30 years have passed since Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty on Oct. 26, 1994. But instead of celebrations — and apart from a few conferences held by Israeli research centers — this anniversary was largely marked by disappointment and even despair. Relations, it is claimed, are at an all-time low, although this has been said before, and the future prospects seem bleak, as the war in Gaza continues and peace between Israelis and Palestinians seems more distant than ever.
However, Israel-Jordan relations have proven resilient, even in the face of the current crisis, and the two countries continue to advance vital shared interests, albeit in a low-profile and more limited way. The strategic importance of Israel-Jordan ties, for both countries and the region as a whole, combined with past successes in reaching bilateral breakthroughs and rapprochement, give hope that relations can improve once more. The US, which played a key role in the development of Israel-Jordan relations, should prioritize them again and do what it can to help mend ties.
Hopeful days
Three decades ago, Israeli, Jordanian, and American leaders — full of optimism and hope — gathered in the Arava desert and spelled out a compelling vision for Israel, Jordan, and the broader region. It was a vision of peace, cooperation, security, and prosperity. Jordan’s King Hussein, Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and US President Bill Clinton all highlighted in their celebratory speeches how peace between Israel and Jordan would not only serve their national interests, but would also positively impact the daily lives of ordinary citizens. The warmth and friendship these leaders projected toward one another raised spirits, heightened expectations, and created a sense that it was a truly transformational and historic moment.
“This is our gift to our peoples and the generations to come, that will herald the change in the quality of life of people. […] It will be real, as we open our hearts and minds to each other,” stressed King Hussein. “Your Majesty, peace between states is peace between peoples. It is an expression of trust and esteem. I have learned to know and admire the quiet and the smiling power with which you guard your nation and the courage with which you lead your people,” said Prime Minister Rabin. “Peace does not spring full grown. It requires cultivation, it requires patience and care. […] I say to the people of Israel and Jordan, now you must make this peace real. […] Open your borders, open your hearts. Peace is more than an argument on paper, it is feeling, it is activity, it is devotion,” concluded President Clinton.
The breakthrough in Israel-Jordan relations did not come out of the blue. It was the outcome of decades of discreet bilateral ties that proved effective and gradually evolved, building trust, establishing personal relationships between leaders, and enabling the countries to pursue shared interests. But making these ties public and formal necessitated a broader change that went beyond bilateral relations. It was only after Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) recognized each other and launched the Israeli-Palestinian peace process with the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords that Jordan felt comfortable taking this step. It was a period in which other Arab and Muslim countries were opening to Israel, creating a positive and supportive regional context for Jordan’s move.
Positive momentum was quickly built following the signing of the 1994 peace treaty. Ideas for mega-projects, such as the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance, were envisioned and put on paper (although nearly all of them eventually fell by the wayside). The opening of new tourism options for Israelis (especially Petra) and new workplaces for Jordanians (following the opening of a factory by Israel’s Delta textile company) showcased the tangible benefits of ties. When King Hussein made his historic visit to Tel Aviv, in January 1996, the city was in an unprecedented celebratory mood, mixed with early mourning for Rabin — Hussein’s partner and friend — who was assassinated just two months earlier.
And when hardships emerged, such as the tragic killing of Israeli school girls by a Jordanian soldier during a 1997 visit to the “Island of Peace” at Naharayim (which was transferred from Israel to Jordan in 1994), King Hussein expressed the utmost humanity and humility as he visited the bereaved Israeli families and apologized. In the eyes of Israelis, both Jordan and its king had a highly positive image, unlike prevailing attitudes toward other Arab leaders. This was further reinforced in October 1998, when a sick King Hussein travelled from the hospital to attend the Wye River summit between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO leader Yasser Arafat, to assist President Clinton’s efforts to reach an interim agreement between the two leaders.
A downturn in relations
However, by that point things were not all that rosy on the bilateral front. Rabin’s assassination in November 1995 and Netanyahu’s election victory in May 1996 dramatically shifted dynamics and led to a downturn in ties. Netanyahu campaigned against the Oslo Accords and was regarded in Jordan as abandoning the path of Israeli-Palestinian peace, which was vital for Israel-Jordan ties to flourish. Netanyahu’s initial actions also indicated a disregard for Jordan’s interests and sensitivities. Most significant was the opening of a controversial tunnel near Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem in October 1996, which sparked Israeli-Palestinian clashes and Jordanian condemnations; and the failed Israeli assassination attempt against Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal on Jordanian soil in 1997, which provoked deep Jordanian anger.
Jordan’s mistrust of Netanyahu has increased steadily since it first emerged in the 1990s. In 2015 it was reported that King Abdullah refused to speak with Netanyahu, after the Israeli prime minister made accusations against Jordan. Tensions peaked in 2017, when Netanyahu gave a warm public welcome to an Israeli security guard who shot and killed two Jordanians while foiling a stabbing incident at the Israeli embassy in Amman. The lack of communication between the Israeli and Jordanian leaders continued for years, with tensions further fueled by Netanyahu’s later — and unsuccessful — efforts in 2019-20 to annex Palestinian territories in the West Bank. It was Jordan that led the international diplomatic efforts against Netanyahu and his agenda at the time.
For Netanyahu and his allies on the Israeli right, the more Israel developed its relations with Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain — both before the Abraham Accords and even more so afterwards — the less important Jordan seemed. Israel could now engage and trade directly with the Gulf, bypassing Jordan altogether. Members of the Israeli right wing began to claim that Israel was giving Jordan more than it was getting in return. Such claims were coupled with the far-right argument that “Jordan is Palestine,” which was always a source of deep concern in Jordan. The message heard in Amman was that Israel had lost interest in peaceful relations. This came even as Israel’s diplomatic and security establishments, as well as moderate politicians, were making the opposite case, highlighting Jordan’s strategic importance for Israel.
