Saudi Arabia has always been one of the world’s most traditional societies but has experienced seismic social change in recent years. The focus on domestic development – and on nation-building at home – is intended to position the Kingdom better for a post-oil future. But the more cautious regional approach that goes along with it may set up Saudi leadership for tensions with the incoming Trump administration.
In mid-November, just a few weeks after the U.S. elections, I traveled to Saudi Arabia on a fact-finding trip organized by the Council on Foreign Relations. My fellow participants on the trip – all term members of the Council with expertise in international politics, finance, and foreign policy – were keen to learn more about the significant changes taking place inside the Kingdom, and how Saudi leadership and its people view the country’s role during a turbulent period in the broader Middle East.
In Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam, we had the chance to speak with officials, businesspeople, and civil society organizations, and we got to see firsthand the extraordinary level of economic re-orientation happening in the country. But while hugely impressive, the visit also left me wondering about the extent to which the enormous social and economic changes prescribed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 plan can successfully be carried through, particularly when faced with economic headwinds and the potential foreign policy turmoil of a second Trump administration.
Here are four big takeaways from the trip:
Social and Economic Change
The level of change that has occurred in Saudi society is profound, even when compared to a period as recently as four or five years ago. In almost every way, a society that was traditional, highly religious, and notably segregated by gender has been transformed. Many forms of entertainment—cinemas, shows, and fashion exhibitions—have been legalized. Sports have come to the Kingdom, ranging from tournament golf to November’s WWE wrestling bout. Though many have criticized these reforms as mere window dressing for an autocratic state, it is nonetheless clear when talking to Saudis how much better and freer their life is on a daily basis, even if political freedoms remain as constricted as ever.
The social transformation, however, is perhaps the clearest success of the Crown Prince’s ambitious Vision 2030 plan, which seeks to situate the country favorably for a post-oil future. Economically, the picture is more mixed. Vision 2030 is undoubtedly ambitious, seeking to diversify some of the Kingdom’s sources of income away from oil in a variety of ways, from relatively traditional import substitution industrialization to diversifying the Kingdom’s investment income, along with significant domestic construction and infrastructure for tourism and services.
The scale of the building is stunning; to repurpose an old joke, one might think that the national bird of Saudi Arabia is the construction crane. Everywhere one looks is new construction, with ambitious plans to attract high-tech companies and tourists to the country. At the same time, for those who are familiar with the economic story of other petrostate attempts at diversification, there are also clear warning signs. The Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) is a major player in almost all projects, providing the capital for this transformation; whether these projects are sustainable without the PIF backing remains an untested proposition. Indeed, some of these projects are already being scaled back or at least slowed down as budgetary constraints begin to bite.
There are also concerns that the PIF may be beginning to crowd out domestic investment. This investment includes an extensive slate of state-backed megaprojects like Neom, a futuristic super-city being built from scratch, that contains “The Line,” a linear city composed of two buildings spanning hundreds of kilometers. Projects like these serve to drive up construction costs generally, making it more challenging for other local businesses. In short, it is possible that Vision 2030’s economic components end up looking rather more like an infusion of oil money into infrastructure development, and less like a transformative economic shift away from oil. It remains to be seen how the Kingdom’s attempts to compete with its smaller Gulf neighbors—for example, by requiring companies to place their regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia rather than Dubai—will fare.
In short, though the social change is real, and the recent economic activity significant, one is left to wonder whether the early successes of Vision 2030 can be sustained in coming years.
Nation-Building and the Politics of Memory
The economic and social components of Vision 2030 fit into a broader attempt by the state to build a new national image for Saudi Arabia, both at home and abroad. The country is well situated both geographically and economically to speak to both East and West in a newly multipolar era. A long-running partnership with the United States throughout the Cold War and growing trade ties with China – in addition to the country’s importance as one of the world’s largest oil exporters – grant it a unique position in world affairs, as does the country’s significance to Muslims as the birthplace of Islam.
