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Narratives around the state of democracy in Africa tend to swing between exuberant optimism and gloomy pessimism. Recent electoral outcomes across the continent, however, reveal a more nuanced reality that defies easy characterization. In what some analysts have seen as part of a global “anti-incumbent election wave,” 2024 saw opposition parties achieve remarkable victories across several African nations with relatively robust democratic institutions, suggesting a vibrant and resilient demand for democracy. For example, the Botswana Democratic Party lost its parliamentary majority after 58 years of uninterrupted rule. South Africa’s African National Congress fell below majority status for the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994, forcing it into a coalition government. Similarly, opposition victories in Senegal, Ghana, Somaliland, and Mauritius all signaled a broader trend of both electoral accountability and dissatisfaction with the status quo.
These outcomes reflect several connected factors: widespread economic discontent exacerbated by slow post-pandemic recoveries, as well as by rising global inflation related to ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East; local perceptions of corruption and governance failures; demographic shifts, with younger voters less tied to liberation narratives and more motivated by their own diminished prospects; and—perhaps most significantly—the presence of independent judiciaries and electoral commissions, free media, and active civil societies that have helped translate public discontent into peaceful political action.
But the enthusiasm around these peaceful transitions is tempered by several less desirable electoral outcomes, which suggest that in places where democratic traditions have been slow to take root—such as Mozambique, Chad, and Comoros—it remains difficult to challenge embedded incumbents and overcome the capture of state institutions. For example, the deeply entrenched Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was able to undermine what was hoped to be a competitive election, instead extending its nearly 50-year hold on power in a process marred by widespread allegations of fraud that sparked violent unrest. Similarly, violence erupted in the lead up to Chad’s presidential vote, with the leading opposition candidate being killed in a standoff with federal forces earlier in the year; President Mahamat Déby formally succeeded his deceased father as president after overseeing the ratification of a new constitution that allowed him to run while serving as the transitional head of state.
With another 10 presidential contests scheduled to take place in 2025, this year is already shaping up to be significant for African politics. The first, which took place in Gabon on April 12, offers a complicated counternarrative to both the optimistic and pessimistic narratives that predominate—perhaps indicating what might lie ahead for the continent’s upcoming elections. As with Chad’s election last year, Gabon saw a junta leader take power, with General Brice Oligui Nguema securing a landslide 90.4 percent of the vote after altering the country’s transitional constitution to allow himself to run. While many Gabonese and outsiders might argue that having no candidate on the ballot with the last name “Bongo” for the first time in more than 50 years is an accomplishment worth celebrating—as is the calm atmosphere of the campaign process—it is hard to argue that Gabon’s election represents a true transition to democratic rule. While on paper the outcome has fulfilled the promise of a transition, it has perhaps more accurately consolidated military power under a democratic veneer. If anything, Gabon’s election demonstrates how seemingly democratic processes can simultaneously reinforce authoritarian tendencies, highlighting the complicated nature of political transitions in Africa.
In this light, some of the most consequential African elections of 2025 will occur in countries where incumbents cling to power through constitutional manipulations and institutional capture. In others, the electoral environment is sure to be more contested. Will we see more of the kind of middle-ground “managed democracy”—hewing closely enough to democratic procedures but without the substantive conditions for genuine competition or accountability—or might true change be on the horizon? There are several African elections worth watching in late 2025 to help make this determination: Cameroon, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. In January 2026, Uganda is set to hold presidential elections, after the country has been under the rule of President Yoweri Museveni for nearly four decades since 1986. Now 80 years old, Museveni’s continued hold on power raises growing questions about succession and the future of governance in Uganda. Meanwhile, civil society organizations, independent media outlets, and human rights defenders face an increasingly repressive environment.
Cameroon: Inflection Point or More of the Same?
Cameroon’s presidential election, scheduled for October 31, exemplifies the complex set of challenges facing African electoral processes this year. On the surface, the contest appears to be merely another iteration of the political status quo that has prevailed since 1982, when President Paul Biya first assumed power. Now 91, making him the world’s oldest serving head of state, Biya is standing for a disquieting eighth consecutive seven-year term; by some medical miracle, he could be 99 when his term expires.
His ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (RDPC) has maintained power since it was established in 1966, having since built up total institutional control of the state. This dominance has enabled a history of fraudulent elections, including the most recent presidential vote in 2018, when opposition candidate Maurice Kamto officially received 14 percent of the votes and was subsequently arrested along with hundreds of supporters for protesting the results.
