick comment about the comment—the goals of the war. The idea of releasing the hostages was to create enough operational pressure that will force Hamas into a deal. And exploiting some operational opportunities to release them in a tactical and in an operational. But it was not to completely destroy Hamas and then later on, after the full destruction of Hamas, to retrieve the hostages. That was not the initial plan. The problem is that after the first phase of the hostage deal, when it broke, there was an escalating situation where eventually Hamas had only one card to play, which was the hostages. And this is the only survival mechanism, the hostage deal. That is basically where we are right now. 

LABOTT: So where are we on the hostages right now? I mean— 

HAYMAN: Well, we’re pretty much stuck. There is only one deal on the table. You must stop the war, cease the fire, maybe for a temporary period of time, but cease the fire, withdraw all your forces from Gaza, all Israeli forces from Gaza, and in return you might—we might get—I don’t—I’m not sure, most of the hostages. I imagine we will get about half, because half of them are already dead and half of those dead we’ll never find out what’s happened— 

LABOTT: And is that a deal Israel would ever accept? 

HAYMAN: That’s a deal that the Israeli government right now would never accept. Most Israelis will accept. And I think what’s new right now is two elements. One, Hamas is left alone. Hezbollah is no longer a partner. And you probably remember Hezbollah conditioned the ceasefire in the north on a ceasefire in the south. Right now it’s moving out of the equation. Second, the future Trump administration. If you remember when Netanyahu addressed the Israeli public mainly kept on saying that if we withdraw from Gaza we will never have the approval of backing to return back. I don’t think that’s happened—that will happen in a future Trump administration. So those two elements will probably create a new momentum. But, again, in order to achieve a hostage deal, Israel must accept something that, in terms of internal Israeli politics, very, very dangerous to the stability of this current Israeli government. 

LABOTT: Robert, you’ve talked about that Hamas has ceased being a fighting force and now is a protracted guerrilla campaign. So how does Israel adapt its military and political strategies to counter this shift, and also try and wrap up the war at the same time?  

PAPE: Yeah. Well, first of all, just to explain what we mean. So the idea was Israel would go into Hamas—go into Gaza. They would do this giant, big campaign. It goes on for much more than just three months. And that what this would do is basically take the steam out of Hamas in multiple ways. Well, what happened is, starting in May, Hamas has reconfigured. It’s reconfigured into a guerilla fighting force. This is something that’s happening under the pressure of Israeli heavy military pressure. And what that means is between—for every month between fifty and a hundred incidents instigated by Hamas are occurring. They are killing Israeli soldiers on a regular basis. This is not slowing down. This is continuing. So when we say there is a movement to guerilla, this is not a minor problem. This is a form of warfare that Hamas can certainly continue for many months, might be able to continue for years. So this is a serious problem.  

Now, what can Israel do about this? As long as Israel refuses to develop any kind of political strategy, and you’re hearing several good ideas on the stage for how to do that, then that pipeline that I talked about is going to continue. Now, they can try to have more surgical attacks of the guerrilla fighters. We’ve done this since Vietnam. We know how to do various operations. I’m sure Tamir could explain some of the tactics to you in detail. It’s not that there are not tactics to deal with guerilla fighters. It’s the fundamental problem is you’ve got to stop the pipeline, because it’s not good enough to take the guerillas off the battlefield today. You’ve got to prevent their replacements coming on board in the future. That’s what the political element does. So as long as that’s missing, yes, we can talk about some improved—you know, minor improvements here on the tactical front. But fundamentally, this picture is not going to change as long as that political element remains missing.  

LABOTT: Go ahead, quick. 

HAYMAN: Just quick. Rolling back Hamas from a military entity to a guerilla organization was planned. We knew that that was the fallback position. So after three months, we knew that they will transition into guerillas, small pockets of resistance. And the plan was to return back and forth through raids. So this is not the problem. Is a part of the challenge that we try to face by a long campaign, problems of long campaign we’ll discuss later on. Secondly, the fact that you mentioned is not that accurate. The numbers of Israeli casualties is diminished dramatically in the second—in the recent three months of the operation. Israelis learned and adjusted itself. So it’s not the steady price that Israelis pay. 

