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This transcript is from a CSIS event hosted on June 17, 2025. Watch the full video here.
Mr. Todman: Hello, and welcome to CSIS. I’m Will Todman, a senior fellow in the Middle East program. I’m joined by some of my colleagues to discuss the latest in the war between Israel and Iran. We are now in the fifth day of the conflict between the two countries that has left at least 224 people dead in Iran and 24 dead in Israel. While Iran continues to fire volleys of missiles at Israel, Israel has reportedly achieved air superiority over Iran and has conducted widespread strikes on various targets across the country.
The U.S. role seems to be shifting. Initially, President Trump and his Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the United States had no role in these operations. But over the last day or so, we’ve seen that rhetoric shifting. Just today, President Trump posted on Truth Social, “unconditional surrender.” He also said “we” when discussing military operations being conducted in Iran.
To discuss the immediate implications of this conflict, but also to zoom out a bit and try to better understand where this all might be going, I am joined by three of my colleagues at CSIS. Mona Yacoubian is Senior Advisor and the new Director of the Middle East Program. Dr. Doreen Horschig is a Fellow in the Project on Nuclear Issues. And Dr. Dan Byman is the Director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program. You can see much more of their bios online. For those of you watching online, you can submit questions, which I will pose to our group today by using the button on the CSIS website. Dan, I would love to start with you, please. How do you evaluate the success of Israel’s military operations so far in Iran?
Dr. Byman: We should have our session today, and then maybe a month from now, do another one. And then another year from now, a third, and I’ll give you a different answer each time. If you look at the immediate results in Iran, Israel appears to have hit some of Iran’s nuclear sites, but certainly not all. And it has done significant damage, it appears, to Natanz, one of the most important. But Fordow, another site, seems largely intact, and a lot of the more dispersed sites have not been hit.
Israel has, however, done significant short-term damage to the Iranian military. It has hit the leadership, hitting numerous targets. To be clear, they’ve been replaced. Israel has also rendered the missile response of Iran less effective. Now, Iran is trying to launch very large salvos at Israel. That’s difficult in part due to the command disruption. Also, it appears that as Iran tries to take missiles from storage to launch areas, Israel is disrupting that process. But again, we see some Iranian response.
So far, it’s been pretty good from an Israeli point of view. I think the casualty ratio you mentioned at the beginning is one that not only that favors Israel, but Israel has been willing to accept. I wouldn’t say that it has been an operation that’s scot-free for Israel. The one thing I would stress, though, is that the future from a military point of view looks more promising for Israel, in that it has now achieved almost complete air supremacy. I’d point out that, over three years into the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia is still not there over Ukraine. The broader intelligence dominance that Israel has shown is likely to pay dividends. But to do this operation successfully in the long term is incredibly difficult, and it’s unclear to me if Israel is going to achieve that.
Mr. Todman: You’ve talked about various types of dominance that Israel has achieved. Is it fair to say that Israel has achieved escalation dominance at this stage?
Dr. Byman: Maybe. Certainly, Israel is believed to be a nuclear power. Israel is a country that has a superior conventional military. However, Iran has responded in the past with international terrorism, and that’s very difficult to stop. It does have tools in its toolkit that it can still respond with. But there’s no question in terms of the broader military force, Israel has the upper hand.
Mr. Todman: Thank you. Mona, I want to come to you next, to better understand what options Iran has at this point. We’re just five days in, but the situation has changed so rapidly. What options does Iran have to either retaliate or escalate? And, quite importantly, is there an off-ramp emerging?
Ms. Yacoubian: Dan laid down quite well the ways in which Israel has achieved different types of superiority. Dan’s also correct that Iran still has tools in its toolbox. Beyond international terrorism, which is something that could play out over months, if not years, Iran also has some asymmetric capabilities.
A number of Iran’s proxies have taken a huge hit over the past many, many months by Israel, certainly Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas. But the Houthis remain a capable proxy that has not shown any reticence to join the fight and could undertake attacks. There are Iranian backed militias in Iraq that retain lots of capability, especially should the United States get involved. We could see some of these Iraqi militias, Iranian-backed groups, going after U.S. targets in Iraq.
Iran could try some interesting ways to snarl maritime traffic to cause more problems, though not necessarily blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which would really be a desperate move by Iran. We’re not at that point. But we could easily see Iran use a variety of means to mess with maritime traffic and even perhaps go after naval targets and those kinds of things.
Mr. Todman: That would be a big shift in Iran’s regional strategy, where over the past few years, we’ve seen Iran trying to integrate into the region and restore ties with Arab Gulf states. Those measures that you just mentioned would really undermine that and cause pain to those Gulf Arab states.
Ms. Yacoubian: Without a doubt. Iran has made a real point of trying not to draw the Gulf in. It has not retaliated or done anything that would anger its warming, new Gulf Arab allies.
Mr. Todman: Mona, something you didn’t mention was anything to do with its nuclear program. I now want to bring in Doreen to help us better understand the options and the choices that Iran might have as it relates to the future of its nuclear program.