But two developments distinguish the 2025 electoral cycle from the past. First, Biya’s increasingly fragile health and extended absences from public view can no longer be ignored and have triggered considerable behind-the-scenes succession maneuvering within his party. While the constitution provides for President of the Senate Marcel Niat Njifenji, himself 90 years old, to assume temporary leadership and organize elections within 120 days should Biya die or step down, this process faces uncertainty given the RDPC’s historical capture and manipulation of state institutions. Indeed, one rumored scenario is that Biya could choose to hand power to his son Franck prior to elections to ensure a dynastic succession.
Second, approximately 30 opposition parties are supporting the Political Alliance for Change, headed by long-time opposition figure Maurice Kamto. This is a significant development in the context of “Cameroon’s single-round plurality system that advantages the incumbent.” However, Biya’s government has already banned this coalition, declaring it “illegal” and a “clandestine movement.” Biya’s RDPC has further attempted to postpone legislative elections until 2026, potentially disqualifying Kamto from even running in the presidential election, given that his coalition currently holds no seats.
With five months to go before the vote, the preelection environment has been marked by increasing repression. Recent months have seen arbitrary arrests of opposition members, journalists, and civil society leaders. Media outlets critical of the government have had their licenses suspended, while reporters covering corruption face violence and detention. Last October, when media speculation was rife that Biya had died after a prolonged foreign absence, the government declared it illegal to publicly speculate about the president’s health. These tactics reflect a broader crackdown on civil liberties and a closing of the political space for civil society actors. This remains especially true in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions, where a simmering conflict with the country’s Anglophone minority has resulted in thousands of deaths and massive displacement.
Tanzania: The Velvet Glove Over the Iron Fist Comes Off Again
Tanzania is gearing up for another contentious parliamentary and presidential election, also on October 31. The Party for Democracy and Progress (CHADEMA), Tanzania’s main opposition party, is barred from participating in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections after refusing to sign an electoral code of conduct in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections after refusing to sign an electoral code of conduct, a move the party claims is unconstitutional. Furthermore, CHADEMA party leader and presidential contender Tundu Lissu was arrested in April 2025 on treason charges after holding public rallies promoting his party’s “No Reforms, No Elections” campaign. These recent attacks on opposition parties—as well as credible reports of electoral fraud and intimidation in the 2020 general elections and the 2024 local government elections and a general culture of repression by Tanzania’s ruling Party of the Revolution (CCM)—suggest that President Samia Suluhu Hassan is willing to use intimidation and force to win reelection this October. It is unclear if CHADEMA’s disqualification is unconstitutional. Furthermore, CHADEMA party leader and presidential contender Tundu Lissu was arrested in April 2025 on treason charges after holding public rallies promoting his party’s “No Reforms, No Elections” campaign. In Dar es Salaam, prominent East African activists were detained and allegedly tortured, and others deported, in advance of a court hearing for Lissu’s treason charge. These recent attacks—as well as credible reports of electoral fraud and intimidation in the 2020 general elections and the 2024 local government elections, and a general culture of repression by Tanzania’s ruling CCM—suggest that President Samia Suluhu Hassan is willing to use intimidation and force to win reelection this October.
The CCM, having ruled Tanzania since the mainland’s independence in 1961, is currently the longest-serving ruling party in Africa. It has operated in lockstep with the country’s police and intelligence services for decades to clamp down on opposition by detaining, arbitrarily arresting, and disappearing political figures and dissidents. In addition, demonstrations are met with disproportionate violence. On the eve of the 2020 elections, for example, security forces shot at protesters in Zanzibar, killing at least 10 citizens and wounding 50. As one anonymous CCM senior leader described the symbiotic relationship between the party and security forces, “A withdrawal of support by the security agencies would mark the end of CCM’s reign. . . . CCM has traditionally avoided criticizing the security agencies even at closed-door meetings, giving them a free hand to do whatever they wished without the fear for accountability in the name of helping CCM win elections.”
Samia Suluhu Hassan, the former vice president, was swept into office in 2021 following the death of President John Pombe Magufuli. Her presidency was initially met with hope of democratic reform after her controversial predecessor had spent his tenure peeling back political freedoms, clamping down on opposition parties, and repressing dissidents. But even after his death—rumored to be by Covid-19, the very existence of which he denied—Magufuli’s legacy remains popular in parts of Tanzania for his no-nonsense, austere approach to governance and his emphasis on improving the country’s physical infrastructure. Ultimately, his oppressive rule made clear what has always been evident: The Tanzanian constitution is weak, and presidential power easily supersedes the law. Opposition figure Tundu Lissu framed it aptly: “What Magufuli did is he removed the velvet glove from the iron fist that has always been the Tanzanian state.”