CRONIN: Can I just say that I think we should also consider the fact that some of what’s happening in Gaza is black market warlordism, clans taking control of aid that is trying to be distributed. I mean, this is also a very serious problem. So, I mean, to overgeneralize at the point where the war is at this stage I think would be a major mistake.  

LABOTT: OK. Salam, pick up on that. We’re talking about guerrilla fighting, black market warlordism. And then we talk about the PA coming back. But, you know, is that—is that enough to fill the vacuum? You know, part of the problem with the PA is not necessarily the players but the whole system of governance. So do we need a whole new kind of system of governance here? And is an international framework necessary? Richard had talked about, you know, kind of Gulf forces coming in, you know, in some capacity. And they’ve been reluctant to do that until there is a concrete plan for a political horizon. 

FAYYAD: Yeah. I’ll address that, but not before I say something about, again, the goals and objectives of the war as enunciated by the government of Israel. We heard the expression repeated today, “destruction of Hanas.” I mean, needless to say, everybody agrees that, as an ideology, an idea, it’s not— 

LABOTT: Is it destruction, or is it defanging the capabilities? 

FAYYAD: Yeah. Yeah.  

HAYMAN: But dismantling the military capability of Hamas. Dismantling those battalions and brigades. 

FAYYAD: OK. OK. The other—related to that—I mean, yes, I understand. But over time that gave way to dismantling, degrading capabilities, et cetera, and dislodging Hanas from governance, et cetera. And I’ll address that, it’s related to your question. But the point is that, again, if there is no horizon as to how you’re going to deal with this—and this is related to the question of erosion of Hamas’ standing, which is obvious. I mean, it’s something one would expect. But regardless of what the polls say or don’t say—and I agree what you said about accurate polls. I mean, I talk to people all the time in Gaza and I get a sense of where they are. Just, like, not very scientific, but it’s what one would expect. Nevertheless, when that day after comes, it will not come a day too soon. When it happens, what alternative do people have? That’s the—that’s the political question that needs to be addressed.  

LABOTT: Yeah, but, I mean— 

FAYYAD: If there is no—you said, vacuum. You said the word “vacuum,” “warlordism,” and what’s going on right now. If there is no other avenues for people, people are going to flock back to Hamas. That’s one. Two, as part of the myth generated by the let’s go after them, get them, eradicate them, eliminate them, et cetera, a perception developed that somehow it’s as if Hamas is a bunch of foreign fighters imported into Gaza, or something like that. I mean, they’re an integral part of Palestinian society. That’s the thing. They’re not—they’re not foreign fighters, or anything like that. So they’re not going to go away. The idea is not going to go away. The ideology is not going to go away. The only way to defeat an idea is with a better idea. 

LABOTT: But is the PA—is the PA a better idea? Or is it just shifting deck chairs on the Titanic? 

FAYYAD: Well, first of all—first of all, the PA as it currently exists, and it existed on the eve of October 7, was not the answer. I’ll be the first one—I said that explicitly in writing. The PA needed to reconfigure itself politically to create of itself an entity that can go physically to Gaza. Can be—can have the ability to get into Gaza. That’s why, even if reform is badly needed, it’s not, you know, the recipe for enabling the PA to political rule Gaza. What is required is some kind of consensus to make it possible to go. Needless to say, it should preoccupy itself with revitalizing itself, with the reforming its own operation, to make it more acceptable to people. That’s part of the equation. To deal with part of the reason why it has become so weak politically. That’s essential. So we need to get that going. And that has to be an integration in thinking.  

My last point is, talking about, you know, ceasefire and all—I think this is what we really should be focused on. But I always thought that it was wrong not to have prioritized adequately the question of what happens in the day after. If you’re really serious about ending the war, you know, immediately, as part of that thinking, you should be thinking about what’s going to happen the day after. If you’re not, then you’re not serious. You’re looking for a respite of sorts, get the hostages out, and maybe everybody goes back to doing business the old way. 

LABOTT: All right. I have one more question for Audrey, and then we’re going to turn it over to the audience. So Israel can claim it’s restored deterrence in the short term, but long-term prospects are more precarious now. There are economic pressures. There’s political isolation. There’s internal strain. So how—does how do you see Israel kind of ensuring both internal cohesion and restoring its legitimacy? 

