For decades, Western experts have viewed Russia as a declining power citing a lack of population growth, technology innovation, and a falling GDP for its decline. While it is unlikely to return to its former status, Russia is gaining higher favorability among China, India, and various states across the Global South, establishing alternative multilateral institutions and leaving the West behind. Increased trade with China has nearly met former economic ties with Europe, illustrating a shift in priorities for Putin. The Russian people—trending older—however, would like to see strengthened ties with the United States or other Global South countries. Failure to adjust to the demands of an aging population, while prioritizing commodities and the War in Ukraine could constrain Russian power domestically and globally.
Significant investment in the Global South and Central Asia, climate change, and a Northern Sea Route in the Arctic, could shift the narrative for Russia moving forward, revitalizing its power and influence. This report examines three potential scenarios for Russia over the next ten years: a “Sovietized” Russia, set on boosting defense spending; a Great Patriotic War against the West, with Russia increasing its reliance on China; and a Reborn Russia, taking advantage of its geographical ties and influence on the Global South.
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Scope Note: The following study is the culmination of a two-year study of Russia’s Futures over the next decade that was supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In undertaking the study, we participated in numerous workshops around the world with several hundreds of Russians who traveled from Russia as well as other experts on Russia from Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. In cooperation with the University of Denver’s Pardee Institute for International Futures,1Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. “Pardee Institute.” Last modified 2025. Accessed May 21, 2025. https://korbel.du.edu/pardee/. the study encompassed a quantitative modeling project, that examined three broad futures for Russia and their economic, social and geopolitical implications. We want to thank Collin Meisel, who is the acting Director of Analysis at the Pardee Institute, for conducting the modeling and drafting the study’s military chapter. Collin Meisel is also a non-resident fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Strategic Foresight Hub. We are also deeply grateful to Ms. Nvard Chalikyan, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center for an unpublished paper on the South Caucasus, which was used extensively in the chapter on the Caucasus and Central Asia. A special thanks to the Henry L. Stimson Center, its director Brian Finlay, head of the Strategic Foresight Hub, Julian Mueller-Kaler and the entire Communications Team headed by Ms. Justine Sullivan for their generous help. Finally, no study would be complete with the expert editing of Ms. Elizabeth Arens.
By Mathew Burrows, Counselor in the Executive Office and Program Lead of the Strategic Foresight Hub
Executive Summary
Since the end of the Cold War, the consensus among a wide range of experts in the United States and abroad has been that Russia is a declining power. Key elements of power—such as declining population, falling gross domestic product (GDP) compared with that of major powers, and lack of technological innovation—confirm this assessment. Nevertheless, for a declining power, Russia has played an outsized role on the global stage for the last decade, in part by working against Western interests. One Russian commentator has claimed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 “can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s [the West’s] demise.” Russia adapted faster to the end of the unipolar moment than the United States: Moscow understood better than Washington how the international order was evolving toward multipolarity, which suits Russia’s long-term interests. With little likelihood of regaining its former superpower status, Russia has repositioned itself as a revisionist power, bolstered by the support of rising powers, such as China and India, which also yearn for a post-Western-dominated world order.
The Ukraine War, although isolating Russia from the West, has increased Moscow’s influence in the Global South. Despite Russia’s flagrant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, Moscow has not been isolated or punished by China, India, or the growing number of middle powers that might have seen Russia’s special military operation as a return to colonialism. Instead, while disliking, and in some cases condemning, Russia’s invasion, many rising states—not just China—have shielded Russia against the West’s punitive economic sanctions. For many Russian observers, their country has become a pivotal actor, able to effect change in the global system despite its declining power. Although Russia is dependent on China and other states, many Russian analysts believe that Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere have accelerated the emergence of a more favorable global order.
Using Moscow’s strong ties with Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin has pushed to establish alternative multilateral institutions, such as the Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa (BRICS) group. Such institutions are expanding rapidly, even among countries well-disposed to the United States, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Putin has brokered a reconciliation, albeit fragile, between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping and has begun to forge a Eurasia bloc spanning two continents. The dexterity of Russian diplomacy at such a critical moment is astonishing, even as the West decries Moscow’s motives as nefarious. In many ways, Russia has filled a vacuum created by the disinterest of the United States and other Western countries in reaching out to the Global South. Polling2Laura Silver et al., “Favorable views of the U.S. and China”. Pew Research Center, November 6, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/11/06/comparing-views-of-the-us-and-china-in-24-countries/#:~:text=Favorable%20views%20of%20the%20U.S.%20and%20China&text=views%20of%20China-,Note:%20Countries%20are%20plotted%20by%20the%20difference%20in%20evaluations%20of,Q3a%20&%20b.&text=On%20balance%2C%20views%20of%20the,the%20U.S.%20and%20China%20favorably. shows global publics generally like America much more than Russia or China, but perhaps due to the West’s fears of losing its privileged position, it has taken too long to understand the aspirations of many middle powers to play a greater role in rulemaking in the global system. Even though Russia and China have each permanent vetoes on the UN Security Council, both countries portray themselves as outsiders, embracing the idea of multipolarity as the logical structure for a heterogeneous world in which power is diffused.
Looking forward, Russia faces critical challenges that could either cause it to decline precipitously or bolster its position depending on how and whether it can overcome those problems. This study is divided into three parts: (1) Constraints that will limit any growth in Russian power; (2) Sources of Resilience that could help Russia surpass some of its limits; and (3) Potential Scenarios for Russia during the next decade. The University of Denver’s Pardee Institute undertook a quantitative modeling effort to synthesize and develop the three scenarios, which depict wide variance among the outcomes.
Constraints
Russia’s biggest problem is too few people. According to Andrey Kortunov3Andrey Kortunov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Balance Sheet and the Road Ahead,” Russian Council, February 7, 2025, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-s-foreign-policy-balance-sheet-and-the-road-ahead/., a top analyst in the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia’s counterparts on the world stage, whether the United States, China, India, or even the European Union (EU) all have over 300 million people. By 2050, even with the likely addition of several million Russian speakers from Ukraine, Russia’s population is forecast to be around 150 million in the best case and 20 million less in the worst case, according to Russian estimates4Interfax. “Russia’s population could fall below 138.8 million by 2045 from 146.4 mln in early 2023 – Rosstat.” Published October 20, 2023. Accessed May 24, 2025. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/95698/., with people older than 65 constituting a quarter of that number in either case.
Russia’s relative lack of people and its rapidly aging population lowers its economic potential over the long run. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) April 2024 World Economic Outlook’s forecast for Russia—1.7% per year—is more bullish for the next five years than actual Russian economic growth during the past ten years: 1.3% from 2019 to 2023 and 0.7% from 2014 to 2018. Compared with other BRICS countries and the United States, Russia’s average annual growth has been and is projected to be below that of its geopolitical peers in the Global South (excluding South Africa) and its main geopolitical rivals in the West.
With fewer workers in their prime years, Moscow is having difficulty funding social welfare systems. Russia (along with China and other countries) already suffers from a relatively weak social safety net: Competing priorities, such as defense expenditures, will make it harder to build and bolster social welfare programs at a time of increased aging, when the demands for health care will continue to grow substantially. As demand for health services grows, the chance of a populist backlash will increase because of the government’s inability to take care of its citizens.
Energy Dependency
Compounding the population shortfall is Russia’s overreliance on commodities—particularly oil and gas exports—even though sales of energy commodities have helped Russia overcome the onslaught of Western sanctions, financial bans, and other restrictions that would have been more punishing for a manufacturing-based economy dependent on external trade. Neighboring China, along with India, is relatively bereft of much-needed energy, making both countries perfect partners for helping Russia surmount its economic difficulties.
Russia’s overall trade with China has almost replaced its former deep economic ties with Europe, so much so that Russia’s trans-Siberian rail networks and Pacific ports are clogged, in contrast to the formerly busy Baltic ones that are now idle. Russian oil exports to China have overtaken those of Saudi Arabia in 2023. After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in March 2014, which prompted Western sanctions, Russia turned to China for help in building a new gas pipeline. Owing to sanctions imposed following the beginning of the second Ukraine War5In the Soviet-Ukrainian War (1917-1921), the Bolshevik Red Army invaded and occupied the Ukrainian People’s Republic, a partially recognized state that had emerged from its own civil war. In this report, the authors refer to Russia’s February 2014 invasion of Ukraine, when Russia occupied and annexed Crimea, as the first Ukraine War. Russian gas exports to Europe declined substantially, but so far China has not agreed to a second Siberian gas pipeline to absorb Russia’s excess gas production. Without such an outlet, Russia will suffer a loss of needed revenue.
But resources are not just a blessing: Academic research6Jeffrey Frankel, “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions” (CID Working Paper No. 233, Harvard University, 2012), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/233.pdf. has shown that “countries with oil, mineral or other natural resource wealth, on average, have failed to show better economic performance than those without.” Indeed, overreliance on commodities has been dubbed a “resource curse”: In addition to subverting optimal growth, dependence on commodities has bolstered authoritarian governance in Russia and other resource-dependent countries. In Russia’s case, the energy sector provides the state with much of its revenues. Without those resources, Putin’s rule would be far less stable.
Authoritarian Rule
Crumbling autocratic regimes usually spawn authoritarian successors7Kathryn Stoner, “Is Putin Vulnerable? One autocracy in Russia may lead to another,” The Washington Post, September 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/27/putin-ukraine-regime-survival-autocracy/., not a turn toward liberal democracy. This has been the case following the death or overthrow of other dictators, such as Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, who died in February 2020: Today Egypt is under military rule. And former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who died in March 2014, was replaced by Nicolas Maduro, who heads an authoritarian government.8Even the Arab Spring “success story” of Tunisia, rated as “free” by Freedom House just five years ago, had backslid into a mixed semi-authoritarian regime as of 2024. In the near future, with Russia having the upper hand in its war against Ukraine, along with a continuing stream of energy revenues, only death or a debilitating disease could trigger Putin’s ouster. Over time, if the war drags on and Russian casualties remain high, Putin could face pressure from elites to step down, but he would most likely still cling to power. Like the tsars who prided themselves in increasing Russia’s territory, recapturing Ukraine (or at least parts of it) and undermining its chances to become a NATO member would solidify Putin’s legacy.
Only over time, as economic challenges accumulate—including a possible failure to find sufficient energy outlets—could a more moderate or technocratic leader come to power in Russia who might agree to a possible deal with the West. State failure or a breakup of Russia is unlikely, and, if it were to happen, could make the country even more dangerous than it is today. Nonetheless, because of Russia’s growing dependence on China, a change in leadership or direction in Beijing could threaten Russia’s stability, making it more open to improving ties with the West. Many Russians see a danger in too much reliance on China and are hoping that Russia can strengthen ties with the United States, led by President Donald Trump, or with Global South countries, which they view as more reliable.
Over the long term, Russia has experienced periods of reform9Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Caught Between Reform and Revanche: Russia’s Struggle to Modernize,” Andrei Kolesnikov, 2016. https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Article_Kolesnikov2016_Eng.pdf., even under conservative leaders, many times as a result of failure at home or abroad, as occurred after Russia’s disastrous Crimean War in the 19th century, which ushered in the end of serfdom under Tsar Alexander II. Over time, a more technocratic leader could emerge who would believe that Russia requires major economic and even some political reforms that could better orient the Russian economy to deal with, for example, the growing weight of renewable energy sources in the global energy mix.10Renewable energy is energy made from renewable natural sources that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed. In contrast, fossil fuels — coal, oil, and gas — are nonrenewable resources that take hundreds of millions of years to form. In previous times, Russia had a storied scientific reputation, but it will need to stop the exit of talented younger scientists and technologists in order to rebuild its base. A technocratic reformer might still be authoritarian but would most likely have to moderate Putin’s highly repressive policies to lure back needed experts and rebuild a technically savvy elite.
Ukraine
How the war ends, especially whether there is an amicable cease-fire and movement toward a stable peace between the two belligerents, Russia and Ukraine, could be a big plus or minus for Russia’s future. A positive outcome or stable peace could open the door to more economic opportunities, with an end or reduction in Western sanctions and the return of Russia’s highly skilled tech experts. Currently (as of April 2025) there is a danger that Trump will impose a peace plan on Ukraine without any commitment to its security. Such a move could risk renewed fighting by either Russia or Ukraine after the end of Trump’s term. Moreover, the Europeans might not accept a Trump peace deal that concedes more to Russia while ignoring Ukraine’s security, splitting what has been a united Western front against Russian aggression.
A Trump successor from the Democratic Party might decide to rearm Ukraine, threatening the peace, in Moscow’s eyes. A Europe that wants Russia to pay for its aggression and has started to build its own independent defense forces could also decide to militarize the now longer border with Russia, eliciting the need from Moscow’s perspective of a counterreaction — ending any peace dividend Russia may have gotten from a Trump peace deal with a weak Ukraine. A new cold war would be costly to both sides. Should Trump draw in the Europeans and provide security assurances to Ukraine, the chances for a more permanent peace would increase. The third section of this paper posits a scenario in which Russian defense expenditures remain high, shortchanging education, social welfare, and research and development (R&D).
Sources of Resilience and Expansion
Despite its challenges, Russia has the potential to increase its power and influence. In addition to Russia’s friendship with China—which proved instrumental for Russia’s fending off the West’s economic and financial pressure—Russia has engaged in a frenzy of diplomatic initiatives exploiting pro-Russia feelings in the Global South. India11Pew Research Center, “Views of India Lean Positive Across 23 Countries,” Christine Huang, Moira Fagan and Sneha Gubbala, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/08/PG_2023.08.29_views-of-india_report.pdf. stands out, with its public highly favorable toward Russia. Moscow hosted a second Russia-Africa summit in July 2023, as well as the first international parliamentary conference of Latin America countries in October that year. It inaugurated the Russia and Islamic World Kazan forum of 79 countries. It has been a driving force behind the expansion of the BRICS12BBC, “Brics: What is the group and which countries have joined,” BBC, February 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-66525474. with Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the UAE joining in 2024-25, plus nine partner countries, making the BRICS representative of 45% of the world’s population and 28% of the global economy. Even without these recent new members, the original BRICS countries have surpassed the economic size of the G-7 in recent years in terms of purchasing power parity. That said, on its current trajectory, Russia’s economic weight among the BRICS countries and Global South more broadly will continue to decline absent major economic reforms to jumpstart growth.
Climate Change
A surprising source of relative advantage for Russia over its partners and adversaries is its limited vulnerability to climate change in contrast to much of the world. Warming temperatures are expected to increase economic output in Russia by boosting agricultural yields, increasing the country’s arable land area, and making its northern climes generally more hospitable. A study recently published in the journal Nature13Maximilian Kotz, Anders Levermann and Leonie Wenz, “The economic commitment of climate change,” Nature 628, 51-557 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07219-0. estimated that in a “middle-of-the-road” climate change scenario, income per capita in northwestern Russia will increase by 20% because of climate impacts, mostly as a result of increased temperatures. This finding is consistent with earlier studies, such as a 2017 analysis14Christine Lagarde and Vitor Gaspar, “Getting Real on Meeting Paris Climate Change Commitments”, International Monetary Fund, May 3, 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2019/05/03/blog-getting-real-on-meeting-paris-climate-change-commitments. by the IMF, which estimates that parts of Russia can be expected to see a several percentage-point increase in economic output per capita with each 1-degree Celsius increase in temperatures. Of course, major infrastructure damage from melting permafrost will prove costly, but the gains elsewhere will outweigh this loss.
A bigger concern is how Russia’s economy will fare should the world successfully transition away from fossil fuels toward renewable energy sources. The shift toward a greener global economy will place unique challenges on whomever is leading Russia in the coming decades. “Net income from gas sales falls from around USD 100 billion in 2021 to less than USD 40 billion in 2030 in all scenarios,” according15International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2023,” IEA, Paris, October 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023?wpappninja_v=pvzbeqxc9. to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) World Energy Outlook 2023.
Nevertheless, Russia has the potential to become a renewables superpower should it choose to do so. The IEA estimated in 200316International Energy Agency, “Renewables in Russia,” IEA, Paris, December 2003, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-in-russia. that the amount of renewable energy that is economically recoverable is equivalent to more than 270 million tons of coal per year. More recent analysis indicates Russia has the largest technical potential for renewable energy in the world17Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf. and could be a major clean energy exporter. Russia is rich in numerous renewable energy sources: wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass, hydrogen and solar energy, but their share in Russian energy consumption is very low.
