Introduction
The role of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in Myanmar has come under scrutiny in recent years. But all across Southeast Asia, the growing presence of PMSCs reflects a shift in how states and external actors manage infrastructure protection, logistical continuity, and political risk. These firms, which can provide a wide range of “specialized military and security services,”1Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are business entities that provide a range of military and security services. According to the Montreux Document and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), these services may include infrastructure protection, logistics, training, intelligence support, and in some contexts, combat. This article focuses on private security providers operating in non-combat roles such as infrastructure protection and corridor security. do not necessarily engage in combat in the region but are intended to serve as site protectors and corridor stabilizers for high-value development projects, often operating in areas where state authority is fragmented or under challenge. This model has gained traction, particularly around Chinese-backed infrastructure projects where private security supports Beijing’s strategic goals without formal military deployment.
This trend reflects dynamics consistent with China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI), both of which promote infrastructure-led growth and cooperative approaches to stability. Neither strategy explicitly names PMSCs, but their use aligns with Beijing’s emphasis on development-based security. By operating under host countries’ legal frameworks, these firms enable China to ensure project continuity and extend influence while avoiding the optics of direct intervention. This approach serves China’s interest in presenting itself as a pragmatic development partner, projecting stabilization without boots on the ground. Myanmar in particular illustrates how the PMSC model functions under real political pressure—and how new legal frameworks can facilitate their operation.
PMSCs in Action in Myanmar
In Myanmar, China’s growing use of PMSCs has drawn concerns from key stakeholders in the country’s ongoing civil war, including ethnic armed organizations, many of whom perceive foreign-backed private security as reinforcing state-linked development at the expense of local autonomy. Moreover, anti-Chinese sentiment has reportedly intensified in some regions since China’s increased coordination with the military.
Since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, large portions of the country have been held by resistance forces and ethnic armed organizations. Despite this, major Chinese-backed infrastructure has remained operational, partly due to the informal use of private security arrangements. In 2024, however, Myanmar’s military government enacted the Private Security Services Law, creating a legal pathway for foreign PMSCs to operate domestically.
A New Legal Framework
While the 2024 law provides a formal structure for PMSC operations, there are no specific regulations yet, and observers have raised concerns that the law’s vague provisions and limited transparency may broaden the scope for abuse. Formal licenses have reportedly been granted but not publicly disclosed. So far, access has been effectively limited to Chinese firms with prior ties to Myanmar’s state-owned enterprises, creating a de facto arrangement shaped by longstanding relationships. Although the law permits companies from Russia, India, and elsewhere, no new approvals from these other countries have been announced. Licensed firms must be majority staffed by Myanmar nationals and unaffiliated with foreign militaries, maintaining formal host-state oversight. However, reports such as that published by Human Rights Myanmar in 2025 warn that Chinese-affiliated contractors could indirectly reinforce the Myanmar military’s operational capacity, particularly by enabling redeployments away from infrastructure protection roles.
Chinese infrastructure projects in Kyaukphyu, near Arakan Army-controlled territory, are illustrative of these issues. Chinese PMSCs reportedly submitted project-specific standard operating procedures, which were approved by Myanmar authorities. On this basis, the PMSCs were allowed to rent weapons from the Myanmar military under an interim arrangement, as the 2024 law’s regulatory framework for carrying weapons remains incomplete. This practice maintains the appearance of civilian oversight while providing functional protection to Chinese projects. This arrangement may also relieve the Myanmar military of some direct security burdens, as its forces could be overextended if the Tatmadaw had to defend the port and the surrounding trade infrastructure without outsourced protection. In this context, Chinese PMSCs may enable the junta to conserve military resources and maintain its position in contested areas like Kyaukphyu.
Other Challenges for PMSCs in Myanmar
The scope of PMSC activity in Myanmar remains limited for now. Many Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects have stalled, and the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor has not progressed. According to conversations with local stakeholders familiar with the situation, Chinese personnel reportedly cost five times more than local guards, limiting feasibility for large-scale use. This cost, along with political caution, has limited deployments to a small number of sites tied to older, long-standing projects.
Chinese companies, for their part, have grown more selective when choosing local partners. Past cases involving Myanmar-based private security firms linked to cross-border criminal networks and scam centers have led to reputational risks. Local stakeholders share that Chinese firms are now avoiding partnerships with actors connected to armed groups or illicit economies, reflecting Beijing’s concern with reputational damage.
The new law for PMSCs in Myanmar is likely to gain greater relevance in reconstruction zones. In post-conflict areas governed by ceasefire arrangements, new roads, rail links, and logistics hubs will likely require customized security provisions. The 2024 law creates a basic framework for this, even if full implementation has not yet begun.