CRONIN: Well, I think this is an element that we’re not paying enough attention to, because what’s happening in Israel right now concerns me a great deal. The Israeli economy is under tremendous stress. You’ve got, you know, extreme factions when it comes to the relationship with the current government. I’m very concerned about the degree to which Israel after October 7 will never be the same. And I don’t just mean in the sense that it’s experienced a broad trauma, but I mean in the sense that can it get back to being the kind of stable, Western democracy that it has been before this time? Economically, I’m very worried about the future of Israel.  

So, you know, if there’s an existential threat to Israel, personally I would not be looking at Iran. I would be looking at the concern that I have about the future stability of Israel, within Israel. And that is somewhat dependent upon the degree to which the situation in Gaza can be resolved. And resolved not just for the Palestinians but also resolved for Israel. Because Israel has 20-21 percent Palestinian, Israelis, Arabs, Arab-extraction population. They go by different names. So in order for Israel to regain a sense of security, it has to regain a sense of stability at home. And I think that’s where we should be focusing our attention.  

LABOTT: Tamir, super quick before we open it up, have the October 7 attacks, and the trauma, and the war kind of fundamentally changed Israel? Can it kind of return to what it was? 

HAYMAN: Definitely. The Israeli society and the Israeli security establishment has been changed, I think, forever. We know from our research that the 2000—the Second Intifada changed the Israeli political spectrum in a manner that’s unreversible. It shifted right wing, OK? And the whole concept of resolutions and agreements, et cetera, that was the 2000s. Right now, we’re going to expect the same phenomenon on steroids. And I think right now it’s a very crucial moment in the history of Israel, where it should decide whether it will go on the corridor that leads to Sparta in the Middle East or Athens in the Western world. And that discussion is right now taking place.  

How are we going to deal with Arabs as general and Palestinians, agreements—with peace agreements? Or whether we should just force all of our attention on security, force generation, building some fortified fortress that can defeat anything and may start defeating everything. And try to make some sense, trying to make some more reasonable adjustments, starts from the point that you are aware of the fact that you are traumatized. And you must not take strategic decisions, long-term, unreversible decisions that are crucial to your identity as a democratic, liberal state, when you are in state of trauma. That’s what we are trying to somehow moderate the flames of the of the discussion.  

LABOTT: Yeah. I think we need another panel today. (Laughter.) OK, we’re going to open it up to questions. I invite members and guests in New York and on virtually to join our conversation. A reminder, this is on the record. Please identify yourself and your affiliation. And keep your question to a question. Right here. 

Q: Yes. I wanted to ask Tamir, Dr. Pape opened the discussion by saying that Israel was at a—at its most weak points security-wise, which is something that surely you—I wanted to ask you whether you agree with that. Hezbollah has been decimated. Hamas has been marginalized to almost nothing, to a guerrilla state. Iran’s defenses have been severely weakened. And we’re about to enter into a new administration in the United States which is likely to be the most pro-Israel administration in history. So surely, Tamir, you do not agree with what Dr. Pape had to say. 

LABOTT: And let me—let me tag onto that. I mean, Israel has really resisted most of the U.S. kind of pleas, or suggestions, or desires for you to kind of scale back the operations. I would argue maybe that Israel’s leverage, and I think Audrey might agree, in its relationship with the U.S. has actually increased over the war. 

HAYMAN: Well, I agree with both of you. I think there was a short period of time during February till May that we were in a very downward spot, where we were practically strategic bleeding. But eventually something changed during the summertime and recent month, from the pager attacks to the Nasrallah operation, something dramatically shifted. And after the ground operation in the north, of course. So if you compare the situation right now to the situation of 6th of October, in terms of threats—direct threats on the Israel national security, our situation right now is much better. There is no immediate threat of invasion, not in the north, not in the south. Hezbollah, which was the great threat that really saved or protects the Iranians from a potential operation against its nuclear site, is not really effective as it was. So it really—the situation right now is that Iran is a little bit more exposed. That’s on the tactical level, and I could go on and on.  