With most countries beginning to transition away from fossils fuels18Dave Jones, “Progress since COP28 on transitioning away from fossil fuels,” Ember, November 20, 2024, https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/progress-since-cop28-on-transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels/., Russia should be accelerating the development of renewables, as the Gulf countries are doing. But there are impediments. Russia’s “decarbonization strategy lacks a countrywide carbon pricing system or other means to penalize emissions19Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf..” Although wedded to achieving net-zero carbon, Russia is relying on a twofold increase in natural carbon sinks in forests instead of renewables.20A carbon sink is a natural or artificial reservoir that absorbs more carbon (CO2) from the atmosphere than it releases. The ocean and forests are the world’s biggest carbon sinks. Soil can also absorb a significant amount of carbon. It also wants technological sovereignty, which means mandatory local content requirements. With such a small domestic market and a gradual ban on cheaper Chinese inputs, Russia’s manufacturing capacity for renewables will struggle.
Moreover, exports of renewables will only partially offset the loss of revenues from fossil fuel exports, as renewable costs decline and renewable production in nontraditional energy producers lessens global demand.21Nneamaka Ilechukwu and Sajal Lahiri, “Renewable-energy consumption and international trade,” Energy Reports 8, 10624-10629, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.08.209. An Asian energy grid22Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf. , which Moscow proposed in the early 2000s, could be an outlet for Russia’s excess energy production, uniting the power plants of Eastern Russia, China, Mongolia, South Korea, and Japan. The concept has not gotten off the ground, but Japan’s SoftBank, a potential big investor, is not giving up on the idea23TASS, “SoftBank keeps plans to create Asian energy ring project involving Russia – top manager,” TASS, December 1, 2022, https://tass.com/economy/1544477. . One bright spot is Russia’s competitiveness in nuclear energy: “Despite sanctions on its economy, Russia continues to be an unrivalled exporter of nuclear power plants24Anastasia Stognei et al., “How Russia is using nuclear power to win global influence,” Financial Times, June 20, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/7110fc18-5a31-4387-9f4c-0cc5753d050a. .” More than a third of the new reactors are being constructed with help from Rosatom, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation.
The Arctic and the Northern Sea Route25The Northern Sea Route is a maritime route in the Arctic Ocean connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
According to a 2020 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study26Center for Strategic & International Studies, “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence,” Heather A. Conley, Matthew Melino and Jon B. Alterman, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence., Putin is infatuated with the Northern Sea Route, viewing it as “man conquering nature,” a source for modern Russian nationalism. China is also active in polar research, styling itself as a near-Arctic country, teaming up with Russia on building high-powered ice breakers27Avesta Afshari Mehr, “Strategic Alliance or Uneasy Tango for Russia and China in the Arctic,” The Moscow Times, February 11, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/11/strategic-alliance-or-uneasy-tango-for-russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-a87946. . With his threats to take over Greenland, Trump has now joined the club. Certainly, strategic military interests are at issue for all sides, but Putin might be playing on Trump’s fascination with the Arctic via his invitation for U.S. energy companies to help with tapping Russia’s oil reserves in the Arctic.
Development of the maritime route across the Arctic Sea would help boost Russia’s economy in northern regions. Shipping costs would be reduced, and any risks from an unstable Middle East would also be avoided. However, turning the Northern Sea Route into a major global artery28Atlantic Council, “Russia and China have been teaming up to reduce reliance on the dollar. Here’s how it’s going,” Maia Nikoladze and Mrugank Bhusari, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-and-china-have-been-teaming-up-to-reduce-reliance-on-the-dollar-heres-how-its-going/. will require more time, if it ever happens. The route is presently only navigable during the summer months, and cargo volume has plateaued. Western governments would need to drop their restrictions on Western ships using the route, and the United States has sanctioned Russia’s development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in the Arctic. Only after peace in Ukraine and/or U.S. normalization of ties with Russia would there be a chance for the Arctic to turn into a major artery that Western shippers would use.
Instead, in the near term, the opening of the Northern Sea Route during summer months – and increasingly long durations29Pengjun Zhao, Yunlin Li and Yu Zhang, “Ships are projected to navigate whole year-round along the North Sea route by 2100,” Communications Earth & Environment 5, 407 (2024), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-024-01557-7. as global temperatures continue to rise – is likely to solidify Russo-Chinese ties. The region has an estimated 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil30Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic resource appraisal; estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle: U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet,” USGS, 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. and 30% of undiscovered natural gas. Most of the commercial traffic so far has been “LNG heading from Russian facilities to Japan and China31Alex Blair, “Will the Northern Sea Route become commercially viable in the near future,” Ship Technology, June 27, 2024, https://www.ship-technology.com/features/will-the-northern-sea-route-become-commercially-viable-in-the-near-future/?cf-view. in specialist vessels.”
Perhaps the biggest challenge for Russia pertaining to the Arctic is how to attract people to the forbidding region. Compared to the populations in other northern areas—Alaska, Greenland, and Scandinavia—Russia’s Arctic populations have declined. Russia’s Far East has also experienced depopulation32Paul Goble, “Population Flight Leaving Russia’s Far East Increasingly Less Russian,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21-103, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/population-flight-leaving-russias-far-east-increasingly-less-russian/.: The population there has fallen by almost a third since 1991. In addition, the Far East population is becoming less ethnically Russian, with growing number of migrants from Central Asia, North Korea, and China.
Global South
Russia’s relations with Global South countries are unlikely to ever match the intensity of current Russo-Chinese ties. Nevertheless—as evidenced by the Global South’s refusal to abide by Western sanctions against Russia—it is clear that Global South countries share with Moscow (and Beijing) a belief that the Western-centered international system is outmoded. Russian ties with India have increased through oil sales and growing diplomatic ties. Putin and Modi have met multiple times since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with Modi hugging the Russian president, and a visit is planned for Modi to host Putin in India33Reuters, “Putin accepts Modi’s invitation to visit India, Kremlin says,” Reuters, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-accepts-modis-invitation-visit-india-kremlin-says-2025-05-05/. despite Putin’s being designated as a war criminal by the International Criminal Court.34On March 17, 2023, the ICC designated Putin as a war criminal for the war crime of the “unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.” At his Kazan, Tatarstan, BRICS summit in October 2024, Putin helped reconcile the Indian and Chinese leaders, though Indo-Chinese ties remain fragile. The BRICS group, with its enlarged membership — plus an additional 29 countries that are applicants to become members or partners — has become the symbol of Putin’s effort to develop a Eurasia bloc centered around Russian, Chinese, and Indian cooperation. The BRICS, working in collaboration with other middle powers, seek to challenge the US-created multilateral system.
South Caucasus and Central Asia
Infrastructural and personal ties will continue to bind countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia to Russia, even in the face of Western pressures and competition from China. Russia’s railway connections with Kazakhstan, for example, are not only numerous, but they also create a crucial advantage: The two states share a railway gauge unique to former Soviet countries. Although a future generation of Central Asian and Caucasus leaders might want to counter their countries’ traditional dependence on Russia with stronger economic ties with China and the West, most understand that Russia will remain an important actor and influence on their futures. If the United States, led by Trump, and Russia, led by Putin, reach an agreement on ending the Ukraine War, this move might also include a tacit acknowledgement of the South Caucasus, as well as Central Asia, coming within Russia’s sphere of influence. Only if Russia’s war in Ukraine unravels to Moscow’s disadvantage and a peace agreement is not reached, would Russia have a limited capacity to project power in its near abroad. Even then, Moscow would most likely maintain strong economic ties with the region.
Three Potential Scenarios
Three different scenarios cover all the fundamental options for Russia in the next decade: (1) a “Sovietized” Russia characterized in part by boosts in defense spending over spending for education, health, R&D, and other areas in order to defend against a longer militarized border with NATO that could see additional U.S. forces under a post-Trump U.S president and/or a militarily stronger Europe, amounting to a new Cold War; (2) a Great Patriotic War against the West, with Russia binding itself to Beijing’s growing bipolar conflict with United States; or (3) a Reborn Russia that exploits the advantages of its Eurasian geography and focuses on its ties more broadly with the Global South, as well as China.
Clearly, the last option holds the most promise for Russia. What the authors of this study have labeled a “Reborn Russia” results in a GDP per capita growing a decade from now to nearly $10,000 (2017 dollars), higher than at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the other two scenarios, the repercussions from aligning with China against the United States, which could escalate into open conflict, would mean a Russia in 2035 at the same level of economic well-being as today. A “Sovietized Russia’s” long-term economic prospects would be less dire, but the economy would still be relatively stagnant over the next decade.
Across all three scenarios, Russia’s GDP at purchasing power parity per capita is forecast to remain higher than that of the original BRICs countries. However, only in a Russia Reborn scenario would the gap between Russia on the one hand and Brazil, China, and India on the other not narrow. In other words, the relative hierarchy of Global South countries in terms of economic well-being would be unlikely to change with a Russia Reborn. In the other two scenarios, Russia’s relative economic stature would be diminished.
In all three scenarios, Russia’s relationship with China would remain unbalanced even in the long run, owing to China’s continued military and economic growth, but some of this effect could be mitigated by the diversification of Russia’s geopolitical influence portfolio across the Global South.
In Central Asia, Russia is expected to sustain a hit to its influence in the wake of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in all scenarios. Nevertheless, despite China’s supposed desire to “fill a void35Carla Freeman, “China Looks to Fill a Void in Central Asia,” USIP, May 2025, https://www.fpi.sais.jhu.edu/articles/china-looks-to-fill-a-void-in-central-asia. ” in Central Asia, the infrastructural ties between Russia and Central Asia are substantial. Far more sizeable Chinese development projects would need to be completed than anything that has been or appears likely to be in the works today. Similar trajectories are expected in the Caucasus. Geography—both physical and human—may not be destiny, but it does place enormous constraints on possibilities for dramatic geopolitical change over short- and medium-term time horizons.
Ironically, a Sovietized Russia bodes least well for Russia’s Central Asian prospects in terms of geopolitical influence. This is because of the heavily economic nature of present-day geopolitical competition, an area where China possesses substantial advantages.
A Reborn Russia might be able to return the country’s geopolitical influence capacity to immediate post-Ukraine-invasion levels in the coming decades. Nonetheless, Russia’s influence is unlikely to return to pre-2022 levels on a global basis any sooner than mid-century. This is especially so for Russia’s influence capacity in Europe and the broader Global North, where it will take time to rebuild ties—and thus interdependence—even if Moscow desires to do so.
As measured by material dimensions of national power, Russia similarly is not projected to return to the early Cold-War era of Soviet glory. In absolute terms, Russia’s “net resources”—a measure of national power popularized by Michael Beckley (2018), consisting of GDP times GDP per capita—can be expected to increase by more than one-and-a-half times if the country brings to life a Reborn Russia scenario. A Sovietized Russia or one emerging from being aligned with China in a conflict with the United States would experience decreased national power in the global arena. Only a New Russia would mitigate or slightly reverse the persistent decline in Russian national power as a share of global power.
Notes
- 1Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. “Pardee Institute.” Last modified 2025. Accessed May 21, 2025. https://korbel.du.edu/pardee/.
- 2Laura Silver et al., “Favorable views of the U.S. and China”. Pew Research Center, November 6, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/11/06/comparing-views-of-the-us-and-china-in-24-countries/#:~:text=Favorable%20views%20of%20the%20U.S.%20and%20China&text=views%20of%20China-,Note:%20Countries%20are%20plotted%20by%20the%20difference%20in%20evaluations%20of,Q3a%20&%20b.&text=On%20balance%2C%20views%20of%20the,the%20U.S.%20and%20China%20favorably.
- 3Andrey Kortunov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Balance Sheet and the Road Ahead,” Russian Council, February 7, 2025, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-s-foreign-policy-balance-sheet-and-the-road-ahead/.
- 4Interfax. “Russia’s population could fall below 138.8 million by 2045 from 146.4 mln in early 2023 – Rosstat.” Published October 20, 2023. Accessed May 24, 2025. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/95698/.
- 5In the Soviet-Ukrainian War (1917-1921), the Bolshevik Red Army invaded and occupied the Ukrainian People’s Republic, a partially recognized state that had emerged from its own civil war. In this report, the authors refer to Russia’s February 2014 invasion of Ukraine, when Russia occupied and annexed Crimea, as the first Ukraine War.
- 6Jeffrey Frankel, “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions” (CID Working Paper No. 233, Harvard University, 2012), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/233.pdf.
- 7Kathryn Stoner, “Is Putin Vulnerable? One autocracy in Russia may lead to another,” The Washington Post, September 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/27/putin-ukraine-regime-survival-autocracy/.
- 8Even the Arab Spring “success story” of Tunisia, rated as “free” by Freedom House just five years ago, had backslid into a mixed semi-authoritarian regime as of 2024.
- 9Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Caught Between Reform and Revanche: Russia’s Struggle to Modernize,” Andrei Kolesnikov, 2016. https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Article_Kolesnikov2016_Eng.pdf.
- 10Renewable energy is energy made from renewable natural sources that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed. In contrast, fossil fuels — coal, oil, and gas — are nonrenewable resources that take hundreds of millions of years to form.
- 11Pew Research Center, “Views of India Lean Positive Across 23 Countries,” Christine Huang, Moira Fagan and Sneha Gubbala, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/08/PG_2023.08.29_views-of-india_report.pdf.
- 12BBC, “Brics: What is the group and which countries have joined,” BBC, February 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-66525474.
- 13Maximilian Kotz, Anders Levermann and Leonie Wenz, “The economic commitment of climate change,” Nature 628, 51-557 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07219-0.
- 14Christine Lagarde and Vitor Gaspar, “Getting Real on Meeting Paris Climate Change Commitments”, International Monetary Fund, May 3, 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2019/05/03/blog-getting-real-on-meeting-paris-climate-change-commitments.
- 15International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2023,” IEA, Paris, October 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023?wpappninja_v=pvzbeqxc9.
- 16International Energy Agency, “Renewables in Russia,” IEA, Paris, December 2003, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-in-russia.
- 17Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf.
- 18Dave Jones, “Progress since COP28 on transitioning away from fossil fuels,” Ember, November 20, 2024, https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/progress-since-cop28-on-transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels/.
- 19Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf.
- 20A carbon sink is a natural or artificial reservoir that absorbs more carbon (CO2) from the atmosphere than it releases. The ocean and forests are the world’s biggest carbon sinks. Soil can also absorb a significant amount of carbon.
- 21Nneamaka Ilechukwu and Sajal Lahiri, “Renewable-energy consumption and international trade,” Energy Reports 8, 10624-10629, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.08.209.
- 22Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf.
- 23TASS, “SoftBank keeps plans to create Asian energy ring project involving Russia – top manager,” TASS, December 1, 2022, https://tass.com/economy/1544477.
- 24Anastasia Stognei et al., “How Russia is using nuclear power to win global influence,” Financial Times, June 20, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/7110fc18-5a31-4387-9f4c-0cc5753d050a.
- 25The Northern Sea Route is a maritime route in the Arctic Ocean connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
- 26Center for Strategic & International Studies, “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence,” Heather A. Conley, Matthew Melino and Jon B. Alterman, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.
- 27Avesta Afshari Mehr, “Strategic Alliance or Uneasy Tango for Russia and China in the Arctic,” The Moscow Times, February 11, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/11/strategic-alliance-or-uneasy-tango-for-russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-a87946.
- 28Atlantic Council, “Russia and China have been teaming up to reduce reliance on the dollar. Here’s how it’s going,” Maia Nikoladze and Mrugank Bhusari, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-and-china-have-been-teaming-up-to-reduce-reliance-on-the-dollar-heres-how-its-going/.
- 29Pengjun Zhao, Yunlin Li and Yu Zhang, “Ships are projected to navigate whole year-round along the North Sea route by 2100,” Communications Earth & Environment 5, 407 (2024), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-024-01557-7.
- 30Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic resource appraisal; estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle: U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet,” USGS, 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.
- 31Alex Blair, “Will the Northern Sea Route become commercially viable in the near future,” Ship Technology, June 27, 2024, https://www.ship-technology.com/features/will-the-northern-sea-route-become-commercially-viable-in-the-near-future/?cf-view.
- 32Paul Goble, “Population Flight Leaving Russia’s Far East Increasingly Less Russian,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21-103, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/population-flight-leaving-russias-far-east-increasingly-less-russian/.
- 33Reuters, “Putin accepts Modi’s invitation to visit India, Kremlin says,” Reuters, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-accepts-modis-invitation-visit-india-kremlin-says-2025-05-05/.
- 34On March 17, 2023, the ICC designated Putin as a war criminal for the war crime of the “unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.”
- 35Carla Freeman, “China Looks to Fill a Void in Central Asia,” USIP, May 2025, https://www.fpi.sais.jhu.edu/articles/china-looks-to-fill-a-void-in-central-asia.
