On October 28-29, the Stimson Center’s East Asia program hosted a two-day workshop in Chiang Mai, Thailand addressing the prospect for 2025 military-led elections in the face of a now EAO-controlled country surrounding Naypyidaw. Questions are abundant around the impact of Operation 1027 and the massive momentum it unleashed, the practicality and the implication of the elections, the status and dynamics of the resistance groups, and how external actors like China, the United States, and ASEAN will respond to the turbulence and uncertainty. This workshop encouraged an exchange of research and perspectives and promoted scholarly dialogues.
Introduction
Myanmar is in an age of uncertainty. Over the past year, momentum from Operation 1027 has won the resistance forces unprecedented territorial control in the ethnic states, encroaching on the city centers. Despite this expansion, the military junta under Min Aung Hlaing is expected to proceed with elections in 2025, following a preparatory “census” this past October. We traveled to Chiang Mai, Thailand, in October with a team of Stimson researchers led by Senior Fellow and East Asia Program Co-Director Yun Sun to hold the third annual Burma Forum with experts on Myanmar. We discussed what may be next for the war-torn country amid deepening crisis and many questions about the coming months – the impact of elections on the state of conflict and the political process, engagement from the international community, especially China, and the complex dynamics of the resistance. The experts who joined us provided multifaceted insights into the future of Myanmar, and how Myanmar leadership could change over the next year.
Territorial Control and Political Fragmentation
The galvanizing effect of Operation 1027 since October 2023 led to an unprecedented level of coordination among ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), also called ethnic resistance organizations (EROs). Since then, EAOs/EROs have continued to expand territorial control in the ethnic states surrounding Myanmar’s heartland. Though the state of the ground operations has not vitally weakened the junta, the shift of momentum is significant. The shadow National Unity Government’s (NUG) Ministry of Defense announced in August 2024 that the junta’s governing body, the State Administration Council (SAC), may now control less than 100 out of 350 townships, while EROs occupy a majority. An expert on Rakhine State noted that the Arakan Army (AA) currently controls 10 of 17 townships in Rakhine, which could lead to AA becoming the first EAO to fully control its home state. The AA also holds the key India-Myanmar border town of Paletwa in neighboring Chin State, bolstering its significance as a player on border issues.
With results like these, observers may think the tide of battle is slowly turning. However, experts in our workshop raised an important caveat: the resistance could be conflating liberated territories with territories abandoned by people who fled the conflict zone. Identifying which territories are held by EAOs or PDFs is critical for an accurate assessment of the current ground situation, and it is also necessary to determine where resistance groups have real governing capabilities. If there are to be elections in 2025, a realistic understanding of which areas are under SAC or resistance command will clarify where elections are likely and unlikely to take place.
In addition, the political wings of the EAOs and the NUG will need to reconcile the fact that, depending on which group or groups are acting as the local authorities, a resistance-controlled territory does not automatically expand or strengthen the central authority of the NUG. The resistance will need to address how this fragmentation might indirectly sustain the SAC’s command.
The EAOs and the NUG largely share a common goal- to remove Min Aung Hlaing and his regime from power. However, their visions for the post-junta government differ based on their own interests and their ideas for the relationship between the central government and the ethnic states in the future. Eventually, the different factions of the resistance will need to discuss the next model of leadership and government, the future role of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, and the power distribution between the Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities. These are issues that have long plagued Burmese politics, and there are no easy answers.
The View from China
As Myanmar’s northern neighbor, China’s policy approach to the civil war continues to draw the close attention of Myanmar watchers. China’s priority for Myanmar is stability. As resistance forces start encroaching on Myanmar’s dry zone, which is a majority Bamar and heavily populated area in the center of the country, the possibility of a collapse of the central government in Myanmar is a concern. China believes the chaos would create further instability on its shared border – an influx of refugees, expanded cyber scam operations, and increased drug trafficking. The fall of Lashio, a major town in northern Shan State, to EAOs in early August marked a shift in China’s engagement with Myanmar, as northern Shan EAOs quickly consolidated power. Intent on shoring up its influence, China is currently taking a two-pronged approach of recentering its support for the SAC and exerting additional pressure on the northern Shan ethnic groups. China held military exercises along the China-Myanmar border in August, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) received a warning letter from the security committee of the Chinese border town Ruili to stop fighting with a threat of consequences. China aims to force northern Shan EAOs to cease fighting so that bilateral border trade can resume standard operation along the China-Myanmar border, which is a key priority for Chinese interests.
