The Kremlin has for three years been pushing false biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons disinformation narratives alleging illicit or suspect behavior by Ukraine and the United States. Meanwhile, Russia’s seizure and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant undermines a number of regimes for the security of nuclear material even as drone attacks demonstrate weakening military restraint towards Zaporizhzhia and other Ukrainian nuclear power plants and fighting endangers external power supplies and other services critical to their safety and security.
A Grim Anniversary
This week marks the third anniversary of Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty and presents a good time to review the ongoing conflict’s potential impact on norms against the use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated dual use materials, as well as on regimes designed to ensure the security of nuclear material. While this feature of the conflict has been less widely discussed than military strategy, battlefield tactics, and paths to peace, it has no less geopolitical importance. The assault on WMD norms is evident across the biological, chemical, and nuclear domains, characterized by rampant disinformation campaigns, alleged violations of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the unprecedented Russian seizure and occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and decreasing military restraint around Zaporizhzhia and other of Ukraine’s vulnerable nuclear power plants. While these topics and treaties may not be what most of us worry about in our day-to-day lives, the continued undermining of these norms may have real and lasting practical impact.
Kremlin’s Bioweapons Disinformation Undermines Legitimate Global Biosecurity Cooperation
One of the first salvos against the BWC and associated nonproliferation norms came in the form of a high level Russian disinformation campaign, led by senior diplomatic officials, alleging at the UN Security Council that the United States was funding illicit offensive biological weapons work at a network of Ukrainian diagnostic laboratories. Dismissed by the United States, independent media, and subject matter experts, and shot down by the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs each of the three times the claims were aired at the Security Council, Russia continued to push the false accusations, calling a formal meeting of BWC states parties in early September, 2022, to review the “evidence,” and amplifying the disinformation narratives over social media, government aligned media outlets, and through regional channels in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. In reality, the United States provided equipment, training, and other capacity building support to Ukrainian laboratories to enable the detection, diagnosis, and reporting – through established national and international channels – of outbreaks of high consequence infectious diseases. Undermining confidence in assistance that would not only provide early warning of a biological weapons attack but of other high consequence infectious human and veterinary diseases, epidemics, and pandemics undermines decades of international cooperation and collaboration to make the world safer from potentially catastrophic events. Of note, the Washington Post reported late last year on expansion at one of the legacy sites of Moscow’s biological weapons program of record in Sergiev Posad; Russian officials say the expansion is for biodefense work.
Most recently, Russia submitted a note verbale, an unsigned diplomatic memo, for circulation among BWC States Parties. The note reportedly reprises the text of a December 24, 2024, Russian Ministry of Defense briefing on U.S. “military and biological activities” in Africa that alleges U.S. efforts to exploit the continent for military purposes and “circumvent” the BWC, all at the price of African national sovereignty. In transferring well-worn false messages about legitimate U.S. biological threat reduction and public health security assistance from the world of social media to the diplomatic halls of Geneva, the note undermines the African governments that requested the assistance and provides a new distraction from the critical business of the BWC at a time when a number of States Parties have been working towards strengthening the Convention. Nor will it smooth the work of diplomats racing to complete difficult negotiations by a May, 2025, deadline on a new global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response agreement to help all countries prepare for future pandemics.
Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use Erode Trust in International Regimes
Russia has followed a similar playbook for its chemical weapons disinformation during the Ukraine conflict, as documented by the recently established counter-disinformation initiative of the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership). Starting with allegations throughout 2022 that Ukraine was preparing various kinds of chemical weapons attacks, the campaign turned in 2023 to fabricated footage of alleged Ukrainian drones dispersing chemical agent over Russian troops, culminating in allegations in 2024 that Ukraine was using chlorine to clear Russian territory in the Kursk region. Amid all the unsubstantiated allegations, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) did, in fact, confirm the presence of a riot control agent, CS, in samples submitted by Ukraine in 2024. The CWC prohibits the use of riot control agents on the battlefield, and the OPCW did not establish whether the alleged incidents took place as described nor attribute responsibility for them. The OPCW as an international membership organization must walk a fine diplomatic line in its statements and it has noted that, “Both the Russian Federation and Ukraine have accused one another and reported a number of allegations of use of chemical weapons to the Organisation.” However, of the two countries, only Russia stands accused of maintaining an undeclared chemical weapons program and using prohibited chemical warfare agents against enemies of the state. As the Global Partnership initiative points out, the stream of unsubstantiated allegations overwhelms the organizations tasked with investigating, undermining their authority and international credibility.