For decades, Western experts have viewed Russia as a declining power citing a lack of population growth, technology innovation, and a falling GDP for its decline. While it is unlikely to return to its former status, Russia is gaining higher favorability among China, India, and various states across the Global South, establishing alternative multilateral institutions and leaving the West behind. Increased trade with China has nearly met former economic ties with Europe, illustrating a shift in priorities for Putin. The Russian people—trending older—however, would like to see strengthened ties with the United States or other Global South countries. Failure to adjust to the demands of an aging population, while prioritizing commodities and the War in Ukraine could constrain Russian power domestically and globally.
Significant investment in the Global South and Central Asia, climate change, and a Northern Sea Route in the Arctic, could shift the narrative for Russia moving forward, revitalizing its power and influence. This report examines three potential scenarios for Russia over the next ten years: a “Sovietized” Russia, set on boosting defense spending; a Great Patriotic War against the West, with Russia increasing its reliance on China; and a Reborn Russia, taking advantage of its geographical ties and influence on the Global South.
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Scope Note: The following study is the culmination of a two-year study of Russia’s Futures over the next decade that was supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In undertaking the study, we participated in numerous workshops around the world with several hundreds of Russians who traveled from Russia as well as other experts on Russia from Asia, Africa, Europe and North America. In cooperation with the University of Denver’s Pardee Institute for International Futures,1Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. “Pardee Institute.” Last modified 2025. Accessed May 21, 2025. https://korbel.du.edu/pardee/. the study encompassed a quantitative modeling project, that examined three broad futures for Russia and their economic, social and geopolitical implications. We want to thank Collin Meisel, who is the acting Director of Analysis at the Pardee Institute, for conducting the modeling and drafting the study’s military chapter. Collin Meisel is also a non-resident fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Strategic Foresight Hub. We are also deeply grateful to Ms. Nvard Chalikyan, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center for an unpublished paper on the South Caucasus, which was used extensively in the chapter on the Caucasus and Central Asia. A special thanks to the Henry L. Stimson Center, its director Brian Finlay, head of the Strategic Foresight Hub, Julian Mueller-Kaler and the entire Communications Team headed by Ms. Justine Sullivan for their generous help. Finally, no study would be complete with the expert editing of Ms. Elizabeth Arens.
By Mathew Burrows, Counselor in the Executive Office and Program Lead of the Strategic Foresight Hub
Executive Summary
Since the end of the Cold War, the consensus among a wide range of experts in the United States and abroad has been that Russia is a declining power. Key elements of power—such as declining population, falling gross domestic product (GDP) compared with that of major powers, and lack of technological innovation—confirm this assessment. Nevertheless, for a declining power, Russia has played an outsized role on the global stage for the last decade, in part by working against Western interests. One Russian commentator has claimed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 “can be considered the formal date of the unipolar world’s [the West’s] demise.” Russia adapted faster to the end of the unipolar moment than the United States: Moscow understood better than Washington how the international order was evolving toward multipolarity, which suits Russia’s long-term interests. With little likelihood of regaining its former superpower status, Russia has repositioned itself as a revisionist power, bolstered by the support of rising powers, such as China and India, which also yearn for a post-Western-dominated world order.
The Ukraine War, although isolating Russia from the West, has increased Moscow’s influence in the Global South. Despite Russia’s flagrant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, Moscow has not been isolated or punished by China, India, or the growing number of middle powers that might have seen Russia’s special military operation as a return to colonialism. Instead, while disliking, and in some cases condemning, Russia’s invasion, many rising states—not just China—have shielded Russia against the West’s punitive economic sanctions. For many Russian observers, their country has become a pivotal actor, able to effect change in the global system despite its declining power. Although Russia is dependent on China and other states, many Russian analysts believe that Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere have accelerated the emergence of a more favorable global order.
Using Moscow’s strong ties with Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin has pushed to establish alternative multilateral institutions, such as the Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa (BRICS) group. Such institutions are expanding rapidly, even among countries well-disposed to the United States, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Putin has brokered a reconciliation, albeit fragile, between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping and has begun to forge a Eurasia bloc spanning two continents. The dexterity of Russian diplomacy at such a critical moment is astonishing, even as the West decries Moscow’s motives as nefarious. In many ways, Russia has filled a vacuum created by the disinterest of the United States and other Western countries in reaching out to the Global South. Polling2Laura Silver et al., “Favorable views of the U.S. and China”. Pew Research Center, November 6, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/11/06/comparing-views-of-the-us-and-china-in-24-countries/#:~:text=Favorable%20views%20of%20the%20U.S.%20and%20China&text=views%20of%20China-,Note:%20Countries%20are%20plotted%20by%20the%20difference%20in%20evaluations%20of,Q3a%20&%20b.&text=On%20balance%2C%20views%20of%20the,the%20U.S.%20and%20China%20favorably. shows global publics generally like America much more than Russia or China, but perhaps due to the West’s fears of losing its privileged position, it has taken too long to understand the aspirations of many middle powers to play a greater role in rulemaking in the global system. Even though Russia and China have each permanent vetoes on the UN Security Council, both countries portray themselves as outsiders, embracing the idea of multipolarity as the logical structure for a heterogeneous world in which power is diffused.
Looking forward, Russia faces critical challenges that could either cause it to decline precipitously or bolster its position depending on how and whether it can overcome those problems. This study is divided into three parts: (1) Constraints that will limit any growth in Russian power; (2) Sources of Resilience that could help Russia surpass some of its limits; and (3) Potential Scenarios for Russia during the next decade. The University of Denver’s Pardee Institute undertook a quantitative modeling effort to synthesize and develop the three scenarios, which depict wide variance among the outcomes.
Constraints
Russia’s biggest problem is too few people. According to Andrey Kortunov3Andrey Kortunov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Balance Sheet and the Road Ahead,” Russian Council, February 7, 2025, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-s-foreign-policy-balance-sheet-and-the-road-ahead/., a top analyst in the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia’s counterparts on the world stage, whether the United States, China, India, or even the European Union (EU) all have over 300 million people. By 2050, even with the likely addition of several million Russian speakers from Ukraine, Russia’s population is forecast to be around 150 million in the best case and 20 million less in the worst case, according to Russian estimates4Interfax. “Russia’s population could fall below 138.8 million by 2045 from 146.4 mln in early 2023 – Rosstat.” Published October 20, 2023. Accessed May 24, 2025. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/95698/., with people older than 65 constituting a quarter of that number in either case.
Russia’s relative lack of people and its rapidly aging population lowers its economic potential over the long run. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) April 2024 World Economic Outlook’s forecast for Russia—1.7% per year—is more bullish for the next five years than actual Russian economic growth during the past ten years: 1.3% from 2019 to 2023 and 0.7% from 2014 to 2018. Compared with other BRICS countries and the United States, Russia’s average annual growth has been and is projected to be below that of its geopolitical peers in the Global South (excluding South Africa) and its main geopolitical rivals in the West.
With fewer workers in their prime years, Moscow is having difficulty funding social welfare systems. Russia (along with China and other countries) already suffers from a relatively weak social safety net: Competing priorities, such as defense expenditures, will make it harder to build and bolster social welfare programs at a time of increased aging, when the demands for health care will continue to grow substantially. As demand for health services grows, the chance of a populist backlash will increase because of the government’s inability to take care of its citizens.
Energy Dependency
Compounding the population shortfall is Russia’s overreliance on commodities—particularly oil and gas exports—even though sales of energy commodities have helped Russia overcome the onslaught of Western sanctions, financial bans, and other restrictions that would have been more punishing for a manufacturing-based economy dependent on external trade. Neighboring China, along with India, is relatively bereft of much-needed energy, making both countries perfect partners for helping Russia surmount its economic difficulties.
Russia’s overall trade with China has almost replaced its former deep economic ties with Europe, so much so that Russia’s trans-Siberian rail networks and Pacific ports are clogged, in contrast to the formerly busy Baltic ones that are now idle. Russian oil exports to China have overtaken those of Saudi Arabia in 2023. After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in March 2014, which prompted Western sanctions, Russia turned to China for help in building a new gas pipeline. Owing to sanctions imposed following the beginning of the second Ukraine War5In the Soviet-Ukrainian War (1917-1921), the Bolshevik Red Army invaded and occupied the Ukrainian People’s Republic, a partially recognized state that had emerged from its own civil war. In this report, the authors refer to Russia’s February 2014 invasion of Ukraine, when Russia occupied and annexed Crimea, as the first Ukraine War. Russian gas exports to Europe declined substantially, but so far China has not agreed to a second Siberian gas pipeline to absorb Russia’s excess gas production. Without such an outlet, Russia will suffer a loss of needed revenue.
