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Argentina’s rapprochement to the United States under President Javier Milei is not just ideological—it is strategic. While pushing through painful economic reforms at home, Milei is aligning with Washington on multiple fronts: International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiations, defense ties (NATO partnership bid and F-16 purchase), and personal diplomacy with U.S. President Donald Trump. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent’s one-day stop in Buenos Aires—right as the new FX regime kicked in and amid Trump’s tariff rollout—was no coincidence. It signals that Argentina is being treated as the closest ally in South America, where U.S. influence is under pressure under China’s global rise.
Milei’s High-Stakes Economic Overhaul
On April 14, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent arrived in Buenos Aires for a 12-hour visit that underscored a shifting relationship between Argentina and the United States. His stop, timed with the launch of the Milei administration’s third economic reform phase, carried more than symbolic weight. Bessent offered “full support” for President Javier Milei’s policies and reaffirmed Washington’s intent to be Argentina’s “partner of choice,” while sending a clear message that Argentina should get rid of the controversial swap currency deal with China. The visit followed the IMF’s approval of a $20 billion rescue package, marking the second biggest IMF deal of its kind, signaling a new stage in the country’s economic and geopolitical realignment. Milei’s administration has dramatically changed Argentina’s economy and its foreign policy. Domestically, he has launched aggressive reforms to tackle triple-digit inflation and fiscal imbalances. Abroad, his administration is moving closer and closer to Washington, both economically, through multilateral finance, and strategically, through defense and security alignment. Milei has also become the key ideological “conservative-libertarian” ally of the Trump administration in the Americas. Whether the “America First” approach can provide real benefits from this realignment is yet to be seen, but the path ahead remains complex in the commercial agenda.
Milei entered the Pink House at one of the worst times for Argentina. The country, which has been experiencing an economic crisis for the past 35 years, entered 2024 with monthly inflation rates above 20 percent. In addition to this, real reserves were negative, meaning its foreign currency liabilities exceeded its liquid assets—effectively leaving the country overdrawn and without usable dollars to stabilize the economy or meet near-term obligations. Years of currency controls, debt accumulation, and protectionist policies were pushing the economy toward another default. In response, Milei moved quickly to slash public spending, dismantle subsidies, and—the greatest achievement for public opinion—place monthly inflation below 4 percent. However, the reform has a long way to go to lay the foundations for long-term macroeconomic stability.
After negotiations with the IMF, the Milei administration secured a highly unusual deal where $12 billion was released immediately to bolster reserves, with total support reaching $20 billion. For Washington, which holds significant influence over IMF decisions, the program represented an endorsement of Milei’s fiscal and monetary tightening. For Milei’s government, it presented an opportunity to break the cycle of devaluation and inflation in an electoral year, while gradually dismantling the financial “cepo” (or currency restrictions). The first step has been to allow individuals (though not companies) to buy U.S. dollars at the official market rate, within a managed foreign exchange band. Managing the currency market has been a key tool to stabilize prices, control capital flight, attract investments, modestly attracted by the Incentive Regime for Large Investments, and boost real economic growth, but its liberalization lagged behind in the economic plan based on concerns over impacts on reserves and inflation. Though the IMF deal buys time, its success depends on continued political resolve and external support.
Argentina’s Foreign Policy Pivot
Milei’s foreign policy reorientation has been reinforced through frequent and high-profile contact with U.S. President Donald Trump. Following Trump’s victory in 2024, Milei became the first foreign leader to visit him, traveling to Mar-a-Lago and addressing a conservative gala in which the president was in attendance. The two leaders share ideological affinity, with Trump calling his Argentine counterpart his favorite president, and Milei arguably inspiring the “chainsaw approach” adopted by the U.S. Department of Government Efficiency.