As Dan mentioned at the start, we have not yet seen the destruction of the Fordow plant, which is deep under a mountain, extremely well-fortified. What might Iran choose to do now with its nuclear program?
Dr. Horschig: This is a really good question. We have to be careful not to make predictions, because we’re still waiting for the damage assessment here to see really what the extent of the attacks have been with regards to the nuclear program.
I see three ways that Iran might go. The first is that it might be now more determined than ever to pursue nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, because the attacks might have shown Iran that it does need nuclear weapons to deter such strikes as we’ve seen. And as Dan already pointed out, they have the Fordow facility that really hasn’t seen any damage, as far as we know. If Iran wanted to sprint to a nuclear bomb, they could use that facility to fairly quickly get from 60 percent enrichment to the 90 percent that would be needed for a nuclear warhead. That could be a short-term option to get a nuclear weapon. In the long term, Iran will have to see what’s still left from the nuclear program and build on that.
Another option, which is a little less likely than the first one, is to look for that off-ramp that Mona was touching on, where I know we’ve seen mixed signals from the United States. But there was a White House statement yesterday, offering or asking Iran to reconsider negotiations. Iran might also be looking for that off-ramp to consider diplomacy if damage continues to rise. Israel would probably not support this. We know from history that Israel hasn’t been very supportive of diplomacy and negotiations. We might see continued counter-proliferation attacks on the Israeli side.
The third way, which is the least likely choice, is that Iran might determine that the nuclear program is not viable at all and forego all nuclear developments. That is just an option, but I see that as the least likely one.
Mr. Todman: Can you explain a bit more on why Iran has this nuclear program in its own telling, and the difference between the civilian energy program? As far as I know, until last week, the U.S. intelligence community continued to assess that Iran hadn’t yet made the decision to break out into the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Can you give a bit more background on that, please?
Dr. Horschig: The intelligence assessment was a little while ago, and things have already changed a bit since then. The IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, put out a statement last week saying that Iran has been in violation of its obligations and Iran itself has expressed interest in building a third nuclear enrichment site. We have seen those steps where there are clear signs that Iran is moving towards nuclear weapons, but it hasn’t yet obtained that nuclear weapon. Israel has seen or perceives Iran to be a bit closer to an actual nuclear weapon than the rest of the international community.
Mr. Todman: Dan, I want to shift to the role of the United States in all of this, because even over the last five days, or at least a little longer over the last week, the rhetoric has changed quite a lot coming out of the White House from various officials. I want to cite a poll that YouGov commissioned over the weekend that said that 60 percent of the U.S. public oppose U.S. involvement in this war, and 16 percent are in favor of it. But from the noise that seems to be coming out, it seems there is at least a possibility that the United States might become involved. How might U.S. involvement change the trajectory of this war?
Dr. Byman: Let me begin by giving some thoughts on the polling data. Polling on the use of force is very sensitive to the positions of leaders. If President Trump comes out strongly, either against intervention or for intervention, it’s going to affect those numbers, in a very large way. Over time, as the United States or another country becomes involved in a conflict, the polling data starts to be a bit more independent of leadership positions. The ability of leaders to set the agenda is very strong at first.
If the United States does intervene, it could have dramatic effects, but there are lots of question marks. One of the biggest, as Doreen said, is the Fordow facility. There’s an immediate question of what to do about one of Iran’s most important facilities, well-guarded, deep in a mountain, and the United States has the munitions to destroy this. This is something that is, in part, why these munitions were designed—to go after targets that are very deep and inaccessible. In terms of reducing Iran’s nuclear program significantly, a U.S. role could make a big difference.
The United States can also sustain operations over Iran much more effectively. Israel is very, very far from Iran. It’s a long distance for its planes to go back and forth. Israel doesn’t have local bases, but the United States has bases, and if it allows its allies access, Israel can do operations in a much more sustained way with far more forces over Iran with very good munitions. This can affect whatever targets are hit, Iran’s military, its broader security infrastructure, and of course, its military facilities.
There’s also, though, the question of Iranian retaliation. Now, I think, and welcome others’ opinion on this, that we don’t really know how Iran would respond. It is plausible to me that they recognize that they’re overmatched, and that fighting the United States, on top of Israel, with their limited capacity isn’t going to work. Maybe revenge is a dish best served cold, and they’ll just wait a year or two, but they’ll figure it out later.
It’s also quite plausible to me that, as Mona said, they’ll go to various proxies and say, hit whatever you can of the United States. That could be U.S. bases, U.S. tourists and businesspeople, it could involve international terrorism—it really could be an all-out effort. I don’t think Iran necessarily has decided one way or another on that, but we must think of possibilities.
And one thing I would stress, we also must think of possibilities that, from our point of view, seem illogical, because we don’t know what information the Iranian leadership is receiving. This is always difficult in peacetime, let alone during wartime, where you have a lot of information coming in, some of it conflicting. Add to that, Iran’s belief that the United States is behind a lot of Israeli actions, even if the United States often sees Israel as acting independently. Iran may believe the United States is going to go to war, even if the United States doesn’t go to war, and respond accordingly. There is a lot of potential for miscalculations that could really change things right now.
