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This transcript is from a CSIS event hosted on June 30, 2025. Watch the full video here.
Mona Yacoubian: Hello and welcome to CSIS. I’m Mona Yacoubian, senior adviser and director of the Middle East Program. And I’m joined by colleagues to discuss what the recent strikes on Iran mean for Russia, China, and North Korea.
Analysts have noted warming ties among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, even giving them the acronym CRINK and dubbing the so-called alliance the Axis of Upheaval. At CSIS, we are assessing/doing work on how these relationships are evolving, and found that the recent conflict between Israel and Iran offers an interesting lens to understand how the relationships were formed, how various actors have responded to the strikes on Iran, and what might happen going forward.
Today, a shaky ceasefire is maintained between Israel and Iran, although Iran has recently warned that it does not believe the ceasefire will hold. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency has said the strikes caused severe but not total damage, and that Iran could start enriching uranium again in a matter of months.
To discuss what the recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran means for Russia, China, and North Korea, I’m joined by three of my colleagues from the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department. Victor Cha is president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, and also the Korea chair. Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. And Brian Hart is deputy director and fellow in the China Power Project.
One quick housekeeping note: Viewers can submit their questions using the button on the CSIS page or on YouTube.
So let’s dive right in. And what I’d like to first do is maybe get a level set and understand sort of the origins of Iran’s ties with these three powers. In particular, Maria, I’d like to start with you and Russia because I think in some ways that’s maybe the most prominent relationship among the so-called Axis of Upheaval. In particular I’d note deepening ties, especially military cooperation between Russia and Iran, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine war. We also note that a comprehensive treaty between Russia and Iran was signed earlier this year. So help us understand: What is the foundation of that relationship? What are the drivers? What are the areas of interest and strategic overlap?
Maria Snegovaya: Absolutely. Both Russia and Iran in a lot of ways pariah states vis-à-vis contemporary international system. They feel like they don’t deserve the current spot in which they exist. And accordingly, after Russia invaded Ukraine and its relationship with West was completely disrupted, Russia outreached to many other states that find itself in similar situation, with Iran obviously open to provide Russia a lot of services and assistance. And indeed, in the post-invasion period we’ve seen Russia-Iran cooperation grow significantly, with Iran in particular providing Russia drones, most prominently Shahed-136, which played a very important role in attacks on Ukraine; missiles; all sorts of other, perhaps, skills – knowhow/skills on sanctions circumvention and whatnot – basically, everything – all the knowledge that Iran accumulated over the years being on the recipient side of sanctions from the West.
On top of that, as you mentioned, Mona, there was a strategic partnership signed between the two countries in January 2025, albeit notably – which is very important for our conversation today – lacking a mutual defense clause, unlike what Russia has with other countries with similar agreements. And of course, it’s important given that – the current escalation between Israel and Iran. On its side, Iran was receiving from Russia cereals, machinery, various agricultural, wood products, and industrial goods. However, we have published an article with Jon Alterman from CSIS at Foreign Affairs some time ago showing that despite this evidence of growing collaboration – I should also mention the major very ambitious infrastructure projects, which if completed would allow Russia to, like, radically alter its trade routes and really boost its sanctions-circumvention infrastructure.
Despite all of this, there is a legacy of deep mistrust between the two countries. There is a legacy – historical legacy that makes Iran very – makes Iran very wary because there was a lot of conflict about – over Caucasus, Caspian influence, and the legacy going all the way back to the Second World War with Russia invading some of the parts that are strategically important for Iran. Just recently, there was an investigation published focused on leaked FSB material. FSB in Russia is quite uncareful; sometimes they email each other very sensitive documents. So we know how they feel about Iran, and a very high degree of mistrust still is there. In fact, both countries very actively spy on each other.
And in the long term, really, it’s hard to see a similarity in the world that they envision. There’s a clear – a clear enemy that they’re both against: the West, the United States. But when it comes to the ideal future, it’s questionable.
Plus, Russia has very different partners in the Middle East. Israel and Russia have maintained a close relationship, Saudi and Russia. And that also is something that prevents Russia from going full scale in assisting Iran.
Altogether, we conclude with Jon that this is really a partnership of convenience that can easily potentially be disrupted if, you know, the West was to do so.
Ms. Yacoubian: So that’s very useful. I want to later on turn back to some of the comments you made, some of the strategic deficits in the relationship, whether a deficit of trust, the lack of a defense clause in this comprehensive treaty. I think that’s going to be interesting to pull the thread on when we talk about what just happened.
But, Brian, I’d like to turn to you, if I could, and talk a little bit to us about China’s relationship with Iran. There, at least overtly, the foundations are very much in the realm of economic and energy. We know that Iran exports some 90 percent of its oil to China. China is also Iran’s largest trading partner. China does supply some arms and technology to Iran, but I think, again, it seems that the most, you know, prominent feature of the relationship is really in that sort of economic and energy space. But help us understand better the origins of that – of that relationship.
Brian Hart: Yeah, I think that’s right. A lot of this is grounded on the economic relationship, especially given that China gets about 13 to 14 percent of its crude oil each year from Iran. And as you said, Iran is – largely depends on China for its trade. I think the figures are about a third of Iran’s imports and exports are with China. So there’s quite a bit of imbalance there with Iran being a lot more economically reliant on China, but China is considerably reliant on Iran for oil – which is sanctioned, and which reaches China through intermediaries like Malaysia and Singapore.