The rise of far-right extremism in Israeli politics has heightened Jordan’s existential fears that Israel seeks to change the status quo in Jerusalem, annex the West Bank, and transfer Palestinians to Jordan. When Israel’s most right-wing government ever was established by Netanyahu in December 2022, giving unprecedented power to extremist ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, Jordan went on offense against Israeli actions. Jordanian officials spoke up against Israeli provocations around the al-Aqsa Mosque, settler violence in the West Bank, de facto annexation, military actions against Palestinians, and more. Amman’s criticism intensified significantly following the Oct. 7 Hamas terror attack — which Jordan did not publicly and clearly condemn — and during the war in Gaza that followed.
Ties continued to deteriorate, with Israel putting much of the blame on the harsh rhetoric used by Jordan’s foreign minister, Ayman Safadi. In the past, public messaging by Jordanian officials emphasized the importance — for Jordanians and Palestinians alike — of maintaining positive Israel-Jordan relations. Nowadays, official messaging is much more aligned with the negative attitude of the Jordanian public toward Israel, raising concerns that this might spiral and lead to instability, and even terror attacks.
Ingredients for improvement
For Israel-Jordan relations to recover and fulfil their potential, steps must be taken to make progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace. The linkage between the two issues, which was evident in the lead up to the signing of the peace treaty 30 years ago, is still true today. This is also well acknowledged by Israeli diplomats, whose perspective differs from Netanyahu’s narrative de-linking the improvement of Israel-Arab relations from the Palestinian issue. The lack of civilian cooperation and interaction between ordinary Israelis and Jordanians is a major failure; such interactions could serve as an unofficial buffer to prevent official ties from deteriorating. This dynamic can be changed but doing so requires positive and significant developments on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
At present, even maintaining the current level of ties is a challenge. Jordan’s decision to halt a trilateral water-for-electricity initiative with Israel and the UAE due to the war in Gaza exemplified this. Reaching a cease-fire in Gaza has become a necessity for preventing further deterioration in Israeli-Jordanian ties and enabling a turn for the positive. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that even during the war in Gaza, and despite public tensions, bilateral cooperation has continued. Israeli export of natural gas to Jordan was not interrupted, the water agreement between the countries was renewed, security coordination continued, Israel allowed Jordanian humanitarian aid into Gaza, and Jordan even took part in US-led efforts to block Iranian attacks on Israel.
“There are many fruits of peace out there, but it is all under the table. Those in Jordan who are supportive of peace with Israel do not dare to say it out loud anymore,” said a former Israeli ambassador at a recent panel on Israel-Jordan relations, reflecting that the reality of ties is better than what is commonly portrayed to the public. While politicians often use alarmist and fatalist language when speaking about Israel-Jordan relations, a nuanced and realistic approach, which acknowledges the difficulties they face but also their resilience and the benefits they bring, needs to be heard. It would allow for a more accurate perception of the true state of relations and convince the public that the Jordan-Israel peace treaty does not lack substance and should be maintained and fostered. In Jordan, public opinion is “extremely hostile” to Israeli policies and largely opposes any cooperation, while in Israel, a recent poll showed that 81 percent are somewhat or very supportive of maintaining and restoring ties with Jordan.
When seeking to improve ties, the Israel-Jordan rapprochement that took place between 2020 and 2022 should be kept in mind. It began in May 2020, when Netanyahu was still prime minister, following the appointment of former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi as foreign minister. From day one in office, Ashkenazi — a political moderate and a trusted figure in Jordan — highlighted the importance of improving ties with Jordan. During his tenure, until mid-2021, he held a series of three meetings with his counterpart Safadi, which improved the atmosphere, resumed dialogue, and paved the way for other government officials to advance ties.
When Netanyahu was ousted, in mid-2021, rapprochement picked up pace. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, his successor Yair Lapid, and newly elected Israeli President Isaac Herzog all visited Amman and met with King Abdullah. Agreements were reached on water and West Bank trade, coordination was improved, and progress in ties was purposely publicized to help improve attitudes. Although the Israeli government at the time was not making progress toward a two-state solution, a trusted, pragmatic, and well-intended Israeli leadership was enough to put ties back on track. This is an important lesson to keep in mind with an eye to any future leadership change in Israel. Ties are not doomed, even if Israeli-Palestinian peace is not yet achieved, and future-oriented messages emphasizing how relations could improve once Israel takes steps toward a two-state solution are important for the public to hear.
Until political change happens or Israeli-Palestinian peace talks resume, dialogue channels between Israelis and Jordanians should be fostered, including civil society-led track-two initiatives. Such dialogues often consist of veterans of previous peace negotiations, and should be made more diverse and inclusive. Regional organizations in which Israel and Jordan are both members, such as the Union for the Mediterranean and the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, could be used as platforms for constructive engagement between officials, and lessons can be learned from the gradual bilateral rapprochement processes that occurred in the region over the last few years. While Israel and Jordan have a long history of managing their relations bilaterally, they could now also benefit from increased US involvement and support. The new American administration should make this a foreign policy and national security priority.
Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Senior Fellow for Israeli Affairs at the Middle East Institute, President of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and Co-Founder of Diplomeds – The Council for Mediterranean Diplomacy.
Photo by Diana Walker/Getty Images
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.
Arab-Israel