Playing with Fire: Nuclear Weapons Disinformation and Nuclear Power Plants in a War Zone
The Kremlin’s disinformation extends into the nuclear and radiological risk zone as well, featuring numerous accusations against Ukraine of plans to acquire a nuclear weapon or launch a dirty (radiological) bomb. More tangible and concerning, however, was Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants early in the war and its dangerous occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) ever since. While Russian troops withdrew after five weeks of occupation from the inactive Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP), site of Europe’s worst nuclear disaster in 1986, reports of reckless and destructive behavior there set the tone for subsequent events at Zaporizhzhya. Recent reports of a drone attack on the “sarcophagus” containing the radioactive ruins of Chornobyl’s Reactor 4 starkly illustrate the risks facing all of Ukraine’s other nuclear power plants, where monitoring teams from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regularly report explosions, power outages, and damage to substations supplying offsite power for cooling spent fuel and other critical functions. On December 10, a drone hit an IAEA team car en route to pick up one of the teams rotating into the country for a monitoring mission.
Nowhere are these risks more evident than at the ZNPP, which has suffered significantly while frontline fighting has ebbed and flowed in its vicinity. Despite IAEA chief Rafael Mariano Grossi’s “Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict,” and the “Concrete Principles to Help Ensure Nuclear Safety and Security At ZNPP,” shelling, drone attacks, and fires are commonly reported by the monitoring team stationed at the plant. Damage to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam compromised the water source used to cool the plant’s reactors, while recurring blackouts, staff turnover and shortages, and lack of operator knowledge as a result of Russia’s management of the plant have escalated the risk of human error at ZNPP.
Renewed Defense Needed for WMD Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security Regimes
While widespread chemical weapons use in the Syrian civil war and use of chemical weapon agents against high profile Russian and North Korean political targets have also severely undermined norms against CW, the Kremlin’s broad based disinformation campaigns and behavior towards Ukrainian nuclear facilities significantly complicate the difficult landscape for international nonproliferation and security regimes. What’s more, the consequences of loss of trust could be difficult to reverse, threatening other important goals. It took decades of negotiation and exquisitely aligned political forces to bring the conventions against biological and chemical weapons into force. Advanced nuclear energy technologies hold promise of helping the world meet energy security as well as global carbon emission reduction goals. Yet the spectacle of a nuclear energy plant held hostage during wartime may give many countries in unstable areas pause.
While the Kremlin bears much responsibility for WMD disinformation and related damage to WMD nonproliferation and CBRN security norms over the past three years, this anniversary also converges with a fraught inflection point for the United States, where efforts to counter disinformation have been deprioritized by both government and major American digital media platforms. Congress allowed the legislative authority for the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center, charged with leading the federal government’s efforts to counter foreign disinformation, to lapse in December, 2024, while the new administration’s moves to slash the federal government’s footprint threatens the future of key funds and federal programming aimed at countering foreign interference and supporting independent journalism and counter disinformation efforts abroad. Meta, which owns social media giants Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, has announced it will end fact checking programs on those platforms.
With the United States consumed with domestic battles and as it downgrades efforts to counter disinformation, other champions of fact-based public speech and WMD nonproliferation norms may seize the opportunity to take the lead. The European Union already has a robust program to counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), and a number of European countries have strong media literacy and other protective frameworks in place. The Global Partnership’s initiative to counter WMD disinformation has made a strong start and can provide leadership. Meanwhile, the international community needs to ensure accountability for any actual violations of regimes and norms, including Russia’s unprecedented occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, as it re-prioritizes nuclear security on the global agenda. The IAEA depends on extra-budgetary, voluntary donations to fund its nuclear security programs and ensuring the continuity of these has never been more critical for the resilience of critical international nonproliferation norms and regimes.