But I think one of the significant things here is that there’s parallels with what Maria laid out in terms of, you know, China’s relationship with Iran, which is that it is largely based on mutual interests. And there is some strategic distrust there, too, you know, dating back years. Early on in the relationship – you know, in the ’80s, for example – China provided some missile defense technologies, air defense technologies to Iran. Iran then used unlicensed versions of those to indigenize some of their own capabilities, which is something that China also did to Russia. So there is this – there is this period or this example of, you know, not always being aligned. Sometimes these actors act in ways that are beneficial to them but contradict the relationship.
But I think overall China hasn’t been supplying arms to Russia – to Iran in recent years, really in the last couple of decades, but what they have been doing is providing more dual-use goods. So earlier this year we saw, for example, providing things like ammonium perchlorate, which is used for ballistic missile fuel production. And they were actually – some Chinese actors were sanctioned by the U.S. for that action, and there’s been reporting that additional shipments of sodium perchlorate have been scheduled from China to Iran. So China’s still planning to provide some of these dual-use goods, so they’re going under the radar. They’re not providing, you know, key military systems for Iran, but they are providing some of this – these fuels for ballistic missiles, drone components, other technologies that have been crucial to Iran’s ability to project power in the region.
Ms. Yacoubian: So under the radar a bit – you know, the strategic element’s a bit more under the radar. I think also notable this sort of massive imbalance, certainly in trade, and less so with energy but nonetheless. Again, I think we’re beginning to see a through line here – (laughs) –
Mr. Hart: Yeah.
Ms. Yacoubian: – in terms of some of the limitations.
But, Victor, I’d like to turn to you. And frankly, in some ways in the Iran-North Korea relationship is maybe sort of the least well, you know, tracked or understood. How do we understand North Korea’s ties to Iran? You know, where does this relationship fall in this – in this CRINK acronym that we’re trying to sort of, you know, dive into more deeply?
Victor Cha: Sure. Well, thanks, Mona, for bringing us all together for this very important discussion.
I would say in terms of North Korea and Iran, like, I think as my colleagues have described, a lot of it is transactional and tactical. But I think sometimes when you have tactical relationships that go on for a long time, they can morph into becoming something more than that. And in the case of Iran and North Korea, we’re talking about four decades – four decades of missile cooperation.
So if we can pull up my slide, I brought a slide. Just one. Just one for all of you today.
Ms. Yacoubian: (Laughs.) You get the gold star.
Dr. Cha: Right. If I – if we look at this slide, four decades of missile cooperation, so the long and the short of it is basically the Iranian Shahab series of missiles were essentially all missiles that were acquired from North Korea. The short-range ballistic missiles are basically what are known in North Korea as the Scud-B and the Scud-C missiles, otherwise known as the Hwasong-5/Hwasong-6. These eventually became Iranian missiles, the Shahab-1 and the Shahab-2. And then in terms of medium-range ballistic missiles, the Hwasong-7 or Nodong, as it is known in North Korea, is the basis of the Shahab-3 missile. So this is deep missile cooperation that has gone back for some time. There have been open-source reports that from the early 2020s this has now moved into long-range missile cooperation because North Korea has, as many of you may know, developed and leapfrogged technology in terms of long-range missile technology. In addition to this, there are scientific exchanges that take place between the two sides, as well as North Korean support in the past providing military weapons to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War but also to proxies like Hamas, grenade launchers and things like – things like that.
I think the thing that concerns most people is the potential for nuclear cooperation between the two sides. Here there’s not a lot of good evidence to go on. There’s just some concern; some reports, again, in the open source of North Korea providing computer simulation programs for doing nuclear warhead detonation tests, and the potential for more scientific cooperation.
Now, if we look at this, four decades of it, and we compare it to what North Korea and Russia have been doing recently, it kind of pales in comparison to the North Korea-Russia side, where we have seen a dramatic increase in North Korea-Russia cooperation, well-reported in the news, that started out with munitions transfers between North Korea – discreet munition transfers between North Korea and the Wagner Group that have now become full-fledged, in the range of millions and millions of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of ballistic missiles, some estimate as many as 25,000 troops that North Korea has provided to Russia, you know, and probably hard currency in the range of 10 (billion dollars) to $20 billion. Again, the point here is that in both cases these thing start out as very tactical and transactional, but as we see in the North Korea-Russia case they quickly became strategic: a mutual defense treaty, Russia probably feeling like it has the use of North Korean troops perhaps anywhere it wants to – not just on the border with Ukraine, but maybe they feel they can use them in the border with Baltic states and others in the future. So it has become much more a strategic relationship.
The other thing that I think is important to note when we look at North Korea-Iran and North Korea-Russia is the North Korea-Russia relationship has also benefited the North Koreans in terms of breaking of any sanctions regime, right? The U.N. sanctions regime – I mean, I was in government when we did the first U.N. Security Council resolution on North Korea that Russia and China signed onto, the first in history. There have since been 11 U.N. Security Council resolutions. Russia has basically broken the U.N. Security Council sanction regime on North Korea. And so when we think of triangular cooperation – which we’ll get to later on – I think, you know, there is some concern that there could be, you know, basically unfettered cooperation among the three, with Russia and perhaps China playing a role in circumventing any sort of sanctions regime.
Ms. Yacoubian: Yeah. I mean, first, transactional and tactical, sounds like, but also I think your point that this can morph into something more significant; and I think noting this notion of four decades of missile cooperation, where of course Iran’s ballistic missile capability has been a key source of concern in the Middle East – and we see how Israel has sort of really gone after and sought to erode those capabilities. I do also, when we – when we get further into this, I do want to turn back to questions around nuclear cooperation, question mark, which I think is going to be, you know, foremost on folks’ minds; and this idea amongst all of them, all three, of sanctions-busting cooperation. And I think we’ve already seen quite a bit of that, but understanding where that might go.