Comparisons Across Southeast Asia
Other countries in mainland Southeast Asia are also using private security for infrastructure protection. Informed stakeholders report that Chinese nationals manage many licensed foreign PMSCs in Cambodia through a combination of methods, including direct management, joint ventures, and the use of Cambodian registration or identities, especially in Sihanoukville’s economic zones. In Laos, similar firms protect Chinese investment corridors along the China–Laos railway and in the Golden Triangle region. These deployments often operate under informal arrangements, with little public reporting or national oversight.
Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have adopted more restrictive approaches, with foreign PMSCs are banned or limited to indirect roles. Even so, investors often turn to local security firms or advisory consultants to ensure project access and continuity. In Thailand and Vietnam, security provision remains firmly under state control, with limited space for foreign-linked entities to operate independently. The preference is to license domestic firms with ties to the police or military, ensuring tighter political oversight. In the Philippines, legal ambiguity persists, but most foreign clients rely on partnerships with local firms that operate under civilian permits or through advisory channels.
The variety of approaches to PMSCs is unsurprising: ASEAN’s long-standing principles of sovereignty and non-interference make regional standard-setting on security matters unlikely. Regulation of PMSCs is a national prerogative, shaped by local legal traditions and political preferences. Yet the functional logic remains consistent across the region: PMSCs help manage physical risk in areas where public enforcement is unreliable or politically constrained.
Myanmar stands out in this regional landscape. Unlike its neighbors, it has created a legal category for foreign PMSCs, though implementation remains narrow and opaque. The Myanmar model appears closer to Cambodia and Laos, where informal arrangements dominate and enforcement is uneven. However, Myanmar’s case is more politically sensitive due to ongoing conflict and international scrutiny. The 2024 law reflects both an effort to formalize foreign protection for key infrastructure and a strategic move to outsource risk in contested zones.
Implications for China in Myanmar
For China, the use of PMSCs reinforces its diplomatic posture, particularly in Myanmar. Beijing engages with both the military and several ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and has recently played a mediating role in northern Myanmar ceasefires, where key trade routes intersect with the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and Lancang–Mekong Cooperation zones. China believes its ability to maintain project operations through private security in conflict-affected areas, where infrastructure is vulnerable and authority is fragmented, strengthens its position as a conflict mediator. By avoiding direct military involvement and demonstrating a focus on continuity and asset protection rather than political alignment, Beijing seeks to present itself as a pragmatic development partner and a neutral interlocutor.
This posture is becoming contested. While PMSCs may enhance operational continuity and suggest reliability to state actors, ethnic armed organizations and segments of the public in Myanmar increasingly have interpreted China’s moves as signs of partiality, particularly following Beijing’s overt support for the State Administration Council after August 2023. These perceptions have undermined China’s neutrality in the eyes of some local stakeholders, weakening its credibility as an impartial mediator.
Conclusion
As infrastructure development expands across contested regions, PMSCs are likely to remain a critical part of the security equation. They influence how access for countries in charge of the companies is maintained, how presence is sustained, and how external actors engage with political uncertainty. Across Southeast Asia, the regulatory landscape for PMSCs is uneven. The absence of regional standards means that PMSCs operate under highly variable terms, shaped more by national discretion and investor needs than by shared principles.
In Myanmar, the 2024 Private Security Services Law demonstrates how fragile states can formalize private security under domestic control. The state retains legal authority, while foreign actors receive limited, project-specific access. Oversight remains weak, but the framework enables infrastructure protection without formal alliances or foreign troop presence. This marks a shift towards formalized private security provision, but its effects remain uncertain. Some local actors view Chinese-linked PMSCs as reinforcing the military’s presence, which may affect how they perceive Beijing’s broader role in the country. These risks are rapidly evolving and tied to the law’s ongoing implementation. But one thing is certain: Observers of PMSCs will need to keep an eye on Myanmar for a glimpse of how this model may evolve going forward and how private security is shaping the future of influence in Southeast Asia.
Disclaimer: This analysis draws in part on ongoing consultations with local security firms, legal advisors, and prospective joint venture participants in Yangon and Mandalay between February and May 2025. Due to the sensitivity of these discussions, citations of individual conversations are withheld.
Notes
- 1Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are business entities that provide a range of military and security services. According to the Montreux Document and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), these services may include infrastructure protection, logistics, training, intelligence support, and in some contexts, combat. This article focuses on private security providers operating in non-combat roles such as infrastructure protection and corridor security.