In this context, China views 2025 elections not as a means to solve Myanmar’s crisis but as an opportunity to improve stability of the regime and in the country, and eventually to move the country forward. In August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pushed Min Aung Hlaing to proceed with the long-delayed elections, with China’s explicit support for the process and results. Experts noted other recent Chinese moves to support the elections, such as meetings in Naypyidaw between Union Election Commission of Myanmar Chairman Ko Ko and China’s then-ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, as well as between Wang Yi and former SPDC chairman Than Shwe. In a way, China is optimistic that if Myanmar can present a newly “elected” government with just enough legitimacy, more options will open for engagement and dialogue on political resolutions down the road.
The Road to Elections and What Comes After
The issue of the legitimacy of the elections, however, evokes pessimism from experts. The elections are not expected to be free, fair, or representative of the population given the junta’s limited territorial control. An expert observed that, at best, only a third of the electorate would have access to operable polling stations to participate in the elections. Though the SAC may be able to leverage the war-weariness across Myanmar to negotiate ceasefires with select armed groups ahead of the elections, there is no guarantee such dialogues will succeed if they take place. It is more likely that elections will move forward without consensus, and eventually only represent a fraction of the country’s population. But not even the SAC expects the elections to resolve the prolonged political and military issues in Myanmar. The question, then, is whether the elections will improve, worsen, or have no impact on the ongoing conflicts across the country.
There are doubts as to whether the country can move forward if Min Aung Hlaing becomes president, as concerns persist about the stability and sustainability of the regime under his control. As he has effectively consolidated power, it is not clear who would succeed him were he to vacate the top position. Experts drew a distinction between the goals of the Burmese military and senior general Min Aung Hlaing. The military wants to ensure the power of the institution, while Min Aung Hlaing is more vested in his own political future.
Like China, ASEAN is keener on stabilization and a chance to turn the page on the conflict than a specific outcome. Elections might pave the way for Myanmar’s reengagement with ASEAN, which has been deadlocked on the crisis and unable to take meaningful action, to the point that in 2023 Timor-Leste said it might reconsider joining ASEAN due to the bloc’s inaction. When the ASEAN chair rotates again, next year to Malaysia, little change is expected in ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar. But given the bloc’s fatigue with the conflict, if Myanmar has new leadership, ASEAN might be willing to accept them into official meetings.
While the junta remains in power, the United States is unlikely to change its approach or recognize the elections. Sanctions against the junta have expanded significantly since the coup, with more targeted sanctions in the BRAVE Burma Act, but these have proven insufficient to change the junta’s behavior. At the same time, despite the great need for humanitarian assistance across Myanmar, and despite lobbying from the Burmese diaspora, the United States government has not been able to provide humanitarian aid swiftly or easily. The U.S. government faces structural obstacles ranging from Congressional appropriation of funds to aid delivery to those in need, and its foreign policy priorities are currently Ukraine and Israel. More creative approaches to aid, such as the USAID initiative for students, are important but will not have an immediate impact. The experts in our forum do not foresee major changes under President Trump. Instead, as they discussed, what Myanmar may need most in the U.S. government and Congress is a champion who can effectively draw attention to the crisis. Whether the Burma Caucus, whose key members were reelected in November 2025, develops into this champion will be important to watch in the next year.
Conclusion
The situation on the ground in Myanmar is extremely fluid, with many possibilities for progress and setbacks at the same time among both the resistance and the junta. Within a year, domestic politics and battlefield developments could turn in new directions. If the SAC carries out elections, the legitimacy of the elections will be challenged by a vast number of internal and external actors and will most likely be accompanied by intensified conflict across the country. The next twelve months in Myanmar may be more unstable.