So this 12-day war between Israel and Iran really does offer, I think, a unique lens to try to understand the relationship among these four countries. You know, does it sort of underscore the weakness, the limitations strategically of the four? Or could it actually end up being some kind of a turning point in which there’s a decision to actually deepen cooperation in a strategic way?
And so, again, I think let’s – you know, starting with Russia, it was notable that the Iranian foreign minister went to Moscow not long after all of this started, about – I guess about a week ago, but he really didn’t seem to get a whole lot other than positive, you know –
Dr. Snegovaya: Best wishes. (Laughter.)
Ms. Yacoubian: Best wishes and happy talk, but clearly nothing much more than that. So, Maria, help us understand, like, in – particularly – frankly, particularly between Russia and Iran, Russia – you know, Iran came to Russia and helped Russia in its moment of need. Here is Iran in its moment of need, and what did it get?
Dr. Snegovaya: So far, not much – (laughter) – other than best wishes, although I will add that the Russian ambassador to the U.N., Vasily Nebenzya, did flag that this is opening a Pandora(’s) Box, the strikes – the strikes on Iran by the United States. And the BRICS also came up with a statement on strikes, however notably not mentioning the U.S. or Israel by name, which is I think an interesting dynamic here.
I think while everything that our colleagues have flagged is absolutely true, in the moments like this I think you really see the extent of this partnership. And so far, at least on the surface in the period that has passed, it doesn’t seem that Russia is eager to rush to Iranian defense. And this is, by the way, not the first time it happens. If you remember what happened in Syria a couple of months ago, similarly, we have seen that while Russia at first had a lot of stakes, a vested interest in survival of the Assad regime, in the end, because it’s so overstretched in Ukraine and doesn’t really have a lot of extra capabilities, it was unable to help, and basically all of this effort was thrown away even if, again, some attempted collaboration with the new Syrian regime continues.
Similarly, in Iran we see a very similar dynamic where Russia is overstretched. It doesn’t have the capacity to assist. And also, it’s not eager to because the Middle Eastern interests of Russia are sort of divergent. I mentioned Saudi, Israel in my previous answer. And it’s potentially careful to, you know, preserve some of the collaboration with Israel, for example, where – just a reminder to our listeners – about 2 million Russian speakers reside among other possible considerations.
It’s clear that the Kremlin had a possible escalation in mind when signing the security agreement in January and that was deliberate not – to avoid mentioning this military collaboration, the security clause that would call for Russia to assist Iran in a situation like this. So they basically already envisioned something similar happening.
And then, since – so there is two reasons, to sum it up. First of all, Russia’s overstretched and it just doesn’t have the capability to assist. I will mention also that Russia’s arms sales have gone down significantly since it started its new war in Ukraine in 2022. It just doesn’t have the leeway. And frankly, it’s not the best advertisement, this war, for its weapons, either, since it often malfunctions, and it’s not – it’s not a given that Ukraine war also served as an extra add for the – for the weapons that it sells. And, hence, it just doesn’t – it cannot really help as much, but also doesn’t want to, clearly, because it envisioned a similar situation, accordingly avoided taking on responsibilities and tries to portray itself as some sort of arbiter without breaking its links to other Middle Eastern states.
Ms. Yacoubian: Yeah. It’s interesting that you note what happened in December when the Assad regime collapsed in Syria. And of course, Syria really provided Iran with its much-needed strategic depth part of its forward defense policy. And many people look at that collapse as paving the way in part for where we are today, where you have a much-weakened Iran, its air defenses eroded, and also lacking this strategic depth. And it’s very – it is notable that the Russians really didn’t do much.
I’d like to just pull a thread briefly with you on Israel, and Russia and Israel ties, because we know that there are also personal relations between President Putin and Prime Minister Netanyahu. Can you give us a sense – I mean, was that a factor deeply in Russia’s calculus, wanting to preserve and deepen, maybe, even those ties?
Dr. Snegovaya: For Putin we know relationship with strong men are very important. It’s how the Kremlin thinks about diplomacy. And in this sense, Israel clearly remains a very important strategic partner in the Middle East, the zone of crucial interest to Russia. And accordingly, this relationship is important for both personal and strategic reasons.
Having said that, the growing alignment between Israel and the United States – because Russia has clearly taken this anti-Western posture – more recently has sort of tilted Russia’s interest to the other side. And we know that it tried to assist or – tried to assist some of the anti-Israeli actors, right, potentially collaborating with Houthis, potentially collaborating with other major groupings in the region, trying to provide them with some technology. However, this has not done – gone too far. There’s limits to how far Russia goes, again, in trying to maintain this arbiter position. But we know that Putin even tried to offer his services in his conversation with President Trump, to which Trump allegedly responded that, you know, Russia should manage its own problems first in Ukraine before going any further. So from that perspective, you know, the current realities sort of push Russia towards one direction, but we see that it’s not eager to abandon all the assets that it previously held in the Middle East.
Ms. Yacoubian: Mmm hmm.
So, Brian, if we could turn again to China, and maybe first walk us through how China has responded to, first, the Israeli strikes on Iran on Friday the 13th, and then following that of course the U.S. eventually gets involved. What are the equities at play here for China? And walk us through and help us understand what China’s reaction has been to this thus far.
Mr. Hart: Yeah. So I think as soon as you saw the Israeli strikes on Iran you – you know, I went to look at what some of the Chinese senior experts were saying about this, and one of the things that caught my eye was that, you know, they’re talking about this not from – in many places they were talking about it not as a what can China do to shape the dynamics, but what can it do to mitigate the risk to China and to mitigate the blowback. That was a refrain that I saw a lot here. So, you know, obviously, as we said, the energy ties are crucial – not just from Iran, but the Strait of Hormuz is crucial to China, with it getting about half of its oil from the Middle East. So there was a clear focus on reducing the risk of a shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, which so far – despite, you know, Iranian threats – has not happened, which is good news for China.