Introduction
The role of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in Myanmar has come under scrutiny in recent years. But all across Southeast Asia, the growing presence of PMSCs reflects a shift in how states and external actors manage infrastructure protection, logistical continuity, and political risk. These firms, which can provide a wide range of “specialized military and security services,”1Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are business entities that provide a range of military and security services. According to the Montreux Document and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), these services may include infrastructure protection, logistics, training, intelligence support, and in some contexts, combat. This article focuses on private security providers operating in non-combat roles such as infrastructure protection and corridor security. do not necessarily engage in combat in the region but are intended to serve as site protectors and corridor stabilizers for high-value development projects, often operating in areas where state authority is fragmented or under challenge. This model has gained traction, particularly around Chinese-backed infrastructure projects where private security supports Beijing’s strategic goals without formal military deployment.
This trend reflects dynamics consistent with China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI), both of which promote infrastructure-led growth and cooperative approaches to stability. Neither strategy explicitly names PMSCs, but their use aligns with Beijing’s emphasis on development-based security. By operating under host countries’ legal frameworks, these firms enable China to ensure project continuity and extend influence while avoiding the optics of direct intervention. This approach serves China’s interest in presenting itself as a pragmatic development partner, projecting stabilization without boots on the ground. Myanmar in particular illustrates how the PMSC model functions under real political pressure—and how new legal frameworks can facilitate their operation.
PMSCs in Action in Myanmar
In Myanmar, China’s growing use of PMSCs has drawn concerns from key stakeholders in the country’s ongoing civil war, including ethnic armed organizations, many of whom perceive foreign-backed private security as reinforcing state-linked development at the expense of local autonomy. Moreover, anti-Chinese sentiment has reportedly intensified in some regions since China’s increased coordination with the military.
Since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, large portions of the country have been held by resistance forces and ethnic armed organizations. Despite this, major Chinese-backed infrastructure has remained operational, partly due to the informal use of private security arrangements. In 2024, however, Myanmar’s military government enacted the Private Security Services Law, creating a legal pathway for foreign PMSCs to operate domestically.
A New Legal Framework
While the 2024 law provides a formal structure for PMSC operations, there are no specific regulations yet, and observers have raised concerns that the law’s vague provisions and limited transparency may broaden the scope for abuse. Formal licenses have reportedly been granted but not publicly disclosed. So far, access has been effectively limited to Chinese firms with prior ties to Myanmar’s state-owned enterprises, creating a de facto arrangement shaped by longstanding relationships. Although the law permits companies from Russia, India, and elsewhere, no new approvals from these other countries have been announced. Licensed firms must be majority staffed by Myanmar nationals and unaffiliated with foreign militaries, maintaining formal host-state oversight. However, reports such as that published by Human Rights Myanmar in 2025 warn that Chinese-affiliated contractors could indirectly reinforce the Myanmar military’s operational capacity, particularly by enabling redeployments away from infrastructure protection roles.
Chinese infrastructure projects in Kyaukphyu, near Arakan Army-controlled territory, are illustrative of these issues. Chinese PMSCs reportedly submitted project-specific standard operating procedures, which were approved by Myanmar authorities. On this basis, the PMSCs were allowed to rent weapons from the Myanmar military under an interim arrangement, as the 2024 law’s regulatory framework for carrying weapons remains incomplete. This practice maintains the appearance of civilian oversight while providing functional protection to Chinese projects. This arrangement may also relieve the Myanmar military of some direct security burdens, as its forces could be overextended if the Tatmadaw had to defend the port and the surrounding trade infrastructure without outsourced protection. In this context, Chinese PMSCs may enable the junta to conserve military resources and maintain its position in contested areas like Kyaukphyu.
Other Challenges for PMSCs in Myanmar
The scope of PMSC activity in Myanmar remains limited for now. Many Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects have stalled, and the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor has not progressed. According to conversations with local stakeholders familiar with the situation, Chinese personnel reportedly cost five times more than local guards, limiting feasibility for large-scale use. This cost, along with political caution, has limited deployments to a small number of sites tied to older, long-standing projects.
Chinese companies, for their part, have grown more selective when choosing local partners. Past cases involving Myanmar-based private security firms linked to cross-border criminal networks and scam centers have led to reputational risks. Local stakeholders share that Chinese firms are now avoiding partnerships with actors connected to armed groups or illicit economies, reflecting Beijing’s concern with reputational damage.
The new law for PMSCs in Myanmar is likely to gain greater relevance in reconstruction zones. In post-conflict areas governed by ceasefire arrangements, new roads, rail links, and logistics hubs will likely require customized security provisions. The 2024 law creates a basic framework for this, even if full implementation has not yet begun.