In practice, however, Saudi attempts to put the country on the map look a lot like that of its neighbors in recent years: using oil wealth to bring in world-class sports tournaments, fashion shows and celebrities, high-class museums, and tourism. Though these steps undoubtedly improve life for elites inside the country (i.e., those who can afford the tickets), it is not clear whether it can differentiate Saudi Arabia from neighbors such as Qatar or the UAE, many of whom have been traveling down this path for a decade or more.
Perhaps more interesting is a parallel domestic focus on nation-building, which seeks to sculpt a new domestic state narrative, one that relies less on religious conceptions of the Kingdom, and more on the secular history of the Arabian tribes. A visit to one of the Kingdom’s new mega projects, Diriyah, makes clear the scope of this ambition. Diriyah was one of the centers of cultural and political life on the Arabian Peninsula during the 19th century before its destruction by Ottoman armies; today it is a UNESCO World Heritage Site that has been painstakingly reconstructed and developed for tourism. The history of the Al Saud monarchy and family is heavily laced throughout the historical exhibits, which minimize the role of religious authorities in the foundation of the Saudi state and attempt to link the current state to past Arabian polities. As with Diriyah, many of the other development projects in Vision 2030 are inextricably linked with this attempt to build a new, more modern Saudi national identity.
Regional Moderation is Mismatched with Trump
Saudi foreign policy has shifted in a more moderate direction in recent years. But it would be a mistake to attribute this shift entirely to domestic priorities; Saudi foreign policy began to shift after some of the Kingdom’s failures during the Arab Spring, which saw a decade of open contestation with many of its neighbors. These failures were compounded by the successful Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq in September 2019. This incident – during which about five percent of world oil production was temporarily taken offline – spooked Saudi leadership, and led them to seek a more conciliatory approach. Since 2019, the Kingdom has returned to a more classically Saudi approach—one that emphasizes dialogue and even buying off some of its adversaries, such as the Houthis in Yemen.
Certainly, this shift, and the regional stability such policies hope to foster, will support the Kingdom’s development-focused turn. But left unsaid – or perhaps implicit in descriptions of the Kingdom’s foreign policy as “maturing” – is that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s earliest forays into foreign policy were aggressive and often failed; the more modest recent approach is his attempt to change course. It is important to point this out because, even as Saudi foreign policy has returned to a more moderate place – one that offers more predictability and fewer concerns for U.S. policymakers – the last decade offers a reminder that this is not a political system with significant built-in accountability for leadership failures.
For Saudi leadership, Donald Trump’s return to the presidency will offer difficult trade-offs. The Kingdom has put significant effort in the last five years into rebuilding ties with Iran, Syria, and others. The more assertive, hardline Iran policy that Trump and some of his advisers may seek to bring back is simply not compatible with these changes. Many around the incoming president seem to assume that Saudi Arabia will wholeheartedly back a new maximum-pressure campaign on Tehran; they may be surprised to find that that is not true.
Nonetheless, the impression one gets from talking to Saudis generally is that they are happy to see Donald Trump return and prefer him to Biden. This is not necessarily because they favor his policies, but rather because they see Trump as a disruptor. No matter the issue—from Ukraine to Gaza—he offers the prospect of change, even if the direction of that change is not necessarily clear. If only Nixon could go to China, then perhaps only someone as unpredictable as Donald Trump could find a better Middle East policy; many in the region are willing to take that chance over an unsustainable status quo.
Between the U.S. and China
The primary point of policy contention between the United States and Saudi Arabia today is the question of normalization of relations with Israel and the associated security guarantees that the Biden administration is offering. Proponents of this deal in Washington have been keen to point to this security deal as helpful for regional stability and for positioning the US better for global competition with China. It’s likely, however, that the Gaza war will sink any prospects of a deal before the end of Biden’s term.