But resources are not just a blessing: Academic research6Jeffrey Frankel, “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions” (CID Working Paper No. 233, Harvard University, 2012), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/233.pdf. has shown that “countries with oil, mineral or other natural resource wealth, on average, have failed to show better economic performance than those without.” Indeed, overreliance on commodities has been dubbed a “resource curse”: In addition to subverting optimal growth, dependence on commodities has bolstered authoritarian governance in Russia and other resource-dependent countries. In Russia’s case, the energy sector provides the state with much of its revenues. Without those resources, Putin’s rule would be far less stable.
Authoritarian Rule
Crumbling autocratic regimes usually spawn authoritarian successors7Kathryn Stoner, “Is Putin Vulnerable? One autocracy in Russia may lead to another,” The Washington Post, September 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/27/putin-ukraine-regime-survival-autocracy/., not a turn toward liberal democracy. This has been the case following the death or overthrow of other dictators, such as Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, who died in February 2020: Today Egypt is under military rule. And former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who died in March 2014, was replaced by Nicolas Maduro, who heads an authoritarian government.8Even the Arab Spring “success story” of Tunisia, rated as “free” by Freedom House just five years ago, had backslid into a mixed semi-authoritarian regime as of 2024. In the near future, with Russia having the upper hand in its war against Ukraine, along with a continuing stream of energy revenues, only death or a debilitating disease could trigger Putin’s ouster. Over time, if the war drags on and Russian casualties remain high, Putin could face pressure from elites to step down, but he would most likely still cling to power. Like the tsars who prided themselves in increasing Russia’s territory, recapturing Ukraine (or at least parts of it) and undermining its chances to become a NATO member would solidify Putin’s legacy.
Only over time, as economic challenges accumulate—including a possible failure to find sufficient energy outlets—could a more moderate or technocratic leader come to power in Russia who might agree to a possible deal with the West. State failure or a breakup of Russia is unlikely, and, if it were to happen, could make the country even more dangerous than it is today. Nonetheless, because of Russia’s growing dependence on China, a change in leadership or direction in Beijing could threaten Russia’s stability, making it more open to improving ties with the West. Many Russians see a danger in too much reliance on China and are hoping that Russia can strengthen ties with the United States, led by President Donald Trump, or with Global South countries, which they view as more reliable.
Over the long term, Russia has experienced periods of reform9Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Caught Between Reform and Revanche: Russia’s Struggle to Modernize,” Andrei Kolesnikov, 2016. https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Article_Kolesnikov2016_Eng.pdf., even under conservative leaders, many times as a result of failure at home or abroad, as occurred after Russia’s disastrous Crimean War in the 19th century, which ushered in the end of serfdom under Tsar Alexander II. Over time, a more technocratic leader could emerge who would believe that Russia requires major economic and even some political reforms that could better orient the Russian economy to deal with, for example, the growing weight of renewable energy sources in the global energy mix.10Renewable energy is energy made from renewable natural sources that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed. In contrast, fossil fuels — coal, oil, and gas — are nonrenewable resources that take hundreds of millions of years to form. In previous times, Russia had a storied scientific reputation, but it will need to stop the exit of talented younger scientists and technologists in order to rebuild its base. A technocratic reformer might still be authoritarian but would most likely have to moderate Putin’s highly repressive policies to lure back needed experts and rebuild a technically savvy elite.
Ukraine
How the war ends, especially whether there is an amicable cease-fire and movement toward a stable peace between the two belligerents, Russia and Ukraine, could be a big plus or minus for Russia’s future. A positive outcome or stable peace could open the door to more economic opportunities, with an end or reduction in Western sanctions and the return of Russia’s highly skilled tech experts. Currently (as of April 2025) there is a danger that Trump will impose a peace plan on Ukraine without any commitment to its security. Such a move could risk renewed fighting by either Russia or Ukraine after the end of Trump’s term. Moreover, the Europeans might not accept a Trump peace deal that concedes more to Russia while ignoring Ukraine’s security, splitting what has been a united Western front against Russian aggression.
A Trump successor from the Democratic Party might decide to rearm Ukraine, threatening the peace, in Moscow’s eyes. A Europe that wants Russia to pay for its aggression and has started to build its own independent defense forces could also decide to militarize the now longer border with Russia, eliciting the need from Moscow’s perspective of a counterreaction — ending any peace dividend Russia may have gotten from a Trump peace deal with a weak Ukraine. A new cold war would be costly to both sides. Should Trump draw in the Europeans and provide security assurances to Ukraine, the chances for a more permanent peace would increase. The third section of this paper posits a scenario in which Russian defense expenditures remain high, shortchanging education, social welfare, and research and development (R&D).
Sources of Resilience and Expansion
Despite its challenges, Russia has the potential to increase its power and influence. In addition to Russia’s friendship with China—which proved instrumental for Russia’s fending off the West’s economic and financial pressure—Russia has engaged in a frenzy of diplomatic initiatives exploiting pro-Russia feelings in the Global South. India11Pew Research Center, “Views of India Lean Positive Across 23 Countries,” Christine Huang, Moira Fagan and Sneha Gubbala, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/08/PG_2023.08.29_views-of-india_report.pdf. stands out, with its public highly favorable toward Russia. Moscow hosted a second Russia-Africa summit in July 2023, as well as the first international parliamentary conference of Latin America countries in October that year. It inaugurated the Russia and Islamic World Kazan forum of 79 countries. It has been a driving force behind the expansion of the BRICS12BBC, “Brics: What is the group and which countries have joined,” BBC, February 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-66525474. with Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the UAE joining in 2024-25, plus nine partner countries, making the BRICS representative of 45% of the world’s population and 28% of the global economy. Even without these recent new members, the original BRICS countries have surpassed the economic size of the G-7 in recent years in terms of purchasing power parity. That said, on its current trajectory, Russia’s economic weight among the BRICS countries and Global South more broadly will continue to decline absent major economic reforms to jumpstart growth.
Climate Change
A surprising source of relative advantage for Russia over its partners and adversaries is its limited vulnerability to climate change in contrast to much of the world. Warming temperatures are expected to increase economic output in Russia by boosting agricultural yields, increasing the country’s arable land area, and making its northern climes generally more hospitable. A study recently published in the journal Nature13Maximilian Kotz, Anders Levermann and Leonie Wenz, “The economic commitment of climate change,” Nature 628, 51-557 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07219-0. estimated that in a “middle-of-the-road” climate change scenario, income per capita in northwestern Russia will increase by 20% because of climate impacts, mostly as a result of increased temperatures. This finding is consistent with earlier studies, such as a 2017 analysis14Christine Lagarde and Vitor Gaspar, “Getting Real on Meeting Paris Climate Change Commitments”, International Monetary Fund, May 3, 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2019/05/03/blog-getting-real-on-meeting-paris-climate-change-commitments. by the IMF, which estimates that parts of Russia can be expected to see a several percentage-point increase in economic output per capita with each 1-degree Celsius increase in temperatures. Of course, major infrastructure damage from melting permafrost will prove costly, but the gains elsewhere will outweigh this loss.
A bigger concern is how Russia’s economy will fare should the world successfully transition away from fossil fuels toward renewable energy sources. The shift toward a greener global economy will place unique challenges on whomever is leading Russia in the coming decades. “Net income from gas sales falls from around USD 100 billion in 2021 to less than USD 40 billion in 2030 in all scenarios,” according15International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2023,” IEA, Paris, October 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023?wpappninja_v=pvzbeqxc9. to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) World Energy Outlook 2023.
Nevertheless, Russia has the potential to become a renewables superpower should it choose to do so. The IEA estimated in 200316International Energy Agency, “Renewables in Russia,” IEA, Paris, December 2003, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-in-russia. that the amount of renewable energy that is economically recoverable is equivalent to more than 270 million tons of coal per year. More recent analysis indicates Russia has the largest technical potential for renewable energy in the world17Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf. and could be a major clean energy exporter. Russia is rich in numerous renewable energy sources: wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass, hydrogen and solar energy, but their share in Russian energy consumption is very low.