Mr. Todman: There are lots of points I want to pick up on, but does anyone else have thoughts about how Iran might retaliate?
Ms. Yacoubian: To Dan’s point, certainly we know that Iran has avoided any targeting of U.S. targets, before the United States is involved, precisely to try to avoid bringing the United States into the fight. I do think Tehran’s calculus would shift, should the United States get involved, and that there could be a feeling that Iran would retaliate, though probably not directly. Again, what we have seen in the past, the Iranian playbook, is the use of proxies, though currently they are vastly diminished. But I think Iran would almost feel compelled to have some sort of indirect response.
The other piece of this, which we have touched on but not really gotten into, is whether Iran is looking for an off-ramp. And if it is, then its calculus would be to not engage in retaliatory attacks, but to continue to push for—through Gulf mediators—some way toward negotiations, some way back to the negotiating table.
President Trump’s rhetoric is making that increasingly difficult. Earlier today, he called for “unconditional surrender,” which in the Iranian culture—or, frankly, in any culture—will be very, very difficult. Iran is looking for a path to back to the negotiating table, but they cannot do it unconditionally. They would look for a ceasefire, and then they would start to negotiate the nuclear questions and demonstrate more flexibility. They may hold back on any significant retaliation if they feel there is a path back to the negotiating table.
Mr. Todman: Doreen, what might concessions look like as it relates to Iran’s nuclear program?
Dr. Horschig: Of course, the one part we are always thinking of is enrichment capabilities. Under the original Iran nuclear deal, Iran wasn’t allowed to go beyond 3.67 percent for highly enriched uranium, but then it was using hedging steps that went to 20 percent and 60 percent. There have been reports that the IAEA found particles enriched to 83 percent. Enrichment is a big part where the international community wants to see a concession, because that is what they would need as the next step to that nuclear weapon.
Even though there are still other steps that are missing from really getting a deliverable nuclear warhead, there are few remaining steps there. We often hear the reference that Iran has enough enriched uranium to produce nine or ten nuclear warheads within a week or two. But we also have to take into account that it still needs to assemble that warhead and then put it on a deliverable vehicle.
Dr. Byman: To briefly add to that, one important question that bedeviled past negotiations was how to think about Iran’s other capabilities. We often think of a nuclear deal legitimately in nuclear terms. But there is also the question of Iran’s missile program. As Mona mentioned, Iran has all these proxy networks that are very important.
The decision under President Obama was to break off the nuclear issue and deal with that. The other stuff would be there and be a problem, but it was seen as less critical than the nuclear issue. Many in the Republican Party, including President Trump in the past, criticized exactly that, basically saying you can’t break off the nuclear issue—you have got to stop Iran’s bad behavior.
It is unclear to me whether a deal could be confined to just the nuclear issue. Maybe it can, but the broader criticisms of Iran are going to come up in any demands for a ceasefire that would be acceptable to the Israeli or perhaps the U.S. side.
Mr. Todman: I suppose, especially if the feeling is that Iran is at a historic weak point now, then perhaps the feeling is to push forward with talks. I do want to pick up on the U.S. role again, though. The way that I’m describing it is as a dichotomy of U.S. involvement or no U.S. involvement. Is that unhelpful? In reality, is it more likely a gradient of levels of U.S. involvement?
And perhaps I can bring in a question from one of our viewers at this point. From Jack Blackstone who says, “if Israel is given bunker buster bombs by the United States, could it deliver the ordinance and avoid needing U.S. B-2 bombers?”
Dr. Byman: Thinking of this as a spectrum is appropriate. But I’ll also note, there are a few breakpoints on that spectrum. Right now, the United States is currently assisting Israel with air defense, as Iranian missiles and drones are shooting at Israel. That’s a significant role. That’s not neutrality in any sense of this.
The United States has long provided significant military support and intelligence support to Israel. To be clear, I don’t know any specifics about how the United States has shaped targeting, but the intelligence relationship in broader terms is well known. The United States, of course, both provides arms and sells arms to Israel. From an Iranian point of view, and the point of view of many countries, the United States has already taken sides and is already part of this.
I do think though, there is a difference between the United States helping Israel on defense, helping Israel with weapons, and actively dropping bombs from U.S. aircraft. One might say that’s just part of the spectrum, which could be true analytically. But politically, there is a big difference. And President Trump can tell the American people right now, we are not at war. Should the United States start bombing, however, then the United States would be at war.
This question that the audience member asked is an important one, which is really about what Israel can do on its own, without US support. Right now, only the United States has these bunker busting munitions, and only the United States has the platforms that can deliver them. Now, having said that, Israel is a very innovative country militarily. There are quite possibly ways that could be designed where Israel could drop these through other means—it doesn’t have to do exactly what the United States is doing. But that broader question of capability still favors the United States. Thus, to go after Iran in a more wholesale way, is more effective if the United States is involved, even though it involves a lot more risk for the United States.