The two main problems are, one, the threat of an endless attrition war that will escalate some form of international isolation of Israel, which can cripple the Israeli economy in science, culture, whatever. Israel is an integral part of the Western world. And the Western isolation or global isolation is a strategic threat. That still lurks there. And the second is the internal discussion of the future of the identity of Israel, which is escalating as we see it right now, in the previous question of the future identity and future entity—or, what will become of Israel during this trauma. Those threats are lurking. But in the more hardcore operational equation, I think we are in a better situation. By the way, it is strange why is not convincing the Israeli civilians who are living in the north to return back. They may feel something differently.  

According to Israel-U.S. relationship, what happened inside the intimate chambers is relatively—is rather different that what you see out in the public. It served some interests to create confrontation—some interests inside the administration in Washington. That is, if you are being blamed as a supporter of genocide you must pretend you—or you—in any case, you are standing strong against—or forcing Israel to be more moderate. It’s good for you and your base. And in the other side, in the more right-wing base of Israeli politics, being strong towards America gives you credit. But inside, in the internal chambers, what happened during the war was amazing. It is something that’s unprecedented. It will be written on the history. The level of coordination, intimate discussions, and military alignment between not just Israel and United States, but I think Israel and CENTCOM as a general and regional aspect, is something beyond the imagination. 

LABOTT: So why does Biden have so many—why is there this—you think, because of this public perception, you know, that Biden was not supportive of Israel, that’s really not the case? 

HAYMAN: Well, it is—the major case was the humanitarian aid and the pressure on the Israelis to be more moderate—to give away more in the hostage deal. Those two element are because of populist, shallow narratives. And the campaigns in Israeli public made an effect. It seems like when you force Israel to, on the one hand, provide humanitarian aid to your enemy, while on the other hand you are not pressuring enough for the release of the hostages, and you’re not giving all your strength, you are—it create criticism over that. 

LABOTT: Raghida. 

Q: Thank you very much, Elise. Raghida Dergham, founder and executive chairman for Beirut Institute.  

Salam Fayyad, we have a very clear vision put forward by General David Petraeus on the day after, in which he basically, in a nutshell, speaks of clear and hold, bring in a very important element of security, build some sort of gated communities with parameters, onto really sort of making sure that Palestinians get their control of Gaza back, and Israelis will have to declare their intention, of course, of withdrawing. Now that is someone who put forward a clear vision. Where is yours? I want to hear one, two, three now that you tell Trump—President Trump—President-elect Donald Trump, because everybody has been talking about the need for President Trump to put forward a plan. Here you are, a very honorable man in the Palestinian leadership. And you know how much I respect you, hold you in the highest regards. I want to hear one, two, three from you. 

LABOTT: OK. Thank you. Salam? 

FAYYAD: Thank you very much. Actually, let me be clear. Anything that brings war to an end, I’m for. When this conversation started, shortly after October 7 of last year, I, with modesty, was first to put ideas in writing. Long before there were committees, and ideas, and all that. 

LABOTT: In Foreign Affairs, I might add. 

FAYYAD: (Laughs.) Foreign Affairs—in Foreign Affairs. It came out the third week of October of last year. And it came out with—and this is how I answer the question—it came out as a response to an idea I had floated that said something along the lines that we have just mentioned. I’m not really saying that General Petraeus had put those ideas then, but people who are kind of trading with ideas of that nature—some coming from Israel itself—about some kind of real local arrangement and all that. I immediately objected. And the reason why I reacted very, very angry to that is this. I said, the problem here—my problem with this approach, it assumed that the day after was going to be a Hamas-less Gaza. And the fundamental problem with that, to me, was tens of thousands of Palestinians killed. And that’s exactly what happened. And that’s exactly what happened.  

And I said—I was angry. And I said, I’m not going to be part of this conversation at all. I can’t really get engaged in a conversation that means that. So I put forward this central idea. And I, in the previous session, said it was our own failure not to have acted on that basis. Had we done so, it would—number one, garnered regional and international support, importantly. It would have provided an answer to the immediate question of postwar governance in Gaza. It would have been the nucleus around which some security arrangements could have been worked out. And it had—it was explicit on the need for everyone to agree to an ironclad commitment on nonviolence for a number of years. So there was something on the table. It was most logical. And it would have provided a bridge, actually, to at some point the restoration of the political process. So you’re asking me now. That was, like, my answer at the time. Now I’ll go for anything. Just stop the war. Do you understand what I’m saying? (Laughter.) And then we’ll talk about the details later. 