The Kremlin has for three years been pushing false biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons disinformation narratives alleging illicit or suspect behavior by Ukraine and the United States. Meanwhile, Russia’s seizure and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant undermines a number of regimes for the security of nuclear material even as drone attacks demonstrate weakening military restraint towards Zaporizhzhia and other Ukrainian nuclear power plants and fighting endangers external power supplies and other services critical to their safety and security.
A Grim Anniversary
This week marks the third anniversary of Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty and presents a good time to review the ongoing conflict’s potential impact on norms against the use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated dual use materials, as well as on regimes designed to ensure the security of nuclear material. While this feature of the conflict has been less widely discussed than military strategy, battlefield tactics, and paths to peace, it has no less geopolitical importance. The assault on WMD norms is evident across the biological, chemical, and nuclear domains, characterized by rampant disinformation campaigns, alleged violations of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the unprecedented Russian seizure and occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and decreasing military restraint around Zaporizhzhia and other of Ukraine’s vulnerable nuclear power plants. While these topics and treaties may not be what most of us worry about in our day-to-day lives, the continued undermining of these norms may have real and lasting practical impact.
Kremlin’s Bioweapons Disinformation Undermines Legitimate Global Biosecurity Cooperation
One of the first salvos against the BWC and associated nonproliferation norms came in the form of a high level Russian disinformation campaign, led by senior diplomatic officials, alleging at the UN Security Council that the United States was funding illicit offensive biological weapons work at a network of Ukrainian diagnostic laboratories. Dismissed by the United States, independent media, and subject matter experts, and shot down by the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs each of the three times the claims were aired at the Security Council, Russia continued to push the false accusations, calling a formal meeting of BWC states parties in early September, 2022, to review the “evidence,” and amplifying the disinformation narratives over social media, government aligned media outlets, and through regional channels in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. In reality, the United States provided equipment, training, and other capacity building support to Ukrainian laboratories to enable the detection, diagnosis, and reporting – through established national and international channels – of outbreaks of high consequence infectious diseases. Undermining confidence in assistance that would not only provide early warning of a biological weapons attack but of other high consequence infectious human and veterinary diseases, epidemics, and pandemics undermines decades of international cooperation and collaboration to make the world safer from potentially catastrophic events. Of note, the Washington Post reported late last year on expansion at one of the legacy sites of Moscow’s biological weapons program of record in Sergiev Posad; Russian officials say the expansion is for biodefense work.
Most recently, Russia submitted a note verbale, an unsigned diplomatic memo, for circulation among BWC States Parties. The note reportedly reprises the text of a December 24, 2024, Russian Ministry of Defense briefing on U.S. “military and biological activities” in Africa that alleges U.S. efforts to exploit the continent for military purposes and “circumvent” the BWC, all at the price of African national sovereignty. In transferring well-worn false messages about legitimate U.S. biological threat reduction and public health security assistance from the world of social media to the diplomatic halls of Geneva, the note undermines the African governments that requested the assistance and provides a new distraction from the critical business of the BWC at a time when a number of States Parties have been working towards strengthening the Convention. Nor will it smooth the work of diplomats racing to complete difficult negotiations by a May, 2025, deadline on a new global pandemic prevention, preparedness and response agreement to help all countries prepare for future pandemics.
Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use Erode Trust in International Regimes
Russia has followed a similar playbook for its chemical weapons disinformation during the Ukraine conflict, as documented by the recently established counter-disinformation initiative of the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership). Starting with allegations throughout 2022 that Ukraine was preparing various kinds of chemical weapons attacks, the campaign turned in 2023 to fabricated footage of alleged Ukrainian drones dispersing chemical agent over Russian troops, culminating in allegations in 2024 that Ukraine was using chlorine to clear Russian territory in the Kursk region. Amid all the unsubstantiated allegations, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) did, in fact, confirm the presence of a riot control agent, CS, in samples submitted by Ukraine in 2024. The CWC prohibits the use of riot control agents on the battlefield, and the OPCW did not establish whether the alleged incidents took place as described nor attribute responsibility for them. The OPCW as an international membership organization must walk a fine diplomatic line in its statements and it has noted that, “Both the Russian Federation and Ukraine have accused one another and reported a number of allegations of use of chemical weapons to the Organisation.” However, of the two countries, only Russia stands accused of maintaining an undeclared chemical weapons program and using prohibited chemical warfare agents against enemies of the state. As the Global Partnership initiative points out, the stream of unsubstantiated allegations overwhelms the organizations tasked with investigating, undermining their authority and international credibility.
