The presence of North Korean troops in Russia has introduced a wild card into the two-and-a-half-year conflict. Russia is desperate for additional manpower, and this is one element of Russia’s effort to fill the ranks without a second mobilization. The numbers make this more than a symbolic effort, but the troops will likely be in support roles and constitute less than 1 percent of Russia’s forces. However, the full extent and impact are unknown, and the effort could expand.
Q1: Why does Russia want North Korean troops involved in its war effort?
A1: Russia is desperate for manpower but wants to avoid a second mobilization, which would involve involuntarily calling up Russian citizens.
Russia’s manpower problems have been widely reported. Western assessments estimate that Russia has suffered about 610,000 casualties. U.S. officials estimate that Russia is recruiting 25,000–30,000 new soldiers a month, barely keeping pace with the reported daily casualty rate of 1,000—or 30,000 a month.
At the same time, Russia seeks to expand the size of its armed forces. For the third time since the full-scale invasion, Russian president Vladimir Putin issued a decree in September 2024 to expand the Russian army. Replacing casualties and expanding the force requires a lot of people.
This personnel shortage is normal in wartime and not unique to Russia. Ukraine, too, faces shortcomings in replacing casualties as the war grinds along in its third year. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Korea, the United States struggled to generate enough personnel. Russia has conscripts, but by law, they cannot serve outside of Russian territory. Although Putin has broad powers, this is one law he has been unwilling to break. He still faces public opinion, and the pressures to protect conscripts are formidable.
Russia conducted a partial mobilization in the fall of 2022 that called up 300,000 reservists. While chaotic and inefficient, the call eased the pressure on Russian forces during Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kherson and Kharkiv.
Putin has tried to avoid a second mobilization. Instead, Russia has pursued personnel strategies that minimize domestic political impact. Thus, it has offered large bonuses to recruits who volunteer, enlisted individual foreigners with promises of citizenship, recruited prisoners and others who do not meet normal standards, raised the maximum age for conscription and expanded the use of military contractors. Bringing in North Korean troops fits with this manpower strategy.
Q2: What is in this for North Korea?
A2: Another CSIS critical question discussed the diplomatic and political aspects of this activity, so there is no need to repeat that here. That piece also speculated that technology transfer might be involved. Money is likely a factor as well. Russia needs manpower and has money from its oil exports. North Korea has manpower but is desperate for foreign currency.
Russia is likely paying for all the deployment costs associated with the North Koreans as well as a stipend for the troops themselves. South Korean intelligence reportedly puts this at USD$2,000 per soldier per month. The average soldier deployed to Russia will see only a little of this money. The state benefits most.
This kind of arrangement between rich and poor combatants is not unusual. The United States paid many allied expenses during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also paid for the deployment of South Korean forces during the war in Vietnam.
Q3: Is this kind of deployment normal for North Korea?
A3: This deployment is historic for North Korea, which has previously sent advisory or specialist groups abroad but never a large ground force. During the Vietnam War, for example, it sent dozens of fighter pilots and military advisors to North Vietnam. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, North Korea sent about 20 specialists to operate Soviet missile systems, train pilots, and fly aircraft. A small specialist group deployed to Syria in support of Bashar Al-Assad’s government during the civil war, and these may have been joined by two North Korean militia units.
In contrast with its limited military overseas presence, North Korea has a large presence of civilian workers. Tens of thousands of North Korean civilians work overseas in Russian construction sites, Chinese factories and restaurants, and hospitals across Africa. This generates substantial foreign currency, most of which goes to the state.
Q4: How many North Korean troops are involved?
A4: The White House confirmed on October 23 that about 3,000 North Korean troops arrived in Russia between early and mid-October. South Korean officials assessed they were given Russian uniforms and IDs and are training to operate drones and other equipment. North Korea reportedly plans to send a total of four brigades, or between 10,000 and 12,000 troops, to Russia by December 2024 and may send additional units next year. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) cites a Russian intelligence report with similarly high numbers.
Many of these soldiers reportedly are part of XI Corps — or “Storm Corps”— a special forces army unit trained on infiltration, infrastructure sabotage, and assassinations. The corps may trace its history to the unit that carried out the 1968 Blue House raid that unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung-hee.
The South Korean Ministry of Defense puts North Korean special forces at 200,000 men, so North Korea retains most of its personnel even after the anticipated deployment.
Q5: How good are these troops?
A5: The effectiveness of the North Korean military as a whole is questionable. Although numerous and ideologically prepared, its equipment is mostly obsolescent, and readiness is poor because of fuel shortages. Troops are often diverted to help with the civilian economy. Defectors report that supplies to special operations forces are “not smooth” due to poor economic conditions Its conventional forces train for homeland defense and do not maintain capabilities for external deployment. Instead, North Korea has focused on nuclear weapons and missiles and, with these, has made itself a major regional presence.
ISW reports that the Russians are training North Koreans in bases mostly in eastern Russia. Nevertheless, if these are special operations forces, they will be much better prepared than the average North Korean unit. Further, based on what other militaries do, these deployed troops will be well trained and equipped because they have an immediate “real world” mission and not an “on call” mission. Typically, units planned for deployment undergo a special training program to prepare them and possess a full set of equipment, even if other units have to be stripped. In any case, the North Koreans will arrive trained and organized, not needing a long preparation.
Q6: What will these North Korean troops do?
A6: Neither Russia nor North Korea has announced what the role of these troops will be. Some have speculated that the troops might engage in deep reconnaissance and direct action for which they were trained (if, indeed, they are from North Korean special forces). However, having these troops fight on the front lines would be a risky strategy. It would make North Korea a direct combatant in the war, something that would be very difficult diplomatically. Further, there is the risk of desertions and prisoners. Both would embarrass North Korea because of what these troops might say. The high casualties are not likely to be a North Korean concern, given its control of state media.
Instead, the troops might perform support activities like transportation and maintenance. Russian logistics are notoriously bad, and additional personnel might help. Combat support roles like drone operations are possible. North Korean special operations forces might train Russian special forces and replacements. In whatever role, substituting North Koreans would free up Russian personnel for frontline service.
Q7: How much of a military impact will this North Korean deployment have?
A7: This is more than symbolism. These troops will help Russia’s war effort by providing needed military functions and easing manpower shortages. However, their presence at the U.S. reported levels will not be decisive. Russia has an estimated half million troops in Ukraine. Three thousand North Korean troops would constitute less than a 1 percent increase.
Q8: What should observers watch for?
A8: The two big questions are how many troops North Korea sends and what roles they take on. If the numbers are limited and roles confined to support and logistics, then this will be helpful for Russia but not decisive. However, if the roles change or the numbers expand significantly, as the South Koreans believe, then this could have a major effect on the course of the war. That will become clearer in the next few weeks.
Mark Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research assistant and program coordinator for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair at CSIS.