Ms. Yacoubian: If I can just jump in on that last point, on what the Israeli options are on Fordow, because we talked about the importance there. Like Dan said, Israel has been showing incredibly creativity and innovative options in its past counterproliferation efforts against Iran. And especially against Fordow, there are still other things it can do, which may not have the same effect as the U.S. bunker busters.
Israel could also target the electricity supply there. It can target the entrances to temporarily set back developments at Fordow, especially if there’s a risk that Iran might currently use the enrichment facility to enrich more uranium. Those are some temporary steps. There are ventilation systems that can be targeted. Or the Israelis might even insert some special forces inside the facility. There are some options that Israel has that we need to think of, and not just jump to that conclusion that it must have U.S. support to fully destroy the Fordow facility.
Mr. Todman: Absolutely, thank you. Now moving to the Gulf, the role of the Arab Gulf states has shifted a lot as it relates to their stance on U.S. efforts to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran. Of course, back when the JCPOA was being negotiated in 2015, Gulf states were furious to have not been included, and furious, as you raised, Dan, about these other issues not being included in those negotiations. They wanted to see the regional activities of Iran included in those negotiations.
Now, though, they have been playing a much more supportive role in the negotiations that, until last week, continued to take place. We were due to have the sixth round of direct talks last Sunday. Mona, what’s at stake for the Arab Gulf states? Can you explain a bit why this calculation has changed for them and why they were initially supportive of diplomacy? How are they thinking about it now?
Ms. Yacoubian: We’ve seen a dramatic, I would say almost a 180 degree, shift in the Gulf’s views of Iran and U.S. negotiations. You rightly point out, Will, that during the JCPOA, they were quite angry at having been left out of it. We could go back further and look at 2010, when you had the Gulf basically calling on the United States to cut the head of the snake, demanding military action to address Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
We’ve seen a significant shift that in part dates to the Iranian-backed attack on Abqaiq—a major Saudi oil facility—in 2019. At that time, the attack took out 50 percent of the capacity of that oil production facility. What was notable to the Gulf was that the United States didn’t respond. That non-response from the United States is what started this shift, and a decision strategically by the Gulf, that they really need to think about how to integrate Iran. This is what led to the rapprochement, of course, between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Those relations have only deepened and warmed since 2023. So much so that if we look at what’s happened over the past five days, the Gulf countries have really been vocal in their condemnation of Israel. What’s at stake here for them is a vision for the Middle East that they believe requires a de-escalation of tensions and a reduction of conflict.
The economic diversification plans in Saudi Arabia—Vision 2030—for example, is deeply contingent on there being stability in the region, and the Saudis’ ability to diversify its economy. New wars, new confrontations breaking out in no way, shape or form, works for the Gulf. And that’s why we’re seeing them, at least for now, continue to stand by their position that Iran needs to be integrated into the region.
Mr. Todman: This ties into a question from Hossein Hawaidi from MENACS, who said, “in light of recent developments, how are the GCC states currently positioning themselves with respect to the regional crisis? Are they leaning more into de-escalation efforts, even as the GCC continues to express deep concerns about Iran’s nuclear program?” How do you see that balance, the concern for the nuclear program versus the de-escalation, particularly at this moment now?
Ms. Yacoubian: We’re seeing them really work very, very hard behind the scenes, particularly Oman, which, of course, has played an important mediating role between the United States and Iran, as well as other traditional mediators like Qatar. We’re seeing them step up efforts to really try to de-escalate, get the parties back to the negotiating table.
Something we have to recall is that Iran is right in the backyard of the Gulf. Speaking to a colleague just earlier today, he was reminding me that it’s only a four-hour boat ride from Iran to his country. For the Gulf, it’s not only their vision for the region that demands stability and de-escalation. Now they must worry about spillover from instability and conflict in Iran, refugee flows, incitement of Shi`a populations in places like Bahrain, that has an 80 percent Shi`a population. They’re actually very worried about where all this is going, and that the region could embark on an uncontrolled cycle of escalation.
Mr. Todman: Iran is a country of 90 million people, many of whom are already fleeing their homes. The scale of potential displacement is just one of those potential implications that could be really quite severe. Doreen, do you have something to add?
Dr. Horschig: We talked a bit about the Gulf states, but can I just expand the scope here and ask a question about what the Russian reaction has been and whether we’re expecting more involvement there? Of course, Will and Dan, feel free to chime in as well.
Ms. Yacoubian: Well, we’ve seen Putin offer himself as a potential mediator in all of this. Russia is pragmatic and always looking for ways in which it can seek advantage. My own guess is, and I’m not an expert on Russia, that from the Russian perspective, if the United States should decide to engage militarily with Israel and engage in active operations against Iran, they may see that this could entangle the United States militarily in the region, which they would see as an advantage and a distraction. They’re biding their time, watching to see how things evolve, and they’re going to seek advantage wherever they can.
We also have to bear in mind, and I’d be curious as to Dan’s views on this, the growing relationship of military cooperation between Russia and Iran. Would Russia choose to provide more advanced weaponry to Iran? That would be rather provocative. I don’t know. I’m curious, Dan, what do you think about that?
Dr. Byman: As many people know, Iranian systems have become quite prevalent in the Russia-Ukraine war, and especially Iranian drone systems. There are close relations. In many different capacities, Russia has become more of a chaos agent. We’ve seen this in North Korea and we’ve seen this—Doreen knows much more than I do—in nuclear negotiations, where it’s less of a positive agenda of trying to shape the world and more just trying to throw a spanner in the works for U.S. and European goals on how things should work.
To me, it is at least plausible that when the dust settles a bit, Russia might start providing more weapons and more advanced weapons. Now, to be clear, Russia needs these weapons right now. It is fighting a bitter war with Ukraine, and it’s not as if it has massive amounts of spare capacity. Having said that, it has really built up its defense industrial base in the last several years with some Chinese assistance, and that will continue should the Russia-Ukraine war end tomorrow. If we think a bit longer term, there is an opening here for Russia, as well as what I suspect would be very strong Iranian demand for more advanced systems.
Ms. Yacoubian: Can I pick up on one thing, this idea of Russia as a chaos agent? I think that is exactly right, and it is seeking to exploit instability wherever it can. It is notable that when the JCPOA was being negotiated, Russia played a critical role alongside the United States to ensure that Iran would come to the table, to add to maximum pressure, etcetera. We’re not seeing that now. And it really does raise the question—Doreen, I don’t know what your thinking is on this—as to where the Russians are in terms of Iran gaining a nuclear capability? Clearly, before they were opposed. Have they shifted their position on this?
Dr. Horschig: Russia really has not met the expectations from the non-proliferation community there, especially having supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is really the bedrock of non-proliferation. There was much more expectation that Russia would step up here and help in preventing that Iranian nuclear program from advancing, but it just hasn’t. And in the worst case, it had, in some ways, even supported Iran in advancing.
Mr. Todman: I want to explore how some of this might play out in the days and weeks ahead, which is always a fraught exercise. Dan, I’m going to ask you, if you might humor me, could you talk through some of the scenarios that you see as being most likely for where this conflict might go over the coming days, weeks, even months?
Dr. Byman: Let me give you three. The first, which we’ve been talking about, is the U.S. intervention scenario. All of a sudden, you would have a much more decisive shift in the military balance against Iran, and far more munitions being dropped, at the very least on Iranian nuclear facilities, but probably also on Iran’s broader military infrastructure. That could be naval bases or missile production sites. And with that, there’s a significant pressure on Iran to come to the negotiating table, but with a deal that is dramatically more restrictive than the JCPOA, perhaps including what’s been talked about in the last few months with Iran, where it’s really an end to Iranian enrichment of all sorts, and perhaps restrictions on missiles and other things. There are a lot of permutations. My sense is if the United States intervenes, the price of peace for Iran is going to go up fairly dramatically.
The other scenario is almost the exact opposite, where the United States does intervene, but pushes Israel and Iran to come to the table. Here you have something like a negotiated settlement with, at the very least, a ceasefire, and the hope of some broader negotiation over the nuclear program. The nuclear program would be diminished, at least somewhat, by the damage done by the Israeli military campaign. But here you get to Doreen’s earlier point, which is that sure, the program is diminished, but now it’s all hands on deck to push this nuclear program forward. A lot of emphasis would have to be on verification and other restrictions.
The third is that this war doesn’t really end. It’s a bit of a strange war because it’s being conducted 1000 miles away. It’s not as if there are two armies clashing on a border, and one is going to win. Instead, there are strikes back and forth. You could see certainly a diminishment in pace of Israeli attacks. But on a regular basis, Israel does some bombing in Iran and takes out efforts to renew air defenses and goes after leadership targets. There’s sabotage, there’s assassination.
Iran, meanwhile, is trying to hit Israeli targets in Israel itself if it can, but also around the world. In the past, Iran has gone after Jewish targets claiming they are identical to Israeli targets. You could see, not exactly a forever war, but a forever skirmish, where there’s back and forth. There’s not quite normalcy, but at the same time, it’s hardly all-out war. I’m sure there are other permutations that others may want to add.
Ms. Yacoubian: If I could jump in on that, and you have laid the scenarios down well. For me, the second scenario might be the United States not intervening militarily but actually taking a more active position to negotiate and de-escalate this conflict and bring Iran to task, perhaps negotiating a more effective, more stringent deal. To my mind, that holds the promise of my initial thought, which is that the Gulf is looking for more stability in the region. It holds the promise of perhaps de-escalating tensions, etcetera.
With the third and the first scenarios, it raises a much bigger issue that there are no rules anymore governing the Middle East. These various military interventions give the sense that all red lines have essentially been transgressed. Again, speaking to those from the region, they raise worries about whatever happened to the international rules-based order? And how does that apply here or not? It raises a much bigger, scarier question about, not just what kind of Middle East that is, but what are the implications beyond the Middle East globally, to have a region that’s just utterly off the rails and ungoverned by any rules.