And China did put out statements after the U.S. strikes saying, you know, China wanted to see stable developments in the region and didn’t want to see the Strait of Hormuz shut down. So I think on one side they put out statements, you know, supporting Iran and criticizing – of course, they used this as an opportunity to criticize the United States for, you know, what they describe as being the destabilizing force in the region. But they then, you know, put – tried to put pressure on Iran to some extent to not close the strait. So they’re really trying to walk this balance here to protect Chinese interests. And you see that, too, in the major actions that they took, were to try to evacuate any Chinese citizens in the region. So they’re really thinking about this from that perspective, of self-preservation.
And I think one of the things, though, that I would say is I think it’s too soon to tell. I think that this does show the limitations of China’s engagement with Iran and with, you know, the CRINK countries overall to some extent. Because I think in peacetime China’s made a lot of gains in the Middle East in recent years – you know, brokering the Iran-Saudi deal, a significant diplomatic breakthrough for Xi Jinping and his administration – but I think this showed the limits of what China’s able and willing to do in a crisis, in a military confrontation. I think China is more – is much more comfortable and prepared to sit back and let the United States engage in this, because I’ve seen many, you know, Chinese scholars say this is – while they don’t want to see this – you know, the conflict destabilize things too much for them and cut into China’s interests, they are – you know, there is strategic interest in seeing the United States bogged down in another war in the Middle East because that distracts them from a pivot to the Indo-Pacific, where that’s China’s priority theater.
So there’s some interest here in China seeing the United States bogged down there if things do continue. But I think – I do think it’s too soon to assume that China won’t do anything long term. I think, you know, there’s a lot of comparisons being made to what China has done for – to support Russia’s war in Ukraine through economic and dual-use and technological support. I think we’re only two weeks into this conflict with Iran, and I think for – you know, China can still marshal significant resources to support Iran long term. So I think it’s too soon to count China’s support for Iran out. But it is – again, this is a good example of there are limitations to what China’s going to do in terms of direct intervention in a military conflict.
Ms. Yacoubian: Yeah. If I could just draw you out a little bit further, because, you know, the one – you know, China has certainly demonstrated its growing influence in the Middle East, largely in the realm of energy and economic and trade ties. But you noted this – the fame rapprochement between Saudi and Iran that Iran (sic; China) sort of played a role in – (laughs) – in negotiating. I mean, this was in 2023. I think the consensus is much of the heavy lifting was done by Iraq and then Oman, and China really very smartly plucked this rather ripe fruit off the vine. But it is – it is notable that contrasted to where we are right now, this moment of extraordinary crisis in the Middle East between Iran and Israel but certainly impacting the Gulf countries. And to what extent is this – let’s put it this way: How damaging is China’s sort of relative lack of ability to have any kind of role? They’re not really appearing to be a crisis player or a clutch player in a moment of crisis in the Middle East. How damaging in this moment is that for its longer-term ability to project influence in the Middle East?
Mr. Hart: Yeah, it’s a great question. And I think it really gets to one of the limitations specifically here of Iran, which is that, you know, China, again, is often thinking about this in economic terms. And if you look at just the sheer numbers, Iran just isn’t nearly as big of an economic player with China as some of the Gulf countries. I mean, the trade between Iran and China pales in comparison to the trade between, you know, Saudi Arabia and China. And because Iran has been, you know, sanctioned in recent years, despite efforts to try to beef up the Chinese investments in Iran over the last couple of decades they’ve really been tepid. You know, the FDI into Iran from China, again, pales in comparison to what China’s been investing in energy but in other areas, technological investments in some of these Gulf states. So, from that perspective, China really has to weigh the economic benefits here, too.
And with Israel. I mean, China’s been, you know, trying to balance and maintain ties with Israel as well. That’s been challenged by Chinese support for the Palestinians amid the conflict in Gaza.
But China has always tried to be this play this middle ground and try to engage all of the sides, and when you have these crises that really exposes the limitations of that strategy. Because during peacetime China can make gains across all of these areas, but when – you know, when things really heat up, you know, that more neutral stance puts China in a more limited position in terms of its ability to really shape events.
Ms. Yacoubian: So, Victor, can you help us understand North Korea’s response, which has been, I think, relatively muted? I mean, we haven’t seen, like, major pronouncements by North Korea, and they don’t have the same kinds of equities that both Russia and China have. We’ve heard both Maria and Brian talk about the need to balance various relationships. We’ve seen the constraints of either power’s diplomacy. North Korea doesn’t really fit into that category. We don’t typically look to the North Koreans to – (laughs) – to be big diplomatic powerhouses. So help us understand a bit in more detail how North Korea has responded to this. And what’s behind it?
Dr. Cha: So I think in a sense there’s something similar in the way they’ve responded to the way Russia and China have, in the sense that they certainly want to minimize the potential for blowback on something like this. So Brian just mentioned the Chinese don’t want the Strait of Hormuz closed. You know, I don’t – I mean, North Korea doesn’t need the Strait of Hormuz, but it’s a similar point. Like, they don’t want to see a lot of blowback.
I think also like China/Russia North Korea doesn’t want to see this escalate into a broader Middle East war. I think everybody – regardless of where you are on this issue, they’re kind of all in the same place.
Having said that, I think they, maybe more so than China/Russia, are willing to benefit transactionally and tactically where they can from this. And so that means if Russia needs more Hwasong-7 missiles – I mean, if Iran needs more Hwasong-7 missiles, the North Koreans might be, like, sure; like, we’d be happy to provide that to you.
