Trump’s decision to bomb three of Iran’s nuclear sites was probably the right call. Many will say that the United States risks a broad and disastrous war, but that is far from the most likely outcome. Instead, this was a targeted effort at a narrow goal, and it was likely the correct decision for two main reasons.
First, leaving Iran’s nuclear program half destroyed was the worst-case scenario for this conflict. I’ve followed Iran for more than 20 years, and in that time, Iran has taken every opportunity to move inexorably toward a nuclear weapon, even during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action era. It’s the logical thing to do—Iran sees it as the ultimate deterrent. And Iran is right; all it needs to do is look to North Korea or the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union for evidence. When Israel started this war, they knew destruction of the nuclear program had to be the end game; otherwise, they would be facing an Iranian sprint toward a weapon. Israel repeatedly said they had a plan to finish the fight themselves, but the United States joining with its heavier, capable weapons adds much longed-for certainty that the destruction would be extensive.
Second, Iran’s leaders are more cautious than their bellicose rhetoric would suggest. Their primary interest is survival, specifically the survival of the revolutionary regime. In the midst of the conflict, the military line of succession has worked well, and Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei short-circuited the normal process of choosing a successor supreme leader by naming three names, tossing aside the traditional semi-democratic process to ensure his regime outlives him.
If Tehran plays true to precedent, it will not engage in a huge retaliation against Washington. They will threaten and express determination to retaliate at a time of their choosing, perhaps with terrorist attacks against U.S. leaders, but their actions will tell a different story. In 1988, Iran did not retaliate when the USS Vincennes accidentally struck a passenger aircraft, misinterpreting it as a military plane and killing 290. Iran responded to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Libya giving up its nuclear program in 2003 by pausing their own nuclear program, entering negotiations in 2004. In 2024, when Israel effectively demolished Hezbollah as a military force, it did little to stick up for their favorite proxy. When faced with overwhelming force, Iran backs down and opts to live to fight another day. It will likely spend time figuring out what survives under the rubble of its nuclear program and come up with a new strategy to try to regain some of its shaky regional position.
So why was this probably the right call? This region of the world has repeatedly taken unexpected turns. Trump’s decision to bomb could also have unanticipated costs if any one of the following three low-probability scenarios turns out to be true.
First, it is possible the strikes didn’t work. These weapons are phenomenally powerful, but there was still some uncertainty about whether they could penetrate deep enough to destroy Fordow, which is buried deep under mountains intentionally to protect Iran’s most advanced centrifuges. Knowing for sure whether the six GBU-57s the United States dropped on Fordow actually demolished it will take time and will likely require Iran revealing its hand. They have come out and said that only tunnels were destroyed, which is almost certainly untrue and only invites further strikes. Isfahan and Natanz also took damage from a barrage of Tomahawks, but establishing what capabilities survived will take time.
Second, it is possible Iran will see this series of events as an existential threat despite U.S. claims it does not seek regime change, and it could decide to retaliate to the full extent of its missile range, against U.S. facilities in the region and even into some parts of Europe. That is unlikely—Iran knows it would invite massive retaliation, and the United States wins on that escalation ladder, handily. The Trump administration has been preparing for the possibility of these strikes, which has included some hardening of U.S. military facilities in the region. As we have seen in Israel, Iran can hurl a lot of metal into the sky, but usually only a small percentage of it hits.
Third, Iran could use its most powerful lever to retaliate against the global economy: oil. It exports 1–2 million barrels per day into world oil supplies, which it could summarily halt. A further step might be fulfilling its long-standing threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would also affect Gulf oil exports, further squeezing the world economy. But this would be a pyrrhic victory for Iran. Oil is its lifeblood. During the fighting with Israel, it has seemingly stepped up exports, not restrained them, even pre-positioning floating storage to ensure its customers in China suffer no interruptions. Any rebuilding post-conflict will require petrodollars. Without it, Iran cannot provide services to a restive population, and it cannot rebuild its proxy network. Its survival is far more dependent on keeping the oil flowing than on a nuclear program.
The United States should look, clear-eyed, at the results of this attack and prepare for these best- and worst-case scenarios. It’s a moment for intelligence officers to shine: A battle damage assessment should be very clear about what we can definitively know about the results of the strikes and what is uncertain. If the strikes did not work, someone will need to deliver that message clearly to the Oval Office.
A far harder intelligence problem is reading regime intentions. Tehran probably does not yet know what it wants to do to retaliate, and Iran’s leadership is not a monolith. Over the next few weeks, there will be a robust internal debate. Deciphering Iran’s options, the way that debate is moving, and its final decision is a truly difficult intelligence question.
To allow for this uncertainty, the Trump administration should act to mitigate the worst-case scenario and prepare to capitalize on the best case. If round one of strikes was less than effective, the United States should be prepared to do it again. The skies over Iran are still clear, thanks to Israeli strikes on air defense. A second round of strikes would be justified if it avoided the worst-case scenario of an Iranian breakout to a bomb.
Second, the administration should signal that the United States is not aiming for regime change, only to end the nuclear program. Khamenei’s primary interest is keeping revolutionary Iran alive. It is a system he has spent his whole life building and supporting, and he will put its survival above all else. If he believes it can survive, he is far more likely to decide not to invite further U.S. strikes with a massive retaliation. Further, regime change from outside is highly unlikely to work. Killing Khamenei and the leadership structure will result in a leadership turnover, but Iran is a robust state with an established line of succession. They are ready for this possibility. A change to the Iranian system must come from within, organically, through the determination of the Iranian people to ask for something better than the last 40 years of oppression.
Finally, Trump should open the door wide to negotiations. Iran understands its position. It should be willing to come to the table and ask for something as a face-saving measure, in return for on-the-ground inspections of the damage and continuing, verifiable evidence that their nuclear program is finished.
Israel has likely just about finished their target deck. Their efforts have been more successful than anticipated. It is time to consolidate our gains and lay the groundwork for a more peaceful, sustainable future, free of Iranian terrorist proxy networks backed by the continuing threat of a nuclear weapon.
Emily Harding is the director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