On October 28-29, the Stimson Center’s East Asia program hosted a two-day workshop in Chiang Mai, Thailand addressing the prospect for 2025 military-led elections in the face of a now EAO-controlled country surrounding Naypyidaw. Questions are abundant around the impact of Operation 1027 and the massive momentum it unleashed, the practicality and the implication of the elections, the status and dynamics of the resistance groups, and how external actors like China, the United States, and ASEAN will respond to the turbulence and uncertainty. This workshop encouraged an exchange of research and perspectives and promoted scholarly dialogues.
Introduction
Myanmar is in an age of uncertainty. Over the past year, momentum from Operation 1027 has won the resistance forces unprecedented territorial control in the ethnic states, encroaching on the city centers. Despite this expansion, the military junta under Min Aung Hlaing is expected to proceed with elections in 2025, following a preparatory “census” this past October. We traveled to Chiang Mai, Thailand, in October with a team of Stimson researchers led by Senior Fellow and East Asia Program Co-Director Yun Sun to hold the third annual Burma Forum with experts on Myanmar. We discussed what may be next for the war-torn country amid deepening crisis and many questions about the coming months – the impact of elections on the state of conflict and the political process, engagement from the international community, especially China, and the complex dynamics of the resistance. The experts who joined us provided multifaceted insights into the future of Myanmar, and how Myanmar leadership could change over the next year.
Territorial Control and Political Fragmentation
The galvanizing effect of Operation 1027 since October 2023 led to an unprecedented level of coordination among ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), also called ethnic resistance organizations (EROs). Since then, EAOs/EROs have continued to expand territorial control in the ethnic states surrounding Myanmar’s heartland. Though the state of the ground operations has not vitally weakened the junta, the shift of momentum is significant. The shadow National Unity Government’s (NUG) Ministry of Defense announced in August 2024 that the junta’s governing body, the State Administration Council (SAC), may now control less than 100 out of 350 townships, while EROs occupy a majority. An expert on Rakhine State noted that the Arakan Army (AA) currently controls 10 of 17 townships in Rakhine, which could lead to AA becoming the first EAO to fully control its home state. The AA also holds the key India-Myanmar border town of Paletwa in neighboring Chin State, bolstering its significance as a player on border issues.
With results like these, observers may think the tide of battle is slowly turning. However, experts in our workshop raised an important caveat: the resistance could be conflating liberated territories with territories abandoned by people who fled the conflict zone. Identifying which territories are held by EAOs or PDFs is critical for an accurate assessment of the current ground situation, and it is also necessary to determine where resistance groups have real governing capabilities. If there are to be elections in 2025, a realistic understanding of which areas are under SAC or resistance command will clarify where elections are likely and unlikely to take place.
In addition, the political wings of the EAOs and the NUG will need to reconcile the fact that, depending on which group or groups are acting as the local authorities, a resistance-controlled territory does not automatically expand or strengthen the central authority of the NUG. The resistance will need to address how this fragmentation might indirectly sustain the SAC’s command.
The EAOs and the NUG largely share a common goal- to remove Min Aung Hlaing and his regime from power. However, their visions for the post-junta government differ based on their own interests and their ideas for the relationship between the central government and the ethnic states in the future. Eventually, the different factions of the resistance will need to discuss the next model of leadership and government, the future role of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, and the power distribution between the Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities. These are issues that have long plagued Burmese politics, and there are no easy answers.
The View from China
As Myanmar’s northern neighbor, China’s policy approach to the civil war continues to draw the close attention of Myanmar watchers. China’s priority for Myanmar is stability. As resistance forces start encroaching on Myanmar’s dry zone, which is a majority Bamar and heavily populated area in the center of the country, the possibility of a collapse of the central government in Myanmar is a concern. China believes the chaos would create further instability on its shared border – an influx of refugees, expanded cyber scam operations, and increased drug trafficking. The fall of Lashio, a major town in northern Shan State, to EAOs in early August marked a shift in China’s engagement with Myanmar, as northern Shan EAOs quickly consolidated power. Intent on shoring up its influence, China is currently taking a two-pronged approach of recentering its support for the SAC and exerting additional pressure on the northern Shan ethnic groups. China held military exercises along the China-Myanmar border in August, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) received a warning letter from the security committee of the Chinese border town Ruili to stop fighting with a threat of consequences. China aims to force northern Shan EAOs to cease fighting so that bilateral border trade can resume standard operation along the China-Myanmar border, which is a key priority for Chinese interests.