And this is kind of where it gets to this whole question of I don’t – like, I don’t see, like, a triangular relationship among Russia, North Korea, and Iran in the aftermath of these strikes. But there’s – I don’t know how you describe – there’s something that is sort of in the ballpark, if you will. So, like, if we – I was just thinking about, like, if we look at the way China, Iran, and North Korea supported Russia in the war in Ukraine, right? China, a lot of microelectronics. Iran, a lot of drones. North Korea, a lot of troops and munitions. They were, for the most part, operating in parallel to each other, but at the same time, there is – there are conversations that take place across.
So, again, I’ve just heard journalistic reports that in the aftermath, or more recently, Iran has looked to Russia for more help on missiles. And the Russians, because they’re busy with other sorts of things, have basically said, yeah, we can’t really help you, but go talk to the North Koreans. Like, we have an in with the North Koreans and, like, they may be able to help you, right? So there’s that kind of conversation that’s taking place that, arguably, might not have taken place before.
And the concern, for me at least, is that – at least looking at it from the perspective of North Korea – this is allowing North Korea to act tactically, transactionally, with virtually no regulation whatsoever. So what the CRINK does provide North Korea is a venue in which they can basically operate without fear of sanctions, without fear of anything else. So if it means more troops to Russia, you know, in Kursk, or wherever else, they can do that. If it means more ballistic missiles to Iran, or maybe Iran needs more help on reconstituting air defenses, or, even worse, more help in reconstituting their highly enriched uranium program, like, there’s – like, North Korea may be willing to do that because, one, the Chinese and the Russians aren’t going to do that, but they’re not saying to the North Koreans, you don’t do that, right?
And so I think that’s something that’s concerning to me. And in part – and, you know, Brian knows as well, because what the Ukraine war has done is it has basically really diminished Chinese influence over North Korea. There are many things that you can say – that we, as Americans, can complain about China vis-à-vis North Korea. We used to always call them your younger communist brother, others like me. But the one thing that the Chinese did do when they had influence was they had – they somewhat regulated North Korean behavior.
Now, as a result of the war in Ukraine, they have very little influence. North Korea is entirely in with Russia. And Putin does not care what North Korea does. They can do whatever they want. And that’s a very dangerous situation, not just in Ukraine, not just on the Korean Peninsula, but also in the Middle East, for what North Korea might be willing to do for Iran.
Ms. Yacoubian: So in a few minutes, I want to actually circle back to some of these bigger questions around global governance and what all of this means, Victor. But I would like to – you’ve raised something really interesting, which is sort of CRINK almost, like, as an unregulated play space, right, for different elements, different actors. And the one that seems to be able to benefit the most is North Korea, maybe by virtue of it having, I don’t know how to put this, like, the least sort of equities initially, and so it’s all upside, I guess, in a sense. Can we say – and it’s probably still very early days – but could we say that this Iran – know, Iran, Israel, U.S. conflict, net-net, has given North Korea a bit more – you know, yet again, a little bit more influence, a little bit more play space, a little bit more ability to exert influence?
Dr. Cha: Yeah, yeah. I think so. I think so, in a number of different ways. I mean, for one, I think you’re right, they don’t have as many equities as, for example, China does in the conflict. But at the same time, they have a lot to give, right? I mean, the war in Ukraine has made them basically an ammunitions-producing machine, as well as a ballistic missiles-producing machine. If there is one product that North Korea has on the market that has been tried and tested, and they have lots of them, it is short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, right? And Iran has already benefited from that, as we talked about, for the past four decades. And they’re probably going to be in need of more of that, you know, post the U.S. strike.
So I think that certainly has opened up more play space for them. You know, potentially it also – and this is – you know, this is a somewhat radical interpretation. It potentially has opened up play space for North Korea vis-à-vis the United States too. I mean, now that the United States has carried out these missile strikes against Iran, that may provide diplomatic space for North Korea to say, OK, like, we see what you can do. Let’s come to the table, right?
And, you know, President Trump famously likes his friend in North Korea. And he’s scheduled to go to APEC in Korea at the end of October. And, you know, who knows what could happen there. He could go up to Panmunjom to meet the North Korean leader again, but in a different context because this, you know, show of military force by the United States may cause Kim to say, I need some insurance that that doesn’t happen to me. So I should talk to the – to the North Korean – to the U.S. leader, rather than keeping him at arm’s distance and hugging Putin closely, which is what he’s been doing throughout the whole Ukraine war.
Ms. Yacoubian: So, Maria, I want to come back to you, because now if we start to think kind of where this might be headed, and we know – certainly the Iranians are, you know, as I said at the outset, raising doubts as to how long this ceasefire will last. It looks like prospects for direct U.S.-Iran talks are being minimized right now by President Trump and others. So if this goes into another round of conflict, you’ve noted Russia’s constraints, right? That it’s got its own wars. But, you know, one idea people have thought about is could or would Russia at all contemplate providing sophisticated weaponry to Iran, if things get worse? Perhaps not. But sort of help us understand kind of over the medium term – understanding that we have no idea where this is going – (laughs) – how Russia – what’s the takeaway for Russia? How is it viewing its relationship with Iran, as this part of this whole axis or not? Where do you see Russia going?
Dr. Snegovaya: Excellent question, and a clearly very deep one. We have discussed all these contradictions within Russian posture on Iran. I will also note, to follow up on Victor’s point, the growing role of North Korea in the sense that while Iran played a crucial role for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine at the start of the war, most notably with by providing Shahed, including Shahed technologies and missiles, right now, North Korea has actually been able to substitute, to a large extent, for the Iranian role by providing missiles, munition, and personnel even. So that actually is somewhat eliminating the need to, you know, be particularly giving vis-à-vis Iran.