Milei himself emphasizes that his government has a “perfect tuning with the Trump administration.” While Argentina’s foreign policy shift is driven in part by economic necessity, Milei’s personal connections have helped expedite the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s support to the IMF. Yet this closeness carries risk. Argentina’s association with the Trump administration may complicate relations with future U.S. governments or limit flexibility in dealings with other powers, especially since the bilateral “tuning” is becoming a contested issue in Argentine domestic politics. Potential conflicts between the Trump and Milei administrations may arise as a result of the newly imposed tariffs affecting sectors such as steel and aluminum. For now, the personal channel has helped secure political capital for Milei as he pursues contentious reforms, but its long-term utility remains uncertain.
Secretary Bessent’s visit reflected the convergence of economic urgency and strategic coordination. In an interview during the trip, he described it as a “fulcrum day” for Argentina’s economy. He framed the visit as a signal of Washington’s support for reforms aimed at, in his words, “bringing Argentina back from the precipice.” The visit took on added significance given that it was not part of a broader regional tour, but a one-day stop exclusively in Buenos Aires and timed to take place the day the Milei administration loosened currency restrictions.
The public reception of the visit in Argentina was mixed. Supporters of Milei viewed it as proof of growing international legitimacy and as a sign that his reforms were bearing fruit. Critics, however, raised concerns about overdependence on U.S. backing and the potential loss of economic sovereignty. In meetings with Milei and his top economic aides at the Casa Rosada, Bessent delivered a clear message: The Trump administration stood fully behind Argentina’s economic turnaround effort. He emphasized Washington’s “full support” for Milei’s reforms and conveyed that the United States wants to be Argentina’s “partner of choice” as it reopens to global markets. This phrasing was pointed—implicitly positioning the United States as a preferable alternative to other partners like China, which had become influential in Argentina during prior administrations. For the Milei government, Bessent’s public endorsement bolstered credibility. For Washington, the trip sent a message to the region: Argentina is now the most strategically engaged South American partner in the U.S. orbit.
Still, the challenges remain significant. Argentina’s inflation, though slowing, is still among the highest in the world. Labor unions have pushed back against cuts, and political resistance to further reforms is likely to grow. Bessent’s endorsement may have bought the Milei administration some time, but it also raised expectations—both in Washington and at home. The extent to which this diplomatic support translates into sustainable recovery will depend on how the results of the next phases of Milei’s program.
Rebuilding Defense Partnerships
Argentina’s pro-U.S. realignment is not confined to economics and politics—it extends decisively into defense and security cooperation. Defense Minister Luis Petri’s trips to Brussels and Copenhagen in April 2024 marked the start of this shift. In Brussels, Petri hand-delivered a letter to NATO formally requesting that Argentina be granted the status of a “global partner” of the Alliance. Petri pledged that Argentina would work to “modernize and train our forces to NATO standards,” reflecting Milei’s strategic decision to integrate Argentina with Western defense frameworks.
The same week, Argentina finalized a long-awaited arms purchase: 24 used F-16 fighter jets from Denmark. The $300 million deal, backed by U.S. foreign military financing, marked a preference for Western over Chinese military suppliers. China had promoted its JF-17 jets as an alternative, but Buenos Aires opted for U.S.-made aircraft with NATO compatibility. In this sense, the F-16s’ NATO compatibility ensures Argentina’s integration into Western security frameworks, facilitating joint operations and interoperability with U.S. and allied forces. This alignment carries strategic implications. It enhances Argentina’s defense capabilities while embedding it more deeply in U.S.-led security frameworks. Additionally, the deal includes reconnaissance pods, AIM-9X and AIM-120 missiles, and training munitions.
In the security cooperation agenda, the bilateral ties experienced a strengthening under the leadership of Patricia Bullrich’s Ministry of Security, which signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to improve investigative coordination and joint responses to transnational crimes. Additionally, the counter-terrorism efforts have been upgraded with the FBI provision of equipment to federal forces, the incorporation of Hamas to Argentina’s terrorist list, while Argentina is expecting to establish a regional intelligence center against synthetic drugs in South America.