LABOTT: OK. And are— 

FAYYAD: That’s what I mean. 

LABOTT: Right here, sir. 

FAYYAD: There are no takers. What can I do? 

Q: Thank you. Niso Abuaf, Pace University.  

I have—from an economist to an economist, I have a question for former Prime Minister Fayyad—a political, economic, and behavioral economics question. As you know, Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005. And there was great optimism that there would be economic dynamism and growth, whereas rejectionist forces won. What are the conditions under which, in Palestinian society, conditions for growth will prevail, as opposed to conditions of rejectionist forces? 

LABOTT: And then, also, tack on the idea that there is a lot of discussion about kind of Arabs coming in and making this the new Dubai. And is that something that the Palestinians would want? Or are they looking for something that’s more indigenous? 

FAYYAD: Yeah. No talk about new Dubai now is very unrealistic, but— 

LABOTT: You know, I’ll tell you, one Gulf official actually said to me, I mean, it’s pretty crass, but, you know, the place is in rubble now. We could totally rebuild it. 

FAYYAD: Yeah, I mean, how about beginning with that? Which requires stopping the war to begin with. The question is, economist to economist, but you also said political economy, which I think is absolutely true. This definitely has, you know, political underpinnings to it. Sure, Israel did redeploy from Gaza in 2005. We know that. We know the history. But it’s also true that the occupation really, in the bigger sense of the word, has been upheld there. Not that Gaza was in any way politically separable in the way we Palestinians feel about our own situation of the occupation on West Bank, from the fact that we are under occupation. We have been living in West Bank and Gaza since 1967. 

And people actually did not really see that leading somewhere. There was a minor—there was some political activity post that. There were some negotiations, too many rounds of negotiations that produced nothing. Gaza itself was under siege for an extended period of time. You know, post-withdrawal from Gaza. Israel withdrawal from Gaza. So I think two things need to happen at the same time. With modesty, I think some sense of hope and possibility about a day—a possible accommodation at some point in the future where Palestinians can invest in the idea that at some point we are going to able to live as free people with dignity in a country of our own. Something needs to go into that. I have some ideas as to how that process can begin. 

And that conversation has started—actually, it had started before October 7, in connection with then-ongoing conversation about normalization with Saudi Arabia, Israel, security with the United States. Not much went into defining what an acceptable Palestinian component might be. I have some ideas about that, as well. But importantly, I think something needs to go into that. But first things first. In parallel, most importantly, you know, to begin to deal with the problem, with attacks against Gaza, you need to stop the war. First stop digging. And more and more war is going to lead to more casualties, more destruction, and more hurt feelings, and more difficulty in getting to a conciliation at some point. So that has to be prioritized. That has to be prioritized. 

In parallel, I think, you know, we Palestinians can—and this extends my answer for Raghida’s question—can and should act immediately to show up in Gaza as a Palestinian Authority government, and deal with the region for sure, and internationally, including in security in ways that can lead to some sustainability. Remember, this is a period where there’s—there has to be a firm commitment to nonviolence by all. And that’s why, in my own political thinking, it’s important to have everybody included in this unified leadership framework, which they already are. Not as part of government, but as part of this unified leadership framework. 

So some steps need to be taken, beginning with what has to begin to happen on the ground as matter of absolute urgency. Minus that, I’m afraid—I’m afraid this is, you know, far from being the next Dubai or something like that, Gaza—and I say this with absolute sadness—Gaza is going to being the world’s largest encampment for many decades to come. That’s the reality I see on the ground. That’s what’s at stake here. And that’s what really gets, you know, lost in the conversation about restoration of deterrence and all of that sort of thing. Extending the concept of self-defense beyond anything that is acceptable under international law.  

The last point I would make is that, at some point, we have learned a lot about what Israel saw, and the threat Israel posed—you know, perceived as it’s facing. We, at the same time, need to understand that Israel has to be—if it is a part of the international community, it has to begin to think about abiding by international rules as well. There is a lot that has happened since October 7 that requires that kind of intervention. And I think—as your point about why is it that, notwithstanding the massive support that United States has given to Israel, that there is this unhappiness when you talk to the Israelis. There is also unhappiness on the part of those who really see it the other way, that they actually saw the United States as unqualifyingly supporting Israel. And that’s part of the problem. And that’s going to make it even more difficult going forward. 