Having said that, in the long term clearly the interest of Russia is definitely empowering all these actors that would take on the hegemony of the, you know, so-called liberal unipolar or, you name it, Western-led order that is seen as primarily threat and target. And so Iran does remain an important strategic ally, even if Russia is constrained right now. I will also mention that Putin’s posture most likely also reflects the – you know, the flexibility vis-à-vis Donald Trump. There’s an effort there, you know, to maintain the channel of communication, not to provoke Trump too much by openly coming to defense of Iran. But, first of all, if the escalation of the war between Israel and Iran continues going forward, there are two threats for Russia.
First of all, strikes of Israel may potentially hurt the important, more effective, technologically sophisticated drones that have been still built in Iran. Most of this construction right now has been relocated to Russia. So for it, it was – all the strikes were relatively a nonissue. But potentially that can escalate the situation. And that would be problematic. On the other hand however, the escalation is beneficial in the sense that it drives the uncertainty in terms of escalating oil prices, which are still – the energy revenues still constitute about 30 percent of Russian budget revenues. And we’ve seen just earlier this year how actually important that is. When the oil prices go down, Russia suddenly has to revise its budget.
So from all this perspective, potentially some sort of uncertainty is actually beneficial, even if Russia is careful not to provoke any of the sides. In the long term, especially if there is some freeze achieved in Ukraine, I would imagine some assistance would be possible, especially if there’s a different U.S. president in power, one who takes more – you know, perhaps more sort of posture vis-à-vis Russia. But for now, however, I would envision more of the, you know, behind the scene coordination. Just want to flag for our audiences that Hamas keeps traveling to Moscow. Just recently – has just been to Moscow in June, for St. Petersburg Economic Forum. I guess there’s a lot of interesting investment opportunities being discussed. (Laughter.)
But, in that sense, it’s clear that behind the scenes Russia tries to maintain the diplomacy and links to Iran. It also tries, for example, to make sure Iran continues its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog. And accordingly, the effort to, you know, maintain a prominent diplomatic role, perhaps assisting more behind the scenes, maybe some technology transfers, without being too open, too provocative about it in the near term, I think that’s the way.
Ms. Yacoubian: So let me – I’m also monitoring questions. And there’s one that I want to sort of give you a quick bite on, which is about whether Russia, and then also China we’ll come to you in a moment, but are they – are they restricted by public opinion and internal conditions facing their citizens, in terms of what they’re willing and able to do? So how much does that factor in?
Dr. Snegovaya: That’s a great question, something that I’ve studied in a lot of detail. Russia is an autocracy and one where the majority of the population, unfortunately, is brainwashed, directly or at least indirectly sides with the Kremlin on the war issues. So in that sense I wouldn’t expect too much from the public – Russian public opinion in the near term. However, that is as long as an average, ordinary Russian feels like the war is something on the side, a beautiful picture on TV, but nothing that concerns them personally.
We’ve seen after partial mobilization in the fall 2022, for example, Putin’s ratings have dropped significantly, by 10 percentage points. That’s because people were afraid they were going to have to go, you know, die in the war. That they’re not, like, fully eager to die, even if they may be siding with some of the ideas that the propaganda conditions them to believe in. So not yet. But especially if the economic situation worsens, as we have seen, for example, in the late Soviet Union, we can anticipate plausibly a growing dislike, dissociation of the war. And in that sense, actually, we see it’s very notable that Putin has been very vocal in the recent St. Petersburg Economic Forum about, you know, how things are going to be improving, because there’s a lot of discontent about this.
So when it comes specifically to Ukrainian war, the population has not been a constraint yet, but it might. Iran, Israel, the population seems to follow the propagandist line on that. And we see that, while in the past the sentiment would be perhaps more divided between the fighting sides, increasingly, just recent poll has shown that there is more leaning towards Iran when it comes to Iran-Israel situation. So far, the population tends to following the lead of the propagandist channels, unfortunately.
Ms. Yacoubian: So, Brian, I want to turn to you with a similar question, that was – the viewer asked to both Russia and China being more restricted. So maybe you could weave that into a broader question I want to ask you about kind of what are China’s key takeaways from the conflict thus far? Again, we’re early days. It’s 12 days in. We’re in a ceasefire that may not last. In particular, for China does it view Tehran’s weakness as something to be leveraged, so that if – you know, if there’s even more of a crackdown, sanctions-wise and otherwise on Iran, could that make oil even cheaper for China? And therefore, I would think that would be a net-net a positive. Or does China view this kind of lack of balance now, or this new strategic balance I should say, in the Middle East, in any sort of worrying way? And in any of these calculations, to what extent, if at all, does popular opinion or internal conditions for Chinese citizens figure into their calculus?
Mr. Hart: Yeah. It’s a great question. And I think if you just look back at, you know, what China has done for Russia, for example, it’s largely walked right up to that line of not providing overt military support, but going right up to that line, providing significant economic support and technological support throughout the war. So I think that there’s a good chance that something like that could materialize here in this dynamic in the long term, in terms of helping the regime in Tehran, you know, stay in power. I think China’s ultimate, I think, goal here is to avoid regime collapse in Tehran. They have this partner in Iran that they don’t want to see go. They didn’t want to see the Strait of Hormuz close. That hasn’t happened. So, so far, things have not tilted too terribly, you know, in China’s – from China’s view.
But in terms of where we go next, I think there’s actually really interesting – there’s a plethora of interesting views of this, if you look at what Chinese netizens are saying. I think I saw one in recent weeks from a commentator who has millions of followers on the Chinese internet saying, you know, Iran would have fared better if they had had Chinese weapons instead of, you know, some indigenous, you know, Russian-copied weapons, and things like that. And they were even specifically citing the fact that Pakistan fared quite well with India using Chinese-integrated weapons and aircraft in that skirmish.