Playing with Fire: Nuclear Weapons Disinformation and Nuclear Power Plants in a War Zone
The Kremlin’s disinformation extends into the nuclear and radiological risk zone as well, featuring numerous accusations against Ukraine of plans to acquire a nuclear weapon or launch a dirty (radiological) bomb. More tangible and concerning, however, was Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants early in the war and its dangerous occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) ever since. While Russian troops withdrew after five weeks of occupation from the inactive Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP), site of Europe’s worst nuclear disaster in 1986, reports of reckless and destructive behavior there set the tone for subsequent events at Zaporizhzhya. Recent reports of a drone attack on the “sarcophagus” containing the radioactive ruins of Chornobyl’s Reactor 4 starkly illustrate the risks facing all of Ukraine’s other nuclear power plants, where monitoring teams from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regularly report explosions, power outages, and damage to substations supplying offsite power for cooling spent fuel and other critical functions. On December 10, a drone hit an IAEA team car en route to pick up one of the teams rotating into the country for a monitoring mission.
Nowhere are these risks more evident than at the ZNPP, which has suffered significantly while frontline fighting has ebbed and flowed in its vicinity. Despite IAEA chief Rafael Mariano Grossi’s “Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict,” and the “Concrete Principles to Help Ensure Nuclear Safety and Security At ZNPP,” shelling, drone attacks, and fires are commonly reported by the monitoring team stationed at the plant. Damage to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam compromised the water source used to cool the plant’s reactors, while recurring blackouts, staff turnover and shortages, and lack of operator knowledge as a result of Russia’s management of the plant have escalated the risk of human error at ZNPP.
Renewed Defense Needed for WMD Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security Regimes
While widespread chemical weapons use in the Syrian civil war and use of chemical weapon agents against high profile Russian and North Korean political targets have also severely undermined norms against CW, the Kremlin’s broad based disinformation campaigns and behavior towards Ukrainian nuclear facilities significantly complicate the difficult landscape for international nonproliferation and security regimes. What’s more, the consequences of loss of trust could be difficult to reverse, threatening other important goals. It took decades of negotiation and exquisitely aligned political forces to bring the conventions against biological and chemical weapons into force. Advanced nuclear energy technologies hold promise of helping the world meet energy security as well as global carbon emission reduction goals. Yet the spectacle of a nuclear energy plant held hostage during wartime may give many countries in unstable areas pause.
While the Kremlin bears much responsibility for WMD disinformation and related damage to WMD nonproliferation and CBRN security norms over the past three years, this anniversary also converges with a fraught inflection point for the United States, where efforts to counter disinformation have been deprioritized by both government and major American digital media platforms. Congress allowed the legislative authority for the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center, charged with leading the federal government’s efforts to counter foreign disinformation, to lapse in December, 2024, while the new administration’s moves to slash the federal government’s footprint threatens the future of key funds and federal programming aimed at countering foreign interference and supporting independent journalism and counter disinformation efforts abroad. Meta, which owns social media giants Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, has announced it will end fact checking programs on those platforms.
With the United States consumed with domestic battles and as it downgrades efforts to counter disinformation, other champions of fact-based public speech and WMD nonproliferation norms may seize the opportunity to take the lead. The European Union already has a robust program to counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), and a number of European countries have strong media literacy and other protective frameworks in place. The Global Partnership’s initiative to counter WMD disinformation has made a strong start and can provide leadership. Meanwhile, the international community needs to ensure accountability for any actual violations of regimes and norms, including Russia’s unprecedented occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, as it re-prioritizes nuclear security on the global agenda. The IAEA depends on extra-budgetary, voluntary donations to fund its nuclear security programs and ensuring the continuity of these has never been more critical for the resilience of critical international nonproliferation norms and regimes.