Early in her presidency, Hassan reversed an unconstitutional ban on all political rallies, eased media censorship, and began reconciliatory talks with opposition parties. She touted these political reforms as her “4Rs” philosophy: reconciliation, resilience, reform, and rebuilding. Seizing on the death of Magufuli and the reconciliatory signals from President Hassan, opposition figures revived a 30-year push for constitutional and electoral reforms. The logic behind opening this space is simple: Maintaining the illusion of participatory democracy is important for the CCM to be seen as a legitimate party that has been chosen resoundingly, time and again, to lead the country since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1995.
The international community also picked up on President Hassan’s reconciliatory tone and raised hopes that she could usher in a different, more democratic leadership for Tanzania. For example, it was one of three countries that former Vice President Kamala Harris visited in her 2023 Africa tour, a rare high-level visit from the Biden administration. Speaking from Dar es Salaam, Harris described President Suluhu as a “champion in terms of democratic reforms” in Tanzania.
But this openness to reforms did not last long. A chain of arrests, abductions, and intimidation of opposition candidates in the run-up to the 2024 local elections—in which officials claimed the CCM won 99 percent of all seats—marked a return to the party’s violent and heavy-handed rule. Ahead of the upcoming elections this October, the CHADEMA party in Tanzania is campaigning under a “No Reforms, No Elections” agenda, calling for a voting boycott unless the government implements electoral reforms, including establishing an independent electoral commission, hiring nonpartisan election staff, and ensuring there is no interference from Tanzania’s security forces in the electoral process. For making these demands, CHADEMA was banned from participating in this year’s election on a procedural basis, and its leader, Tundu Lissu, was arrested on treason charges—which are punishable by death.
Ahead of a court hearing for Tundu Lissu in late May, the government detained prominent Kenyan lawyers and activists at Dar es Salaam’s airport and promptly deported them. Activists, including Martha Karua (Kenya’s former Justice Minister), Willy Mutunga (Kenya’s chief justice and president of the Supreme Court), Hanifa Farsafi (prominent Gen Z activist), and others, were visiting Dar es Salaam to show support for Tundu Lissu. In an unprecedented escalation, two other prominent East African activists, Boniface Mwangi and Agather Atuhaire, were reportedly arrested, brutally tortured, and abandoned days later on the Kenyan and Ugandan border, respectively. Atuhaire and Mwangi described alleged rape while in detention. While the detention, torture, and disappearance of Tanzanian activists is sadly a frequent occurrence, the alleged abuse of these foreign activists by the Tanzanian government is a new and dangerous escalation by CCM to suppress dissent in the country.
Hassan and the CCM do not appear interested in yielding any of the power and control they have accumulated over six decades. Barring the highly unexpected, the CCM appears likely to win these parliamentary elections resoundingly, with Hassan also winning her presidential race by a comfortable margin. The same anonymous senior CCM official described their party’s approach succinctly: “The priority at the moment is to win regardless of the cost.” In doing so, the party will continue the trends seen in Mozambique and Comoros: entrenched political parties using violence and intimidation to cling to power.
Côte d’Ivoire: Balancing Democracy and Stability
Côte d’Ivoire’s current political stability has been maintained through its steady economic growth and development rather than President Alassane Ouattara’s commitment to democracy. Since 2017, the country’s democratic institutions have weakened, with diminished vertical and horizontal accountability because neither parliament nor the judiciary holds much influence, and the political arena showcases limited opposition participation. In the lead up to the presidential election on October 25, tensions are rising as politicians and their supporters face the reality that this process will test the foundations of their democracy. If Ouattara chooses to run for a fourth term, it could endanger Côte d’Ivoire’s strides in economic growth and development.
In the 15 years Ouattara has been at the helm, the country has had “one of the fastest-growing economies globally, with an average growth rate of 8 [percent] between 2012 and 2019.” Côte d’Ivoire is also the second-largest economy in West Africa after Nigeria. This makes its stability critical for the region, especially given the recent fracturing of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the ongoing terrorist insurgencies in the Sahel. Sharing borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire remains vulnerable to insurgent groups who might seize upon the internal instability triggered by a controversial or contested election process to gain a foothold.