Indeed, though Saudi leadership remains relatively quiet on the subject, public opinion across the Middle East is enraged by the brutality of the Israeli war in Gaza – and by the obvious disconnect between how Western leaders appear to view this war and the war in Ukraine. In almost every conversation, there is palpable anger about American support for Israel’s war, and American hypocrisy in talking about a rules-based order. And though unstated, for governments across the Gulf, there is also a significant fear that Gaza could drive domestic radicalization as prior regional crises have done.
On a practical level, what this means is that Saudi leaders—though they have always insisted on the implementation of a two-state solution in exchange for normalization—are now more likely to insist that any such deal be concrete. Eighteen months ago, Saudi leadership might well have been willing to accept smaller political or less clear-cut “steps” towards a two-state solution as sufficient for normalization. The promise of progress might have been enough. Now—or at least as long as the memories of Gaza remain fresh—significantly more Israeli concessions would likely be required before Saudi leadership would be willing to risk the popular backlash of normalization.
For all of that, the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains clearly important to those inside the Kingdom; many of our interlocuters during our trip noted that Saudis are seeking stability in their relationship with the United States after a decade of turmoil. But the underlying reasons for the tumultuous relationship persist: the rise of China, and the shift in Saudi oil exports away from Western consumers towards Asian ones. Chinese companies, labor, and technology are contributing to much of the construction underway inside the Kingdom, and Chinese technology is everywhere, from consumer electronics to oil-prospecting drones.
Here again, the incoming Trump administration offers significant risks for Saudi Arabia: pressure to choose among the U.S., China, Russia, and Iran, and the potential for sanctions that could impact the Saudi economy and its ties with China. As one interlocutor memorably put it: “Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to be in the middle between the United States and China; we want to find common ground with the United States on China.” Translated, this suggests that Riyadh wants to have its cake and eat it too – maintaining a strong security relationship with the United States and an economic partnership with China.
From the point of view of the United States, however, being relegated to a one-dimensional role as a military security provider for the Gulf – while China reaps the economic benefits – is not a particularly compelling offer.
Saudi Arabia has always been one of the world’s most traditional societies but has experienced seismic social change in recent years. The focus on domestic development – and on nation-building at home – is intended to position the Kingdom better for a post-oil future. But the more cautious regional approach that goes along with it may set up Saudi leadership for tensions with the incoming Trump administration.
In mid-November, just a few weeks after the U.S. elections, I traveled to Saudi Arabia on a fact-finding trip organized by the Council on Foreign Relations. My fellow participants on the trip – all term members of the Council with expertise in international politics, finance, and foreign policy – were keen to learn more about the significant changes taking place inside the Kingdom, and how Saudi leadership and its people view the country’s role during a turbulent period in the broader Middle East.
In Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam, we had the chance to speak with officials, businesspeople, and civil society organizations, and we got to see firsthand the extraordinary level of economic re-orientation happening in the country. But while hugely impressive, the visit also left me wondering about the extent to which the enormous social and economic changes prescribed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 plan can successfully be carried through, particularly when faced with economic headwinds and the potential foreign policy turmoil of a second Trump administration.
Here are four big takeaways from the trip:
Social and Economic Change
The level of change that has occurred in Saudi society is profound, even when compared to a period as recently as four or five years ago. In almost every way, a society that was traditional, highly religious, and notably segregated by gender has been transformed. Many forms of entertainment—cinemas, shows, and fashion exhibitions—have been legalized. Sports have come to the Kingdom, ranging from tournament golf to November’s WWE wrestling bout. Though many have criticized these reforms as mere window dressing for an autocratic state, it is nonetheless clear when talking to Saudis how much better and freer their life is on a daily basis, even if political freedoms remain as constricted as ever.
The social transformation, however, is perhaps the clearest success of the Crown Prince’s ambitious Vision 2030 plan, which seeks to situate the country favorably for a post-oil future. Economically, the picture is more mixed. Vision 2030 is undoubtedly ambitious, seeking to diversify some of the Kingdom’s sources of income away from oil in a variety of ways, from relatively traditional import substitution industrialization to diversifying the Kingdom’s investment income, along with significant domestic construction and infrastructure for tourism and services.