LABOTT: Very quick. 

PAPE: So I’d like to build on what I said earlier. I believe Trump’s victory is offering Israel an opportunity for a reset. Trump is making very clear that his number-one goal in the Middle East is Iran. Israel’s number-one threat, I would still maintain, is Iran. However, in order to get there, in order to deal with Iran, it’s not good enough to have Israel and the United States. You need Saudi Arabia. You need the UAE. In order to do that— 

LABOTT: You need to end the war. 

PAPE: —Trump has also told Netanyahu to shut down the wars. If you don’t shut down those wars, you’re not going to get the UAE and Saudi Arabia. So there is a real tradeoff now coming for Israel’s security—its grand strategic security. As I said, in the last year—I still say—this has been a grand strategic disaster. There is an opportunity for a reset. The key would be if Netanyahu would promise to freeze any settlements, not go in and resettle Gaza, for at least five years. Then you might actually be able to move in this direction and truly reset for Israel’s security for the future. 

LABOTT: OK. We’re coming on time. We’re just going to have Audrey and Tamir make one quick last remark. Trump made a threat there was going to be hell to pay if Hamas doesn’t release those hostages. What does that mean? 

CRONIN: (Laughs.) Well, I’m not sure exactly what Trump’s plan is. I think I’d have to hear what that was, as to know what he meant by “hell to pay.” But I will say that the effort on the part of the Biden administration to control Israel’s behavior—to the extent that they were publicly talking about that here—was definitely a failure. And so having a new administration in place that is much closer to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates could potentially be an opportunity for Israel. 

HAYMAN: I’ll take it from there. I think, first of all most Israeli wants to stop the war. The problem is that you must understand how traumatic is the situation of the hostages. I don’t think you really—you need to be in Israel for a period of time to understand how much suffering the situation of imagining those poor souls rotting in the tunnels beneath Gaza. We must understand that they are interconnected. We need to stop the war, but we need to somehow stop this catastrophe from happening. 

Secondly, I think the Trump administration may pose, or may present a great opportunity, if it will succeed in connecting all the dots. That is, both hostage deal, with a ceasefire, reconnect that period of a ceasefire to some form of a political component and the Israel-Saudi normalization, and create a network of alliances that deter Iran, or weakening its expansion. I think that bargain is worth working on. And it may present him, on the stage of history, as one of the great—(inaudible)—of the Middle East. 

FAYYAD: Can I just say one last thing? 

LABOTT: Super quick or I might get fired. 

FAYYAD: Sure. (Laughs.) Super quick. Yeah, on the hostages and the deal. President Biden actually made an initiative—I mean, announced a plan in late May of this year. And he said it’s a plan that Israel had agreed to, and the onus was on Hamas to agree to it in order for it to happen. Weeks, months into this, it didn’t happen. At some point, Biden himself—it’s not only my reporting—Biden himself said that Netanyahu was the problem in terms of getting a deal. There was a situation with Israel’s security establishment. All of Israel’s security chiefs were recommending to the prime minister, agreeing to the deal in the making. And he himself refused to do that. It’s the only situation I know of where a political leader does not listen to what his security chiefs tell him. So that has to really be also factored into the conversation. 

HAYMAN: Let’s ask— 

LABOTT: All right. 

HAYMAN: Let’s ask Brett McGurk. He is going to come. Let’s ask him the question. 

FAYYAD: OK.  

LABOTT: OK. OK. I’d like to thank my panelists, Robert, Salam, Audrey, Tamir. A reminder, this was on the record. We are going to have video and transcript of this symposium on CFR’s website. 

And a reminder, for everyone—our attendees in person, we have an adjustment to the schedule. Brett McGurk, after a short coffee break—a short one—Brett McGurk, deputy assistant to the president and coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa at the National Security Council, will speak with Steven Cook from 12:15 to 12:45. Lunch will immediately follow. Thank you very much. (Applause.) 

(END) 

This is an uncorrected transcript.