The last point I’ll make is those kinds of chaotic scenarios, scenarios one and three, also do have implications here at home, in terms of prices at the gas pump, and just broader supply chain instability questions. We’ve seen that already with the Houthis and their interventions in the Red Sea, adding to shipping times and prices and so forth. Both of those are really, really frightening scenarios not just in terms of the region, but with real implications and reverberations globally.
Mr. Todman: Perhaps to continue the theme of frightening implications for the world, Doreen, I wonder if you could share what you think some of the implications of this war are for non-proliferation or proliferation, elsewhere in the region, but also more broadly around the world?
Dr. Horschig: It is a crucial question, especially as we see the nuclear order already crumbling quite a bit. Iran is not the only issue that the nuclear community faces. But let me just touch on three points, the NPT, the IAEA, and what it means for actors that might be interested in proliferation.
The first one, the NPT, we’ve heard that Iran is considering introducing a bill or is drafting a bill to withdraw from the NPT. That would have huge implications for the non-proliferation community. That’s something they would have to wrestle with. It would, of course, in some ways, hurt that regime. But we also have to be careful to say that all non-proliferation efforts will then go down the drain. There are other past examples like North Korea, where the NPT in some ways survived that, and there are still 190 countries that are part of the NPT that all agree that non-proliferation is the way forward and that don’t want additional actors proliferating.
The second one, the IAEA, here we’ll see that the IAEA will be weakened and probably have less access to Iran’s production and stocks. Already, after the Iranian nuclear deal broke down, the IAEA lost its ability to surveil the country. We’ll probably see that continue to break down.
The third one is to look at what message is sent by the Israeli strikes to other states that might be interested in proliferation. One of the arguments here is that others may think that taking that step is too risky and too costly. But we must be careful to make that assessment because Israel, as a counter proliferation actor, is very unique. We haven’t seen that type of aggressive preventative action from any other country. We hadn’t seen that when India and Pakistan proliferated. Whether that sends a message to other states proliferating is something we need to be careful about.
Mr. Todman: Just to make sure I’ve understood, are you saying that other states might take the lesson that if Iran had nuclear weapons capabilities, they would not have suffered from this attack, and therefore it might encourage others to pursue nuclear capabilities?
Dr. Horschig: That’s a lesson that some would take away, just how that was maybe an implication of Ukraine. If Ukraine would have had nuclear weapons, would Russia have attacked? That’s something that’s really hard to assess and really hard to measure because it’s so hypothetical.
Dr. Byman: This is fascinating. Would Israel’s campaign allow other states to justify their operations in the name of counter proliferation? For example, Russia saying: Poland, you’re thinking of getting a nuclear weapon. That’s unacceptable. We’re going in. Same for China with South Korea. You would know the examples better than I, but can that be a rationale?
Dr. Horschig: In some ways, it would almost legitimize Israeli actions and aggressive counter proliferation actions. A lot of these types of attacks are violating international law and are oftentimes ignored or just a slap on the wrist, like with verbal condemnation and saying, oh, you can’t do that. But in the end, we are also seeing that there’s a part of the international community that supports this type of action. Most importantly, that type of action to go and use counter proliferation actions delegitimizes the IAEA, international law, and treaties and agreements that countries came to in a formal manner.
Mr. Todman: In a piece you put out recently, you drew some comparisons between Israel’s past counter proliferation operations in both Syria and in Iraq, which led in quite different directions. Can you talk a bit more about that?
Dr. Horschig: Two very different scenarios. Of course, in Iraq and Syria, the attacks were singular activities on one location. Israel used surgical strikes there before the programs were as advanced as Iran’s program. And now we’re seeing a full-out campaign of assassinations of the Iranian scientists, the airstrikes taking out the Natanz facility, but also targeting of some other facilities that provide equipment for the nuclear program. This campaign has been very different than it was in Iraq and Syria.
Mr. Todman: Dan, one of the scenarios that you did not lay out is regime collapse. We’ve had a lot of interest from the audience in exploring that in some more detail. Noting that you did not lay that out as one of the most likely scenarios, a question from Susanna, who identified herself as an analyst said, “what are the signposts to watch for that the current conflict could lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime?”
Dr. Byman: Let me give a short-term and long-term perspective. We can imagine, or at least, I can imagine two primary paths to regime change in Iran. One is popular unrest that leads the regime to collapse. That, in some ways, is a variant of the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself. The other is a military coup.
A military coup is harder right now, because the military is having trouble talking to itself. A coup demands quick coordinated actions where forces move decisively. Israel is disrupting communications in Iran and is targeting military leaders. It’s harder to actually pull off a coup. The Iranian regime carefully controls the leadership of the armed forces. In fact, they’re so integrated, it’s actually hard to sort out because so many of the people in the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps have political leadership positions as well. Because of that, I think a coup is unlikely in the short term.
Popular unrest is also unlikely to happen. People are fleeing Tehran. It’s not a great time to go march in a big square. People are looking to their families. In general, it’s very hard for outsiders to inspire popular unrest. Very few people are excited about a foreigner telling them to rise up against their own government. And when that foreigner is Israel or the United States, it’s less likely given kind of the broader associations in many countries with them. I think the short-term scenarios are unlikely.