Comparisons Across Southeast Asia
Other countries in mainland Southeast Asia are also using private security for infrastructure protection. Informed stakeholders report that Chinese nationals manage many licensed foreign PMSCs in Cambodia through a combination of methods, including direct management, joint ventures, and the use of Cambodian registration or identities, especially in Sihanoukville’s economic zones. In Laos, similar firms protect Chinese investment corridors along the China–Laos railway and in the Golden Triangle region. These deployments often operate under informal arrangements, with little public reporting or national oversight.
Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have adopted more restrictive approaches, with foreign PMSCs are banned or limited to indirect roles. Even so, investors often turn to local security firms or advisory consultants to ensure project access and continuity. In Thailand and Vietnam, security provision remains firmly under state control, with limited space for foreign-linked entities to operate independently. The preference is to license domestic firms with ties to the police or military, ensuring tighter political oversight. In the Philippines, legal ambiguity persists, but most foreign clients rely on partnerships with local firms that operate under civilian permits or through advisory channels.
The variety of approaches to PMSCs is unsurprising: ASEAN’s long-standing principles of sovereignty and non-interference make regional standard-setting on security matters unlikely. Regulation of PMSCs is a national prerogative, shaped by local legal traditions and political preferences. Yet the functional logic remains consistent across the region: PMSCs help manage physical risk in areas where public enforcement is unreliable or politically constrained.
Myanmar stands out in this regional landscape. Unlike its neighbors, it has created a legal category for foreign PMSCs, though implementation remains narrow and opaque. The Myanmar model appears closer to Cambodia and Laos, where informal arrangements dominate and enforcement is uneven. However, Myanmar’s case is more politically sensitive due to ongoing conflict and international scrutiny. The 2024 law reflects both an effort to formalize foreign protection for key infrastructure and a strategic move to outsource risk in contested zones.
Implications for China in Myanmar
For China, the use of PMSCs reinforces its diplomatic posture, particularly in Myanmar. Beijing engages with both the military and several ethnic armed groups in Myanmar and has recently played a mediating role in northern Myanmar ceasefires, where key trade routes intersect with the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and Lancang–Mekong Cooperation zones. China believes its ability to maintain project operations through private security in conflict-affected areas, where infrastructure is vulnerable and authority is fragmented, strengthens its position as a conflict mediator. By avoiding direct military involvement and demonstrating a focus on continuity and asset protection rather than political alignment, Beijing seeks to present itself as a pragmatic development partner and a neutral interlocutor.
This posture is becoming contested. While PMSCs may enhance operational continuity and suggest reliability to state actors, ethnic armed organizations and segments of the public in Myanmar increasingly have interpreted China’s moves as signs of partiality, particularly following Beijing’s overt support for the State Administration Council after August 2023. These perceptions have undermined China’s neutrality in the eyes of some local stakeholders, weakening its credibility as an impartial mediator.
Conclusion
As infrastructure development expands across contested regions, PMSCs are likely to remain a critical part of the security equation. They influence how access for countries in charge of the companies is maintained, how presence is sustained, and how external actors engage with political uncertainty. Across Southeast Asia, the regulatory landscape for PMSCs is uneven. The absence of regional standards means that PMSCs operate under highly variable terms, shaped more by national discretion and investor needs than by shared principles.
In Myanmar, the 2024 Private Security Services Law demonstrates how fragile states can formalize private security under domestic control. The state retains legal authority, while foreign actors receive limited, project-specific access. Oversight remains weak, but the framework enables infrastructure protection without formal alliances or foreign troop presence. This marks a shift towards formalized private security provision, but its effects remain uncertain. Some local actors view Chinese-linked PMSCs as reinforcing the military’s presence, which may affect how they perceive Beijing’s broader role in the country. These risks are rapidly evolving and tied to the law’s ongoing implementation. But one thing is certain: Observers of PMSCs will need to keep an eye on Myanmar for a glimpse of how this model may evolve going forward and how private security is shaping the future of influence in Southeast Asia.
Disclaimer: This analysis draws in part on ongoing consultations with local security firms, legal advisors, and prospective joint venture participants in Yangon and Mandalay between February and May 2025. Due to the sensitivity of these discussions, citations of individual conversations are withheld.
Notes
- 1Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are business entities that provide a range of military and security services. According to the Montreux Document and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), these services may include infrastructure protection, logistics, training, intelligence support, and in some contexts, combat. This article focuses on private security providers operating in non-combat roles such as infrastructure protection and corridor security.