In this context, China views 2025 elections not as a means to solve Myanmar’s crisis but as an opportunity to improve stability of the regime and in the country, and eventually to move the country forward. In August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pushed Min Aung Hlaing to proceed with the long-delayed elections, with China’s explicit support for the process and results. Experts noted other recent Chinese moves to support the elections, such as meetings in Naypyidaw between Union Election Commission of Myanmar Chairman Ko Ko and China’s then-ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, as well as between Wang Yi and former SPDC chairman Than Shwe. In a way, China is optimistic that if Myanmar can present a newly “elected” government with just enough legitimacy, more options will open for engagement and dialogue on political resolutions down the road.
The Road to Elections and What Comes After
The issue of the legitimacy of the elections, however, evokes pessimism from experts. The elections are not expected to be free, fair, or representative of the population given the junta’s limited territorial control. An expert observed that, at best, only a third of the electorate would have access to operable polling stations to participate in the elections. Though the SAC may be able to leverage the war-weariness across Myanmar to negotiate ceasefires with select armed groups ahead of the elections, there is no guarantee such dialogues will succeed if they take place. It is more likely that elections will move forward without consensus, and eventually only represent a fraction of the country’s population. But not even the SAC expects the elections to resolve the prolonged political and military issues in Myanmar. The question, then, is whether the elections will improve, worsen, or have no impact on the ongoing conflicts across the country.
There are doubts as to whether the country can move forward if Min Aung Hlaing becomes president, as concerns persist about the stability and sustainability of the regime under his control. As he has effectively consolidated power, it is not clear who would succeed him were he to vacate the top position. Experts drew a distinction between the goals of the Burmese military and senior general Min Aung Hlaing. The military wants to ensure the power of the institution, while Min Aung Hlaing is more vested in his own political future.
Like China, ASEAN is keener on stabilization and a chance to turn the page on the conflict than a specific outcome. Elections might pave the way for Myanmar’s reengagement with ASEAN, which has been deadlocked on the crisis and unable to take meaningful action, to the point that in 2023 Timor-Leste said it might reconsider joining ASEAN due to the bloc’s inaction. When the ASEAN chair rotates again, next year to Malaysia, little change is expected in ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar. But given the bloc’s fatigue with the conflict, if Myanmar has new leadership, ASEAN might be willing to accept them into official meetings.
While the junta remains in power, the United States is unlikely to change its approach or recognize the elections. Sanctions against the junta have expanded significantly since the coup, with more targeted sanctions in the BRAVE Burma Act, but these have proven insufficient to change the junta’s behavior. At the same time, despite the great need for humanitarian assistance across Myanmar, and despite lobbying from the Burmese diaspora, the United States government has not been able to provide humanitarian aid swiftly or easily. The U.S. government faces structural obstacles ranging from Congressional appropriation of funds to aid delivery to those in need, and its foreign policy priorities are currently Ukraine and Israel. More creative approaches to aid, such as the USAID initiative for students, are important but will not have an immediate impact. The experts in our forum do not foresee major changes under President Trump. Instead, as they discussed, what Myanmar may need most in the U.S. government and Congress is a champion who can effectively draw attention to the crisis. Whether the Burma Caucus, whose key members were reelected in November 2025, develops into this champion will be important to watch in the next year.
Conclusion
The situation on the ground in Myanmar is extremely fluid, with many possibilities for progress and setbacks at the same time among both the resistance and the junta. Within a year, domestic politics and battlefield developments could turn in new directions. If the SAC carries out elections, the legitimacy of the elections will be challenged by a vast number of internal and external actors and will most likely be accompanied by intensified conflict across the country. The next twelve months in Myanmar may be more unstable.