A signpost I’d look for in military operations, though, would be the targeting of the regime’s internal security forces. In Iran, this is the Basij forces, and they have several dedicated units focused on internal security. To my knowledge, and to be clear, there’s quite a bit I don’t know, Israel has not targeted those units or their leadership. Taking out the ability to quash unrest would be something I’d watch for.
Of course, it’s very hard to detect a coup from the outside. For popular unrest, however, you would look for the size of the crowds and how quickly it spreads from city to city. Is it simply in Tehran, or is it spreading to other cities? I will ask others to join in on this, but I will note that the long term is a little different. Here there’s a question mark. For those who study the Middle East past, there was a fairly long tradition of military defeat or humiliation followed by a coup. The legitimacy of many of these regimes is predicated on the defense of the country.
In Iran’s case, its legitimacy is very much predicated on standing up to Israel and standing up to the United States. To fail, not just in a general sense, but in a rather humiliating sense—where Israel does these dramatic intelligence operations that show penetration of the Iranian system—that embarrassment is the sort of thing that discredits existing leaders. It may well lead some leaders in the military or elsewhere to say, the problem is the current leadership, and we need to change things. But I don’t think that’s going to happen soon. There would be a lot of factors involved in that long term calculation, not just current military operations.
Ms. Yacoubian: Those scenarios you laid down, Dan, sound right. For me, the bigger question is broader instability. There has been discussion by President Trump, for example, that the United States knows where the Supreme Leader is hiding but will not target him yet. It raises these bigger questions of the promotion of widespread instability and power vacuums, not necessarily with organized protests precipitating regime change, but an amalgam of all kinds of chaotic developments that really, we don’t know where they might go. I think that’s almost a bigger concern, maybe in the medium term. One question back is, what if the Supreme Leader is taken out and assassinated? What does that look like from your vantage point?
Dr. Byman: If he’s taken out, in the short term, they have a succession plan, or at least a succession process. The system can function without him and will function without him. Though, it would be something that would be enraging from an Iranian regime point of view.
The caveat to all this is, looking at the Hezbollah operation in September and October of last year, where of course, Hassan Nasrallah—this incredibly important charismatic figure, very much at the center of Hezbollah’s identity—is killed by Israel and there’s outrage in Hezbollah. But then Israel killed leader after leader, commander after commander, taking out capability after capability. Right now, Hezbollah is saying very clearly, we want to stay out of this.
One Israeli argument might be, sure, there’ll be a short-term spike in anger. But the way these campaigns succeed is when you go after leadership more broadly, not individual leaders. And if they can make it clear, we can target you anytime, anywhere, then despite their own desires, Iran may be forced to come to the table.
Dr. Horschig: To add my two cents on this, the uncertainty we’ve been talking about is exactly why the international community doesn’t want Iran to have nuclear weapons. It justifies this for these reasons, because we don’t know if nuclear weapons would then fall into the wrong hands because of the risk of regime change and instability in the country.
Mr. Todman: Someone who identified himself as David, asked this question on YouTube: “Could the following strategic considerations, cutting off China from a source of cheap oil, depriving Russia of affordable Iranian drones and key imports, halting Iran’s nuclear program and possibly achieving regime change, combined with domestic political pressures, be enough to convince President Trump to pursue a land invasion of Iran?” I think that’s probably quite extreme. But I wonder, could it convince him to increase the U.S. involvement in this conflict?
Ms. Yacoubian: If I could jump in on that question. If we go back even just a couple weeks, we should recall that President Trump was really staking his policies and positioning in the Middle East on avoiding any more forever wars. And he was really eschewing military intervention. In speeches he gave during his trip to the Gulf, he criticized earlier efforts by the United States at nation building and so forth very specifically. I think coming in with ground forces is highly, highly, highly unlikely.
If the United States does get involved, it’ll be in an air war. But I do think President Trump does have to weigh whatever decision he takes on intervening militarily against what he campaigned on, and against, frankly, how his base seems to feel about military intervention. People are not interested in the United States once again finding itself enmeshed and entangled in a long-term military intervention. That’s why no matter how compelling some of those reasons might be, and we could push back on how realistic they are, there is still this domestic political question that is still quite significant for the president in terms of how these decisions might be taken.
Mr. Todman: This leads to another question from a colleague of ours at CSIS, Natalia, who says, “what would an increased U.S. intervention in the Israel-Iran conflict signal about U.S. broader strategic priorities, and foreign policy relations with key Middle Eastern powers? Would this be the 180 that we’ve been discussing that the Gulf States took? Would this be a 180 for President Trump’s policy in the region?”
Ms. Yacoubian: It would be an upending of where things were a month ago, when the president signed, on paper anyway, $2 trillion of deals with major investments with the Qataris, the Emiratis, and the Saudis, all in the name of a seemingly new approach. There was no Trump doctrine, but a new approach that really prioritized economic engagements—big deals—that would bring investment into the United States.
All that goes up in smoke, in a sense, if the United States gets involved militarily and finds itself, once again, on a war footing in the Middle East. This is something that would, in no way, shape, or form, be favored by Gulf Arab states.
