Iraqi militias were already powering down for weeks before the November 18 Israeli warning, after which attacks dropped off almost entirely.
On November 18, 2024, the Israeli minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Saar, sent a letter to the current rotating president of the UN Security Council expressing concern over increased attacks by Iran-backed militias in Iraq targeting Israel. In his letter, Saar held the Iraqi government responsible for those attacks and emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself if the Iraqi state was unwilling or unable to control armed groups launching drones and cruise missiles at Israel.
Militias greatly accelerate their reduction in attacks on Israel
Even before the Israeli communique, Iraq’s militias already appeared to have been reducing their attacks on Israel for weeks. The below chart (Graph 1) shows the two weekly drops from the high-point of 41 attacks on the week of October 29 to November 4, 2024. But after Israel’s November 18 letter, the decline in Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claims is dramatic. To put it another way; if the Iraqi militias were backing away from their anti-Israel attacks prior to November 18, they appear to be running away since November 18.
Increased faking by Iraqi militias?
In addition to reduced claims, remaining claims are losing their credibility. Very little close-up imagery is now being shown of drones since mid-November, which had allowed a degree of confidence because each claim was providing fresh imagery of a drone with unique features (markings, serial numbers, scratches, paintwork, configuration). Since mid-November, there is more apparent re-use of launch imagery (i.e., a single drone launch video’d from four angles, with two angles used to claim one attacks, and two other angles used for a separate fraudulent claim video of an attack that may not have actually happened).
Very weak statements by Iraqi militia leaders
Iraq’s militia leaders tried to respond boldly to the Israeli threat but their communiques seem to indicate weakness, not confidence.
Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS). On November 19, KSS commander Abbas al-Zaidi appeared on al-Rabiaa TV and stated: “We have the religious cover. First, we are the sons of Marjaia, not the sons of governments… If there is a threat by Israel in targeting Iraq, the response will be mighty and powerful… (Figure 1). KSS are the mouthiest muqawama group and always chasing headlines, so them moving first is not a surprise.
Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN). On November 20, Nujaba’s military assistant to the commander, Abdal Qadir al-Karbalai, reacted to Israeli’s ‘threats’ on his X account. His short post reads “To sticky Netanyahu: Know that your entity is weaker than a spider‘s web, and you are more despicable to threaten the Iraq of steadfastness and jihad. Our drones will keep frighten you and is no escape for you from them…” (Figure 2).
Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). AAH were mentioned in Israel’s letter to the UN Security Council – a disturbing outcome for a faction that has portrayed itself as non-kinetic for many years, albeit at some cost to its muqawama credibility. Responding on November 20 via its parliamentary bloc, al-Sadiqun, AAH issued a lengthy statement denying an Iraqi role in attacks on Israel, calling the Israeli letter a “blatant attempt to distort the image of Iraq and its popular mobilization” (Figure 3).
Kataib Hezbollah (KH). KH‘s reaction on November 20 probably reveals more about the state of mind of the Iraqi muqawama than any of the other communiques. KH published a rare interview with its Secretary-General, Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi (aka Abu Hussein), who commented: “Ultimately, the final decision rests with our brothers in Hezbollah, as they are more aware of their immediate and long-term interests.” In response to a question about the impact of these efforts on the so called ‘unity of the fronts’, he reiterated that the decision is with Hezbollah (Figure 4).
Badr. Named in the Israeli letter as one of the attacking Iraqi factions, Badr parliamentary bloc member and member of the Security and Defence Committee, Mahdi al-Amerli, told on al-Ghadeer TV on November 21 that: “Any violation of the Iraqi sovereignty by the Israeli Zionist entity will lead to cancelling the security agreement signed between Baghdad and Washington (Figure 5).
In our assessment, the range of responses – all flaccid – tell us a few things about intra-muqawama dynamics. First, the Iraqi muqawama are terrified, as they should be, of Israel turning its intelligence gaze upon them in the same way it has focused on Palestinian groups and Lebanese Hezbollah. Second, the Iraqi groups have been trying to power down for weeks, probably with Iran’s keen approval, and the fear of an Iran-backed ballistic missile strike out of Iraq did not manifest. This reduces the near-term likelihood of Israeli strikes in Iraq. Finally, KH remains the weightiest voice among the muqawama, and Abu Hussein is the one to speak at the most troubling moments – like his January 30 effort to forestall heavy U.S. retaliation after three Americans were killed, and his November 20 straight-talking that Lebanese Hezbollah could accept a ceasefire with Israeli if they saw fit, an implicit hint that Kataib Hezbollah would respect (and probably mirror) such a decision.