With most countries beginning to transition away from fossils fuels18Dave Jones, “Progress since COP28 on transitioning away from fossil fuels,” Ember, November 20, 2024, https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/progress-since-cop28-on-transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels/., Russia should be accelerating the development of renewables, as the Gulf countries are doing. But there are impediments. Russia’s “decarbonization strategy lacks a countrywide carbon pricing system or other means to penalize emissions19Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf..” Although wedded to achieving net-zero carbon, Russia is relying on a twofold increase in natural carbon sinks in forests instead of renewables.20A carbon sink is a natural or artificial reservoir that absorbs more carbon (CO2) from the atmosphere than it releases. The ocean and forests are the world’s biggest carbon sinks. Soil can also absorb a significant amount of carbon. It also wants technological sovereignty, which means mandatory local content requirements. With such a small domestic market and a gradual ban on cheaper Chinese inputs, Russia’s manufacturing capacity for renewables will struggle.
Moreover, exports of renewables will only partially offset the loss of revenues from fossil fuel exports, as renewable costs decline and renewable production in nontraditional energy producers lessens global demand.21Nneamaka Ilechukwu and Sajal Lahiri, “Renewable-energy consumption and international trade,” Energy Reports 8, 10624-10629, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.08.209. An Asian energy grid22Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf. , which Moscow proposed in the early 2000s, could be an outlet for Russia’s excess energy production, uniting the power plants of Eastern Russia, China, Mongolia, South Korea, and Japan. The concept has not gotten off the ground, but Japan’s SoftBank, a potential big investor, is not giving up on the idea23TASS, “SoftBank keeps plans to create Asian energy ring project involving Russia – top manager,” TASS, December 1, 2022, https://tass.com/economy/1544477. . One bright spot is Russia’s competitiveness in nuclear energy: “Despite sanctions on its economy, Russia continues to be an unrivalled exporter of nuclear power plants24Anastasia Stognei et al., “How Russia is using nuclear power to win global influence,” Financial Times, June 20, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/7110fc18-5a31-4387-9f4c-0cc5753d050a. .” More than a third of the new reactors are being constructed with help from Rosatom, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation.
The Arctic and the Northern Sea Route25The Northern Sea Route is a maritime route in the Arctic Ocean connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
According to a 2020 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study26Center for Strategic & International Studies, “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence,” Heather A. Conley, Matthew Melino and Jon B. Alterman, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence., Putin is infatuated with the Northern Sea Route, viewing it as “man conquering nature,” a source for modern Russian nationalism. China is also active in polar research, styling itself as a near-Arctic country, teaming up with Russia on building high-powered ice breakers27Avesta Afshari Mehr, “Strategic Alliance or Uneasy Tango for Russia and China in the Arctic,” The Moscow Times, February 11, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/11/strategic-alliance-or-uneasy-tango-for-russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-a87946. . With his threats to take over Greenland, Trump has now joined the club. Certainly, strategic military interests are at issue for all sides, but Putin might be playing on Trump’s fascination with the Arctic via his invitation for U.S. energy companies to help with tapping Russia’s oil reserves in the Arctic.
Development of the maritime route across the Arctic Sea would help boost Russia’s economy in northern regions. Shipping costs would be reduced, and any risks from an unstable Middle East would also be avoided. However, turning the Northern Sea Route into a major global artery28Atlantic Council, “Russia and China have been teaming up to reduce reliance on the dollar. Here’s how it’s going,” Maia Nikoladze and Mrugank Bhusari, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-and-china-have-been-teaming-up-to-reduce-reliance-on-the-dollar-heres-how-its-going/. will require more time, if it ever happens. The route is presently only navigable during the summer months, and cargo volume has plateaued. Western governments would need to drop their restrictions on Western ships using the route, and the United States has sanctioned Russia’s development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in the Arctic. Only after peace in Ukraine and/or U.S. normalization of ties with Russia would there be a chance for the Arctic to turn into a major artery that Western shippers would use.
Instead, in the near term, the opening of the Northern Sea Route during summer months – and increasingly long durations29Pengjun Zhao, Yunlin Li and Yu Zhang, “Ships are projected to navigate whole year-round along the North Sea route by 2100,” Communications Earth & Environment 5, 407 (2024), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-024-01557-7. as global temperatures continue to rise – is likely to solidify Russo-Chinese ties. The region has an estimated 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil30Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic resource appraisal; estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle: U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet,” USGS, 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf. and 30% of undiscovered natural gas. Most of the commercial traffic so far has been “LNG heading from Russian facilities to Japan and China31Alex Blair, “Will the Northern Sea Route become commercially viable in the near future,” Ship Technology, June 27, 2024, https://www.ship-technology.com/features/will-the-northern-sea-route-become-commercially-viable-in-the-near-future/?cf-view. in specialist vessels.”
Perhaps the biggest challenge for Russia pertaining to the Arctic is how to attract people to the forbidding region. Compared to the populations in other northern areas—Alaska, Greenland, and Scandinavia—Russia’s Arctic populations have declined. Russia’s Far East has also experienced depopulation32Paul Goble, “Population Flight Leaving Russia’s Far East Increasingly Less Russian,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21-103, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/population-flight-leaving-russias-far-east-increasingly-less-russian/.: The population there has fallen by almost a third since 1991. In addition, the Far East population is becoming less ethnically Russian, with growing number of migrants from Central Asia, North Korea, and China.
Global South
Russia’s relations with Global South countries are unlikely to ever match the intensity of current Russo-Chinese ties. Nevertheless—as evidenced by the Global South’s refusal to abide by Western sanctions against Russia—it is clear that Global South countries share with Moscow (and Beijing) a belief that the Western-centered international system is outmoded. Russian ties with India have increased through oil sales and growing diplomatic ties. Putin and Modi have met multiple times since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with Modi hugging the Russian president, and a visit is planned for Modi to host Putin in India33Reuters, “Putin accepts Modi’s invitation to visit India, Kremlin says,” Reuters, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-accepts-modis-invitation-visit-india-kremlin-says-2025-05-05/. despite Putin’s being designated as a war criminal by the International Criminal Court.34On March 17, 2023, the ICC designated Putin as a war criminal for the war crime of the “unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.” At his Kazan, Tatarstan, BRICS summit in October 2024, Putin helped reconcile the Indian and Chinese leaders, though Indo-Chinese ties remain fragile. The BRICS group, with its enlarged membership — plus an additional 29 countries that are applicants to become members or partners — has become the symbol of Putin’s effort to develop a Eurasia bloc centered around Russian, Chinese, and Indian cooperation. The BRICS, working in collaboration with other middle powers, seek to challenge the US-created multilateral system.
South Caucasus and Central Asia
Infrastructural and personal ties will continue to bind countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia to Russia, even in the face of Western pressures and competition from China. Russia’s railway connections with Kazakhstan, for example, are not only numerous, but they also create a crucial advantage: The two states share a railway gauge unique to former Soviet countries. Although a future generation of Central Asian and Caucasus leaders might want to counter their countries’ traditional dependence on Russia with stronger economic ties with China and the West, most understand that Russia will remain an important actor and influence on their futures. If the United States, led by Trump, and Russia, led by Putin, reach an agreement on ending the Ukraine War, this move might also include a tacit acknowledgement of the South Caucasus, as well as Central Asia, coming within Russia’s sphere of influence. Only if Russia’s war in Ukraine unravels to Moscow’s disadvantage and a peace agreement is not reached, would Russia have a limited capacity to project power in its near abroad. Even then, Moscow would most likely maintain strong economic ties with the region.
Three Potential Scenarios
Three different scenarios cover all the fundamental options for Russia in the next decade: (1) a “Sovietized” Russia characterized in part by boosts in defense spending over spending for education, health, R&D, and other areas in order to defend against a longer militarized border with NATO that could see additional U.S. forces under a post-Trump U.S president and/or a militarily stronger Europe, amounting to a new Cold War; (2) a Great Patriotic War against the West, with Russia binding itself to Beijing’s growing bipolar conflict with United States; or (3) a Reborn Russia that exploits the advantages of its Eurasian geography and focuses on its ties more broadly with the Global South, as well as China.
Clearly, the last option holds the most promise for Russia. What the authors of this study have labeled a “Reborn Russia” results in a GDP per capita growing a decade from now to nearly $10,000 (2017 dollars), higher than at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the other two scenarios, the repercussions from aligning with China against the United States, which could escalate into open conflict, would mean a Russia in 2035 at the same level of economic well-being as today. A “Sovietized Russia’s” long-term economic prospects would be less dire, but the economy would still be relatively stagnant over the next decade.
Across all three scenarios, Russia’s GDP at purchasing power parity per capita is forecast to remain higher than that of the original BRICs countries. However, only in a Russia Reborn scenario would the gap between Russia on the one hand and Brazil, China, and India on the other not narrow. In other words, the relative hierarchy of Global South countries in terms of economic well-being would be unlikely to change with a Russia Reborn. In the other two scenarios, Russia’s relative economic stature would be diminished.