So I think that there’s a long-term question here about, you know, how much China will provide, but there are interesting views. I think the public would be supportive of supporting Iran, because – to a certain extent – because the ultimate goal here is to have a partner that pushes back against the United States and the West. And that’s what Tehran has provided for Beijing for years. And so I think ultimately, Beijing’s, you know, goal, and that the Chinese public’s supportive view of that, is to keep that going. And to avoid the situation where, you know, Iran becomes no longer a partner.
And they don’t want to see Iran too weakened. You know, a lot of these Chinese commentators have described how weak Iran is, with the decline of its proxies in the region. And that limits its utility to Beijing, to some extent. If it can’t really push back and challenge U.S. forces and influence in the region, then that means Iran, you know, is less able to support Beijing’s overall interest in pushing back against the West.
But some weakness is good too. Some reliance on Beijing is good. You know, as you said, it may offer opportunities for Beijing to get, you know, further, you know, cheap oil, things like that. Cheap, you know, supplies of oil in the future. But I think, you know, those are pretty limited in terms of overall strategic benefit to China. That’s good, but I think, you know, cheaper oil, there’s only so much Beijing can benefit from that. So I think overall their goal is to keep the situation overall balanced and to keep Iran as an important player, but to keep them dependent on China to a significant extent.
Ms. Yacoubian: So, Victor, I want to turn to you. We’d be remiss if we did not talk about what many have raised, which is the North Korea model with respect to nuclear proliferation. And the path, thus far, not taken by Iran. What is North Korea’s takeaway in terms of its own decisions and where we see Iran today with respect to nuclear – its nuclear weapons capabilities? And, second and related, you know, there are many who are speculating that Iran could indeed make the calculus that it must actually race to some sort of crude nuclear weapon as the only way to restore deterrence. Could you foresee North Korea playing a role in any sort of cooperation in that way?
Dr. Cha: Well, on the latter point, I think we can’t rule it out, right? I mean, as sort of national security experts, like, right, we have to worst case everything, right? And so in that sense, you can’t rule it out. You know, there has been reported cooperation in the past, scientific exchange, things like that. So you can’t rule it out. I mean, I think that North Korea – I mean, one of the – I think one of the costs of our bombing of Iran is that we may have basically ended CVID with North Korea – like, complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization with North Korea – because, if anything, the lesson North Korea has taken away from this is, you know, we need to keep our weapons to avoid, you know, a dozen massive ordinance penetrators being dropped on North Korea, like they were dropped on Iran. I mean, I think, if anything, they are reaffirmed in their view that they have pursued the right path.
Now, having said that, I don’t think that rules out the possibility of, as we spoke about earlier in the previous iteration, that this action against Iran could actually open up space for what have been stalled talks between Trump and North Korea, which have been stalled since the first Trump administration, right? Biden administration had no success in talking to North Korea. But they’re not for the reasons that we want. I mean, for the North Koreans they’d engage with negotiations to ensure that they don’t get a dozen or so massive ordinance penetrators dropped on them. And for the United States, the focus will really be on stopping North Korean predatory behavior in this disruptive order. That is, trying to stop all the weapons supplies to Russia and trying to stop any cooperation between Iran and North Korea – even potential future cooperation over reconstituting their highly enriched uranium program. So for all the wrong reasons, this strike against Iran may bring the North Koreans and the U.S. into negotiations.
But I think I want to echo something that you said earlier, Mona, which is that we’re still very early on in this, right? And so to say that, oh, well, you know, these strikes on Iran are going to actually lead to U.S.-North Korea negotiations again, we just don’t know. Like, we just don’t know. But I think one of the things that we do know, you know, and that we’ve heard from everybody, is I think everybody wants to avoid this blowback where it’s closing the Straits of Hormuz. Everybody wants to avoid a wider war. I think you’re right. All three countries don’t want to see regime collapse in Iran. Like, it’s not in any of their benefits to see that. But then fourth is, like you said, there’s this, I’m never going to look at a baby crib the same way again, right? Like, unregulated play space where there could be very predatory behavior. And I think, like, North Korea is one of the – you know, one of the most forward leaning in terms of trying to take advantage of that space for predatory action.
Ms. Yacoubian: So I want to stay with you, and I know we’re coming toward the end here, Victor. But I there’s a really important question that a viewer has asked, which is: How does a strike on one sovereign U.N. member by another legitimize and pave the way for such acts in the future by sovereign states against non-sovereign states, like Taiwan, or an ostracized state like North Korea? So we talked about the play space within CRINK, but there’s these bigger global governance questions and norms around the use of force. What is your takeaway on that?
Dr. Cha: Sure, absolutely. I mean, I think – I mean, this is – this is actually the fifth point that I wanted to make, but I ran out of time. (Laughter.) But I do think that’s right. I mean, I think that, you know, as we talk about what the implications of this are, what space it opens up for diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran, the U.S. and North Korea. I mean, at the same time, like this fundamental norm against the use of force is being completely, I hate to use the word, but obliterated, right, in almost every respect – whether we’re talking about, you know, Russia in Europe, Israel in Gaza or Iran, and the U.S. and Iran. And it does raise questions about is China taking a lesson for this with regard to Taiwan.
I mean, there’s a great piece in the current Foreign Affairs on this by two Yale scholars, about the destroying of the of the post-war norm against the use of force. And we’re seeing it all play out now. And we’re all trying to find out, like, what are the potential upsides, diplomatic space that’s opened. But we shouldn’t lose, as your question states, the fundamental lesson that what we are witnessing is the complete overturning of this post-war norm against the use of force.