Since the beginning of multiparty elections in Côte d’Ivoire in 1990, the country has never experienced a peaceful transfer of power. Current tensions over the presidential election are fueled by memories of past electoral crises, which led to two consecutive civil wars from 2002–2007 and again from 2010–2011. While both conflicts began under previous governments before President Ouattara’s first term, the collective trauma of thousands of civilians losing their lives in political violence and collectively more than a million Ivorians being displaced from their homes provokes a visceral response ahead of elections today.
Voters understand that the integrity of Côte d’Ivoire’s elections depends on the strength of its democratic institutions—yet the current government has already shown troubling signs of undermining them. When Ouattara announced that he intended to run for a third term in 2020, civil society actors reported harassment, arrests, and restrictions on freedom of assembly. Additionally, concerns were widespread regarding the role of Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Court and Independent Electoral Commission, with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights finding the latter lacked impartiality and independence ahead of the 2020 elections. In June 2024, Ouattara issued a presidential decree that further restricts freedom of association. Ahead of this year’s election, opposition parties have threatened to withdraw representatives from the Independent Electoral Commission, citing a lack of transparency and a bias toward the ruling party, the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP). RHDP has expressed its support for a fourth Ouattara term, and Ouattara has hinted at his intention to run again, saying, “I am in good health and eager to serve my country.”
The openness and fairness of Côte d’Ivoire’s election and the sanctity of the electoral space are currently under threat. Multiple candidates have been excluded from participating, including leading opposition candidate Tidjane Thiam, due to his now-renounced French citizenship. (Disqualifying candidates because of dual citizenship is a tactic that was previously used in 1995 and 2000 to bar Ouattara from contesting due to his father’s Burkinabe citizenship. ) As a result, Thiam stepped down from the presidency of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire—although his party reelected him to the position a few days later. Other key opposition figures who have been barred from running in the upcoming election are Charles Blé Goudé, Guillaume Soro, and former president Laurent Gbagbo due to their criminal convictions in court.
The RHDP has not yet named a potential successor to President Ouattara, stating that the decision to step down rests with him. If Ouattara decides to run again, international reactions will be illustrative. First, because ECOWAS strongly condemned recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, it is now in an awkward position of having to steadfastly uphold its commitment to democracy in all member states—including holding Côte d’Ivoire to the same standard. Second, Ouattara’s close relationship with French President Emmanuel Macron raises questions about whether Paris will publicly support him, especially as it is facing waning influence in Africa and sees Ouattara as one of its few remaining reliable allies. Given Côte d’Ivoire’s strategic importance in fighting extremism and as a regional economic power, the question remains how much political malfeasance the international community will accept in the name of overall stability. Outtara’s answer to this question could well be the deciding factor in his decision whether to seek a fourth term.
Guinea: Does the Military Plan to Stay in Power?
The Guinean military deposed President Alpha Condé in September 2021 and installed then-Colonel Mamady Doumbouya as the country’s new leader. The military leaders dissolved the civilian government and suspended the constitution, promising to organize elections by December 2024. This three-year timeline resulted from consultations between the military leaders, ECOWAS, and the African Union. As part of the agreement, ECOWAS agreed to lift the sanctions it had imposed on Guinea when the military took over.
As an opposition leader for many years, Alpha Condé had fought for democracy and stood up against the various dictatorial regimes that ruled Guinea. He won the 2010 presidential election and became the first democratically elected president in the country’s history. Five years later, he was reelected for his second allowed term under the constitution. But in 2020, he organized a constitutional referendum that reset the presidential term limits, which (among other changes) enabled him to run for a third time. The population voiced their discontent through massive protests leading up to the referendum and through the presidential election. While these protests were widely ignored, the post-electoral violence and civil unrest that followed fueled growing tensions between the population and the state, setting the stage for the military coup in 2021.
After three years in power, Guinean military leaders have postponed the promised 2024 elections until further notice with little public communication. They have pointed to logistical and other challenges, such as the lack of adequate road infrastructure and communication systems, as the main reasons, even though neither of these impediments is a new development. Still, since 2022, the military government has engaged in popular consultations about a new constitution and spoken with different segments of society, including former officials, political parties, and the Guinean diaspora. In his New Year’s address to the nation, Doumbouya said he was committed to restoring constitutional order and announced that his government would organize a constitutional referendum in 2025, to be followed by general elections, but did not set a date. The lack of an electoral timetable or transparency has fueled uneasiness among Guineans, who have serious doubts about Doumbouya’s commitment to a democratic transition. Five months after Doumbouya’s speech, the government did announce that the constitutional referendum would be held on September 21, 2025. But there is still no exact date announced for the much-awaited legislative and presidential elections slated for December.