In all three scenarios, Russia’s relationship with China would remain unbalanced even in the long run, owing to China’s continued military and economic growth, but some of this effect could be mitigated by the diversification of Russia’s geopolitical influence portfolio across the Global South.
In Central Asia, Russia is expected to sustain a hit to its influence in the wake of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in all scenarios. Nevertheless, despite China’s supposed desire to “fill a void35Carla Freeman, “China Looks to Fill a Void in Central Asia,” USIP, May 2025, https://www.fpi.sais.jhu.edu/articles/china-looks-to-fill-a-void-in-central-asia. ” in Central Asia, the infrastructural ties between Russia and Central Asia are substantial. Far more sizeable Chinese development projects would need to be completed than anything that has been or appears likely to be in the works today. Similar trajectories are expected in the Caucasus. Geography—both physical and human—may not be destiny, but it does place enormous constraints on possibilities for dramatic geopolitical change over short- and medium-term time horizons.
Ironically, a Sovietized Russia bodes least well for Russia’s Central Asian prospects in terms of geopolitical influence. This is because of the heavily economic nature of present-day geopolitical competition, an area where China possesses substantial advantages.
A Reborn Russia might be able to return the country’s geopolitical influence capacity to immediate post-Ukraine-invasion levels in the coming decades. Nonetheless, Russia’s influence is unlikely to return to pre-2022 levels on a global basis any sooner than mid-century. This is especially so for Russia’s influence capacity in Europe and the broader Global North, where it will take time to rebuild ties—and thus interdependence—even if Moscow desires to do so.
As measured by material dimensions of national power, Russia similarly is not projected to return to the early Cold-War era of Soviet glory. In absolute terms, Russia’s “net resources”—a measure of national power popularized by Michael Beckley (2018), consisting of GDP times GDP per capita—can be expected to increase by more than one-and-a-half times if the country brings to life a Reborn Russia scenario. A Sovietized Russia or one emerging from being aligned with China in a conflict with the United States would experience decreased national power in the global arena. Only a New Russia would mitigate or slightly reverse the persistent decline in Russian national power as a share of global power.
Notes
- 1Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. “Pardee Institute.” Last modified 2025. Accessed May 21, 2025. https://korbel.du.edu/pardee/.
- 2Laura Silver et al., “Favorable views of the U.S. and China”. Pew Research Center, November 6, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/11/06/comparing-views-of-the-us-and-china-in-24-countries/#:~:text=Favorable%20views%20of%20the%20U.S.%20and%20China&text=views%20of%20China-,Note:%20Countries%20are%20plotted%20by%20the%20difference%20in%20evaluations%20of,Q3a%20&%20b.&text=On%20balance%2C%20views%20of%20the,the%20U.S.%20and%20China%20favorably.
- 3Andrey Kortunov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Balance Sheet and the Road Ahead,” Russian Council, February 7, 2025, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-s-foreign-policy-balance-sheet-and-the-road-ahead/.
- 4Interfax. “Russia’s population could fall below 138.8 million by 2045 from 146.4 mln in early 2023 – Rosstat.” Published October 20, 2023. Accessed May 24, 2025. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/95698/.
- 5In the Soviet-Ukrainian War (1917-1921), the Bolshevik Red Army invaded and occupied the Ukrainian People’s Republic, a partially recognized state that had emerged from its own civil war. In this report, the authors refer to Russia’s February 2014 invasion of Ukraine, when Russia occupied and annexed Crimea, as the first Ukraine War.
- 6Jeffrey Frankel, “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions” (CID Working Paper No. 233, Harvard University, 2012), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/233.pdf.
- 7Kathryn Stoner, “Is Putin Vulnerable? One autocracy in Russia may lead to another,” The Washington Post, September 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/27/putin-ukraine-regime-survival-autocracy/.
- 8Even the Arab Spring “success story” of Tunisia, rated as “free” by Freedom House just five years ago, had backslid into a mixed semi-authoritarian regime as of 2024.
- 9Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Caught Between Reform and Revanche: Russia’s Struggle to Modernize,” Andrei Kolesnikov, 2016. https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Article_Kolesnikov2016_Eng.pdf.
- 10Renewable energy is energy made from renewable natural sources that are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed. In contrast, fossil fuels — coal, oil, and gas — are nonrenewable resources that take hundreds of millions of years to form.
- 11Pew Research Center, “Views of India Lean Positive Across 23 Countries,” Christine Huang, Moira Fagan and Sneha Gubbala, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/08/PG_2023.08.29_views-of-india_report.pdf.
- 12BBC, “Brics: What is the group and which countries have joined,” BBC, February 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-66525474.
- 13Maximilian Kotz, Anders Levermann and Leonie Wenz, “The economic commitment of climate change,” Nature 628, 51-557 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07219-0.
- 14Christine Lagarde and Vitor Gaspar, “Getting Real on Meeting Paris Climate Change Commitments”, International Monetary Fund, May 3, 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2019/05/03/blog-getting-real-on-meeting-paris-climate-change-commitments.
- 15International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2023,” IEA, Paris, October 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2023?wpappninja_v=pvzbeqxc9.
- 16International Energy Agency, “Renewables in Russia,” IEA, Paris, December 2003, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-in-russia.
- 17Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf.
- 18Dave Jones, “Progress since COP28 on transitioning away from fossil fuels,” Ember, November 20, 2024, https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/progress-since-cop28-on-transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels/.
- 19Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf.
- 20A carbon sink is a natural or artificial reservoir that absorbs more carbon (CO2) from the atmosphere than it releases. The ocean and forests are the world’s biggest carbon sinks. Soil can also absorb a significant amount of carbon.
- 21Nneamaka Ilechukwu and Sajal Lahiri, “Renewable-energy consumption and international trade,” Energy Reports 8, 10624-10629, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.08.209.
- 22Yury Melnikov, “Russia’s Renewable Energy: Prospects in an Era of Geopolitical Confrontation,” (Russia’s Global Energy Role—Working Paper No. 2, Energy Innovation Reform Project, June 2023), https://innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/EIRP-Report2-final-corrected.pdf.
- 23TASS, “SoftBank keeps plans to create Asian energy ring project involving Russia – top manager,” TASS, December 1, 2022, https://tass.com/economy/1544477.
- 24Anastasia Stognei et al., “How Russia is using nuclear power to win global influence,” Financial Times, June 20, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/7110fc18-5a31-4387-9f4c-0cc5753d050a.
- 25The Northern Sea Route is a maritime route in the Arctic Ocean connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
- 26Center for Strategic & International Studies, “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence,” Heather A. Conley, Matthew Melino and Jon B. Alterman, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.
- 27Avesta Afshari Mehr, “Strategic Alliance or Uneasy Tango for Russia and China in the Arctic,” The Moscow Times, February 11, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/11/strategic-alliance-or-uneasy-tango-for-russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-a87946.
- 28Atlantic Council, “Russia and China have been teaming up to reduce reliance on the dollar. Here’s how it’s going,” Maia Nikoladze and Mrugank Bhusari, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-and-china-have-been-teaming-up-to-reduce-reliance-on-the-dollar-heres-how-its-going/.
- 29Pengjun Zhao, Yunlin Li and Yu Zhang, “Ships are projected to navigate whole year-round along the North Sea route by 2100,” Communications Earth & Environment 5, 407 (2024), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-024-01557-7.
- 30Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic resource appraisal; estimates of undiscovered oil and gas north of the Arctic Circle: U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet,” USGS, 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.
- 31Alex Blair, “Will the Northern Sea Route become commercially viable in the near future,” Ship Technology, June 27, 2024, https://www.ship-technology.com/features/will-the-northern-sea-route-become-commercially-viable-in-the-near-future/?cf-view.
- 32Paul Goble, “Population Flight Leaving Russia’s Far East Increasingly Less Russian,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 21-103, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/population-flight-leaving-russias-far-east-increasingly-less-russian/.
- 33Reuters, “Putin accepts Modi’s invitation to visit India, Kremlin says,” Reuters, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-accepts-modis-invitation-visit-india-kremlin-says-2025-05-05/.
- 34On March 17, 2023, the ICC designated Putin as a war criminal for the war crime of the “unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.”
- 35Carla Freeman, “China Looks to Fill a Void in Central Asia,” USIP, May 2025, https://www.fpi.sais.jhu.edu/articles/china-looks-to-fill-a-void-in-central-asia.