Ms. Yacoubian: So I want to do a very quick lightning round and ask each of you to reflect as we look forward on where all of this is going, and what it means for CRINK. Is there one indicator, or one data point, or one action with respect to each of your countries that you work on, that we should be looking for that will give us a sense of which way this is tacking? So I’m going to pick on you first, Brian, and see if you’ve got any thoughts on that.
Mr. Hart: I think the main thing I’ll be watching is to see how far Beijing goes to support Iran long term. Again, going back to the same comments I made earlier about what they did to support Russia throughout the war in Ukraine, you know, Russia would not be able to continue prosecuting that war against Ukraine for all these years if it were not for the substantial economic, technological, and dual-use support that China has provided. And so to me, I want to see, what does – what does China provide to Iran, along those same lines? What’s different? You know, what does Iran need that’s different from Russia? I think there are going to be, you know, differences in terms of what they need there. So, you know, how far is Beijing willing to go?
You know, long term I think a question is, as I was saying, there now speculation – or there’s at least, you know, chatter that that Iran may want to eventually get Chinese military equipment. So far, you know, China has not done that for decades, overtly. But, you know, Iran could perhaps look to get transferred Chinese-made equipment from Pakistan. Beijing would need to sign off on that, but that would be an interesting development, and I think a pretty significant escalation from Beijing’s standpoint. And, you know, more long term, as things develop does Beijing, you know, go further and start to look at more overt military cooperation with Iran?
That would be a significant escalation, and would come with some costs from Beijing, especially in terms of how, you know, Beijing – I think Beijing has the most to lose here, in terms of – Beijing is the most invested in the existing international order, compared to Russia, and certainly compared to North Korea. So those things come at a cost from Beijing. And so if they do kind of cross that Rubicon, you know, it’s a sign that they are more willing to accept the risk of, you know, blowback from that – from the West and the international order, more than they have been in the past.
Ms. Yacoubian: Fascinating.
Maria, same question.
Dr. Snegovaya: Along similar lines. I think so far, if anything, this current situation between Russia not really eager, rushing to help Iran, I think it’s good news, showing that – while I agree with Victor – there’s definitely prospects for long term collaboration, maybe delegating some of the, you know, more sensitive tasks to other actors, like North Korea, we haven’t yet seen, like, this radical alteration of Russia’s posture in the Middle East. It more or less continues as usual, albeit in a weakened form, while trying, you know, to present itself as some sort of arbiter, maintaining good – well, decent ties to various Middle Eastern actors, and also trying, you know, to perhaps avoid, you know, helping Iran with having the nuclear capacity, which was historically Russian posture on that, even if everybody’s concerned this may change.
So I would watch this very closely, especially if, as we – if we see something we haven’t seen as yet, that is provision of important military, like, types of weapons – for example, like air defense to Iran in the near future. That would be a really serious sign. Plus, as I mentioned before, Russia is really vested – or, is really very interested in developing the major infrastructure sanction circumvention projects, like INSTC, for example, which would allow Russia basically, through Iran, to create this alternative network, making it more or less defended against, protected against Western sanctions. So I would watch closely how much Russia invests into reconstruction and into those projects going forward. Again, that would be another indication of Russia’s continuing deepening ties with these countries.
Ms. Yacoubian: Fascinating.
Victor, last word to you.
Dr. Cha: So I would worry about countries like Russia and China trying to ensure that, you know, the Iranian regime doesn’t completely weaken and use North Korea as a proxy, right? Use North Korea as a way. Be like, well, we can’t provide you MRBMs, but, you know, the North Koreans might be able to do that. Or China may not want to reconstitute Iran’s air defenses, but they may look to North Korea. So I think that’s one, right?
The other is, and probably – maybe Russia wouldn’t care. China would definitely care, but would not be able to stop it if North Korea engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran, right? You know, there have been rumors that there’s been some already. We know that North Korea was providing support to Syria right before the Israelis blew up that facility. You know, there was rumor that Saddam Hussein was talking to the North Koreans at one point or another about nuclear cooperation. So it’s not like there isn’t a history of this for North Korea. So I think that’s another.
And from a North Korean perspective, you know, again, it’s not implausible, because, you know, the North Koreans never managed that they would be somehow able to complicate the U.S. security picture in Europe. And yet, they’re doing that today, right? And the notion that they could do that at the same time in the Middle East might be appealing to some in North Korea. On top of that, they have the unfortunate advantage of flying below the radar screen, right? Because everybody’s focused on what Russia and China are going to do. People don’t focus so much on what North Korea is going to do.
And the only example I would give to skeptics about that is, you know, they were flying below the radar screen in the beginning when it came to ammunition to Russia, right? Everybody said, well, it’s, like, not much. It won’t really make a difference on the battlefield. And look at where we’ve ended up – six million rounds of ammunition. Fifty percent of what the Russians were using in Kursk probably was sourced to North Korea. And 25,000 troops, right? So, you know, they’re really kind of the spoiler in the picture that could – that could make things go quite badly, so.
Ms. Yacoubian: Well, I want to thank my colleagues. We’re out of time. This has been a fascinating discussion. Thank you all. Lots to look for, in particular this CRINK unregulated play space, that I think bears close watching. Let me also thank colleagues from the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, Minchi, Ninar, and Briana, as well as our streaming and broadcasting team, Dinesh, Eric, and Qi. It’s been a fascinating conversation. I thank our audience very much. Please go to CSIS’s website, www.CSIS.org/geopolitics. We will be posting research and data on this topic later on this summer. Thank you all very much for joining us.
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