Dr. Horschig: This would also hurt all options for any nuclear talks. What we’ve seen on Truth Social earlier today, but also yesterday, is a way the president might put pressure on Iran to come to the negotiating table. I’m not sure that he has changed his views on getting entangled in another conflict in the Middle East.
Dr. Byman: It’s very hard, of course, to predict President Trump. The rhetoric in the last 24 hours has changed a lot. And one small factoid, if you will, is that the president was very critical of Tucker Carlson, who has long been extremely opposed to the United States going to war in Iran. That’s part of his constituency.
There are possibilities in terms of what might happen. But as Mona said, this would be a huge change. I’ll add and foot-stomp two points. One is, there was supposed to be a greater U.S. emphasis on China and less on the Middle East. People who are a little older who are watching this may smile because they’ll say, I remember when President Obama said that. And I remember when they tried to do that, and Trump won, and President Biden was trying to do that too. The Middle East does tend to suck the United States back in despite the wishes of U.S. strategists.
The second point is, as Mona said, when Iran attacked Saudi Arabia in the past, the United States really did nothing. Yes, President Trump has at times been involved in the Middle East, but it’s not the high profile sustained engagement that past administrations had done and that President Biden’s administration had done. This would be a real shift and is something that would make the Middle East much more front and center. It’s not a one off, it’s not a deal. It would put the United States back in the Middle East in a way I’m not sure the administration, at least a month ago, wanted to do.
Mr. Todman: I want to give you each a moment to provide any final thoughts you have. But Mona, firstly, I do want to ask you a question that has come from Ibad Rahman, who said, “has this conflict fundamentally shifted the balance of deterrence in the Middle East or set the stage for a new cycle of escalation and instability?”
Ms. Yacoubian: We talked a little bit about whether Israel has achieved escalation dominance, which is part of this equation. The issue really is more about the fact that the rules of the game have been upended. That’s what is most dangerous. It begs the question of how to restore deterrence. And it begs the question of how the region finds its way back to a situation in which there are clear guardrails, there are clear rules of the game, there are clear principles that all parties are respecting. In the absence of that, I fear that we really are really heading into, unfortunately, a very, very chaotic and very dangerous Middle East.
Mr. Todman: Doreen, any final thoughts?
Dr. Horschig: What we’re watching for the most is what actions Israel will take with Fordow, or what it can take, whether it will be as creative as we’ve been discussing, but also what it will do with some of the other facilities. Another important site is the Isfahan facility, where—until recently—it was suspected that there was the enriched stockpile from the Iranian nuclear program. We’re not sure if that has been moved. This is another important site for the nuclear program. We’re watching what Israel will do since they have been saying that this is an unfinished campaign and that it will continue to go on. The other part, of course, is the U.S. involvement there. Will the push for negotiations and diplomacy continue? Or will we really see that shift in strategy?
Mr. Todman: Thank you. Dan?
Dr. Byman: I’ll give my final thoughts about the sustainability from the Israeli side. Israel’s military was not designed to fight long wars. It’s very much a reserve force, and it is a small country. It’s been at war in Gaza, and in Lebanon, for almost two years now. That has put tremendous strain on parts of the Israeli population. Now you have this additional war involving different assets. It’s not like there are tens of thousands of ground forces involved. But when you have large numbers of civilians regularly going to shelters, there are estimates that the cost of the war is about $300 million a day. Israel’s economy will find it hard to sustain this burden indefinitely.
You have a country that’s at war on multiple fronts for long periods of time. The population, after October 7, is willing to bear pretty heavy burdens. It’s not as if there are mass protests about the need to go to war. But it is something that is draining and causing strain within Israel. To me, there are questions about how sustainable Israel’s policies are in the long term, given the way the society is set up.
Mr. Todman: Mona, anything final to add?
Ms. Yacoubian: No, I think my colleagues have touched on all the key points.
Mr. Todman: You have given us some ideas of things to watch out for in the days and weeks ahead. Whether Israel starts targeting internal security forces in Iran, and not just targeting Fordow, but also Isfahan, the regional ripple effects and how that might change the calculations of some of the Arab Gulf states. You’ve also given some nuance to some of these ideas that are being thrown around. It may not be as clear as the United States entering or not entering this conflict, it’s more of a gradient.
Also, to think through the strain on the Israeli forces, thinking through the fact that we don’t really know very much about what information Iranian leadership has access to and how that might shape their thinking. Mona, a really important piece that you raised, is just to zoom out and realize that these strikes have upended the rules of the game in the region, which could have implications far, far beyond it. There is a huge amount more to discuss.
I hope that you will join me again, to think more about this, and better understand everything that’s playing out. I just want to say a few thanks. Thank you to Alex, Eric, Dinesh, and the streaming and broadcasting team. Also, thanks to Ninar and Briana in the Middle East program, who pulled this all together at really short notice. Of course, thank you so much to the panelists for joining me today. And thank you to the audience for watching online.
To follow the latest analysis, please go to the CSIS website, and you will see a plethora of pieces from our experts across the building.
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