The scale of the building is stunning; to repurpose an old joke, one might think that the national bird of Saudi Arabia is the construction crane. Everywhere one looks is new construction, with ambitious plans to attract high-tech companies and tourists to the country. At the same time, for those who are familiar with the economic story of other petrostate attempts at diversification, there are also clear warning signs. The Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) is a major player in almost all projects, providing the capital for this transformation; whether these projects are sustainable without the PIF backing remains an untested proposition. Indeed, some of these projects are already being scaled back or at least slowed down as budgetary constraints begin to bite.
There are also concerns that the PIF may be beginning to crowd out domestic investment. This investment includes an extensive slate of state-backed megaprojects like Neom, a futuristic super-city being built from scratch, that contains “The Line,” a linear city composed of two buildings spanning hundreds of kilometers. Projects like these serve to drive up construction costs generally, making it more challenging for other local businesses. In short, it is possible that Vision 2030’s economic components end up looking rather more like an infusion of oil money into infrastructure development, and less like a transformative economic shift away from oil. It remains to be seen how the Kingdom’s attempts to compete with its smaller Gulf neighbors—for example, by requiring companies to place their regional headquarters in Saudi Arabia rather than Dubai—will fare.
In short, though the social change is real, and the recent economic activity significant, one is left to wonder whether the early successes of Vision 2030 can be sustained in coming years.
Nation-Building and the Politics of Memory
The economic and social components of Vision 2030 fit into a broader attempt by the state to build a new national image for Saudi Arabia, both at home and abroad. The country is well situated both geographically and economically to speak to both East and West in a newly multipolar era. A long-running partnership with the United States throughout the Cold War and growing trade ties with China – in addition to the country’s importance as one of the world’s largest oil exporters – grant it a unique position in world affairs, as does the country’s significance to Muslims as the birthplace of Islam.
In practice, however, Saudi attempts to put the country on the map look a lot like that of its neighbors in recent years: using oil wealth to bring in world-class sports tournaments, fashion shows and celebrities, high-class museums, and tourism. Though these steps undoubtedly improve life for elites inside the country (i.e., those who can afford the tickets), it is not clear whether it can differentiate Saudi Arabia from neighbors such as Qatar or the UAE, many of whom have been traveling down this path for a decade or more.
Perhaps more interesting is a parallel domestic focus on nation-building, which seeks to sculpt a new domestic state narrative, one that relies less on religious conceptions of the Kingdom, and more on the secular history of the Arabian tribes. A visit to one of the Kingdom’s new mega projects, Diriyah, makes clear the scope of this ambition. Diriyah was one of the centers of cultural and political life on the Arabian Peninsula during the 19th century before its destruction by Ottoman armies; today it is a UNESCO World Heritage Site that has been painstakingly reconstructed and developed for tourism. The history of the Al Saud monarchy and family is heavily laced throughout the historical exhibits, which minimize the role of religious authorities in the foundation of the Saudi state and attempt to link the current state to past Arabian polities. As with Diriyah, many of the other development projects in Vision 2030 are inextricably linked with this attempt to build a new, more modern Saudi national identity.
Regional Moderation is Mismatched with Trump
Saudi foreign policy has shifted in a more moderate direction in recent years. But it would be a mistake to attribute this shift entirely to domestic priorities; Saudi foreign policy began to shift after some of the Kingdom’s failures during the Arab Spring, which saw a decade of open contestation with many of its neighbors. These failures were compounded by the successful Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq in September 2019. This incident – during which about five percent of world oil production was temporarily taken offline – spooked Saudi leadership, and led them to seek a more conciliatory approach. Since 2019, the Kingdom has returned to a more classically Saudi approach—one that emphasizes dialogue and even buying off some of its adversaries, such as the Houthis in Yemen.
