No one expects a great deal of focus on Africa policy from the incoming Trump administration. But the Africa portfolio in 2025 will present ample opportunities to assert or decline U.S. leadership, to protect or endanger U.S. interests, and to align with or oppose African societies.
The peace and security agenda is particularly fraught. Instability in the Horn of Africa, headlined by Sudan’s ongoing conflict but also encompassing Somalia and Ethiopia, will join the Sahel’s expanding violent extremism to drive up urgent demands for humanitarian assistance and an increasingly desperate search for competent security partners as the limits of Russian assistance become clear. Meanwhile, the absence of effective diplomacy for conflict resolution will create new opportunities for states like Turkey and Qatar to expand their influence, and to compete with regional rivals. The latest breakdown in the Angolan-led talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda raises the possibility that the conflict in eastern Congo—which will continue to be costly in any scenario—could heat up with potential destabilizing spillovers.
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Any temptation to dismiss these issues as “African problems” of no interest to the United States will have to contend with their implications on freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a vital commercial corridor, and the strengthening of terrorist organizations aspiring to harm the United States. No change in Washington’s ideology can erase the importance of the Congo Basin to the world’s future, or the need for critical minerals to drive the next major economic transition.
China, Russia, Gulf states and others will continue to seek influence and access across the continent in pursuit of their own grand strategies, regardless of whether the United States is paying attention. Bolstering commercial diplomacy will be essential if the United States wishes to compete in the region, but the new team in Washington will confront an expiring trade preference regime and multiple partners in debt distress—all while the region’s labor force continues to grow at a pace far faster than employment opportunities.
The year 2025 will bring elections to Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Tanzania that could further erode support for democracy in the region and create new opportunities for powers looking to stoke dissatisfaction and scapegoat the West. Positive democratic developments in places like Zambia and Senegal will be threatened by the very limited fiscal space those governments have to deliver for their citizens.
An ever-more disinterested United States might not feel the consequences of neglect immediately—but it will undoubtedly experience them eventually. Any incoming Africa team would have their work cut out for them responding to threats, seizing opportunities—and convincing senior policymakers to carve out more space for the U.S.-Africa agenda.
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What’s at Stake for Africa in 2025
The incoming administration should think twice before ignoring the Africa portfolio.
December 20, 2024 4:18 pm (EST)
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- Blog posts represent the views of CFR fellows and staff and not those of CFR, which takes no institutional positions.
No one expects a great deal of focus on Africa policy from the incoming Trump administration. But the Africa portfolio in 2025 will present ample opportunities to assert or decline U.S. leadership, to protect or endanger U.S. interests, and to align with or oppose African societies.
The peace and security agenda is particularly fraught. Instability in the Horn of Africa, headlined by Sudan’s ongoing conflict but also encompassing Somalia and Ethiopia, will join the Sahel’s expanding violent extremism to drive up urgent demands for humanitarian assistance and an increasingly desperate search for competent security partners as the limits of Russian assistance become clear. Meanwhile, the absence of effective diplomacy for conflict resolution will create new opportunities for states like Turkey and Qatar to expand their influence, and to compete with regional rivals. The latest breakdown in the Angolan-led talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda raises the possibility that the conflict in eastern Congo—which will continue to be costly in any scenario—could heat up with potential destabilizing spillovers.
More on:
Any temptation to dismiss these issues as “African problems” of no interest to the United States will have to contend with their implications on freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a vital commercial corridor, and the strengthening of terrorist organizations aspiring to harm the United States. No change in Washington’s ideology can erase the importance of the Congo Basin to the world’s future, or the need for critical minerals to drive the next major economic transition.
China, Russia, Gulf states and others will continue to seek influence and access across the continent in pursuit of their own grand strategies, regardless of whether the United States is paying attention. Bolstering commercial diplomacy will be essential if the United States wishes to compete in the region, but the new team in Washington will confront an expiring trade preference regime and multiple partners in debt distress—all while the region’s labor force continues to grow at a pace far faster than employment opportunities.
The year 2025 will bring elections to Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and Tanzania that could further erode support for democracy in the region and create new opportunities for powers looking to stoke dissatisfaction and scapegoat the West. Positive democratic developments in places like Zambia and Senegal will be threatened by the very limited fiscal space those governments have to deliver for their citizens.
An ever-more disinterested United States might not feel the consequences of neglect immediately—but it will undoubtedly experience them eventually. Any incoming Africa team would have their work cut out for them responding to threats, seizing opportunities—and convincing senior policymakers to carve out more space for the U.S.-Africa agenda.
More on:
