Masoud Pezeshkian assumed office as Iran’s president during a period of crisis. The evening after his inauguration, Israel killed Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, who cheered on the Oct. 7 massacre in Israel, in a Tehran guesthouse. Whereas some Western media outlets hailed Pezeshkian’s arrival by dubbing him as a “liberalizer” whose administration foreign actors are trying to spoil, his choices for cabinet and executive positions reflect the limitations of the power of the presidency.
Nomination Trends
The individuals Pezeshkian nominated are mostly recycled members of the Islamic Republic’s political elite. His choices include fewer internationally sanctioned individuals than President Ebrahim Raisi’s cabinet ministers, perhaps because more pragmatic presidential administrations routinely put forward nominees who tend to hide the system’s abuses better than conservative presidencies. Several prospective ministerial officers have a history of service as deputies to ministers, ministries, and state entities that are under sanctions by the United States and Europe. This can be seen in the nominees for the ministries of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Defense, Information and Communications Technology, and Oil. Some are sanctioned themselves like industry minister-designate Mohammad Atabak, who was designated by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for having been a board member of Kaveh Pars Mining Industries Development Company, a holding company for the Mostazafan Foundation that has enriched regime insiders.
Additionally, Pezeshkian’s cabinet will not have the degree of educational pedigrees from Imam Sadegh University, a hardline ideological training ground for the regime, that Raisi’s administration did, which served as a de facto alumni club for the university. Some of Pezeshkian’s deputies are even Western educated. Nevertheless, the number of holdovers from Raisi’s administration that Pezeshkian decided to keep on, coupled with the violation of his own selection criteria, is already causing consternation among his supporters.
These new cabinet voices, while not decision-makers like Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are decision-shapers, especially those who hold membership on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Profiled below are the nominees for key positions.
Foreign Minister
Pezeshkian has decided to nominate Abbas Araghchi as foreign minister. Born in 1962, Araghchi, who speaks fluent English and holds a PhD from the University of Kent, has held a variety of posts in the foreign ministry, entering the service in 1989. A former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Javad Mansouri, once claimed that Araghchi was a member of the Quds Force. Although Iran’s foreign ministry has denied this claim, Araghchi has spoken fondly of his service in the IRGC, saying in 2013, “my heart remains with them, and I have carefully preserved the sacred uniforms from those days.”
Araghchi began his career as an expert in the Department for United Nations Affairs at Iran’s foreign ministry. Afterwards, he served a stint as head of the Islamic Republic’s Mission to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Saudi Arabia and as director-general of the foreign ministry’s internal think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS). He was later ambassador to Finland, the dean of the foreign ministry’s School of International Relations, deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, ambassador to Japan, deputy foreign minister for Asia-Pacific and Commonwealth Nations, foreign ministry spokesman, and most significantly, deputy foreign minister for political affairs.
Araghchi will have had more experience across the full spectrum of Iran’s foreign ministry than many of his predecessors. He also has the distinction of surviving and thriving in the ministry across the ideological spectrum of presidential administrations — from reformist to conservative — with the sole exception of the presidency of Ebrahim Raisi, during which he was relegated to the position of secretary of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations.
Some Western diplomats will view Araghchi’s reappearance on the diplomatic stage as a relief, given their familiarity with him as a longtime member and later chief of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team with whom they were able to produce acceptable outcomes. There are longstanding relationships between Araghchi and key European capitals, not to mention some current and former US officials.
Araghchi will differ in style, tactics, tone, and relationships from the current Acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani. Araghchi’s fluency in English stands in contrast to that of Bagheri Kani, who served as deputy to Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. Amir-Abdollahian, who spoke broken English, was not a central player in the nuclear negotiations compared to his predecessor Mohammad Javad Zarif. Likewise, Araghchi, having headed IPIS and worked closely with Zarif, is more practiced and polished than Raisi’s foreign policy team in cultivating sympathetic individuals and media outlets in Western capitals to promote the Islamic Republic’s narratives via information operations.
Pezeshkian and Araghchi will also likely favor more balance in Iran’s foreign relations compared with Raisi’s focus on “Looking East” — abiding by the motto of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ruhollah Khomeini: “Neither East, Nor West.” In this respect he may attempt to build more bridges to Europe to divide it from the US, especially if Donald Trump wins the presidency and aims to isolate Tehran. If Kamala Harris becomes president, Araghchi will lean into his experience dealing with foreign policy officials in the Democratic Party to secure sanctions relief. But he will be a loyal steward of the IRGC’s equities, recounting in a 2023 interview that “what kept the United States, the three European states as well as Russia and China at the negotiating table was not simply our diplomatic strength. It was also our missiles that did not allow anyone to attack our nuclear establishments.” After Pezeshkian announced his nomination, Araghchi began seeking to distance himself from his former boss Zarif, telling lawmakers he was not part of that “New York gang,” a reference to Zarif and his deputies who served at the Iranian Mission to the UN in Manhattan.
Yet in the end Araghchi is an implementer and messenger, not a decision-maker. As Zarif lamented in a leaked audio tape from 2021, he had “zero” influence over foreign policy decision-making. The supreme leader later made clear, “nowhere in the world the foreign ministry determines foreign policy. There are higher ranking officials that make the decisions and policies. Of course, the foreign ministry is also involved.” Although the foreign minister is technically a member of the SNSC, Araghchi will likely encounter similar limitations. For example, despite coming close to achieving a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2021 when he was the chief nuclear negotiator, higher-ups in Tehran never authorized him to close the deal as the presidential election in Iran neared. Times have changed, however, and Araghchi is now joining the chorus of Iranian officials who have been threatening to change their nuclear doctrine amid Israeli attacks.
Intelligence Minister
Pezeshkian decided to retain Esmail Khatib as intelligence minister. Khatib, who was originally tapped for the post by Raisi and had a similar career trajectory, served a stint as director of the judiciary’s Intelligence Protection Center, while Raisi spent most of his professional life rising through the ranks of the judiciary. Khatib was also head of security at the wealthy religious foundation Astan Quds Razavi, which Raisi led at one point, and has experience in both the IRGC’s intelligence unit and in the Ministry of Intelligence, for example as director of its Qom office.
Khatib will have less in common with Pezeshkian than he did with Raisi, as Pezeshkian has been ensconced in the medical sector, the health ministry, and the parliament for most of his professional life. This suggests that the supreme leader may have insisted Khatib stay on as intelligence minister, which would be consistent with his past behavior. In 2011, Khamenei blocked President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from ousting Heydar Moslehi as intelligence minister. Khatib is especially trusted by Khamenei as he once headed the Office of the Supreme Leader’s Protection Organization. Pezeshkian’s lack of experience in the security services and more pragmatic approach to governance likely increased Khamenei’s desire to retain a dependable operative like Khatib. It is telling that this is the first time since the Ministry of Intelligence was founded that a new president has kept a predecessor’s minister in the job.
Defense Minister
For defense minister, Pezeshkian tapped Aziz Nasirzadeh, a deputy chief of staff for Iran’s armed forces. Nasirzadeh was previously commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), the aviation branch of the Iranian army. He spent most of his career rising through the ranks of the IRIAF, beginning as a military attaché of the Islamic Republic to Italy and serving as deputy commander for intelligence in the air force and in other posts.
Nasirzadeh’s ascension as defense minister is consistent with that of his predecessor Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, who was elevated to the post after also serving as a deputy chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces. Ditto for Amir Hatami, who was a deputy on the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Like Hatami and Ashtiani, Nasirzadeh continues the trend of army officers, as opposed to IRGC commanders, leading the defense ministry since 2017.
But where Nasirzadeh differs is that, if confirmed, he will be the first Air Force officer to become defense minister since Javad Fakoori in 1980. Historically, those who have been defense minister who hail from the regular army as opposed to the IRGC were either Ground Force or Navy officers. Thus, Nasirzadeh’s rise may indicate the Iranian establishment’s priority to bolster the Air Force, especially at a time when Tehran has been attempting to secure Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and other materiel from Russia. Additionally, Nasirzadeh’s successor as commander of the IRIAF, Hamid Vahedi, has been sanctioned by the European Union and the United Kingdom for provision of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine. The EU cited his involvement in “decision-making concerning the Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program, UAV exports, and defense cooperation with the Russian Federation in this area.” Thus, Nasirzadeh may bring additional experience and concentration to this effort, especially when Tehran is trying to market its drones for export worldwide now that the arms restrictions defined by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 have expired.
Interior Minister
Pezeshkian tapped Eskandar Momeni as interior minister. Momeni is an IRGC officer who has spent much of his career in Iran’s uniformed police force, the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), including as its deputy commander. While some media accounts portray Momeni as a “moderate,” he served as deputy to commanders of Iran’s police who were sanctioned for abuses like Hossein Ashtari, who was designated by the US for “multiple cases of violence” during his tenure from 2015 to 2023. Momeni was also head of Iran’s traffic police, and he led police operations at one point. He is considered by some to be an ally of Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Iran’s police force as an institution has been sanctioned for human rights abuses by the US government since 2011, all while Momeni rose through the ranks.
In contrast with his predecessors as interior minister, many of whom were later sanctioned, Momeni will be the first interior minister of the Islamic Republic to have spent much of his career as a police officer. For example, his predecessor Ahmad Vahidi was previously defense minister and the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, who was interior minister under President Hassan Rouhani, served in parliament, held roles in the SNSC, and was head of the Supreme Audit Court.
However, while in theory Momeni will also assume the role of deputy or replacement commander-in-chief of the police upon his confirmation as interior minister, the commander of the national police, Ahmad-Reza Radan, who has a fearsome reputation as one of the most repressive forces in Iran, is an appointee of the supreme leader. In fact, Momeni was reportedly not Pezeshkian’s first choice as interior minister, with the nomination being forced upon him. As IranWire has noted, this has similarities to Rouhani nominating Rahmani Fazli as interior minister in 2013 as he was close to then Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani like Momeni is to Ghalibaf. This is especially important as Pezeshkian has been critical at times of the methods of enforcement of the regime’s hijab regulations. Thus, the power of Pezeshkian and Momeni, as with all presidents and interior ministers, will be limited here.
Atomic Energy Organization
Another key post is the vice president and head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Here, Pezeshkian allowed Mohammad Eslami to keep his position. Eslami gained cross-factional support as roads minister under Rouhani and as a Raisi appointee at the helm of the AEOI. However, he was sanctioned by the UN for weapons of mass destruction proliferation in 2008. There is evidence that Eslami also liaised with Pakistani proliferator Abdul Qadeer Khan in building a nuclear weapons program for Iran in the 1980s.
Throughout Eslami’s tenure in the Raisi administration, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had increasingly difficult interactions with the AEOI, which withdrew the designations of several experienced IAEA inspectors, stonewalled outstanding Safeguards Agreement probes, and implemented an unprecedented expansion of Iran’s nuclear program, including enrichment up to 60% purity. Eslami’s reappointment is likely to cause anguish for Western diplomats who were looking to make progress with Tehran as Pezeshkian ascended to the presidency following promises on the campaign trail to secure sanctions relief. In recent years, new presidents have been able to select new AEOI chiefs, except for Reza Amrollahi, who was in office from 1981 to 1997, and Gholamreza Aghazadeh, whose tenure spanned the administrations of Mohammad Khatami and Ahmadinejad. But this shows once again the constraints on Pezeshkian in appointments to sensitive positions like the heads of the intelligence ministry and the AEOI.
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council
Traditionally, Iranian presidents name secretaries of the SNSC who also serve as personal representatives of the supreme leader in the chamber. This remains an influential post. However, in the Islamic Republic’s recent history, some presidents have inherited secretaries named during the tenures of their predecessors. For example, Raisi was forced keep Ali Shamkhani as secretary, who took office under Rouhani despite repeated attempts to remove him. The supreme leader blocked these efforts while negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program were ongoing.
Finally, in May 2023, Raisi was able to name Ali Akbar Ahmadian as secretary after Khamenei relented. Ahmadian was previously deputy commander of the IRGC’s navy under Shamkhani before becoming commander of the force. He was known as being an architect of the Islamic Republic’s asymmetric defense doctrine. Later he became chief of the IRGC’s Joint Staff and head of its Strategic Center.
It is unclear as of this writing whether Pezeshkian will be ordered to keep Ahmadian in his position. After all, he has been in office for only a little over a year. If the supreme leader insists Ahmadian remain in his post, he will clash with Pezeshkian’s new team. Ahmadian once deemed negotiations with the US “Satan’s temptation” and said in 2007, “once we identify a threat, we must confront it through a protocol of hostility, rather than a protocol of dialogue.” This may cause tensions, given Pezeshkian’s campaign pledges to pursue sanctions relief.
With the news that Javad Zarif has resigned his post as vice president for strategic affairs only days after Pezeshkian appointed him, the new government already is facing not only a foreign relations but also a personnel crisis. Zarif hinted at constraints in appointments, and Iranian media reported he could not obtain the requisite security clearances. Some supporters of Pezeshkian have also expressed disappointment with his team. In the end, the new administration will be significantly handcuffed.
Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.
Photo by Majid Saeed via Getty Images
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