Argentina’s Emerging Role in a Polarized Hemisphere
Argentina’s pivot comes amid heightened U.S.-China competition in Latin America. Over the past decade, China has become deeply embedded in Argentina’s economic landscape, becoming the country’s second-largest trading partner after Brazil. Chinese companies have invested heavily in sectors like lithium, energy infrastructure, and agriculture with potential investments in the nuclear sector, while Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative was formally adopted by Alberto Fernandez’s government.
One of the most geopolitically sensitive symbols of China’s presence is the space station in Neuquén, operated by China’s military-linked space agency under a 50-year lease. The site has drawn scrutiny from U.S. defense officials who see it as part of China’s dual-use infrastructure footprint across the Global South. While the Milei government has not cut ties with Beijing, it has clearly changed the tone and pace of engagement. During the 2023 campaign, Milei sharply criticized the Chinese Communist Party. Once in office, he toned down his rhetoric but moved to impose greater oversight on the station. His foreign minister has suggested that the Neuquén facility could be subject to greater Argentine scrutiny or even joint inspections.
Most notably, Beijing extended an $18 billion currency swap that helped shore up Argentine reserves during previous crises. Bessent referred to the deal with expectations that Argentina will be able to pay it off, and avoid “rapacious deals marked as aid”, a comment that drew an immediate and sharply worded rebuke from Beijing. The Chinese Embassy in Buenos Aires denounced his remarks as “malicious slanders,” accused Washington of attempting to sabotage China’s cooperation with the Global South, and warned the United States against imposing “a new version of the Monroe Doctrine” on Latin America.
For its part, Argentina’s Central Bank renewed the currency swap with China only five days before Bessent’s visit. In this sense, Argentina is pursuing a calibrated approach, reducing political and strategic dependence on Beijing without rupturing economic ties. The regional contrast is notable. Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil has moved closer to China, even questioning the global role of the U.S. dollar. In contrast, Argentina’s realignment offers Washington a foothold in the Southern Cone at a moment of strategic competition.
In less than a year, Argentina has undergone a dramatic realignment in both domestic and foreign policy. The Milei administration has positioned itself as a reformist government willing to pursue unpopular measures to stabilize the economy, while simultaneously forging a deeper strategic partnership with the United States. For Washington, this opening presents an opportunity unseen in decades to reassert influence in a region where China has gained ground. This goes beyond personal affinities. Statements made over the past months begin to show not only by ideological proximity but concrete shared interests: energy development, trade integration, and countering China’s influence. Secretary Bessent’s visit, the IMF deal, and defense agreements all point to a convergence that has unfolded with unusual speed.
Yet the road ahead remains uncertain. Domestically, Milei faces significant political and social challenges. Inflation, though haphazardly moderating, remains high. Labor unrest and legislative resistance threaten to slow or reverse reforms. Public opinion, increasingly polarized, may take a downturn if economic improvements fail to materialize quickly. At the same time, Argentina’s close identification with the Trump administration may limit flexibility should political dynamics shift in Washington.
Externally, even if Beijing’s regional influence will be under strong stress, it is unlikely to cede it. Its economic presence in Argentina remains robust, and Chinese officials have already signaled discomfort with the country’s pivot but are showing restraint with the country without any backlash beyond not moving forward with new additional investment projects. A faltering recovery or change in Argentine leadership could open the door once again to greater Chinese engagement, and that is the long-term game that Beijing seems to be playing.
Still, for the time being, Argentina has become one of the most strategically aligned U.S. partners in the Western Hemisphere. While the relationship is not yet fully institutionalized, it has moved well beyond words and into deeds, deepening relations across finance, defense, and diplomatic coordination as the landscape allows. Most of the Latin American governments look at Milei with distrust, but Argentina now stands as a focal point and potential anchor for Washington’s renewed engagement in the Southern Cone amid intensifying global competition.
Ariel González Levaggi is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Claudio Robelo Guzman is a PhD candidate in political science at Florida State University.