Several signs indicate that Doumbouya and his associates in the military plan to tighten their grip on state institutions. They have gradually consolidated power by delaying the timetable and not respecting the budgetary constraints agreed upon with ECOWAS, favoring military appointees over civilian officials, cracking down on opposition groups and protests, suppressing the media, and arbitrarily detaining critics. For example, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization started an evaluation and audit of 211 political parties in June 2024; four months later, it dissolved 53 parties, placing another 67 “under observation” and suspending 54 for three months.
The Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) and the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), two major opposition parties, are under observation but are permitted to operate for the moment. Former president and RPG leader Alpha Condé is in exile, as is former prime minister and UFDG leader Cellou Dalein Diallo. Their return remains uncertain. Condé, who had been under house arrest, was granted temporary medical leave with the understanding that he would return to Guinea after receiving care. He would likely be reassigned to house arrest should he come back and run for president. The same fate might await Diallo. As of this writing, no opposition leader still in the country has emerged as a serious potential challenger to Doumbouya at the polls.
Doumbouya had been officially referred to as the “president of the transition” in official communications following his investiture in October 2021. Since 2023, this is no longer the case, signaling a sense of permanence in the position. He also promoted himself to general in January 2024. Meanwhile, he has been building political support through coalitions and alliances with senior leaders who have defected or been co-opted from Condé’s RPG and Diallo’s UFDG. Furthermore, he has been credited with reducing ethnic tensions by surrounding himself with representatives of different regions.
Guinean military leaders’ approach to power is anchored in the country’s long history of authoritarian rule. This includes the 25-year dictatorship of Ahmed Sékou Touré and the 24-year military-backed regime of General Lansana Conté. These repressive regimes nevertheless fostered a resilient civil society and a strong public commitment to democracy, leading to Guinea’s first multiparty elections in 2010, which brought longtime opposition leader Alpha Condé to power. Time will tell whether Doumbouya will persevere in consolidating military power or steer the country back toward civilian democratic rule. Either way, he will face a civil society that remains active, continuing to hold protests despite several bans. These stakeholders can be his allies or adversaries, depending on whether he organizes credible elections in 2025 or manipulates the process to cement military rule. Breaking the cycle of authoritarianism and transitioning back to democratic governance will be critical for Guinea’s national stability, economic growth, and regional security.
Policy Implications: Beyond the Binary
Africa’s democratic trajectory has been marked by both progress and setbacks over the past few decades. Indeed, the trends remain troubling, with only 7 percent of Africans living in what Freedom House terms “free” societies, a figure that has been in steady decline over the past 20 years. But rather than viewing African democracy through a binary lens of progress or decline, policymakers should recognize these varied trajectories as part of a complex continuum requiring tailored approaches to institutional development, economic governance, and civil society engagement. The contrasting electoral developments of 2024—and likely 2025—present several considerations for policymakers and democracy advocates.
First, democratic outcomes depend heavily on institutional foundations: Independent judiciaries, electoral bodies, and media enable genuine transitions, while their absence facilitates the illusion of democracy. In Africa’s upcoming elections, the weakness and capture of state institutions in those countries holding votes is perhaps the greatest hindrance to future free and fair elections, but also the most difficult indicator to change in terms of labor, money, and time.
Second, economic and governance failures remain primary drivers of political change, whether channeled through democratic institutions, social movements, or military interventions. Here, too, many of the African countries with presidential elections this year have demonstrated governance failings, as well as growing public dissatisfaction over these failings.
Third, civil society and youth activism represent critical vectors for democratic pressure. Youth-led movements are challenging entrenched leadership, while diaspora communities amplify calls for accountability. Digital technologies offer both enhanced transparency and new avenues for electoral manipulation. Amid the waning presence of international electoral observers, civil society groups have become more sophisticated at conducting their own election monitoring. But as capable as these groups have become, they also require institutional channels to translate discontent into sustainable reform. Given the influence that a robust civil society can have on the conduct and outcome of elections, many governments in Africa are making concerted efforts to close the civic space open to potential watchdogs.
Africa’s upcoming year of elections already signals a moment of great promise and potential peril for a continent that has yet to fully meet the aspirations of its growing populations, who increasingly demand responsive governance, economic opportunity, and equitable treatment. How voters express their beliefs and demands through these election cycles could well determine the future trajectories of these nations and their respective regions.
Cameron Hudson is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Mvemba Dizolele is a senior associate (non-resident) with the CSIS Africa Program. Khasai Makhhulo is a research assistant with the CSIS Africa Program.
This report is made possible through the generous support of Open Society Foundations.