Certainly, this shift, and the regional stability such policies hope to foster, will support the Kingdom’s development-focused turn. But left unsaid – or perhaps implicit in descriptions of the Kingdom’s foreign policy as “maturing” – is that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s earliest forays into foreign policy were aggressive and often failed; the more modest recent approach is his attempt to change course. It is important to point this out because, even as Saudi foreign policy has returned to a more moderate place – one that offers more predictability and fewer concerns for U.S. policymakers – the last decade offers a reminder that this is not a political system with significant built-in accountability for leadership failures.
For Saudi leadership, Donald Trump’s return to the presidency will offer difficult trade-offs. The Kingdom has put significant effort in the last five years into rebuilding ties with Iran, Syria, and others. The more assertive, hardline Iran policy that Trump and some of his advisers may seek to bring back is simply not compatible with these changes. Many around the incoming president seem to assume that Saudi Arabia will wholeheartedly back a new maximum-pressure campaign on Tehran; they may be surprised to find that that is not true.
Nonetheless, the impression one gets from talking to Saudis generally is that they are happy to see Donald Trump return and prefer him to Biden. This is not necessarily because they favor his policies, but rather because they see Trump as a disruptor. No matter the issue—from Ukraine to Gaza—he offers the prospect of change, even if the direction of that change is not necessarily clear. If only Nixon could go to China, then perhaps only someone as unpredictable as Donald Trump could find a better Middle East policy; many in the region are willing to take that chance over an unsustainable status quo.
Between the U.S. and China
The primary point of policy contention between the United States and Saudi Arabia today is the question of normalization of relations with Israel and the associated security guarantees that the Biden administration is offering. Proponents of this deal in Washington have been keen to point to this security deal as helpful for regional stability and for positioning the US better for global competition with China. It’s likely, however, that the Gaza war will sink any prospects of a deal before the end of Biden’s term.
Indeed, though Saudi leadership remains relatively quiet on the subject, public opinion across the Middle East is enraged by the brutality of the Israeli war in Gaza – and by the obvious disconnect between how Western leaders appear to view this war and the war in Ukraine. In almost every conversation, there is palpable anger about American support for Israel’s war, and American hypocrisy in talking about a rules-based order. And though unstated, for governments across the Gulf, there is also a significant fear that Gaza could drive domestic radicalization as prior regional crises have done.
On a practical level, what this means is that Saudi leaders—though they have always insisted on the implementation of a two-state solution in exchange for normalization—are now more likely to insist that any such deal be concrete. Eighteen months ago, Saudi leadership might well have been willing to accept smaller political or less clear-cut “steps” towards a two-state solution as sufficient for normalization. The promise of progress might have been enough. Now—or at least as long as the memories of Gaza remain fresh—significantly more Israeli concessions would likely be required before Saudi leadership would be willing to risk the popular backlash of normalization.
For all of that, the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains clearly important to those inside the Kingdom; many of our interlocuters during our trip noted that Saudis are seeking stability in their relationship with the United States after a decade of turmoil. But the underlying reasons for the tumultuous relationship persist: the rise of China, and the shift in Saudi oil exports away from Western consumers towards Asian ones. Chinese companies, labor, and technology are contributing to much of the construction underway inside the Kingdom, and Chinese technology is everywhere, from consumer electronics to oil-prospecting drones.
Here again, the incoming Trump administration offers significant risks for Saudi Arabia: pressure to choose among the U.S., China, Russia, and Iran, and the potential for sanctions that could impact the Saudi economy and its ties with China. As one interlocutor memorably put it: “Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to be in the middle between the United States and China; we want to find common ground with the United States on China.” Translated, this suggests that Riyadh wants to have its cake and eat it too – maintaining a strong security relationship with the United States and an economic partnership with China.
From the point of view of the United States, however, being relegated to a one-dimensional role as a military security provider for the Gulf – while China reaps the economic benefits – is not a particularly compelling offer.
