A poster of 36 militia “martyrs” provides useful data about how was killed by the U.S. at certain times and places.
On November 6, 2024, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) War Media released a claim of a Shahed-101 drone attack on “a military target in Jordan Valley”, in Israel. Instead of the more typical image shown alongside the drone of a very recognizable militia “martyr” (like Hassan Nasrallah or Hashem Safieddine), the drone was shown with a sheet of 36 faces, all of Iraqi “martyrs” claimed killed by the U.S. during the post-October 7 Gaza War. Listing these fighters and linking their deaths to specific incidents (if accurate) provides some interesting potential findings about the war effort of Iraqi groups in the last year.
Finding 1: No militia fighters were claimed killed by the first four of the ten U.S. strikes listed. This is a reminder that “starting slow”, the U.S. initially did non-lethal strikes aimed at buildings and arms caches (on October 27 and 30, and November 9 and 13, all in 2023). Deterrence became more effective when militia personnel began to drop in large numbers, including leaders. For a listing of Iraqi militia strikes and U.S. retaliatory actions, see our tracker.
Finding 2: The U.S. started killing PMF terrorist leaders on December 26, 2023. The Christmas Day strike that grievously wounded an American was met with an angry response on December 26, 2023, killing just one militiaman but an important one: Dera Ali al-Ameri, the commander of Kataib Hezbollah’s brigade 47 of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). By linking Dera to the PMF, the “martyr” statement underlines Iraqi government complicity in attacks on U.S. forces – i.e., that a senior PMF commander was selected by the U.S. for lethal targeting, due to his involvement in terrorist acts and membership of a terrorist organization.
Finding 3: Many militia “martyrs” are not associated here with specific terrorist organizations. The IRI only ascribes factional membership to half the dead men: eleven (30%) to KH and seven (19%) to Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN). Almost half of the named men are not tied to any faction, with the remaining one being a seemingly senior fighter (Alaa Abdal-Abadi of the PMF brigade 33 (Quwat Waad Allah, a Fadhila Party militia). This opens up many possibilities. Why would militia groups, who are proud of their martyrs, not claim them? It stands to reason that the remaining seventeen dead militiamen may be tied to PMF units that are not yet sanctioned by the U.S. or otherwise deliberately targeted. Nine of the unclaimed were killed during the U.S. strikes in Jurf as-Sakr on November 22, 2023, and the remaining eight were killed during the February 3, 2024 strikes in central and western Anbar, which included KH Jazira Operations Command / PMF Western Anbar Operations Command headquarters in locations like Akashat and Al-Qaim that draw on militiamen from numerous groups closely associated with KH such as Liwa al-Tafuf (PMF brigade 13), Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (PMF brigade 19), Harakat al-Abdal (PMF brigade 39), Saraya al-Jihad (PMF brigade 17), and the less capable Liwa al-Muntadher (brigade 7). One can now add PMF brigade 33 (Quwat Waad Allah) to this list.
Finding 4: Nujaba was not present in Anbar. If the listing is accurate, the only Nujaba deaths are the drone cell destroyed in Dibis, near Kirkuk, on December 3, 2023, and the Nujaba commander killed in Baghdad on January 4, 2024. This fits neatly with other datapoints that Nujaba is focused on U.S. targets in Kurdistan (from northern launchpoints) or in Syria (from Syrian launch areas). The apparent Nujaba cell leader killed at Dibis, Hussein Hadi al-Aqabi, appears to have had close ties to Abu Taqwa, the high-level Nujaba leader killed on on January 4, 2024 (Figure 1).
Finding 5: No Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) “martyrs” are shown. This might be an interesting pointer that KSS play a very small actual role in kinetics, and/or that all KSS actions and communications use the Saraya Awliya al-Dam brand, separate from the IRI brand.
